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1894, August 18, chap. 299 ......•..•..••..........••.... 221, 246, 305, 594 
1894, August 18, chap. 301. ..•.........•••••.•••••..•... 247,515,543,614 
1894, August 23, chap. 307 ............ _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 133 
1894, August 27, chap. 349 _ ....••. _ .. _ ..... _ ...........•.. 66, 74, 80, 109, 
112, 116,117,225,229,243,255, 260, 301, 377,474,501,541,592 
1894, December 15, chap. 7 ............................ _ • • . . . . . . 291 
1895, January 12, chap. 23 ....••..•••••• 119,137,175,181,370,405,423,427 
18951 February 8, chap. 64.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . 227 
1895, February 18, chap. 97 .........••.•...•.............•...•... 285,485 
1895, February 19, chap. 102 ..........................••.....•.. 227, 513 
1895, February 28, chap. 140 ....... _ . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • 407 
1895, March 2, chap.162 ..•. __ .. .... .... ...••. ...... .... •... .... 179 
1895, March 2, chap. 169...... . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 162, 168, 175, 189, 193, 230, 375 
1895, March 2, chap. 176 ••••••...•..............••••.•.....•... 223, 351 
1895, March 2, chap. 177 ........••....••..•.....•... " .••.....•. 154, 187 
1895, March 2, chap. 186 . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . • . . . . . • • • . 164 
1895, March 2, chap. 187 .......•..••....••............•••..... _ 154, 523 
1895, March 2, chap.189 ...•••.......•••... 205,218,247,261,286,331,350 
1895, March 2, chap. 191 . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . • • . . . • . • • . . . . . . • . . . • • • • . 314 
1896, February 27, chap'. 34 ...••. ••.. ..•••• •••••• •••••. ••.. .•.. 515 
1896, March 2, chap. 39 .... ..•.•. .... .••••• •..• .••••• .••••. .... 509. 
1896, April 25, cJ:iap.140. .•.• .••••• ...••. •.•. ••.• .... •••• ...... 372 
1896, May 28, chap. 252 . • . . . . • . . • . • • • • • • . • • • • . . . • . • . • • • • . . . . . . . 553 
1896, May 28, chap. 255 ••....•••..•••••••••..•••..••• _..... . . . . 413 
1896, June 3, chap. 314 ...••....•••...•......... 379,391,414,420,472,587 
1896, June 19, chap. 419._ •..................... __ . .••.•. .•• ••. .. 546 
1896, June 11, chap, 4-20...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423 
1897, February 4, chap.146 .......... ____ ..•. .... .... .... ..••.• 580 
1897, February 19, chap. 265 .......... _........................ 507 
1897, February 20, chap. 269 .... .. ,, , ..... _....... .. • . . . • . . . •• • . 514 
1897, March 3, chap. 387 ..... _.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . 545 
1897, June 4, chap. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551 
1897, July 24, chap.11 .•..................••.••..••••.••••.•••• 591,597 
REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES CITED OR 
REFERRED TO IN THIS VOLUME, 
Section. Page. Section. Page. 
60. ____ ... _... . . . • • . . . . • • . 356 1251 .. _... • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • 389 
161 .. _ • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 1345. . • • . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • . 32 
163 .... _ ......... _... . . . • . 363 1416 .. _. . . • • . . • • • • • . • • • • . . 329 
167....................... 363 1418-1420 ..•••............ 327,328 
169 ... __ ......... ___ ... __ . 306, 363 1443.... . . . • • • . . . . . . • . • . . . 103, 287 
178 ....................... 365 1467...................... 46 
189 ..................... _. 195 1483-1487 .......•••...••• _ 46 
192 _ ... _ ... ___ .. _ .••.. __ . . 178 1513 ...••..••.. __ . __ ..... _ 164 
194 .. _. _ .. ____ . _. _ .... _... 356 1514...... . . • . • • • . • . . . . . . . 164, 342 
201 . ____ .. _ . _ •. ____ . __ . _ _ _ 364 1516 • . . . . . • • • • . . • • • . . . • • . . 342 
249 .... _______ ..•••. __ . _. _ 571 154 7 . _ . . . . • • • . . . . . • • • • • . 46, 50, 441 
250 .. _____ . ____ ... _ . . • • • • . 296 1556 .• _ .. _ ... : ..••..•. _ . _ _ 287 
272 . _____ . _ . ___ ••••..... _ . 296 1624 ...••• _ . _ • _ . . • . • • • 328, 442, 505 
354 ... __ ...... _ ....... ___ . 175 1715 . . . . . . . . . • . . . • • • • . . . . . 572 
356 .•..... _ ... : . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 36, 1752 . . . • • . . . • • . . . . . . . . . • . . 57 4 
175,370,478,507,509,511,570 1753 .......••••...•....... 393,445 
357 .. _... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196, 198, 511 1754...... . . . • . . . . . . .. • . . . 393 
358, 361. .... __ . _ .. _ ..... _ . 176 1818 . - ...•.••....•....••. _ 224 
365 ........ _. _ .... _. _ ... _. 197 1841. - .• - - -....... - - ..••. _ 117, 292 
4. 76 ... __ .....• _ ....... __ .. 356 1956 .. - • . . . . . • . . . . • • • . 333, 3{6, 583 
483 ... ___ ...•.• _ .. _ ... _ . _ . 122 1958 . -- . . . . • . . . • • • . . . . . • . . 292 
4 7 ... _ . _ .. _ ... ____ .. _ _ _ _ _ 176 1963 .•....••••.•...••..• -• 177 
527 .. ___ .. __ •... _ _ _ 55, 163, 321, 373 2098 _. . • • . . . . • • . • • • • . . • • • . 132 
714 _ .. _______ . _ . _ •.. -- - • - • 450 2152 -• . • . • . • • . . . . . • • • . . . . • 72 
850 ..• - .. - - . - . . . . . . . . . . • . . 263 2165 . . . • . . . • • • • . . . • • • . • . . • 37 
934 ........ _.... . . . • . . . . . . 74, 233 2169......... •• • •• . • • . • • . . 37 
1047 -··· ·-···· ........ ·-·· 564 2174.... ••.• ..•••. •••• •... 412 
1049 ........ _. __ . . • . . . . . . . 4-51 2380. _.. . . • • • . • • • . • • . • • • . • 444 
1204 ......... _ . . . . • . . • • • • . 493 2502 . . • • . . . • . • • . . . . • . . . . . . 603 
1214 ............ ___ ... - . - . 493 26::i2 . . . • • • . . . • . . . . • • • . . . . . 203 
L15 ......... _ ..... - .. - . . . 493 2749 .. _ ... _... . • • • . . . • . • • . 552 
1223 ..... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506, 511 2750 ... _ ....•••... _... . . . . 552 
1226 ...............•. - . . . . 579 2751 .•.•. _ .. _ ..•••...... _. 552 
124.3-1260 ............ - . . . . 3 9 2752 . . . . . . • • • • • . • • • . . . . • . . 552 
1246 .. - - -... - . . . . . . . . . . . • . 390 2753 ••••..•••..•••••.•• _.. 287, 552 
12 .•••.... - ... - . - . . . • • . . 388 2766 . . . . . . • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 92, 94 
1249 ........ - .•.. - - . • . . . . . 388 2795-2797.... . . • • • . • • • • . . . 92, 94 
1250 . • • • • • . . • . . • • • • • . • • • • • 389 2853 .• _ . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . 573 
X 
REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES CITED. XI 
Section. Page. Section. Page. 
2854 ...•••... __ • . . . . . . . • . . 573 3469.... . . • . . . . . . . . 50, 265, 361, 495 
2855 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572 34 77 . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . 75 
2858 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 117, 292 3481...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 
2866 ............. _.. . . . • • . 572 3679 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244, 280 
2869 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .. 419 3683.... . .. . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • 178 
2~07.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 109 3709 ........... 57, 59, 137, 138, 162, 
2926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 181, 208, 304, 349, 546, 578, 596 
2928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • 121 3710...... . . . • . . . . . . • . . • . . 57, 181 
2931 . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . . 93, 251 3718.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57, 184 
2960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 3719. . . . . . . . • • . • . . . • . . . . . . 57 
2961-2962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 3721 . . . • . . . . . . . . . • • • . . . • . . 578 
2965...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 3722...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • 57 
2970...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 .3724.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
2971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 40, 117, 130 3732.... . . . . . . . . 1, 244, 288, 458, 496 
2972, '.:l973 ............. ~. . . 117 3733 . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 244, 288 
2977 . . . • . • . . . . . • . . • . . . . • . . 232 3735 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 
2981. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 40 37 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77 
2983.. . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . • . • • 4 76 3760.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 
2989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3780 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 
2990-2994...... ........••. 39 3802 ................ 9••-·· 423 
2998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 304 3836. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596 
3001. .......... ,.. .... .... 117 3894 ...... ······ ...... .... 4,171 . 
3001-3007. ...... ...... ...• 304 3915 .............. ···--· .. 119 
3003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . 40 3929 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 
3010...................... 345 3982-3984................. 398 
3011 . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 3985 . . . . • . . • • . . . . • • . . • • • . . 394 
3012½. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . 225 3990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 4:00 
3013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • 225, 252 3992... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 
3015...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 3993.... . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . 394 
3025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 36. 3995 . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
3038 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 257 4000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • • . 9 
3040 . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . 257 4026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 400 
3041.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 257 4041.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
3077 .... .... ...• .... ...... 72 4131 ...................... 166,413 
3078 .. -.. - ......... - ... - . . 117, 292 4136.... . . . . . . . . . • • • . . 143, 198, 200 
3102 .. - - ......... - . . . . . • . . 598 4219.... . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . 412 
3111, 3113...... . . . • . . . . . . . 92, 94 4228.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597 
3186 ........ ~. . • • • . . . . • • • . 264 4229.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603 
3208 . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . . 4 77 4230 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 603 
3229 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565 4232 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602 
3244 .........•••.. - . . . . . . . 23 4233 .... ~ ........ ~ . . . . 106, 228, 513 
3329 . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . 502 4234 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 
3330 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502 4309. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 190 
3371 .. - . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . 264 4310.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 
3413.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561 4312.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 191 
3415 . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . 564 4400. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
3433 ... - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 4412... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 
3461.... . . . . • . . . . . • • . . 117, 266, 292 4415 .. ~ .................. ~ 393 
XII REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES CITED. 
Section. 
4511 __ ... - - • - ...••••...... 
4512 .. _ ........... ---- ---· 
4513 ____ .... ··-··· ---- -··· 
4520 .... ····-· .... ···-·· .. 
4520-4523 ... - .... _ ....... . 
4522 ...... __ ......... ____ . 
4526 ........ ··-· ......... . 
4527 ......... - ........... . 
4529 .... ··-··· .......... · .. 
4561 ..................... . 
4 577 .... - .. - .. - .. - - ... - - - -
4579 ______ ···-·· ......... . 
4580 ............ ······ ... . 
4581 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
4582 ...... ·-- ·- .......... . 
4583 ..................... . 
4.5 4 .•••..... _ ........... . 
4.598 ...... - ......... -- ... . 
4600 ..................... . 
4609 .... ··--·· ··-··· ..... . 
Page. Section. Page. 
484 . 4692 ........•....... ------ 287 
484 4 724 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 408, 454 
485 4 741. ....... _. . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 
483 4 792-4 796 ....... _ . . . . . . . . . 193 
486 4843 . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 
484 4859-4868 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 
485 4884 .....•.. _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
485 4894 ....... ___ ....... __ . _ . 123 
485 4952 ... __ ........ _ . . . . . . . . 416 
26 4956 ..... - ......... _ . _ .. _. 160, 416 
27, 35 5286 .... _ .. __ ... - . _ ... _... 271 
27, 35 5289.-.. .... .... .... ...• .. 273 








5292 _. - ....... 101) 117,266,283,292 
5293 ..... - ... __ 90) 101) 147) 283) 292 
5294 .. - . -......... _ . . . . . . . 291 
5295. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 
5413 .......... --·· .... --·· 137 
5440 .................. - . . . 8, 400 
4612 ............. -.... ___ . 285, 484 
5503 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244, 288 
5601...... .. ... . ... . ... . .. 285 
OPINIONS OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL CITED OR REFERRED 
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XIII ........... 174 209 
XIII ........... 354 348 
XIII ........... 479 50 
XIII ........... 531 507 
XIII ........... 583 197 
XIV - - - ---- -- .. - 152 398 
XIV ----- ..... -- -- 367 202,220, 
507 
XIV .. - -- - .. - - -... 574 24,130 
XIV ----- ------ 577 596 
xv . ---... ----. 3 363 
xv ........................... 5 363 
xv ............ 6 364 
xv -.. -... ----. 226 471 
XV ............ 235, ?.40 1 
xv . - .. --- - - - -- - :&36 249 
xv ...... -----· 336 49 
xv -.. --.. ----. 402 143,199 
xv ............ 637 49 
xv·----- ...... 648,651 57 
XVI -.. -- - .... - --- 74 39 
XVI - - - - .. - - - -... 335 29 
XVI - -- - ...... ---. 617 266 
XVII - - ... - - .... --- 7 382 
XVII - -.......... - -- 137 29, 31 
XVII ..... -.... - - -..... 213 266 
XVII .. -.......... --- 448 324 
XVII -- .... - - .. -- .. 534 413" 
XVII ---- ------ 545 75 
XVII ---------- 579 24,130, 
502 
XVII -----. -- .. - 590 158,528 
XIII 






































IX ....... ..... 
IX ............ 
IX ............ 
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x ....... ······ 
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158 xx ............. 373 
50 xx ............. 383 
107 
210 xx ............. 420 
502 xx ............. 440 
24,130 xx ............. 465 
584 xx ............. 493 
259 xx ............. 526 
410 xx ....... ······ 534 
528 xx ............. 536 
135 xx ............. 539 
25 xx ............. 592 
197 xx ............. 593 
168,507 xx ....... ······ 599 
36,220 xx ............. 602 
142 XX ............. 609 
168 xx ............. 614 
584 xx ............. 618 
325 xx ............. 649 
220 xx ....... ······ 652 
135 xx ............. 655 
595 xx ............ . 660 
36,220, xx ...... ....... 691 
584 xx ............. 695 
186 xx ............. 697 
297 
491 xx ............. 698 
86 xx ....... ...... 699 
135 xx ............. 702 
507 xx ........ ~ .... 703 
512 xx . ............ 711 
144,199, 
595 xx.······ ...... 713 
202 xx ............. 714 
220 
291 ·xx ... .......... 715 
135 XX ............. 717 









































OPINIONS OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL CITED. XV 
Volume. I Volume. Page. 
I 
Page. 
Number. Page. Number. Page. 
721 339,352, 
I 162 322 xx.······ ...... XXI ....... _ ..... 
410,423 XXL. .......... 164 34.5 
xx ............. 723 174,202 XXI ............ 178 181,221, 
xx ....... ······ 724 220 531 
xx ............. 728 186,364 XXI ............ 179 225,406 
xx ............ . 729 168 XXI ... · ......... 180 256 
xx ............. 730 413 XXI ............ 183 221,225 
xx ............. 740 174 XXL ........... 188 221,225, 
xx ............. 748 314 531 
XXI ............ 4 314 XXL ........... 
221 225 
XXL ........... 6 370,509 XXL ........... 
224 251,320, 
403,419 
XXI ............ 23 130,502 XXI ............ 226 455 
XXL ........ ~ .. 33 58 XXL ........... 251 320,404, 
XXI ............ 37 582 419 
XXL ........... 51 266 XXL ........... 253 332 
XXI .........•.. 55 322 XXL ........... 262 404 
XXI ............ 75 448 XXI --....... - - .. -.. 289 335,550 
XXL ........... 80 377 XXI ............ 292 418 
XXI ............. 90 284 XXL ........... 320 419 
XXL ........... 92 404 XXL ........... 326 403 
XXI .•.•........ 94 365 XXL ........... 338 423,427 
XXI ............ 95 404 XXL ........... 340 365 
XXI ..•......... 101 284 XXI. ........... 345 419 
XXI ............ 102 284 XXL ........... 349 423 
XXI ............ 106 513,584 XXI ............ 355 363 
XXI ........ .... 109 159,570 XXL. .......... 369 509 
XXI ...•........ 110 229 XXI ............ 371 423 
XXI ..... . ...... 129 135 XXI ............ 391 422 
XXI .. _ .......... 133 509 XXI ............ 405 406,423 
XXL ........... 135 260 XXL. .......... 473 476 
XXI ............ 153 225 XXL ........... 509 570 
XXI ............ 154 523 XXI ............ 537 565 

INDEX TO SUBJECTS. 
Page. 
Abandonment of goods·-----· ______ -·-- __ __ ·----··--··· -- •••. 326,402 
Absence, leaves of. ____ ····-··-···- ______ ····-·---··· ___ 318, 338,353,427 
Acceptance of vessel subject to liemi .. __ ... __ ••. -•. - .. - ... - . - - 70 
Accounts . ___ ..••• _ .•••• _ •••. _ •• _ ..• ___ •.. ___ .. __ • __ . ____ . 296, 297, 323 
Actions. __________ ·····---······--··-····-···----·---··· 13, 18,447,478 
Advertisements for supplies ____ •••. ____ 59, 137,181,207,304,349,577,595 
of a lottery ..•..••• _ .. _ •••............• - -.. - . . 171 
monthly bulletin, Bureau American Republics. 514 
Agents • __ .•.• _ •• __ •••.••• _ .•.•• _ ..• _ .•... _... • • • • • • • • • • • • 255, 298, 361 
Agriculture. (See Department of Agriculture.) 
Alaska, tax on liquor dealers ..•••••••• - • • . • . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 
Alcohol, drawback .•...•••.••••..•..• __ • . • • • • . • • • . • • • • • . •• • •• • 501 
Alien, officers, etc., on vessels .••••..••••...••.••••.••••••.••• _. 166, 412 
immigration laws ....•.••• _ •••••••.• __ -· ••. _............ 6 
Altamonte Water Company .•••. ··-·-· ••••••.•••.••••. •.•-·.... 41 
American registry ....••.•.....• _. _. • • • • • • . . • • • . • . • • • • • • . • • • • • 143, 198 
American Republics, Bureau of ...•••.•.•.. ~._................. 514 
Animals, diseased ..• ___ .. _.. . • • . . • • • • • . • • • • . • • . . . • • • • • 167, 193, 229, 460 
Annapolis Naval Academy--·· •.••••.•••••.• -·····-· •••••. -··· 164,342 
Appointment of cadets .•••.•••••••• _ •••••••••••....••••••••• _. 164, 342 
to office . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 211, 289, 355, 507 
Appropriations ••.......••••••••••••.•••••.••••...•••...... 55, 84, 178, 
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officers ...••••.••••...••••.•• - . . 112, 130, 385, 408, 453, 491, 510, 579 
Arrest of soldier ...••..•.•••..•••••.•••••.••••••••.•••••.• ___ . 88 
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Bishop, Joshua, retirement . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • . • • • • • • • • • 103 
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"Calumet," revenue cutter.... . . . • • • .. .. . • • • • • • • • • • . . . . • • • • ••• 70 
California Debris Commission................................. 10, 62 
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Detroit, extension of postal service . . . . • • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 
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HON. RICHARD OLNEY, OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
APPOINTED MARCH 6, 1893. 
COMPENSATION OF INFORMERS. 
[The following opinion was inadvertently omitted from Volume XX:] 
The Secretary of the Navy is, impliedly, authorized to contract for their 
compensation with persons furnishing information of frauds prac-
ticed upon the Government in the supplying of equipment which was 
not according to contract. (Rev. Stat., sec. 3732, considered in con-
nection with 15 Opin. ; 235, 240.) 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 27, 1893. 
Sm: Your communication of November 17 asks my advice 
as to whether you have authority to contract for their com-
pensation with the persons offering you information of frauds 
upon your Department. 
The facts are, in short, that you have outstanding contracts 
for a large amount of equipment; that large deliveries have 
been made under these contracts, but that the deliveries 
have not been completed, so that the contracts are still alive; 
that you have received certain information from employes Of 
the contractor indicating frauds upon your inspectors by 
which articles have been accepted that are not completed 
according to the contract; that the information s~ far received 
has been proved correct and bas been the cause of precau. 
tions by which the Department will be protected in the 
future; that it has been given under the understanding 
that proper compensation should be made and that further 
information is promised, through which it is believed that 
the Government can be made .whole for an the losses it has 
suffered up to this time; but that to obtain this information 
it will be necessary to give the informants fair compensation, 
both for services done and services proposed. · The inform-
ants will be contented with a percentage upon the moneys to 
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be realized by the Government as a result of the information 
furnished. 
By section 3732 of the Revised Statutes, you are debarred 
from making any contract in the premises, "un]ess the same 
is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate 
to its fulfillment." The latest authoritative interpretation of 
this statute is contained in the opinion of .Attorney-General 
Devens on the "Fifteen per cent contracts," as follows: "In 
order that a contract should be authorized by law, it must 
appear either that express authority was given to make such 
contract, or that it was necessarily to be inferred from some 
duty imposed upon, or from some authority given to, the per-
son assuming the contract on behalf of the United States." 
(15 Opin., 235, 240.) 
If, therefore, you have authority to inake the proposed con-
tract, it must be by implication from the statutes authorizing 
you to make the aforesaid contracts for equipment. The 
question is a difficult one, but it is my opinion that you have 
the authority desired. The statutes contemplated necessa-
rily large expenditures on your part for inspection of articles 
offered before their acceptance. The proposed informants 
have seen things which the force you provided was inade-
quate to discover. It appe'trs that, owing to overconfidence 
in the honesty of the contractor, the outlay for inspection 
force has been inadequate, and these informants propose, on 
being compensated for the necessary loss involved to them-
selves, to put you in the same position as if they had been 
all the while under your employ as watchmen. The contracts 
being still uncompleted, and the matter, therefore, still 
within your jurisdiction, I think that you can make such 
arrangements in the premises as you may deem best for the 
interest of the United States, whether we regard the pro-
posed moneys to be paid in the nature of inspection for 
inspectors' wages, or for detective work. 
The contract should be made with some responsible person 
who will represent all the rest. i inclose a draft which may 
give sugge tions as to the form of contract desired. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.ARY OF THE N.AVY. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Import Duties-"Personsl Effects." 
IMPORT DUTIES-"PERSONAL EFFECTS." 
Whether persons crossing into Canada, buying clothes there, and imme-
diately returning with the clothes, can introduce them free- of duty as 
"personal effects" involves a question of fact. 
Persons crossing the line with no other purpose than to buy the clothes, 
and immediately returning, are not entitled to introduce them free of 
duty. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 2, 1894. 
Sm: Your communication of February 21 calls my atten-
tion to the practice of a certain Canadian tailor who comes 
across the line to North Troy, Vt., and other border villages 
with samples of cloth, soliciting orders for clothing; and you 
inform me that when the garments are ready they are deliv-
ered at a point just over the line in Canada, the purchasers 
crossing the line to get their clothes and returning wearing 
the clothes or carrying them in bundles. You ask substan-
tially a single question, namely, whether these clothes are 
entitled to free entry under paragraph 752 of the tariff act 
of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, as answering the following 
description: 
"Wearing apparel and other personal effects (not mer-
chandise) of persons arriving in the United States, but this 
exemption shall not be held to include articles not actually 
in use and necessary and appropriate for the use of such per-
sons for the purposes of their journey and present comfort or 
convenience, or which are intended for any other person or 
persons, or for sale." 
In my opinion, the nature of the transaction may be such 
that the buyers are not entitled to be classed as "persons 
arriving in the United States" within the meaning of this 
paragraph. That phrase can not be construed to include all 
persons crossing the Canadian line in a southerly direction, 
whether or not they may have crossed it in a northerly direc-
tion a few minutes previous with no purpose but that of 
bringing themselves within the letter of the paragraph 
quoted. Whether in any given case the clothes are or 
are not within the protection of this paragraph would be a 
question of fact. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
4 HON. RICHARD OLNEY. 
Unmailable 1'1attor-Lottery. 
UNMAILABLE MATTER-LOTTERY. 
The business of a certain company considered and determined to be in 
the nature of a lottery within the meaning of sections 389'1 and 4041 
of the Revised Statutes, as amended. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 4, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 19th 
ultimo, requesting my opinion upon the question of the right 
of the Tontine Savings .Association of Minneapolis, Minn., 
to use the United States mails in the carrying on of its 
business. 
I concur in the conclusion reached by the .Assistant .Attor-
ney-General for the Post-Office Department that the com• 
pany's business is in the nature of a lottery within the mean-
ing of sections 3894 and 4041 of the Revised Statutes of the 




N oTE.-The association above referred to issued bonds, 
in numerical order, to their patrons, by whfoh it agreed to 
pay to the holder of each bond, forty years after date, 
the sum of $1,500, unless the . bond was redeemed at an 
earlier date, according to the conditions on the back of the 
bond. .An initiation -fee of $15 ·was charged, all of which 
went to the expense fund. Monthly dues were $3, 12½ per 
cent of which was set apart to the expense fund, 50 per 
cent as a maturity fund, and 37¼ per cent as a reserve fund . 
.Attached to each bond were three coupons for $500 each, 
redeemable out of the maturity fund. The coupons on all 
the bonds were numbered from 1 up, in numerical order. 
Tbe coupons were redeemable out of the maturity fund in 
the order of 1, 3; 2, 6; 9; 4, 12; 5, 15; 18; 7, 21, etc . 
.Assistant .Attorney-General (of the Post-Office Depart-
ment) Thomas was of opinion that the plan of business of 
the Tontine Company was, in all essential particulars, simi-
lar to tliat of the Provident Bond and Investment Company, 
in ref r n e to which company an opinion will be found in 
20 Opinion , 74 .-W. II. P. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 5 
Chinese Merchant-Return to tl1e United States. 
CHINESE MERCHANT-RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES. 
Section 2 of act of November 3, 1893, chapter 14, amending the act 
approved May 5, 1892; chapter 60, construed; and held, that amember 
of a Chinese copartnership within the United States, whose name is 
not a part of the firm name, is not a "merchant" within the mean-
ing of the section. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 6, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 3d 
instant, in which my opinion is requested upon the question 
whether a member of a· Chinese copartnership, whose name 
does not form a part of the firm. name under which the 
copartnership business is carried on, can leave the United 
States and return thereto as a merchant, under section 2 
of the act approved November 3, 1893, amending the act 
approved May 5, 1892, entitled "An act to prohibit the com-
ing of Chinese persons into the United States." 
Section 2 of the act referred to defines a merchant in the 
following language: '' A merchant is- a person engaged in 
buying and selling merchandise, at a fixed place of business, 
which business is conducted in bis name, and who during 
the time he claims to be engaged as · a merchant, does not 
engage in the performance of any manual labor, except 
such as is necessary in the conduct of his business as such 
merchant." 
This requirement that a merchant must conduct the busi-
ness in his own name can have but one purpose, to wit, 
that he who is a merchant in fact shall also be known to be 
such by the parties with whom he deals and by the . public 
generally. That purpose could readily be defeated if it were 
permissible to conceal his identity by trading under an 
assumed name, or under the disguise of a" Co." 
I am therefore of the opinion that a Ohinese person does 
not bring him.self within the statutory definition of merchant 
unless he conducts his business either in his own name or in 
a firm name of which his own is a part. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF 1'HE TREASURY. 
6 HON. RICHARD OLNEY. 
Chinese-Atto rney-General. 
CHINESE. 
The requirements of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 220, should be strictly 
complied with uy Chinese applicants for admission to the country. 
DEP AR'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
.April 10, 1894. 
SIR: Your communication of April 6 incloses certain 
papers presented by Lee Gong and Mark Yune, claiming to 
be merchants resident at Toronto, Canada, and naturalized 
British subjects, but Chinese by birth. These papers are 
presented *in support of applications for admission to this 
country. You ask my opinion whether they comply with the 
act of July 5, 1884 ( chap. 220, sec. 6). The requirements of 
that act, in my opinion, should be strictly complied with by 
applicants for admission. The papers submitted to me do not 
comply with all the requirements of the act of 1884. ]for 
instance, the passports offered as certificates do not, in either 
case, state either the nature, character, or estimated value of 
the business carried on by the applicant. The consular vise 
. supplies the nature aud character of the business, but not 
its estimated value. It is not sufficient, however, that nec-
essary information should be supplied by the vise alone. 
The statute requires the guaranty of the certificate as well 
as the vise upon each point. 
· Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Certain steamship companies disputed the validity of the Treasury 
Department's regulations, holding them liable under the immigration 
act of March 3, 1891, cbapter 551, for the maintenance and transpor-
tation to the seaboard of certain alien immigrants who had reached 
the interior of the country. IIeld, that as there was no way of 
enforcing tlle statute against the steamship companies except through 
th~ court , the question is one arising in the Department of Justice, 
and tho official opinion of the Attorney-General can not be required 
th •r on. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 7 
Attorney -General. 
DEP .A.RTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE, 
April 12, 1894. 
Sm: I :µave the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of April 9, asking my opinion as to the law-
fulness of one of your recently promulgated rules relatil).g to 
the maintenance and deportation of alien immigrants. 
The immigration act of March 3, 1891 (chap. 551, sec. 11), 
provides for the return to his own country, within one year 
from his immigration, of any alien who shall have come into 
the United States in violation of law, or who shall have 
beeome a public charge from causes existing prior to his 
landing in the country; and further provides that such 
return shall be at the expense of the person or persons, ves-
sel, transportation company, or corporation bringing such 
alien into tbe United States. Section 10 of the same act pro-
vides for the immediate return of all aliens who may unlaw-
fully come to the United States. It provides, further, that 
the cost of their maintenance while on land, as well as 
expense of the return of such aliens, shall be borne by the 
owner or owners of the vessel on which such aliens came, 
and that refusal to return them or to pay the cost of their 
maintenance shall be a misdemeanor punishable by fine. 
On November 29, 1893, a circular was issued by the 8uper-
intendent of Immigration, approved by yourself, providing 
certain rules with relation to alien immigrants; these rules 
being promulgated under your general power to establisll 
regulations and rules and issue instructions not inconsistent 
with law for carrying out the provisions of the immigration 
laws of the United States. (Act of Aug. 3, 1882, chap. 376, 
sec. 3.) Rule 7 of this circular provides that the expense of 
the return of any alien under the provisions of section 11 of 
the act of 1891 shall be at the expense of the person or per-
sons; vessel, transportation company, or corporation bringing 
such alien; and it provides, further, that this expense shal1 
include all expenses incurred for maintenance and transpor-
tation on land after such cases are brought to the attentiou 
of the Bureau of Immigration. 
In other words, your Department construes the provision 
with regard to maintenance of aliens unlawfully landed as 
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applicable to the persons referred to in section 11 as well as 
those referred to fo section 10 of the act of 1891. You also 
construe the expense of the return of such aliens as includ-
ing the expense of their transportation to the seaboard from 
any interior point at whi.cli they may be apprehended. 
The question is now raised by the steamship companies, 
who refuse to pay the expenses of maintenance and trans-
portation to the seaboard in the case of aliens returned under 
the provisions of section 11. There are no means of enforc-
ing the statutory provisions against the steamship companies 
except through the courts. In other words, the companies 
not being under control of the Executive Departments of the 
Government, your rule is ineffective except as a declaration 
of the law as construed by your Department, and its enforce-
ment, if your construction is correct, is the duty of the 
Department of Justice. 
Your question is substantially whether if a civil suit or 
criminal prosecution is instituted under the provisions of 
section 10 for the purpose of compelling payment of the main-
tenance and inland transportation of the aliens described in 
section 11 success would result. For the reasons stated by 
me in the opinions of January 29 and February 10, 1894, upon 
the questions submitted by you relating to a proposed attach-
ment of goods at suit of the United States under the laws of 
the State of Maine, I think that your present question is not 
one arising in the administration of your Department within 
the meaning of section 356 of the Revised Statutes, and I 
therefore think that it would be improper for me to give an 
official opinion thereon. 
· Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 
MAILS-OBSTRUCTI•NG CARRIAGE-CONSPIRACY. 
Any interference with the carriage of the mail upon railroads in the 
usual and ordinary way i a criminal offense, and a combination of 
offenders may be prosecuted under I evise<l. Statutes, section 5440. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 9 
Mails-Obstructing Uarriage--Conspiracy. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 21, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of to-day relating to the stoppage of pas-
senger trains carrying the mails on the Great Northern 
Railroad. 
The statutes of the United States provide that "every 
railroad company carrying the mail shall carry on any train 
which may run over its route all mailable matter directed to 
be carried thereon, with the person in charge of the same." 
The statutes also make it an offense for any person to 
"kn_owingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of 
the mail." 
It has been decided by the courts, and, in my opinion, is 
clearly the law, that under these provisions of the statutes 
it is an offense for any person knowingly and willfully to 
obstruct or retard the passage of a train carrying the mail, 
and that it is no excuse that such person is willing that the 
mail car may be detached and run separately. He is bound 
to permit the mail to be carried in the usual and ordinary 
way, such as is contemplated by the act of Congress and 
directed by the Postmaster-General. 
It would seem from your statement that the persons who 
have entere~ into the combination to which you refer have 
brought themselves within the further provisions of the 
statutes of the United States which declare that "if two 
or more persons conspire to commit an offense against the 
United States, * * * and one or more of such parties 
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the 
parties to the conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not 
less than one thousand dollars and not more than ten thou-
sand dollars, and to imprisonment not more than two years." 
Respectfully, · 
L.A. WRENCE MAXWELL, JR., 
Acting Attorney-General. 
Tile SECRET.A.RY OF THE TRE.A.SUI{Y. 
10 HON. RICHARD OLNEY. 
Hydraulic Mining-California Debris Uommission. 
HYDRAULIC MINING-CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION. 
Section 19 of the act of March 1, 1893, chapter 183, creating the Com-
mission, construed, with reference to a case stated, and held, that the 
Commission bad power to take necessary steps to prevent injury, by 
hydraulic mining, to a navigable river within its jurisdiction, and 
that it might resort to the remedy of injunction, to be obtained on a 
bill in equity filed in the name of the United States, etc. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 24, 1894. 
SIR: Your letter of the 18th instant states that the Cali-
fornia Debris Commission, created by act of Congress (27 
Stat., 507) reports that the Volcano Gold Gravel Mining 
Company (a corporation) is mining by the hydraulic process 
in California, within the territory of the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, as defined by the act; that a portion of the 
"detritus" from this mining must reach the Sacramento 
River and do more or less injury to the navigability of this 
stream. That the company have not made application to 
mine, nor has it made the surrender referred to in section l _O 
of the act. 
On this state of fact you submit for my opinion the follow-
ing inquiries: 
"1. As to the application to this case of the last sentence 
of section 19 of the act creating the Commission." 
The sentence indicated is as follows: 
" Said Commission shall take necessary steps to enforce its 
orders in case of the failure, neglect, or refusal of such owner 
or owners, company, or corporation, or agents thereof, to 
comply therewith, or in the event of any person or persons, 
company, or corporation working by said process in said ter-
ritory contrary to law." 
Section 19 applies to those mine owners who have filed the 
petition provided for in section 9 and have surrendered to 
the United -States the right to regulate the working of the 
mine, as provided for in section 10. But it also extends to 
all who have not complied with sections 9 and 10, but who are 
"working by aid process in said territory contrary to law." 
Section 3 provides that-
"Hydraulic mining, as defined in section eight hereof, 
dir ·tly or indirectly injuring the navigability of said river 
TO THE SECRE'rARY OF WAR. 11 
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systems, carried on in said territory other than is permitted 
under the provisions of this act is hereby prohibited and 
declared itnlawf ul." 
So the Commission has the power to take such "necessary 
steps" as may be required to prevent or restrain those per-
sons who by the operations of hydraulic mining are injuring 
the navigability of the river in the defined territory. 
"2. Whether or not it is the duty of the Commission to 
give the company orders to cease hydraulic mining." 
While it may not be strictly the legal d~ty of the Commis-
sion to give such orders, it would seem to be, on all accounts, 
preferable that before resorting to the harsh and drastic 
remedies of the law the attention of the offending company 
should be called to the provisions of the statute and to the 
acts and conduct of the company which appear to be in vio-
lation of those provisions, to the end that the evil complained 
of may be voluntarily removed and the company admonished 
of the consequence of continued recusancy. 
"3 and 4. If the second question be answered in the 
affirmative, what course the Commission shall pursue to 
enforce such order. And what steps should be taken to 
enforce the provisions of the act." 
The obvious remedy would seem to be by injunction, to be 
obtained from one of the judges of the Federal courts in 
California, on a bill in equity, brought in the name of the 
United States by the district attorney. 
This appears to have proven efficient in the cases of The 
People of the State of California v. The Gold Ditch and M. Com-
pany (66 Cal., 138), on a state of facts nearly resembling that 
above stated; and in Willamette Iron Bridge Company v. 
Hatch (125 U. S., 1 ), where like principles were involved. 
Very respectfully, 
RICH.ARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
12 HON. RICHARD OLNEY. 
Contract-Payment of' Installments-M.odif'ication. 
CONTRACT-PAYMENT OJ<, INSTALLMENTS-MODIFICATION. 
Contract for construction of battle ship Indiana, construed, and held, 
that it was not competent for the Secretary of the Navy, under the 
existing contract, to pay to the contractors any part of the last three 
installments of the price of the vessel or of reservations from previous 
payments, prior to the preliminary or conditional acceptance of the 
vessel; but that a supplemental contract might be entered into, modi-
fying the terms and provisions of the existing contract. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
.April 27, 1894. 
Sm: I have your letter of the 26th instant inclosing a copy 
of the contract for the construction of a seagoing coast-line 
battle ship No. 1, made the 19th November, 1890, between 
"The Wi1liam Cramp & Sous Ship and Engine Building 
Oo~pauy, a corporation," etc., party of the first part, and 
the United States, party of the second part. 
You state that the contractors notified the Navy Depart-
ment that the ship (Indiana) would be ready for her prelimi-
nary trial required by the tenth clause of the contract, on or 
about the 30th instant, "but in view of the report of a board 
of officers appointed to inspect the vessel, I am convinced 
that she is not in such condition as ·will permit of her trial 
at that time with due regard to t he interests of the Govern-
ment, and the trial will accordingly be postponed until a 
later date"; and you request an expression of my opinion 
as to whether "it is competent for me [you] under the provi-
sions of the contract for the constritetion of the Indiana to pay 
the contractors any part of the last three installments of the 
price of the vessel or of the reservations from the previous 
payments prior to her preliminary or conditional acceptance, 
provided," etc. 
The tenth clause of the contract provides "that when the 
vessel is completed and ready for delivery to the United 
States, as required by the drawings, plans, and specifica-
tions, she shall be imbjected to a trial trip, in the open sea, 
under conditions prescribed or approved by the Secretary 
of the Navy, to test the bull and fittings," etc. 
The eleventh clau e of the contract provides: '' If at and 
upon the trial trip before mentioned, the foregoing require-
TO ROBERT W. HUNTER, ESQ. . ]3 
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ments and conditions * * * shall be fulfilled * * * 
then and in such case the ·vessel shall be preliminarily 
accepted." 
The :fifth ·section of the nineteenth clause provides: "The 
payment of the last three installments shall not be made 
except as provided for jn the eleventll clause hereof." 
I am constrained to conclude, then, that it is not compe-
tent for you" under the provisions of the contract" to pay· 
to the contractors . any part of the last three installments 
of the price of the vessel or of the reservations from the 
previous payments prior to her preliminary or conditional 
acceptance. 
The contracting parties may, however, so modify such of 
the terms and provisions of their contract-as in their 
opinion operate injuriously to their interests-taking care 
in so doing that the rights of each as already secured are 
not impaired by such alteration. Draft of such supple-
mental contract is inclosed. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY. 
LAND P .A.TENT-SUIT TO REFORM-LACHES. 
Patents to Mexican land grants in California under the act of March 3, 
1851, chapter 41, were conclusive only as between the United States 
and the patentees. They did not affect the interests of third persons. 
The surveys confirmed by such patents do not preclude a legal investi-
gation and decision by the proper tribunals between conflicting 
claimants. 
Third persons claiming title to the land thus patented may bring a suit 
to declare a trust in said land. Such a suit may be brought without 
the aid of the Attorney-General, and in the State courts. The deci-
sion of a State court upon such a suit, unappealed from, binds the 
parties thereto, whether righteous or erroneous. 
When such third persons fail to sue until the period of the statute of 
limitations of the State has expired, they are barred by their laches 
from suing thereafter. That they had meanwhile been applying to 
Congress for reli._ef is immaterial. 
The Attorney-General should not institute for the benefit of private 
parties a suit to vacate or reform a United States land patent unless 
there is reasonable ground to believe that it will be sustained by the 
court; or, except for a wrong "which private litigation could not 
remedy." 
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DEP,A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 28, 1894. 
Sm: Your petition and argument on behalf of the Cop-
pinger claimants have received specially careful attention, 
both on account of the value of the property in question 
and because the decision upon your application will be a 
precedent upon many others. 
You represent persons now interested in the- California 
ranch called Canada de Raymundo~ which ranch was granted 
in Mexican times to one Coppinger. Your clients, or their 
predecessors in title, actually occupied the tePritory in dis-
pute, or some part thereof, from Mexican times down to their 
eviction under process of court about 1861. The disputed 
territory, while occupied and claimed by Coppinger and his 
family or grantees, was included in tlle patent for the neigh-
boring ranch known as Las Pulgas. You now apply to· me 
for a direction that the U. S. attorney for the northern dis-
trict of California file a bill in equity to reform the patent of 
the Las Pulgas ranch, so that it shall not cover this disputed 
territory. On the original merits the questions are the same 
discussed in the cases of Arguello v. United States (18 How., 
539, 543-544), Greer v. Mezes (24 How., 268, 275), and De 
Arguello v. Greer (26 Cal., 615). While the Las Pulgas 
patent was issued in 1857, no application seems to have been 
made on behalf of your clients or their predecessors in title 
to this Department or to the Department of the Interior 
until 1885. 
Both Las Pulgas and Uaiiada de Raymundo were well-
known Mexican ranches, both were submitted to the Board 
of Land Commissioners established under the act of March 
3, 1851, chapter 41, and the titles of both were confirmed by 
this Board and by the courts on appeal, the final confirmation 
of each having occurred in 1856. You claim that, by the 
orders and decrees of confirmation in each case, properly 
construed, the territory in que tion belonged to the Canada 
de Raymundo ranch; that its inclu ion in tbe patent for the 
Las Pulga ranch in 1857 was induced by fraud or gross mis-
take in the urvey, and amounted to an overruling of the 
de i ions of the Land Com mi ioners and of the courts; that 
the action of the Interior Department in confirming the sur-
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vey and issuing the patent did not bind the Coppingers, but 
that they were entitled to equitable relief in the premises. 
From examination of all the papers on file these c]aims 
appear to be well founded; and it would follow that, upon 
proper proceedings, promptly instituted, the Las Pulgas 
patent ought to have been reformed. The questions, how-
ever, remain to be decided, whether it ever has been the duty 
of the Attorney-General, or would have been proper for him~ 
to bring such a suit in the name of the United States; and, 
further, whether the lapse of time and subsequent litigations 
among the parties have affected your clients' rights. 
In Greer v. · JJf ezes, above cited, the Supreme Court held 
that your clients were not entitled to set up their rights in 
an action at common law. That action was ejectment brought 
against them by the owners of tbe Las Pulgas patent. After 
the decision, and in accordance therewith, the Coppingers 
were ejected from the premises in or about 1861. All were 
then of age except Manuela Coppinger, who canie of age 
about 1868. The statute of limitations in California, is five 
years. ( Gurtner v. United States, 149 U. S., 662, 676.) 
In January, 1862, immediately after your clients were 
ejected, they were joined as defendants in a biJI of peace in 
the State courts of California. The suit thus instituted was 
decided by the court of first instance in favor of the com-
plainants, the Las Pulgas people, and this decision, on 
appeal, was affirmed by the supreme court of the State. 
(De Arguello v. Greer, supra.) The decree in this suit 
quieted the title and enjoined your clients from ever setting 
up further claim to the land. You insist that the State 
court had no jurisdiction, and that Federal questions were 
involved and treaty rights affected. Assuming this to be 
true, and assuming the decree and affirmance thereof to 
have been erroneous, nevertheless the appeal taken to the 
U. S. Supreme Court was allowed to be dismissed for 
informality about 1871, and no further attempt was made by 
your clients to maintain their rights in court. The State 
court, however, had, in my opinion, full jurisdiction of the 
controversy and power to settle every question involved. 
( California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S., 389.) By the 
express terms of the act of 1851, and of the Louisiana act 
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of 1831 therein referred to, the Las Pulgas patent was con. 
elusive between the United States and the Las Pulgas claim-
ants only, and did not affect the interest of third persons, 
and the survey thereunder was not in anywise to be consid-
ered as precluding a legal in_vestigation and decision by the 
proper tribunals between conflicting claimants, but only to 
operate as a relinquishment on the part of the United States 
of all title to the land in question. The remedy of third 
parties is by the familiar suit to declare a trust in the lands 
obtained by the patentee. Such a suit may be brought 
without the aid of the Attorney-General, and in the State 
courts, under a long line of authorities. (Johnson v. Towsley, 
13 Wall., 72; Gibson v. Chouteau, id., 99, 102; O'Brien v. 
Perry, 1 Black, 139; Widdicombe v. Childers, 124 U. S., 400; 
Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U. S., 456; California Powder Works 
v. Davis, supra.) The State courts having jurisdiction all 
parties were bound by their decisions, whether righteous or 
erroneous. 
But had there-been no litigation at all in the premises, 
your clients would have been barred by their laches in not 
instituting proper legal proceedings. ( Gurtner v. United 
States, 149 U.S., 662.) The fact that they knocked at the 
wrong door by vain applications to Congressional favor does 
not relieve them. Nor are they entitled to special consider-
ation in ~his regard, for their true remedy was pointed out 
by Judge Hoffman in 1857 and by Land Commissioner 
Edmunds in 1863. 
In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, the duty 
of the Attorney-General is not, I think, doubtful. The suit 
I am asked to initiate ought not to be brought unless there 
is reasonable ground to believe that it will be sustained by 
the court. But, after careful deliberation, and with the 
strongest desire that the applicants shall have every oppor-
tup.ity to secure justice, I am unable to see that such reason-
able ground does exist. Without taking into account other 
formidable difficulties, the applicants must, in my judgment, 
be defeated on either of three distinct grounds: First, that 
the tt rn y-General ha no proper right to sue except for a -
wrong "which private litigation could not remedy" ( Gurtner 
v. United States, 149 U.S., 662,672); second, that, with clear 
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and ample remedies in their hands, your clients have been 
guilty of gross laches in resorting to them, and are barred.by 
the statute of limitations; third, that they have had their 
day in court and have tried their claim in a suit directly 
betw.een themselves and those in possession of the lands 
before a court having full jurisdiction of the controversy. 
Under such circumstances it would be highly improper, I 
think, for the Attorney-General to lend the name and sanc-
tion of the United States to the proposed litigation. The 
consequences would be far-reaching, and would not merely 
affect the parties to this proposed suit. A precedent would 
be established to the. effect that the Attorney-General must 
sue and call in question long-established land titles, and 
involve those interested in all the expense and hardship of 
years of controversy, whenever applied to in good faith, and 
even though, in his own judgment, the claim to be prose-
cuted was wholly destitute of legal foundation. My concep-
tion of the duty of the Attorney-General in such a case is 
different. When he sues for and in the name of the United 
States, he in effect represents that in bis judgment the suit 
has legal merits deserving to be brought before the courts 
for their adjudication. It is true that in refusing to accede 
to an application to bring suit the Attorney-General may 
settle the rights of the claimants adversely and absolutely. 
In that view he of course assumes a grave responsibility. 
But just that responsibility is legally and rightfully devolved 
upon him. And the true result is not that he is to shirk it 
by bringing suit as matter of course every time be is asked 
to do so, but that each case is to receive careful and deliber-
ate investigation, and suit be authorized only if a reasonable 
probability of its success is disclosed. 
Your application for an order directing the U. S. attorney 
for the district of California to bring suit to reform the 
patent of the Las Pulgas ranch is therefore denied. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
ROBERT W. HUNTER, Esq., 
Attorney at Law, City. 
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CHINESE-DETENTION PENDING DEPORTATION. 
Under act of May 5, 1892 ( chap. 60, see. 7), the Secretary of the Treasury 
may authorize the landing at a port in this country of Chinese 
sentenced to deportation and their detention at said port until the 
vessel returns and is ready to proceed on her return voyage. 
DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
May 4, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 2d 
instant, accompanied by certain inclosures which, as re-
quested, I herewith return. 
The question put to me is, as I understand, whether Chi-
nese sentenced to deportation may be landed at Port Towns-
end on the voyage to Victoria and there be temporarily 
detained in the custody of the collector of customs until the 
return of the vessel from Victoria to Port Townsend, when 
they will be put on board the vessel and taken thence 
directly to Yokohama. Such an arrangement seems to me 
entirely competent under that provision of the act of May 
5, 1892, by which the Secretary of the Treasury is directed 
to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for 
the efficient execution of the act. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
LIEN LAWS-PROPERTY OF UNI'fED STATES-CONTRACTORS. 
Assuming that the title to the land on which a dry dock is bnilt, and the 
exclusive jurisdiction over it, are in the United States, the mechanic's 
lien laws of South Carolina do not operate thereon, and claims under 
such laws may be ignored in settlements with contractors. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
May ll, 1894. 
Sm: I have your letter of the 8th instant in closing a copy 
of the contract between J ustiu McCarthy and the Chief of the 
Bureau of Yards and Docks for the construction of a timber 
dry do ·k at the coaling Rtation, Port Royal, S. C., together 
with a certificate l>y the clerk of the court of Beaufort 
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County, S. C., that two liens have been filed in bis office for 
labor and supplies furnished in the construction of the dry 
dock. On the case stated in your letter you ask my opinion 
as to- · . 
"Whether, by the insertion in the contract of said stipu-
latjon, that payment shall not be made if there be any lien 
upon the dock other than that of the United States, the 
exemption of Government property from the operation of the 
mechanics' lien laws was waived so as to give legal effect to 
the lieus of the kind described in the accompanying papers." 
Generally, on grounds of public policy, the mechanic's lien 
laws do not, in the absence of express provisions, apply to 
public buildings erected by States for public uses. 
And, further, the United States does not suffe'r itself to be 
sued without its consent; and a proceeding against it, or its 
property, for the enforcement of a mechanic's lien would be 
a suit against it such as it does not allow. 
Again, public property can be subjected to claims against 
it only when it is in the possession of the courts by the act 
of the Government seeking to have its rights established. 
(The Siren, 7 Wall., 152; Garr v. United States, 98 U. S., 
432.) 
But assuming that the title to the land on which the dock 
is built, and the exclusive jurisdiction over it, are in the 
United States, then the mechanic's lien laws of South Caro-
lina have no application to it. These laws are wholly the 
creature of statute, deriving their existence from positive 
enactment, by which alone is the lien· created and imposed 
on the ]and. Congress is the only legislature by which such 
a lien can be created and imposed upon land under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Because this 
land lies within the limits of South Carolina it is not subject 
to her laws, except there be in the act of her legislature, 
under which jurisdiction was ceded to the United States, a 
reservation of concurrent jurisdiction to the State. (Fort 
Leavenworth R. R. Go. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 532; Common-
wealth v. Clary, 8 Mass., 72; Foley v Shriver, 81 Va., 568; 
Crook, Horner & Go. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Go., 54 Fed. 
Rep., 604.) 
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The fifth paragraph of the twelfth section of the contract 
forbids any payment, under the contract, "without satisfac-
tory evidence, such as a county clerk's certificate, that there 
are no existing liens other t han that of the United States 
upon such work or material." 
From what has been already said, it follows that there are 
not and can not be any "mechanic's liens " on the dock for 
labor and supplies used in its construction, unless such liens 
attached before the property was acquired by the United 
States and built into or upon its land. In that case the 
principles stated and applied in Briggs v. A Light Boat (7 
Allen, 292), will control. Paragraph 5, section 12, applies to 
any hens that exist upon the work and materials, without 
regard to when such liens were created. I wish to say that 
as to mechanic's liens created since the construction of the 
dock under this contract was begun, there are none existing; 
and no bar is raised by anything that appears in your letter 
to the payment of the money to the contractor as the con-
tract provides. 
In reply to your further question, I beg to say that I think 
it is competent for the Department to make payment to the 
cont ractor of the amounts to which he is or may become 
entitled under the contract. 
While it is eminently desirable and proper that the Gov-
ernment should not aid or countenance it s general contract-
ors in withholding payment from those who have furnished 
labor and material for the construction of Government works, 
but should, where it may be practicable, require that they 
should be paid, yet the Government should not, in the 
absence of any legal liability upon it or up.on its property 
for the debts of its contractors, make voluntary payment of 
such debts, because such payments might not avail as credits 
in the :final settlement of accounts with the contractor. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
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Chinese Merchants-Return to the United States. 
CHINESE MERCHANTS-RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES. 
The third paragraph of section 2 of act of November 3, 1893, chapter 14, 
construed, and held, that its provisions are to be regarded as merely 
prospective in their operation and as applying exclusively to Chinese 
merchants who both come into the United States for the first time 
since November 3, 1893, and having carried on business here, after-
wards leave the country and seek to return. 
Merchants already here when the statute took effect may leave the 
country and return as if the act of November 3, 1893, had not been 
passed. 
DEP.ARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE, 
May 14, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 8th 
instant, asking my opinion upon the question whether Chi-
nese merchants, lawfully in the United States when the 
statute of November 3, 1893, took effect, are within the pro-
visions of the third paragraph of section 2 of that statute, 
which provides as follows: 
" Where an application is made by a Chinaman for 
entrance into the United States on the ground that he was 
formerly engaged in this country as a merchant, he shall 
establish by the ~estimony of two credible witnesses other 
than Chinese the fact that he conducted such business as 
hereinbefore defined for at least one year before his depar-
ture from the United States, and that during such year he 
was not engaged in the performance of any manual labor, 
except such as was necessary in the conduct of bis business 
as such merchant and in default of such proof shall be refused 
landing." 
This paragraph undoubtedly presents serious difficulties 
of construction. To interpret its language literally would 
be to make Congress declare a new class of Chinese persons 
admissible to the United States, to wit, persons who might 
not be merchants at the time of their application and might 
even be laborers, but who had been merchants in the United 
States at some former period. For obvious reasons it is not 
possible to impute any such purpose to Congress, or to 
believe it did not intend that all persons, when applying 
under said third paragraph, should be merchants then, and 
not merely at some previous time. That view being inevita-
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ble, the persons covered by the third paragraph are clearly 
persons who, having previously come into the United States 
and carried on business here as merchants and still being 
merchants, have temporarily left the county and are seeking 
to return. 
The question, however, still remains, whether this para-
graph applies to merchants who had come into the country 
and were doing business here before the passage of the act 
of November 3, 1893. The consequences of that construction 
are obvious. A Chinese merchant lawfully here and law-
fully doing business here before November 3, 1893, under 
some other name than his own, could not depart from the 
country for at least a year from that time, except under the 
penalty of not being able to return. Neither could he leave 
at any later period with the right of return, unless he had 
first carried on his business in this country for a year in his 
own name. But nothing in the law requires a Chinese mer-
chant who was here prior to November 3, 1893, to make any 
change in his mode of doing business-to conduct it, for 
instance, in his own name rather than in an assumed name. 
Nothing in the law in any way countenances the idea that 
such a Chinese merchant is meant to be hindered from tempo-
rarily leaving the country by the necessity of changing his 
established business methods. Yet so serious alterations of 
the status of persons rightfully in the United States when the 
act of November 3, 1893, took efl1ect are not to be brought 
about by mere implication, unless such implication be 
unavoidable, and certainly are not to be so brought about 
if they will be avoided by treating the statute as wholly pro-
spective in its operation. The ordinary presumption applica 
ble to every statute is to prevail in the case of the act of 
November 3, 1893, namely, that it lays down a rule of con-
duct for the future, but makes no change in rights already 
acquired or conditions already established. 
Such a presumption yields, of course, to any language 
indicative of an intent to change the existing status of any 
per on or clas of per ons, or to take away or impair any 
right or privileg already enjoyed. But nothing can be 
found in th law in que tion ugge:tive of any such purpose 
as r gard Chine e merchants already commercially domi-
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ciled in the United States, while the statute must be con-
strued, as emphatically declared by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in an analogous case (Lau Ow Bew, 144 
U.S., 47), not only so as not to produce absurd or incongru-
ous or unjust results, but so as to produce the least conflict 
with existing treaties providing for the free ingress and 
egress of Chinese merchants into and from the United States. 
I am constrained to the conclusion, therefore; that this 
third paragraph of section 2 of the act of November 3, 1893, 
is to be regarded as wholly prospective in its operation and 
as applying exclusively to Chinese merchants who both come 
into the United States for the first time since November 3, 
1893, and having carried on business here, afterwards leave 
the country and seek to return. Merchants already here 
when the statute took effect may leave the country and 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
IMPORT DUTIES-WAREHOUSED GOODS. 
Goods imported and warehoused for nearly three years, then withdrawn 
and exported, and finally reshipped to the United States by a differ-
ent merchant, there being no evidence that the transaction was a color-
able one to evade the tariff laws, may be entered for warehousing· 
as an "original importation" within Revised Statutes, section 2971. 
If the transaction were merely colorable t Qucere. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 19, 1894. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of April 6 
asking my official opinion as to whether certain wool im-
ported at Philadelphia is lawfully entitled to the privileges 
of an original warehouse entry under the customs laws. It 
appears that this wool was imported into the United States 
early in 1891 and remained in war~house nearly three years, 
when it was withdrawn for exportation to Canada. Very 
shortly thereafter it was reshipped to the United States by 
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a different merchant, who has applied to have it entered for 
warehousing as if a new "original importation." You ask 
whether 1t is entitled to be considered an original importa-
tion under the terms of section 2971 of the Revised Statutes. 
Attorney-General Williams, in 1875, answered the question 
in the affirmative (14 Opin., 574). He held that warehoused 
goods could be withdrawn, sent across the border, and then 
reimported and reentered for warehousing for a new three 
years' term as if they never before had been in the country, 
and this even if the transaction were for the purpose of 
evading a duty to which they would otherwise be liable. 
A question once definitely answered by one of my prede-
cessors and left at rest for a long term of years should be 
reconsidered by me only in a very exceptional case; but so 
far as the opinion above mentioned applies to goods ex-
ported for the mere purpose of reimporting them so as to 
extend the warehousing period, the subsequent opinions of 
Attorneys-General Brewster and Garland upon analogous 
questions arising under the internal-revenue laws (17 Opin., 
579; 18 Opin., 381) might be regarded as justifying recon-
sideration in this instance. 
Neither your letter nor the inclosed letter from the Phila-
delphia collector, however, states as a fact that there was 
any intention on the part of the importer whose case is now 
before you to evade any statutory provision. It may be that 
the goods were bona fide sold in the open market after 
export, and that the intent to reimport them was :first formed 
by the vendee after the sale had been perfected. Except 
where the transaction is shown to be a mere colorable one, 
so that there is no real exportation and importation of the 
goods at all within the later rulings of this Department, the 
definition established by Attorney-General Williams so loug 
ago should stand unquestioned by me; and I therefore advise 
you that these Philadelphia goods are to be regarded as an 
original importation upon the facts stated. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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TAX ON RETAIL LIQUOR DEALERS. 
The opinion of Attorney-General Miller, of May 15, 1889 (19 Opin., 306), 
does no" conflict with the collection of the special tax on retail 
liquor dealers in the Indian country and Alaska under Revised Stat-
utes, section 3244. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 24, 1894. 
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of May 22, inclosing a letter of the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue and an opinion of the Solicitor 
of Internal Revenue relating to the collection of a special 
tax from retail liquor dealers in the Indian country and in 
Alaska under section 3244 of the Revised Statutes. The 
Commissioner and Solicitor state that according to their 
understanding of the law such tax is collectible, but that 
they :find an obstacle to its collection in an opinion of 
Attorney-General Miller, rendered May 15, 1889. (19 
Opin., 306.) You accordingly ask me to advise you whether 
I concur in that opinion. 
I :find, on examining the opinion you refer to, . that no 
question was asked of the Attorney-General relating to the 
Indian country or Alaska. Bis references to the position 
of liquor dealers in the Indian country were obiter merely, 
and hence do not have the force and effect of an official 
opinion of this Department. Those whose cases were then 
under consideration he held to be taxable, and his ruling 
constitutes no obstacle to any action now desired to be taken 
by your Department. I therefore return the inclosures 
without further comment. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRE'.I.'ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
SHIPWRECKED SEAMEN-ASSISTING-WITHHOLDING FROM 
PAY. 
·Where a U. S. consul-general bas provided shipwrecked, destitute sea-
men with food, clothing, and passage to a port in this country, the 
amount so expended should not be deducted from the wages of such 
seamen. 
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF .JUSTICE, 
May 24, 1894. 
SIR: I have your letter of the 22d, inclosing letters from 
the U. S. consul-general at Honolulu and the shipping com-
missioner at San Francisco, from which it appears that the 
American bark Hilo was wrecked in the region of the 
Hawaiian Islands; that the seamen were "utterly destitute" 
when they reached Honolulu; that the U. S. consul-general 
there provided them with food and clothing and procured 
for them passage to San Francisco; and wrote to the U. S. 
shipping commissioner at San Francisco, advising him of 
the facts, and inclosed to him an itemized statement of the 
amount in value of the supplies furnished to each of the 
seamen. The owners of the vessel paid the amounts due to 
the men for wages, but as each man was paid off the U.S. 
shipping commissioner withheld from his wages the amount 
expended by the consul-general at Honolulu for his relief. 
The men protested and demanded their full pay. 
The amount so withheld by the U. S. shipping commis-
sioner is still retained, and you ask my opinion "whether the 
amount so reserved should be retained by the Government, 
or be paid to the seamen by the shipping commissioner." 
Congress appears to have intended and provided differ-
ent measures and kinds of relief for two distinct classes of 
seamen. 
In the class of cases provided for by sections 4580, 4581, 
4582, 4583, 4600, 4561, Revised Statutes, as amended June 
26, 1884 (23 Stat. L., 53), the consular officers of the United 
States are required to see that the discharged seamen receive 
from the master of the vessel the extra pay therein pre-
scribed. And by section 4584, Revised Statutes, they are 
further required to retain one-third of the amount of the 
wages so paid "for the purpose of creating a fund for the 
payment of the passages of seamen * * * and for the 
maintenance of .American seamen who may be destitute and 
may be in such foreign port." 
By section 4583 it is expressly provided that" no payment of 
extra wages hall be required upon the discharge of any sea-
men in cases where vessels are wrecked or stranded." * * * 
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By sections 4577 and 4579, Revised Statutes, provision is 
made for seamen who are destitute by reason of wrecking, 
stranding, etc. It is made the duty of the consular officers 
of the United States "to provide for the seamen of the United 
States who may be found destitute ·within their districts, 
respectively, sufficient subsistence and passages to some 
point in the United States in the most reasonable manner, 
at the expense of the United States, subject to such instruc-
tions as the Secretary of State shall give. The seamen shall, 
if able, be bound to do duty on board the vessels in which 
they may be transported·, according to their several abilities." 
And by section 4579 provision is made for the payment of 
reasonable compensation by the United States to the owner 
of the vessel in which the seamen are transported. 
From which it would seem that while those seamen who 
were discharged under the conditions described in the sec-
tions amended by the act of June 26, 1884, and who received 
extra pay, were required to contribute from their extra pay 
to the relief of the destitute seamen, that the seamen who 
were discharged by reason of wrecking or stranding of their 
> 
vessels received no extra pay and were to be maintained and 
brought home at the expense of the Government out of the 
fund created for that purpose and from appropriations made 
by Congress in the regular general appropriation bills. 
I am of opinion, then, that the amount reserved by the 
shipping commissioner at San Francisco from the wages of 
these destitute seamen should not be retained by the Govern-
ment, but should be refunded to the seamen. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNIJY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
CONTRACT-:--DELAY IN COMPLETING-REMITTING PENALTIES. 
Where penalties are imposed under the terms of a contract between the 
War Department and a contractor for delay in completing the work, 
but the contract has been performed in all other respects and no 
actual damage has resulted from the delay, the Secretary of War may 
remit the forfeiture. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 28, 1894, 
SIR: I have your letter of the 14th instant, inclosing copy 
of a contract between the post quartermaster at West Point 
and John Moore, of Syracuse, N. Y, for completing the gym-
nasium at West Point. 
In the printed "advertisement and specifications" for the 
erection of the gymnasium it is provided that: 
"The contractor will be required to commence building 
oi,erations within ten days after the approval of the con-
tract and to push the work regularly and vigorously, so as 
to have it completed and ready for occupancy by January 
1, 1892, For every day, including Sundays, after January 
1, 1892, that the building is not entirely completed accord-
ing· to this contract the contractor shall forfeit to the United 
States $25 per day, to be deducted from the final payment 
to be made to him." 
It appears that the building was not completed by ,Jan-
uary 1, 1892, but that the time for completion was extended 
from time to time to August 31, 1892. The building was not 
fully completed until October 19, 1893; and there has been 
withheld of the contract price the sum of $10,350, being the 
amount of the forfeiture of $25 per day from August 31, 1892, 
to October 19, 1893. 
It appears that on October 31, 1892, the architect, by direc-
tion of the Superintendent of the Military Academy, made 
a "complete and careful inspection of the structure" and 
reported that the amount to be done to complete it accord-
ing to the contract was "comparatively trifling." 
You request that I will advise your Department ' 6 whether 
the Secretary of War has authority to remit the forfeiture 
provided in the contract and to order the payment of the 
entire sum withheld from the contractor." 
Inasmuch as the forfeiture or penalty incurred here was 
one imposed by the contract between the parties and not 
by any act of Congress, and the work contracted for bas 
all been :finished according to tlie contract, and no actual 
damage has resulted to the United States, and the penalty 
was one from which, in like cases, a court of equity would 
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grant relief, I am of opinion that the Secretary of War has 
authority to remit the forfeiture provided for in the contract 




The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER-SOUTH PASS CHANNEL-EADS CONTRACT. 
The contract between the United States and James B. Eads and his 
associates for the construction of a ship canal between the South 
Pass of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, coos trued; and 
opinions of Attorney-General Devens (16 Opm., 335) and Actmg 
Attorney-General Phillips (17 Opin., 137) as to the width and charac-
teristics of channel required to be mamtained concurred in. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 29, 1894. 
Sm: I have your communication of the 23d of May, in clos-
ing a letter from Maj.James B. Quinn, of the Engineer Corps, 
referring to the contract between the United States and 
James B. Eads and his associates for the construction of a 
ship canal between the South Pass of the Mississippi River, 
and you ask me to "inform this [Warj Department as to 
what width and characteristics of channel are required to 
be maintained through the bar at the head of South Pass 
and throughout the pass itself by the terms of this contract." 
The contract to which you refer can be ascertained only 
from the various acts of Congress relating to the subject, 
and to these recourse must be had for the reply to your 
inquiry. These statutes will be found in 18 Stat. L., 463-466; 
20 Stat. L., 168 and 376; and 25 Stat. L., 1334. 
By act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 463), James B. Eads 
and his associates undertook-
" To construct such permanent and sufficient jetties and 
such auxiliary works as are necessary to create and per-
manently maintain, as hereinafter set forth, a wide and deep 
channel between the South Pass of the Mississippi River 
and the Gulf of Mexico * * *. 
"Upon full compliance with the conditions prescribed, the 
United States promised and agreed to pay to Eads 
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"$5,250,000 for const~ucting said work and obtaining a 
depth of 30 feet i.n said channel." 
This act further provides for the payment of the money in 
installments as certain results were reached in the course of 
construction of the work. 
When a channel 30 feet in depth and 350 in width, shall 
have been obtained, the remaining $1,000,000 shall be deemed 
to have been earned by Eads and his associates, but the 
amount shall remain in the possession of the United States 
for the purposes set forth in the act, interest thereon to be 
paid to Eads, etc., as long as the money is held. 
"That after said channel of thirty feet in depth and of not 
less than three hundred and fifty feet in width shall have 
been secured, one hundred thousand dollars per annum shall 
be paid in equal quarterly payments during each and every 
year that said channel of thirty feet in depth and three hun-
dred and fifty feet in width shall have been maintained by 
said Eads and his associates by the effect of said jetties 
and auxiliary works aforesaid in said pass, for a period of 
twenty years, dating from the date on which said channel 
of thirty feet in depth a,nd three hundred and fifty feet in 
width shall be first secured: Provided, however, That no part 
of such annual compensation shall be paid for a11y period of 
time during which the channel of said pass sball be less than 
thirty feet in depth and three hundred and fifty feet in width, 
as hereinbefore specified. 
"That the said channel of thirty feet in depth and three 
hundred and fifty feet in width having been maintained for 
ten years, one-half of the one mi1lion dollars hereinbefore 
mentioned shall be released and paid to said Eads, his 
as ign , or legal representatives; and said depth and width 
having been maintained for ten additional years, the remain-
ing half of the aid oue million dollars shall be released and 
paid a afore aid." 
By act approved June 19, 1878 (20 Stat. L., 168), the former 
act wa am ~nded in certain particulars as to the payment of 
50 ,000 in advance for labor, material, etc. But this act 
further provides: 
11 ther payments to said Eads * * * are to be 
mad und r and in pur uance of the provi ions of the herein-
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before-recited act; the whole of said act, except ab the same is 
hereby expressly modified or amended, to have the same force 
and effect as if this act bad not been passed." 
By joint resolution of February 14, 1889 (25 Stat. L., 1335), 
$500,000 of this $1,000,000 was appropriated and ordered to 
be paid to the legal representatives of James B.. Eads. 
• It appears now, from the letter of Major Quinn and the 
blue-print maps inclosed therewith, that a channel of 26 feet 
in depth and 250 feet in width has not been maintained. 
I have carefully examined the history of the execution of 
this contract as the same appears in the Senate documents 
of the l!..,orty-fifth, Forty-sixth, and Forty-seventh Congresses, 
in the records of the War Department, and in the opinions 
of the Attorneys-General; and I find that in the opinion of 
May 17, 1879, of the Hon. Charles Devens, Attorney-General 
(16 Opin., 335)1 the following construction is given of the 
words "navigable depth," referred to in the letter of Major 
Quinn: · 
"What is the meaning of tbe words 'navigable depth' is 
a question partly of law and partly of fact. It is a depth 
sufficiently wide to admit of safe navigation. In considering 
what was intended to be provided for tlie whole character of 
the structure contemplated is to be examined. This shows 
that a channel of considerable width, in which necessarily 
vessels could pass each other as they ascended and descended 
the river, was contemplated. And this navigation is not 
limited to any particular class of vessels-as, for instance, 
those propelled only by steam. .rhe legal meaning of the 
term 'navigable depth' is a depth sufficiently wide, therefore, 
to be navigated by vessels either moved by sails or steam, 
and to permit them to pass each other in the channel formed 
through the pass and the shoal at its head.", etc. 
In the opinion of the Hon. S. F. Phillips, Acting Attor-
ney-General, of June 27, 1881 (17 Opin., 137), the question 
propounded to me in your letter appears to have been sub-
stantially answered. In that opinion it was held: 
"1. That a navigable depth of 26 feet is thereby required 
to be maintained through the shoal at the head of the Pass. 
'' 2. That a navigable depth of 26 feet is required to be 
maintained through the Pass itself." 
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I concur in the reasoning and conclusions expressed in 
these opinions, and respectfully refer to the opinions them-
selves for a reply to your inquiry-" as to what width and 
characteristics of channel are required to be maintained at 
the bar at the head of South Pass and throughout the pass 
itself by the terms of the contract." 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
EIGHT-HOUR LAW. 
Certain foremen at the Fort Leavenworth Military Prison are not 
"laborers or mechanics" within the eight-hour law of August 1, 1892 
chapter 352. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 7, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of May 26, asking my official opinion as to whether certain 
employes at the military prison, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 
are entitled to the benefits of the eight-hour law of August 
I, 1892, chapter 352, as "laborers or mechanics." 
It appears that four of these men are employed at the 
prison as "foremen of mechanics," and are each paid under 
the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 
602), a stated salary of $1,200 per annum. Their duties 
appear to be directing mechanical labor of the prisoners. 
By section 1345 of the Revised Statutes a board organized 
by you is empowered to "frame regulations for the govern-
ment of prisons." You inform me that the regulations so 
framed require more than eight hours' work of the prisoners, 
and. therefore necessarily require more than eight hours' work 
of the men who are set to watch and direct them. Under 
these circum tance it is my opinion that the eight-hour law 
i not applicable to these employe . The facts as to the 
other emp1oyes mentioned are not so clearly tated, but their 
·a app ar. to be governed by the same principles. 
ry r pectfully, 
Th ECRET.A.RY OF WAR. 
RICilARD OLNEY. 
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Uivil Service-Bona, l<'ide Resicleuce. 
CIVIL SERVICE-BONA l!.,IDE RESIDENCE. 
Th~ facts bearing upon the question of the residence of EdwaJ.'.d D. 
Morrill on August 4, 1890, considered; and~ held, that Morrill WM 
not an actual and bona fide resident either of the county of Wilcox 
or of the State of Alabama on the date named, nor had he been for 
auy of the six months next preceding that date. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 8, 1894. 
SIR: My opinion is asked with reference to the question 
whether or not Edward D. Morrill was a resident of Alabama 
at the time of his appointment under the civil-Rervice rules 
in the Interior Department, to wit, on August 4, 1890. The 
evidence in this case, upon which opinion is asked, consists 
of, first, the affidavit of three men who are stated to have 
knowledge on the subject, that Morrill has never resided in 
the State of Alabama or been a citizen of said State since 
the 9th day of November, 1886; and, secondly, the statell!ent 
of Morrill himself, that, having a home in Camden, Wilcox 
County, A.la., in 1886, he engaged in v'lrious kinds of tem-
porary business in other States until December of that year, 
when he returned to Camden, put his property in a condition 
to leave by repairing, painting, and renting it, and in March, 
1887, sent part of his personal effects to Chattanooga, Tenn.; 
was engaged through the summer of 1887 in temporary 
employment in Dalton, Ga., and on its completion went to 
Chattanooga, where he engaged in business apparently per-
manent in its character. 
In December, 1887, he returned to Camden long enough to 
arrange with tenants and collect rents, occupying meanwhile 
certain reserved rooms in his house, returned to Chattanooga 
in February, 1888, and apparently remained there until 
December following, voting at the general election in Novem-
ber, 1888, at Chattanooga. On December 1, 1888, he went to 
Camden to look after his property, and returned to Chatta-
nooga the 23d of the same month. Ou April 4, 1889, he gave 
up his rented house in Chattanooga, stored his furniture in 
that neighborhood, spent the summer traveling, and late in 
the fall went to Camden for a period not stated, but certainly 
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not longer than four months, as he was in Washington in 
March, 1890, since which time he ha.s actually lived in that 
city. 
Upon this state of facts it seems to me that the fact of 
Morrill's residence at Chattanooga on and for a year prior to 
November, 1888, is established by his own act in voting at 
that place, and that there is nothing as to his subsequent 
movements sufficient to show an abandonment of that resi-
dence and the acquisition of a new one at Camden, Ala. I 
therefore am of opinion, upon the facts before me, that 
Edward D. Morrill, on August 4, 1890, was not an actual and 
bona fide resident either of the county of Wilcox or of the 
State of Alabama, nor had he been for any of the six months 




SHIPWRECKED SEAMEN-DEDUCTION FROM PAY. 
Opinion of May 24, 1894 (supra, p. 25), reaffirmed. 
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 14, 1894. 
SIR: By letter dated 22d May, 1894, inclosing letters from 
the U.S. consul-general at Honolulu and the U.S. shipping 
commissioner at San Francisco, you presented to me the case 
of certain seamen of the American bark Hilo, which was 
wrecked near the Hawaiian Islands. These seamen were 
"utterly destitute" when they reached Honolulu. The con-
sul-general supplied their necessary wants and shipped them 
to Sau Francisco. He wrote to the shipping commissioner 
at San l_i.,rancisco, inclosing a statement of the amount in 
value of the necessaries furnished the seamen, and requested 
him to withhold the amount furnished to each seaman from 
the wage due him when the same were paid to him in San 
Franci co. The shipping commissioner did so, and you asked 
my opinion whether the amount so reserved should be re-
tained by th Government or be paid to the seamen by the 
hi I ing commi ioner. I replied by letter dated May 24, 
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and stated, as the conclusion which I had reached, "That the 
amount reserved by the shipping commissioner at San Fran-
cisco from the wages of these destitute seamen should not 
be retained by the Government, but should be refunded to 
the seamen." 
Recent consideration of the matter has confirmed that 
conclusion. The only provision of the existing statutes 
requiring the retention of seamen's wages to meet their ex-
penses appears in section 4581, Revised Statutes, as amended 
(23 Stat., 55, and 25 Stat., 80), which provides that-
"If any seaman, after his discharge, ~hall have incurred 
any expense for board, or other necessaries * * * ." 
In this case the expenses were all incurred at Honolulu 
before the seamen were discharged and paid off in San Fran-
cisco. Until a seaman is regularly discharged in one of the 
ways provided by statute, he remains under his shipping 
articles, and is to be maintained by the master of the ship, as 
stipulated in the articles. 
When an American seaman is found destitute within the 
district of a U. S. consular officer, he is to be provided for 
as prescribed in sections 4577 and 4579, Revised Statutes. 
But that no unwarranted inferences may be drawn from 
my letter of May 24, I think it proper to say now that the 
extracts quoted therein from certain sections of the Revised 
Statutes, which are referred to as amended, were inserted 
there only to illustrate what seemed to be the policy of the 
Government as to two classes of seamen who were dis-
charged for different causes, and not as existing and opera-
tive provisions of statute on which the conclusion I expressed 
at all depended. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-WORLD'S FAIR. 
The Attorney-General ca,n not give official opinions except upon ques-
tions of law, nor without a definite statement of the facts upon which 
the question is submitted. 
The question of drawbacks upon the exhibits of foreign Governments 
at the World's Fair of 1893 is governed by the act of April 25, 1890 
( chap. 156, sec. 11), and not by the Revised Statutes. 
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 14, 1894. 
SIR: Your communication of June 9 in closes the corre-
spondence with the Swiss charge d'affaires at Washington 
and the Swiss consul at Chicago relating to the refund of 
duties paid on certain Swiss exhibits at the World's Colum-
bian Exposition, and asks my opinion "as to whether the 
Department, under the circumstances,. and considering the 
special character of the. enterprise and the status of the 
importers, should grant the request of the consul." This is 
not a question of law, and I am therefore not warranted by 
section 356 of the Revised Statutes in answering it, nor 
can I properly make a ~tatement of facts for my own use 
out of this correspondence. The facts upon which the ques· 
tion is submitted should "be agreed and stated as facts 
established." (19 Opin., 396, 696.) 
It appears by the opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury, 
which was transmitted with the papers, that the real ques-
tion that arises is whether section 3025 of the Revised Stat-
utes is applicable to this case. Were this question directly 
submitted, I would answer that in my opinion it does not 
apply to the exhibits of foreign Governments at the recent 
Exposition, which are governed by section 11 of the act of 
April 25, 1890, and by your regulations thereunder, which 
regulations it is rather your province than mine to construe. 
Very re pectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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CHINESE NATURALIZATION-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. · 
Since the act of May 6, 1882, chapter 126, no court, State or Federal, has 
had jurisdiction to admit.Chinese to citizenship. · 
The question as to how far a certain judgment was void for want of 
jurisdiction· should not be determined nntil actually presented for 
decision in a case in which a party to such judgment shall be a party. 
DEP ARTMEN'r OF JUSTICE, 
J u1•,e 15, 1894. 
SiR: I have your letter of 13th of June, in closing a letter 
from the collector of customs at Astoria, Oreg., and a copy of 
a letter from the Solicitor of the Treasury, expressing the 
opinion that the naturalization papers issued in the year 
1878 in New Orleans, La., to somp, 50 Chinamen, were issued 
without authority of law and are void, and you request au 
opinion from me on the question submitted in the letter from 
the collector of customs at Astoria, Oreg. 
Without entering upon the ethnological questions, so 
learnedly discussed in the opinion of the Solicitor of the 
Treasury, but referring, on that aspect of the question, to 
Webster's dictionary-Race-and the opinion of Sawyer, 
J. , in Ah Yup (5 Saw., 157), it is sufficient for the present 
purpose to say that under section 2169, Revised Statutes, the 
privilege of naturalization is limited "to aliens being free 
white persons and to aliens of African nativity and to per-
sons of African descent." 
In Fong Yue Ting v. The Uniterl States (149 U. S., 698), 
Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, says, ' 
page 716: 
"Chinese persons not born in this country have never been 
recognized as citizens of the United States nor authorized 
to become such under the naturalization laws." (Rev. Stat., 
2d ed., secs. 2165, 2169; acts of April 14, 1802, chap. 28, 2 
Stat., 153; l\fay 26, 1824, chap. 186, 4 Stat., 69; July 14, 
1870, chap. 254, sec. 7, 16 Stat., 256; February 18, 1875, 
chap. 80, 18 Stat., 318; In re Ah Yup, 5 Saw., 155; act of 
May 6, 1882, chap. 126, sec. 14, 22 Stat., 61.) 
Section 14 of tlle act of May 6, 1882, chapter 126 (22 Stat., -
61), referred to by Mr. Justice Gray, is as follows: 
''That hereafter no State court or court of the United 
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States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in 
conflict with this act are hereby repealed." 
It is certainly very clear that since May 6, 1882, no court, 
State or Federal, has had jurisdiction to admit Chinese to 
citizenship. 
It was held by the circuit court of the district of Califor-
nia, in April, 1878 (In re Ah Yup, 5 Saw., 155), that a native 
of China is not entitled to become a citizen of the United 
States under the Revised Statutes as amended in 1875; and 
this view has been adopted in subsequent cases. . 
How far the judgment of the court in Louisiana in admit-
ting to citizenship the 50 Chinese referred to here was void 
for want of jurisdiction is a question the determination of 
which may better be deferred until actually presented for 
decision in a case in which one or more of the 50 Chinamen 
referred to shall be parties. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
-LIEN ON MERCHANDISE IMPORTED FOR EXPORTATION. 
Article 309, Customs Regulations, 1892, providing " " " " Nor can 
liens be recognized for freight on merchandise intended for export," 
is inconsistent with Revised Statutes, section 281, as amended. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 16, 1894. 
SIR: I have your letter of June 1, 1894, inclosing a letter of 
20th of January from H. Maitland Kersey, on behalf of cer-
tain steamship companies, requesting a modification of the 
Trea ury regulations relating to liens for freight; a letter 
from George 0. Glavi , of May 5; and an opinion of the Solic-
itor of the Trea 'ury of May 28, on the same subject, and 
you a k £ r an '' xpre ion of opir\ion" from me "in the 
matt r. 
I i,' by no means clear from these letters just what the 
matt r' i n whi h my opinion i de ired. I will assume 
that i i inquir wh th r, in my opinion, ection 2981, 
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Revised Statutes, as amended, affords to the . owner or con-
signee of a vessel arriving from a foreign port a lien for 
freight on the merchandise imported on such vessel when 
such merchandise is imported for exportation. Section 2981 
is as follows: 
"Whenever the collector or other chief officer of the cus-
toms of any port shall be notified in writ.ing by the owner or 
consignee of any vessel or vehicle, arriving from any foreign 
port, of a lien for freight on any merchandise imported in 
such vessel or vehicle, and remaining· in his custody, such 
officer may refuse the delivery of such merchandise from any 
public or bonded warehouse, or other place in which the 
same shall be deposited, until proof to his satisfaction shall 
be produced that the freight due thereon has been paid or 
secured." * * * · 
It seems that the Treasury Department has given to 
this section a construction which denies to the owner or 
consignee a lien for freight on merchandise imported for 
exportation. 
Article 309, Customs Regulations. 1892. provides: 
* * * * * * * 
"Nor can liens be recognized for freight on merchandise 
intended for export." 
A construction given in such solemn form by the Treasury 
Department, and continuously acted upon for a long time, is 
entitled to great respect and consideration. 
Section 2989, Revised Statutes, provides: 
"The Secretary of · the Treasury may from time to time 
establish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with 
law, for the due execution of the provisions of this chapter, 
and to secure a just accountability . under the same, as he 
may deem to be expedient and necessary." 
The chapter referred to is that on The Bond and Ware-
house System, within which are embraced all the provisions 
which apply to the matter in band. 
The question for consideration is, Is the regulation re-
ferred to "inconsistent with law"~ 
The chapter appears to intend and provide for three classes 
of imported merchandise, viz, that imported for consump-
40 HON. RICHARD OLNEY. 
L i e n o n lU e r c 11 an tl i s e I m p o rt e d f o r E x p o r ta ti o n • 
tion, that imported for exportation, .and that imported for 
transportation. 
With that class imported for consumption we have here 
nothing to do. As to the other two classes, it is provided by 
section 2971, Revised Statutes, t4at-
"All merchandise which may be deposited in public store 
or bonded warehouse may be withdrawn by the owner for 
exportation to foreign countries, or ma.y be transshipped to 
any port of the Pacific or western coast of the United States 
at any time before the expiration of three years from the date 
of original importation, such goods on arrival at a Pacific or 
western port to be subject to the same rules and regulations as 
if originally imported there." 
And the distinction between the two classes is also recog-
nized by the statute (secs. 2900, 2994, aud 3005), by the 
Treasury Department (Customs Regulations, arts. 568-590), 
and by this Department (16 Opin., 74). 
All merchandise imported into the United States and 
unloaded at any port passes into the custody of the officer 
of customs at such port, whether it be unloaded for con-
sumption, transportation, or exportation. 
Section 2981, Revised Statutes, provides that the owner or 
consignee of any vessel or vehicle arriving from any foreign 
port may notify the officer of customs of any port of a lien 
for freight on any merchandise imported in such vessel and 
remaining in his custody, and that such officer may refuse 
the delivery of such merchandise until the freight due thereon 
has been paid. 
This may perhaps be limited as to certain classes of goods 
for transportation under seetion 2971, Revised Statutes, but 
I have been unable to discover any provision of statute 
which re train its application from merchandise imported 
for exportation, nor do I perceive any rea on why it should 
b or strain d. It i difficult to ee bow the owner of the 
I in wbich th merchandi e i imported can be ecured 
a to the freight due thereon except by such a lien as 
app ar, · t m to b provided by . ection 2981. 
I , 111 f pinion that . o much of artic]e 302 Cu tom Reg-
} . ' u a 1 n ,a.·pr id : ' orcanlie11 berecognizedforfreight 
n m r ·b n Ii . intend cl for xr ort' i in con i tent with 
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section 2981, Revised Statutes, as amended; and that the 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The St. Louis and Cloquet rivers are navigable waters of the United 
States, and the Secretary of War bad authority to authorize their 
obstruction by dams, but can not revoke his permit when large 
expenditures have been made on the faith thereof. (20 Opin., 713, 
reaffirmed.) 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
June 25, 1894. 
Sm: I have yours of the 12th instant, with accompanying 
papers. 
A permit having been granted to the Altamonte Water 
Company to construct dams across the St. Louis and Cloquet 
r ivers, in accordance with the opinion of the Attorney-
General of February 9, 1894, a reconsideration of the matter 
is now suggested, and the following questions are submitted: 
1. Are the St. Louis and Cloquet rivers; or either of them, 
navigable waters of the United States 1 
2. Has _the Secretary of War jurisdiction . to grant per-
mission to obstruct such rivers, or either of them, 
3. The permission to so obstruct said rivers having beeri 
granted, can such permission be revoked by the Secretary 
of War under the existing circumstances of this ca~e ~ 
The first two questions may be advantageously considered 
together. 
It does not seem to be open to reasonable doubt that upon 
the evidence disclosed by the papers the St. Louis and 
Cloquet rivers are navigable waters of the United States 
within ~he definition of such navigable waters repeatedly 
given by the Supreme Court of the United States. Nor, 
being navigable waters of the United States, can I see room 
for question respecting the complete and exclusive authority 
of the Secretary of War to permi1; their obstruction by dams. 
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Such authority is expressly given by the :first clause of sec-
tion 7 of the act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 54), as 
amended by section 3 of the act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat., 110). 
If this clause stood by itself its meaning and effect, as 
above stated, would be deemed too plain for discussion. If 
its meaning and effect are now doubtful, the doubt is occa-
sioned by certain subsequent clauses of the same section, and 
especially by the concluding proviso, which declares that the 
section shall "not be so construed as to authorize the con-
struction of any bridge, drawbridge, bridge piers and abut-
ments, or other works under an act of the legislature of any 
State over or in any stream, port, roadstead, haven, or har-
bor, or other navigable water not wholly within the limits of 
such State." It may be admitted tliat the Bntire act is 
infelicitously, not to say clumsily, drawn, and that the pro-
viso just cited is the most obscure and unfortunate portion of 
it. Nevertheless, when the general scope and tenor of the 
whole statute are considered in connection with its main pur-
pose, and in view of the facts to which Congress must have 
meant it to apply, the difficulties attending its interpretation 
largely disappear and leave a tolerably intelligible and con-
sistent piece of legislation. 
The main object of Congress in the statute is clear. It 
intended that the navigable waters of the United States 
should thereafter be under the exclusive control of the United 
States; that for the future their navigability should be inter-
fered with by bridges, dams, or other obstructions only by 
express permission of the United States, granted through 
its agent, the Secretary of War. That is the plain meaning 
and operation of the :first clause of the amended section 7, 
already referred - to. The same unmistakable purpose is 
manife ted by that clau e of section 7 which immediately 
pre ede. the provi o, and which declares that it shall not be 
lawful hereafter to '' excavate or :fill, or in any manner to alter 
or rno<lify the cour e, location, condition or capacity of any 
p rt, r ad tead, haven, harbor of refuge, or in closure within 
th limit of any breakwater, or of the channel of any naviga-
bl w ter f th nited tate , unle approved and author-
th er tary of War." Thi, clau e and the :fir t 
f h tion cov r the wh I ubj ct, the one apply-
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ing to structures in navigable waters of the United States, 
the other to excavating, filling, or other disturbance of such 
waters. As structures are not to be erected without the 
permission of the Secretary of War, so any excavation, fill-
ing, etc., must be approved and authorized by him. Thus 
the determination of Congress that, as a general proposition, 
the United States shall take and hold jurisdiction over its 
navigable waters, which should be complete and exclusive of 
all interference with them from any other quarter, is too 
plainly and industriously declared to admit of any real 
question. 
But while the main intent and object of this statute (sec. 7) 
must be deemed to be as above stated, it is equally plain that 
Congress realized that it was not dealing with a new and 
untouched subject-matter. It recognized the fact that for 
many years almost every State of the Union had been exer-
cising control over the navigable waters of the United States 
within its limits; that it had been doing so with the tacit 
assent of Congress, and that in reliance upon the validity of 
such State action individuals and corporations had invested 
vast sums of money in bridges and other permanent struc-
tures which could not be dealt with as nuisances without 
the most injurious consequences to both public and private 
interests. It recognized the additional fact that when the 
statute should become a law many State grants or licenses 
for structures in navigable waters of the United States would 
be found to be outstanding under which work had not as yet 
been begun by the grantees or licensees. Under these cir-
cumstances, with the desire of avoiding unnecessary injury 
to any public interests and of doing no injustice to private 
interests concerned, and aiming to treat bona fide State leg-
islation and action with becoming courtesy, Congress quali-
fied the general assumption by the statute of complete and 
exclusive jurisdiction by the United States over its naviga-
ble waters in two important particulars. In the first place, 
to protect public and private interests in bridges, piers, etc., 
which were already accomplished facts, the statute is made 
to declare that it shall not apply to them at all. In the sec-
ond place, to treat State grants and licenses for structures 
already conferred but not acted upon with respect, and at 
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the same time not lose all control over the subject, the ·statute 
is made to declare that construction is not to begin uuder 
such grants or licenses until the location and plan of each 
structure is approved by the Secretary of War. 
If the foregoing views are correct the statute in question, 
first, puts all navigable waters of the United States within 
the full and exclusive control of the United States; second, 
excepts from the statute certain existing structures, like 
bridges, piers, etc., and third, excepts from · the statute 
bridges, piers, etc., already authorizeci by State authority, 
but not constructed, so far as to provide that construction 
shall not begin until the location and plan of work have been 
approved by tbe Secretary of War. There remains for con-
sideration only the concluding proviso of section 7, already 
quoted, the meaning and effect of which, if the foregoing-
exposition of the statute can be relied upon, would seem to 
be tolerably clear. It will be observed that the subject of 
tliis proviso is to exclude a possible construction of the sec-
tion. It is not to "be so construed as to authorize," etc. 
Now, what possible constructiou of the statute was Congress 
guardmg against, It is not difficult to see. In the previous 
portions of tue statute Congress had recognized the validity 
of State action respecting tile navigable waters of the United 
States in two classes of cases, one class being that of existing 
structures, the other that of certain structures not existing, 
l>ut authorized by the State. 
Having thus recognized State authority iu these two 
classes of cases, Congress inserted this proviso, by way of 
exces ive precaution, perhapt-i, but to make sure that such 
recognition could not l>e u ed to cover any other than the 
two . pecifically defined and excepted cla,·ses of cases. It 
meant in particular to dispose of the contention that, after 
the statute and notwjth tanding the statute, it w:1s still 
·ompeteut for a State to license a brj<lge, pier, or other like 
. tru tur rn navigable waters of the United States, subject 
only t the apr roval of the location and plan of the work 
b the ecr tary of · ar. It meant to make that contention 
impo ibl , t make it c rtain that, except in the two cla. ses 
f c· : <l th juri. dict1011 of he 11ited States should 
b · ru 1 t 11d wh 11 · xclud any tate jnri, diction. To 
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1m1ke this purpose the more manifest tbe proviso is so 
phrased as to indicate just what waters would or might 
be under the jurisdiction of a State after the passage of 
the statute. Throughout all the preceding portions of the 
statute the waters dealt with are "navigable waters of the 
United States." In this proviso the waters dealt with are 
waters "wholly within the limits of" a State. The distinc-
tion is not accidental or insignificant. It was meant to 
draw the line between the waters over which, with certain 
exceptions, the statute meant to assert exclusive jurisdiction 
in the United States, and other waters over which the stat-
ute meant to leave the jurisdiction of the State unquestioned, 
if not :final1y and forever, at least for the time being. 
I see no occasion, therefore, for modifying the opinion 
already given by me under date of the 9th of February last. 
The remaining, question, whether the permit granted.Feb-
ruary 13, 1894, can, under the existing circumstances of this 
case, be revoked, is more easily answered. It does not 
involve the issue whether the power to rescind a permit is 
a necessarily implied element of the power to grant it, or 
whether, all the circumstances remaining the same, the 
Secretary of War, after granting a permit, might cancel it-
beca"Q.se of a change of mind as to the wisdom or propriety of 
his original action. Upon the facts appearing in the papers 
submitted the circumstances are not unchanged, but on the 
faith of the permit the Altamonte Water Company has gone 
forward and made contracts, spent large sums of money, and 
otherwise materially altered its situation. Under such cir-
cumstances, I am of the opinion that the Secretary of War 
is not now at liberty to revoke the permit. 
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NAVY DEPARTMENT-PRECEDENCE OF OFFICERS. 
Article 21 of the Navy Regulations is within the authority conferred 
upon the Secretary of the Navy by Revise<l. Statutes, section 1547. 
There is no inconsistency between sections 1483 and 1484, Revised 
Statutes, in their operation upon the question of the precedence of 
Engineer officers of the Navy. 
A rule for as<.,ertaining the date of precedence of officers on the active 
list of the Navy held to be in conflict with the act approved August 
5, 1882. (22 Stat., 284.) 
Status of members of the staff corps is governed by Revised Statutes, 
sections 1485, 1486, and 1487. 
DEP ARTMEN'I.1 OF JUSTICE, 
June 28, 1894. 
SIR: Your letter of the 22d instant, with that of C. W. 
Rae, Chief Engineer, U. S. Navy, head of Department of 
Steam Engineering~ presents for my consideration and 
opinion three questions arising out of the state of facts dis-
closed in these letters. 
'' 1. Whether or not the present practice of the Depart-
ment in assigning to graduates of the Naval Academy dates 
of precedence according to the rules fixed by the 'Febiger 
Board,' as herein set forth, is warranted by law. 
"2. Whether the provisions of article 21 of the Navy 
Regulations are within the authority conferred upon the 
Secretary of the Navy by section 1547 of the Revised 
Statutes. 
"3. To what extent, if at all, are the provisions of section 
1483 of the Revised Statutes (act of 23d of May, 1872) that 
graduates of the Na val Academy shall take rank according 
to their proficiency as shown by their order of merit at the 
date of graduation, modified by section 1484 of the Revised 
Statutes (act of 3d of March, 1873), providing that engineer 
officers graduated at the aval Academy shall take prec-
edence with all other officers with whom they have relative 
rank according to the actual length of service in the Navy." 
The provisions of the statute relating to the subject-
ma t r of the e inquirie are as follows: 
' EC. 1467. Line officer shall take rank m each grade 
ace rdin to he date of their commis ion . 
" E C. 1 raduate of the aval Academy shall take 
rank a· ording to their profi.ci n y a hown by their order 
f m rit t th dat f raduation. 
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"SEC. 1484. Engineer officers graduated at the Na val 
Academy shall take precedence with all oth_er officers with 
whom they have relative rank, according to the actual 
length of service in the Navy. 
'' SEC. 1485. The officers of the staff corps of the Navy 
shall take precedence in their several corps, and in their 
several grades, and with officers of the line with whom they 
hold relative rank, according to length of service in the Navy. 
"SEC. 1486. In estimating the length of service for such 
purpose, the several officers of the staff corps shall, respec-
tively, take precedence in their several grades and with 
those officers of the line of the Navy with whom they hold 
relative rank who have been in the naval service six years 
longer than such officers of said staff corps have been in said 
service; and -officers who have been advanced or lost num-
bers on the Naval Register shall be considered as having 
gained or lost length of service accordingly. 
"SEC. 1487. No staff officer shall, in virtue of his relative 
rank or precedence, have any additional right to quarters." 
The orders, . regulations, and instructions issued by the 
Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President, 
for the government of the Navy, have the force of the ·stat-
ute law when not inconsistent therewith. (6 Opin., 10; 13 
Opin., 9; United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S., 46.) 
The commissioned officers of the Navy are either of the 
line or of the staff. The rank, grade, and order of preced-
ence of the officers of the Navy are prescribed by the statute 
law and the Naval Regulations. 
Article 21 of the Na val Regulations, 1893, provides: 
" The precedence of officers of the staff in their several 
corps and in their several grades and with officers of the line 
with whom they hold relative rank * * * shall be regu-
lated by the precedence list published in the Navy Register. 
* * * In all cases where commissioned officers of different 
corps have the same date of precedence, they shall take rank 
as follows: 
"1. Line officers. 
" 2. Medical officers. 
"3. Pay officers. 
"4. Engineer officers." 
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* * * * * * 
Graduates of the Naval Academy are appointed and 
commissioned-
" To fill vacancies in the lower grades of the line and 
Engineer Corps of the Navy and of the Marine Corps: Pro-
vided, That no greater number of appointments into these 
grades shall be made each year than shall equal the number 
of vacancies which has occurred in the same grades during 
the preceding year; such appointments to be made from the 
graduates of the year * * * in the order of merit." (22 
Stat., 285.) 
· It must happen, then, that graduates of the same class 
receive their commissions as officers in the Navy at widely 
different dates; aud section 1467 provides as to line officers 
that they take rank in each grade according to the date of 
tlleir commissions. 
The rule proposed by the" Febiger Board" for ascertaining 
the date of precedence of officers on the active list of the 
Navy and adopted by the Department is stated by you to l;le 
as follows: 
"That the date of entry of the member of a class longest 
in the service shall apply to him and to all who passed above 
him at graduation; that the date of entry of the member of 
the remainder of the class longest in the service shall apply 
to him and all above him, and to all above him not placed 
by the first date, and so on through the class." 
As thus formula,ted the rule is obscure and barely intelli-
gible. If it iutends that in each class of graduates from the 
Naval Academy the "date of precedence" of the members 
of uch class shall be determined by ascertaining the mem-
ber having the earliest date of admission to the Academy 
aud imputiug that date of admission to every other member 
who tands above him in the class, aud then taking the 
m mb r below him who has the next earliest date of admis-
si n and i111putiug tllat date to all who stand above him but 
b low tli fi.r,'t <lat and o on down in that order, but pre-
; rvi11g to th m mber of each elate tl1eir relative class 
tandiug in th ord r of merit I do not perceive that the 
rnl i11v l : any i11 011. i ·te11cy with the requir ments of the 
,·t tn •: ba , "l' iu op rati ll at th• date of it: adoption, 
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but it is in conflict with the act approved August 5, 1882. 
(22 Stat., 284). 
As to the members of the staff corps of the Navy, their 
status appears to be quite clearly defined by sections 1485, 
1486, and 1487 of the Revised Statutes, and particularly as 
to Engineer officers whose precedence is prescribed by section 
1484, which operates as an exception to 1486. (15 Opin., 336.) 
I do not perceive any inconsistency between sections 1483 
and 1484 in their operation upon the question of the pre-
cedence of Engineer officers of the Navy. 
Just what is meant by the term "graduates of the Naval · 
Academy" was considered by Solicitor-General Phillips in 
an instructive opinion (15 Opin., 637), to which I beg leave 
to refer. 
Section 1483 relates to graduates generally from the Naval 
Academy, and prescribes the "order of merit" as the scale 
of precedence . 
. Section 1484 relates to a restricted and peculiar body of 
"graduates," who are eligible to only one corps of the Naval 
service, to wit, the staff, and to the engineer department 
only of that corps. 
By act approved March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 878), the aca-
demic board of the Naval Academy was required-
" To separate the first class of naval cadets then commenc-
ing their fourth year into two divisions, as they may have 
shown special aptitude for the duties of the respective corps, 
in the proportion which the aggregate number of vacancies 
occurring in the prem•ding fiscal year; ending on the :10th 
day of June, in the le, west grades of commissioned officers 
of the line of the Nal y and the Marine Corps of the Navy 
sha11 bear to the number of vacancies to be supplie4 from 
the Academy occurring during the same period.in the lowest 
grade of commissioned officers of the :r,;ngineer Corps of the 
Navy; and the cadets so assigned to the line and Marine 
Corps division of the first class shall thereafter pursuff a 
course of study arranged to fit them for service in the line 
of the Navy, and the cadets so assigned to the Engineer 
Corps division of the first class shall thereafter pursue a 
course of study arranged to fit them for service in tlrn Engi-
neer Uorps of the Navy, * * * ; and from the final 
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graduates from the line and Marine Corps division, appoint-
ments shall be made hereafter as it shall be necessary to 
fill vacancies in the lowest grades of commissioned officers 
of the line of the Navy and Marine Corps; and the vacancies 
in the lowest grades of the commissioned officers of the 
Engineer Corps of the Navy shall be filled in like manner 
by appointments from the final graduates of the Engineer 
Division." * * * 
Article 21 of the U. S~ Na val Regulations is within the 
authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Navy. by sec-
· tion 1547, Revised Statutes, inasmuch as it does not appear 
to be in conflict with any provision of the stat.ute law relat-
ing to the relative rank of line and staff officers in the Navy. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRE1'.A.RY OF THE NA. VY. 
COMPROMISE 01? JUDGMENT INDEBTEDNESS. 
Revised Statutes, section 3469, does not confer power to remit or release 
any portion of a judgment indebtedness on considerations of hardship 
to particular individuals. The authority to "compromise" relates to 
claims of doubtful recovery or enforcement. (13 Opin., 479, and 18 
Opin ., 72, distinguished.) 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 11, 1894. 
SIR: Your communication of the 7th instant to the Attor-
ney-General presents a case in which the Supreme Court of 
the Uuited States, in a proceeding under Revised Statutes, 
section 3207, bas adjudged ( United States v. Snyder, 149 U. 
S., 210) that for certain internal-revenue taxes assessed 
against one nyder, the United States have a lien upon real 
e tate in tbe city of New Orleans now owned by the Inter-
national otton Pre Company, which that company bought 
from nyder after be lien had attached. The amount of 
th ta i 3,463.29, with considerable interest. The Inter-
n tional otton Pre ompany ubrnit an offer to pay $50, 
t g her with all co t and expen e , in con ideration of a 
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release of the lien, and the U. S. district attorney and the 
Solicitor of the Treasury recommended the acceptance of 
the proposition. You ask whether you can legally approve 
the proposed compromise "Rnder Revised Statutes, section 
3469. 
The petition for settlement and the recommendations in 
support thereof are not based upon doubts as to the possi-
bility of realizing the amount of the tax out of the property, 
but upon the ground of the hardship to the company sup-
posed to be involved in enforcing against it the laws of the 
United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court in a 
proceeding to which the company was a party. 
I am of the opinion that section 3469 has no application to 
such a case. It provides that-
" Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special attor-
ney or agent having charge of any claim "in favor of the 
United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim, 
and the terms upon which the same may be ..compromised, 
and recommending that it be compromised upon the terms 
so offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of 
the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to 
compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of 
this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the 
postal laws." 
The section does not authorize the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to remit or release moneys due to the United States and· 
clearly recoverable, but to "compromise," which implies a 
claim of doubtful recovery or enforcement. 
In the case which you submit there is nothing to "com-
promise," for the right of recovery and the amount have been 
finally adjudged by the court of last resort, and the property 
is said to be sufficient to satisfy the debt. 
These views are not in conflict with the opinion to which 
I have been referred, given to the Secretary of the Treasury 
on November 13, 1884, by Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips (18 
Opin., 72), for that was the case of a claim with respect to 
which, although it had been reduced to judgment, there was, 
to use the language of the opinion, "doubt whether anything 
more could be made;" nor with the opinion of Mr. Attorney-
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General Akerman (13 Opin., 479), which seems to relate to a 
judgment open to be reviewed, and not to the final judgment 
of a court of last resort. 
Respectfully, 
LAWRENCE MAXWELL, JR., 
Solicitor-General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
INSPECTION OF STEAMSHIPS-EXPIRED CERTIFICATES. 
The regulations provided by title 52 of the Revised Statutes do not 
apply to American steam vessels whilst engaged in commerce beyond 
the jurisdictio~ of the United States. 
Expired inspection certificates can not be extended by consular officers 
of the United States; and there is no authority of law for sending 
local inspectors out of the country to make inspection. 
DEP.A.R'.I.'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 17, 1894. 
SIR: I have your letter of July 14, 1894, submitting for my 
"consideration and opinion the following questions regard-
ing the application of the U.S. steamboat laws (title 52, Rev. 
Stat.) to American steam vessels, originally inspected under 
those laws in a port of the United States, whose inspection 
certificates have expired by limitation whilst the steamers 
are engaged in commerce between foreign ports outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and which steamers are 
likely to remain beyond such jurisdiction for an indefinite 
period." 
The question to be considered being, "Whether such steam-
ers run11ing on expired certificates of inspection outside the 
territory of the United States are liable to the penalties pro 
vided in titl 52 for violation of the provi ions of that title.'7 
nd " hetber under the diplomatic or con ular laws of 
nit d tat there i any authority for such officers to 
t nd in pe tion rtificates granted by United States 
iu p t r · of team ve el to merican teamers," etc. 
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And, "As to the legality of sending local inspectors to 
Panama to inspect the vessels referred to," etc. 
Section 4400 of title 52, Revised Statutes, provides: 
"All steam vessels navigating any waters of the United 
States which are common highways of commerce, or open to 
general or competitive navigation, excepting public vessels 
of the United States, vessels of other countries, and boats, 
propelled in whole or in part by steam for navigating canals, 
shall be subject to the provisions of this title." 
As all of your questions relate to "steamers engaged in 
commerce between foreign ports outside the jurisdict-ion of the 
United States, and which are likely to remain beyond such 
jurisdiction for an indefinite period," it is obvious that they 
do not fall within the class to which title 52, Revised Stat-
utes, applies; and it is difficult to see how, whilst they 
"remain beyond the jurisdiction of the United States and 
engaged in commerce between foreign ports outside such 
jurisdiction," the laws of the United States for the regulation 
of steam vessels can be made to apply to or be enforced 
against them. 
I am of opinion that such steam vessels, whilst so engaged 
in commerce beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, are 
not subject to the regulations provided by title 52 of the 
Revised Statutes, and that there is no authority of law for 
consular officers of the.United States " to extend inspection 
certificates granted by the United States inspectors of steam 
vessels to American steamers;" and that there is no authority 
of law for '' sending local inspectors to Panama to inspect 
the steam vessels referred to." 
Very respectfully, 
RICH.ARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF TREASURY. 
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MILITARY EQUIPMENTS-RIGHT 01? CONTROL. 
The opinion expressed that certain arms furnished the Washington 
Light Infantry, of Charleston, S. C., are held by the State of South 
Carolina for the use of the whole body of the militia of that State 
in such manner and in accordance with such rules and regulations as 
the proper authorities of the State may prescribe. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 25, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 23d 
instant, in which my opinion is requested upon two questions 
presented in a letter of the attorney-general of the State of 
South Carolina of the 22d instant. 
The facts as there stated are that under a joint resolution 
of April 27, 1876 (Stat. L., vol. 19, p. 212), certain arms and 
accouterments were loaned by the United States to the 
Washington Light Infantry, of Charleston, S. O., and that 
under joint resolution of March 9, 1878 (20 Stat. L., p. 248), 
120 of these rifles and other accouterments were charged to 
the State of South Carolina on its quota, upon the written 
approval of the government of the said State, for the use of 
said Washington Light Infantry. 
The inquiries made are: 
'' (1) Are these arms the property of the Washington Light 
Infantry or have they any right deriv.ed from the laws of the 
United States to said arms over and above any other partic-
ular militia of the State of South Carolina f 
"(2) Are these arms not to be considered as devoted to the 
general purposes of the militia of the State of South Caro-
lina, and as between the said Washington Light Infantry 
and the State of South Carolina are they not subject to such 
disposition as the rules, regulations, and commands of the 
general militia may require '!" 
It i exceedingly doubtful whether I can rightfully give 
any opinion a requested, the arms referred to having been 
ab olutely and finally delivered by the United States, so that 
the inquirie above tated relate to the effect of an act already 
d n b the ar Department, rather tlrnn raise any que tion 
of pre ent administration. Without pa sing upon that point, 
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however, which I mention only that it may not seem to have 
escaped notice, I answer the inquiries propo'unded by say-
ing that, in my judgment, the arms in question are held by 
the State of South Carolina for the use of the whole body of 
the militia of that State in such manner ·and in accordance 
with such rules and regulations as the proper authorities of 
the State may prescribe. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. · 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
SEEDS-PURCHASE-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. 
'fhe act· making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for 
the fiscal year 1895 does not authorize the purchase of any other than 
seeds described in Revised Statutes, section 527. 
Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
.August 15, 1894. 
Sm: , I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 14th 
instant, in which you ask my opinion upon the question 
whether the act making appropriations for the Department 
of Agriculture for the fiscal year 1895 enables the Secretary 
of that Department to purchase any other than seeds 
described in section 527 of the Revised Statutes, to wit, 
seeds " rare and uncommon to the country or such as can 
be made more profitable by frequent changes from one part 
of our country to another." 
I have no hesitation in answering the question in the neg-
ative. Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored, 
and are held to have taken place only when the provisions 
of the former and latter statutes are irreconcilable and can 
uot have been intended to be operative at the same time. 
In the present instance not only is there nothing in the 
appropriation act for 1895 nece8sarily inconsistent with the 
terms of section 527 of the Revjsed Statutes, but the lan-
guage of the former is "For the purchase, propagation, and 
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distribution, as reqitired by law," etc. Here is an express 
reference to prior legislation on the subject, which makes it 




The SECRE'l'ARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
NAVAL SUPPLIES-CONTRACTS-WITHDRAWING BID. 
The Secretary of the Navy is obliged to give contracts for supplies 
to the lowest b idder uho fills the r equirements as to security, etc., 
although the Secretary is the person charged with the duty of ascer-
taining the facts in this regard, and h is decision ie not reviewable in 
any court. 
In the absence of any special statutor y pr ovision to the contrary, a bid-
der for a Government contract may withdraw his bid at any time until 
notice of acceptance. 
Whether t-here is any such special statutory provision relating to the 
Navy Departmentf Qmure. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Augus1, 31, 1894. 
SIR: Your communication of August 28 states the follow-
ing facts : You advertised for sealed proposals for supplying 
certain chain cables for the use of t he Navy, which proposals 
were opened, by the terms of the advertisement, on August 21 
last. The lowest bidder was one Neville. Before receiving· 
notice of acceptance, however, he withdrew his proposal on 
August 25. You ask an official opinion as to whether you 
have the right to release him, or may and must hold him to 
his offer. 
You are required by statute, when time will permit, to 
procure supplies only by the method adopted in this case, 
namely, by advertising a certain length of time for sealed 
propo al , and opening the proposals at a specified time in 
he pre ence of all bidders desiring to attend . You are 
required to award the contract for . uch supplies to the low-
est bidder who gives ati fa tory security and whose p ro-
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posal shall be accompanied by the guaranty prescribed by 
the statute. (Rev. Stat., secs. 3709, 3710, 3718, 3719, 3722.) 
You may also refuse to accept bids for other reasons, as for 
the bad record of the bidder or his guarantor, or excessive 
price demanded. (Rev. Stat., secs. 3722, 3724.) 
You have, therefore, no arbitrary right of selection, like a 
private person to whom an offer is made. The lowest bidder 
who fills the other requirements is entitled to an award of 
the contract, although you are the person charged to ascer-
tain the facts in this regard, and your decision is not review-
able by any court. Under these circumstances the suggestion 
is made that the law really accepts the lowest competent 
bid at the moment the sealed proposals are opened, so that 
on correct analysis it is the advertisement which corre-
sponds to the common-law offer, and the bid which corre-
sponds to the common-law acceptance; and therefore that 
the bidder can not thereafter assert the common-law right to 
withdraw an unaccepted offer. Such a ruling would avoid 
gross abuses. ( Twiss v. City of Port Huron, 63 Mich., 528, 
531.) The rulings of this Department, however, in the 
absence of any special statutory provision, are that the bid-
der may withdraw at any moment until notice of acceptance 
of his bid. (9 Opin., 17 4; rn Opin., 648, 651.) 
A special statute relating to bids in your Department 
requfres that "each proposal shall be accompanied by a 
written guaranty * * * that the bidder, if his bid is 
accepted, will * * * give bond with good and sufficient 
sureties to furnish the supplies proposed." (Rev. Stat., sec. 
3719.) Strictly construed, this does not prevent a with-
drawal before acceptance. Liberally construed, in conform-
ity with the manifest intent of the provision, I think it may 
fairly be held that it binds the bidder to stand by his bid, at 
least after- the hour of opening. The case being doubtful, I 
am inclined to give a liberal construction to the statute, 
since in this way only can its authoritative construction be 
obtained from the courts. I would therefore advise that Mr. 
Neville be held to his proposal, and that no· right of with-
drawal O!l his part be recognized, but that he and his guar-
antors be held responsible. 
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You further ask whether it is your duty to award the con-
tract to the next lowest bidder. I would answer that it is 
not necessarily so. The next lowest bidder may, for instance, 
have bid too high. (Rev. Stat., sec. 3724; see sec. 3719.) 
Very respectfully, 
EDWARD B. WHITNEY, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRET.ARY OF 'l'HE N.AVY • 
.ATTORNEY-GENER.AL-CIVIL SERVICE-RESIDENCE. 
Opinion of June 8, 1894 (supra, p. 33), will not be reconsidered for the 
purpose of passing upon new and .conflicting evidence. The credi-
bility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are not questions to 
be considered in rendering an opinion. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 12, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt, by reference 
from you, of communication of July 20, 1894, from John R. 
Procter and Charles Lyman, requesting further considera-
tion and opinion as to residence of Edward D. Morrill, to be 
based upon new and additional evidence accompanying such 
request. 
I am not at liberty to comply with such request, as it 
would involve consideration and decision upon conflicting 
evidence. The former opinion was based upon Morrill's own 
declarations as a statement of fact. He now seeks to change 
the conclusion reached by stating in his own affidavit, in 
some measure supported by others, a new fact, namely, a 
mental purpose. · 
Morrill having established Chattanooga, Tenn., as his 
legal residence in November, 1888, by voting there, now 
state (affidavit of July 16, 1894) that in November, 1889, 
be xeturned to Camden, Ala.," with the full intention of mak-
ing that hi future home, or rather of resuming his former 
domicile," while in hi affidavit of July 31, 1894, purporting 
to tate all facts relevant to his acts and intentions on ques-
tion of re idence, he declare that on ovember 21, 1889, he 
r urned amd n, Ala., an<l. " tayed in my own home and 
made preparations to come to Wa. hington." 
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This brings up for consideration the weight to be given to 
the affidavit of the person to be benefited in proving a pur-
pose to adopt a new residence, when such affiant appears 
jn the same record to have sworn differently on the same 
question, and to have sworn in his application in 1890 to 
continuous legal residence in Camden, Ala., since 1866, not-
withstanding the fact, now admitted by him, that Chatta-
nooga, Tenn., had been his legal residence for at least a year 
prior to November, 1888. 
Weight of evidence and credibility of such witnesses are 





.Acting .Attorney- ~eneral. 
HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE-PURCHASE OF SUPPLIES. 
All purchases and contracts for supplies in any of the Departments of 
the Government must be made by advertisement unless immediate 
delivery is necessary. 
The first two sentences of section 3709, Revised Statutes, as amended 
by the acts of January 27, chapter 22, and April 21, 1894, chapter 61, 
apply to purchases anywhere in the United States. The remaining 
three sentences apply only to purchases in the city of Washington. 
The word" miscellaneous," in the urgent deficiency act of April 21, 1894, 
section 2, must be restricted to that class of commodities which must 
be purchased on a considerable scale and used alike by many or all of 
the various Departments and Government establishments in the city 
of Washington. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 22, 1894. 
Srn: Your communication of September 11 asks my opinion 
as to the method which you should pursue in procuring cer-
tain drawing, engraving, and chart printing supplies required 
for the use of the Hydrographic Office in your Department. 
The schedule which you inclose, enumerating the articles to 
be purchased, shows them to be very varied in character, 
including paper, pencils, pens, water colors of different 
descriptions, with curves, dividers, gauges, and triangles, 
together with brushes, sponges, cloths, tacks, acids, and 
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other chemicals, etc. You ask me whether these supplies 
fall within the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised 
Statutes or the acts amendatory thereof. 
Section 3709 requires that "all purchases and contracts 
for supplies * * * in any of the Departments of the 
Government" shall be made by advertisement ''when the 
public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of 
the articles." Hence it is necessary for you to obtain these 
supplies, like all others, by advertisement unless immediate 
delivery is necessary. 
It remains to be considered whether these supplies must 
be advertised fo:r and the proposals therefor considered 
under the provisions of the amendatory act of January 27, 
1894. That act added to section 3709 three sentences by 
way of ~mendment, providing that the advertisements for 
supplies should be made by all the Departments on the same 
days, that proposals should be opened on the same days, 
and that they should be submitted for examination to a 
special board consisting of one .Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury, one .Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and one 
.Assistant Postmaster-General. 
Section 3709 being applicable to all purchases of supplies, 
whether made in Washington or elsewhere, this amendatory 
act had at first the same wide application. That was ~wt, 
however, its intention. Hence the oversight was corrected 
by section 2 of the urgent deficiency act of .April 21, 1894. 
That section restricts the application of the act of January 
27 to advertisements for proposals for "fuel, ice, stationery, 
and other miscellaneous supplies, to be purchased at Wash-
ington for the use of the Executive Departments and other 
Government establishments therein named." No such restric-
tion, however, was imposed upon the original provisions of 
section 3709. Hence that section in its present form must 
receive an anomalous construction. Its first two sentences 
apply to purchases anywhere in the United States, while the 
remaining three sentences apply only to purchases in this 
city. 
Thi geographical restriction, a I have said, was the main 
obj ct of the tatut of pril. That tatute, however, 
impos d a ·till further restriction upon the operation of the 
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three sentences added in January. The origmal portion of 
section 3709 relates to all "supplies." The last three sen-
tences, however, now apply only to "fuel, ice, stationery, 
and other miscellaneous supplies." 
Whether you are obliged to advertise in the present instance 
under the .act of January depends on whether the supplies 
you now desire are covered by this phraseology. I could not 
undertake to decide that question as a pure matter of law in 
the case of each of the oue hundred and twenty-two items in 
your schedule, even were I acquainted with all the relevant 
facts bearing upon each article. Congress has spoken in very 
general language, which necessarily and wisely, and perhaps 
intentionally, leaves much to the Executive Departments 
themselves in the interpretation of the act. I can only indi-
cate the general principles governing the application of the 
statute of April, leaving its application in matters of detail 
to the heads of the various Departments in consultation with 
the members of the examining board, who, through special 
knowledge and experience, are much better qualified than . 
myself in this regard. 
The definitions of " fuel" and " ice" are unnecessary here 
to consider. The word "stationery" has no special legal 
definition. It is defined in the Century Dictionary as follows: 
"The articles usually sold by stationers; the various mate-
rials employed in writing, such as paper, pens, pencils, and 
ink." Webster defines it as follows: "The articles usually 
sold by stationers, as paper, pens, ink, quills, blank books 
' etc." Whether the a"rticles required by them are usually
sold by stationers is a matter concerning which your employes 
in the Hydrographic Office can doubtless afford full informa-
tion. I am uot sufficiently informed to be able to advise as 
matter of law whether or not there may be varieties of paper, 
pens, pencils, etc., which are not classifiable as "stationery." 
The word "miscellaneous" in this statute is still more diffi-
cult to construe. It evidently does not include all supplies, 
for this would make the whole provision entirely unneces-
sary. Congress must be presumed to have inserted it for 
some reason. A. practical definition of the word can only be 
obtained by applying the rule noscitur a, sociis. Fuel, ice, 
and stationery are staples required by every Department 
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and every branch of the service. The word ''miscellaneousi' 
must be restricted to other supplies of the same general 
nature; in other words, to that class of commodities which 
must be purchased on a considerable scale and used alike by 
many or all of the various Departments and Government 
establishments in this city. This conclusion is s~rengthenecl 
by the fact that proposals are submitted to a board contain-
ing one representative from each of the three Departments 
that require these staple commodities in the largest amount. 
It is natural to provide that high officers of the Treasury, 
Interior, and Post-Office Departments should superintend 
the purchase of these staples, not only for their own Depart-
ments,. but for the other Departments and establishments as 
well. It is less natural that they should be designated to 
negotiate the purchase of articles required for scientific or 
technical work of your Department, of the Department of 
Agriculture, of the U. S. Fish Commission, or the Smithson-
ian Institution. It is well known, moreover, that the main 
object of the statute of January was to equalize, at the low-
est possible price, the prices paid by the different Depart-
ments for the supplies common to all; it having been cause 
for remark that the. rates obtained by the various Depart-
ments had greatly varied in the past. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLN.EY. 
The SECRETARY Olf THE NAVY. 
HYDRAULIC MINING. 
The North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company, of California, is within 
the jurisdiction of the California Debris Commission. (53 Fed. Rep., 
625, considered.) 
Resort may be had to a court of equity to compel allowance of inspec-
tion of premises where hydraulic mining is being, or is supposed to 
be, unlawfully conducted. 
DEP AR'.l1MEN'l1 OF JUSTICE, 
September 24, 1S94. 
IR: I ha e the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the 
f th ting e retary of War, inquiring whether or 
r h Bloomfi Id Gravel Mining Company, of Cali-
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fornia, falls within the jurisdiction of the California Debris 
Commission, under the act of Congress approved March 1, 
1893, and entitled "An act to create the California Debris 
Commission and regulate hydraulic mining in the State of 
California;" and inqµiring also whether, in view of the fact 
that the said mining company has never made application to 
the said Commission for license to operate, as required by the 
tei:·ms of said act, the Commission has "authority to enter 
upon the premises for the purpose of inspecting or supervis-
ing the operation of the mine, or performing any of the 
duties devolved by the said act upon the Commission in 
respect thereto; and, if it has that authority and is forbid-
den by the said company to enter upon its premises for that 
purpose, by what means can the Commission enforce its said 
authority¥" 
In reply I beg to state that in my opinion there is no rea-
son whatever why the company mentioned should not come 
equally with any other company or individual engaged in 
hydraulic mining within the jurisdiction and under the 
authority of the Commission. The claim of the company 
that, under the decision of the circuit court of the United 
States for the northern district of California, iu the case of 
The United States v. The Same Company (53 Fed. Rep., 625), 
dated October 5, 1892, the defendant was removed beyond 
the provision and operation of the law creating the Com-
mission I deem utterly untenable. At the time of the trial 
and decision of the case mentioned that law was not in 
existence; consequently it could not have been construed or 
the extent of its operation defined by the court. Moreover, 
the decision referred to was only to the effect that an injunc-
tion to restrain hydraulic mining by the defendant should 
be denied, for the reason_ that there was not sufficient show -
ing of damage to the navigability of public waters. But, 
whatever might have been the status of' this company 
prior to the enactment of the debris law, that law has 
become operative upon it as well as upon all others conduct-
ing the business of hydraulic mining; and this company, if 
engaged in such mining and without license, is doing so iu 
violation of law; for it is provided by section 9 of said act 
(27 Stat., 508): " That the individual proprietor or proprie-
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tors, or in case of a corporation its manager or agent 
appointed for that purpose, owning mining . ground in the 
territory in the State of California mentioned in section 
three hereof, which it is desired to work by the hydraulic 
process, must file with said Commission a verified petition 
setting forth such facts as will comply with law and the rules 
prescribed by said Commission." 
The right of the Commission to enter upon the lands of 
the company where such mining is being, or is supposed 
to be, unlawfully conducted seems entirely clear under the 
provisions . of section 5 of said act. This section, after 
directing that· the Commission shall make examinations 
and surveys to determine the practicability, utility, etc., 
of storage sites for debris, reservoirs, etc., to aid in the 
improvement and protection of the rivers within its juris-
diction, and to that end, preventing, amongst other mat-
ters, the deposit of debris resulting from mining operations, 
declares that the Commission shall " * * * investi-
gate such hydraulic and other mines as now are or may 
have been worked by . methods intended to restrain the 
debris and material moved in operating such mines by 
impounding dams, settling reservoirs, or otherwise, and in gen-
eral to make such study of and researches in the hydraulic 
mining industry as science, experience, and engineering skill 
may suggest as practicable and useful in devising a method 
or methods whereby such mining may be carried on as 
•aforesaid." 
By section 20 of said act it is provided: "That said Com-
mission, or a committee therefrom, or officer of said corps 
assigned to duty under its orders, shall, whenever deemed 
necessary, visit said territory and all mines operating under 
the provisions of this act * * * ." By section 22 of this 
act hydraulic mining contrary to the provisions of the act 
to the injury, direct or indirect, of navigable waters is made 
a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, while 
by ection 5 the power to investigate mines is given iu rela-
tion to tho e that "are now or may have been" worked. I 
think that the law intended th us to give to the Commission 
ample means for a certaining the method of conduct of the 
mining indu try, with a view to the protection of the navi-
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gable waters concerned and the punishment of violators of 
the law, and that such means necessarily include the right 
to enter upon and inspect premises even at the present time. 
I am unable to find in the act in question any provision 
for the enforcement of the right of the Commission to enter 
upon lands for the examination of mines, and in the absence 
of such expres·s provision am of the opinion that the pref-
erable course would be the filing of a bill in equity, alleging 
(amongst other and usual matters) that the company is con-
ducting hydraulic mining without license and without appli-
cation for license, and, as believed, to the injury of navigation 
of the streams; that the Commission desire to investigate 
the method of mining, construction of reservoirs, etc., and to 
that end have attempted to enter upon the land, but have 
been denied · admittance, the prayer of the bill to be for an 
injunction to prevent the defendants from preventing the 
entry of the Commission and for injunction restraining the 
defendants from mining during the time the Commission is 
excluded by it and pending the investigation. 
Respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF W.A.R. 
LIFE-SAVING MEDALS. 
Section 12 of act of June 18, 1878, chapter 265, does not confer authority 
upon the Secretary of the Treasury to bestow life-saving medals for 
signal exertions made in saving persons from drowning in small 
inland streams, ponds, and pools. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 26, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of Sep-
tember 21, from which I understand you to desire my opinion 
upon the question "whether section 12 of the act of June 
18, 1878, entitled 'An act to organize the Life-Saving Serv-
ice,' authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to bestow life-
saving medals for signal exertions made in saving persons 
from drowning in small inland streams, ponds, pools;" the 
tern! "inland " being used, I take it, to indicate that the 
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waters referred to are wholly within a State and no part of 
the navigable waters of the United States. 
I am of the opinion that the section referred to does not 
confer such authority. Its terms are vague and general, but 
must be construed in connection with other sections of the 
same act and with other acts relating to the same subject-
matter. So construed, the waters contemplated by the sec-
tion are, in my judgment, either the high seas or what may 
be described as .waters of the United States; that is, waters 
belonging to the United States as owner, or over which it 
has jurisdiction by virtue of its authority to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce. 
Respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES-MANUFACTURES OF WOOL. 
The phrase "manufactures of wool" in paragraph 297 of the tariff act 
of Aug-ust 27, 1894, does not include manufactures of the hair of any 
animals other than the sheep. 
All doubts arising under said act are presumptively to be resolved in 
favor of the lower rate of duty, save where the act mentions or de-
scribes the same article in two different places, under two different 
rates, when the higher rate governs. 
The phrase in question having been given a restrictive meaning in 
prior tariff acts, there is a presumption, in the absence of anything 
to the contrary, that Congress intended it still to have the same 
meaning. 
The titles of the schedules in the tariff act have little significance. 
The phrase aforesaid 'does not include articles partly of wool of which 
wool is not the component material of chief value. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 9, 1894. 
Sm: The new rates of import duties prescribed by section 
1 of the tariff act of .August 27, 1894, went into effect imme-
diately, "unless otherwise specially provided for." Para-
graph 297 of that act provided that "the reduction of the 
rates of duty herein provided for manufactures of wool shall 
take effect January 1, 1895." That paragraph closes Sched-
ul of th act, who e heading is "Wool, and manufactures 
of wool.' The schedule doe not, however, deal with wool 
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and manufactures of wool alone. It distinguishes repeat-
edly between '' wool, worsted, the hair of the camel, goat, 
alpaca, or other animals." It includes also certain manufac-
tures of flax and cotton. 
You ask my opinion whether paragraph 297 refers solely 
to merchandise of which wool, the product of the sheep, forms 
the material, or whether the product of the camel, goat, 
alpaca, or other animals is equally included. 
The general intent of the act was to effect an immediate 
as well as extensive reduction of duties. To postpone the 
reduction in the case of any specific article, the article must 
be brought clearly within some exception to this general 
intent. All doubts arising under the act are presumptively 
to be resolved in favor of the lower rate of duty, save where 
the act mentions or describes the same article in two dif-
ferent places, under two different rates, wh~n the higher rate 
governs. 
"Wool," within dictionary definitions, includes the hair of 
the alpaca and of the Angora goat; it never is used to 
include all goat's hair, nor yet camel's hair, cow hair, or 
horsehair. Throughout Schedule K, except in the heading, 
it is undoubtedly used so as to exclude even hair of the kinds 
first mentioned. Moreover, the phrase, "manufactures of 
wool" has been given a very restrictive meaning in prior 
tariff -acts (Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 137; Seeberger v. 
Gahn, 137 U. S., 95), and there is a presumption, in the 
absence of anything to the contrary, that Congress intended 
it still to have the same signification. (J.11.addock v. Magone, 
152 u. s., 368, 371, 372.) 
If the heading· of Schedule K were intended as an accu-
rate and comprehensive deseription of its contents, the 
question would arise whether the heading or the contents 
should control; and it might be argued that hair, flax, and 
/ cotton were all wool. But the heading has little significance. 
It is intended only for a general suggestion as to the char-
acter of the articles within the schedule. (Hollender v. 
Magone, 149 U. S., 586, 591; Seeberger v. Schlesinger, 152 
U. S., 581, 583.) If the rule of construction were otherwise, 
then sponges would be either "chemicals, oils, or paints," 
and cork would be either "flax, hemp, or jute." 
68 HON. RICHARD OLNEY. 
Chinese Immigration. 
Moreover, it is proper to consider, as an aid to construc-
tion, the original form of the bill and the changes made by 
amendment. The bill as it first passed the House of Repre-
sentatives, in the same paragraph, with the exception above 
quoted concerning" manufactures of wool," had further pro-
visions as to "all rates of duty in the woolen schedule." 
The latter was stricken out in the Senate, but serves to 
show that the distinction was brought to the attention of 
Congress. 
I am therefore very clearly of the opinion that the word 
'' wool," as used in paragraph 297, refers to hair of the sheep 
only, and that the new duties upon articles made of the 
hair of other animals went immediately into effect upon the 
passage of the act. 
You ask also my opinion whether the phrase ''manufac-
tures of wool" in that paragraph is applicable to articles of 
which -wool, as so defined, although a component material, is 
not the material of chief value. I would answer this ques-
tion in the negative. (Arthur v. Butterfield, 125 U. S., 70, 
75; Herrman v. Robertson, 152 U. S., 521, 524.) 
Very respectfully, 
LA. WRENOE MAXWELL, JR., 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CHINESE IMMIGRATION. 
The convention of March 17, 1894, between the United States and 
China did not repeal any prior legislation except the act approved 
October 1, 1888. . (25 Stat., 504.) 
The Secretary of the Treasury bas power to require the production of a 
certificate, in such form as he may prescribe, evidencing the right of 
certain subjects of China to enter tho United States, ancl has author-
ity to require that Chinese laborers leaving the United States tempo-
rarily shall return to this country only at the ports from which they 
depart. 
DEP .A.R'.J..'MEN'.I.' OF J STICE, 
October 16, 1894. 
Sm: I hav the honor to a knowledge the receipt of your 
tt r f the d in taut, in ·Io iu(Y copy of the convent10n of 
arch 1 la t e we u h uited tat and Chiua for the 
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regulation of immigration between the two countries; and I 
have considered the questions propounded by you. 
"1. Whether or not the treaty repeals in whole or in part 
any legislation except the act approved October 1, 1888. 
(25 Stat. L., 504.)" 
From the examination I have been able to give to t,he 
legislation on the subject of Chinese immigrat10n, I am of 
opinion that the treaty does not repeal any other legislation 
than that iudicated. 
"2. Will it be permissible for this Department to require 
the production of such certificate as a condition precedent 
t 
to entry; and if so, may the certificate be in the form pro-
vided for by section 6 of the act approved July 5, 1884 ! (23 
Stat., 115.)" 
The power was given to you, in the act referred to, to pre_ 
scribe the form of the certificate required in that act, while 
article 3 of the treaty is more general in its terms than were 
the requirements of the act referred to. 
I am of opinion that it is still competent for you to require 
the production of a certificate, in such form as you may pre-
scribe, by such '' Chinese subjects being officials, teachers, 
students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity o.r; pleasure, 
but not laborers, as evidence of their right to enter the United 
States. 
"3. As to your 'authority to issue a regulation providing 
that Chinese laborers residing in the United States, and who 
may depart therefrom for temporary sojourn abroad, shall 
return to this country only at the ports from which they 
depart.'" 
I am of opinion that you clearly have such authority under 
your general powers as well as under the legislation on this 
subject, which remains unaffected by the treaty. 
I herewith return the copy of the convention, inclosed in 
your letter, as you request. · 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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ACCEPTANCE OF VESSEL-LIENS. 
The Treasury Department can legally accept the revenue cutter Calumet, 
subject to a creditor's lien, and, after satisfying the lien, proceed 
against the contractor's bondsmen to recover a payment in excess of 
the requirements of the contract. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 16, 1894. 
Sm: I have to acknowledge yours of this date, in which 
you ask my opinion upon the question whether the Treasury 
Department ca:n legally accept the revenue cutter Oalurnet, 
subject to a creditor"s lien for $2,000, and, after discharging 
the lien by payment of the $2,000, then proceed against the 
contractor's bondsmen to recover a balance of $1,000 paid 
by the Department in excess of the requirements of the 
contract. 
In my judgment, the Treasury Department can legally 
take the course above outlined. In giving this opinion, 
however, I assume that the contract and the bond, neither 
of which instruments I have seen, are in the ordinary form 
and contain no special provisions preventing any such action 
by the Treasury Department as is above indicated. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY. 
BONDS OF FLOYD COUNTY, GA. 
A proposed issue of interest-bearing bonds by the county commissioners 
of Floyd County, Ga., will not conflict with the banking laws of the 
United States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
October 19, 1894. 
SIR : I have your of the 17th instant, in which you request 
my opinion upon the que tion whether the proposed issue of 
inter t-bearing boud by the county commissioners of F loyd 
ounty, Ga., will be in conflict with the banking laws of the 
nit d tate ·. u inclo e the opimou of the Solicitor of 
the Trea ury to the effect that uch i u if made wiU not 
' ' 
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conflict with the banking laws of the United States, and, 
for the reasons given- by the Solicitor, I concur in that 
conclusion. 
As the question whether such bonds, if issued, will be sub-
ject to taxation, under sections 19 and 20 of the act of Feb-
ruary 18, 1875, does not arise upon any facts now existing 
and is one upon which my opinion is not asked, I express no 
opinion respecting it. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD . OLNEY. 
The SECRE'.L'ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
N OTE.-The portion of the opinion of the Solicitor of the 
Treasury referred to in the foregoing, as concurred in, is as 
follows: 
"WASHINGTON, D. c., September 28, 1894. 
"Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your reference of 
a letter addressed to the Comptroller of the Currency by 
Mr. R. G. Clark, of Rome, Ga. 
'' Mr. CJ ark states that the county commissioners of Floyd 
County, Ga., propose to issue a certain amount in county 
bonds, 4 pe,· cent interest, in denominations of $51 $10, and 
$20, with a view of using the same as local currency; and 
he inquires "hether such action would conflict in any way 
with United States banking laws. 
"In response to your request for an expression of my 
opinion, I have to advise you that no statute of the United 
States prohibits the issue of county bonds in any denomina-
tion. A county has a right to issue bonds, when not in con-
travention to the constitution of the State. 
* * * * * 
"Very respectfully, 
"F. A. REEVE, 
'' Solicitor of the Treasury. 
"The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY." 
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CUSTOMS-SALE OF SMUGGLED PATENTED ARTICLE. 
Smuggled goods may be seized and sold by a coliector of customs 
although protected by patents. 
DEPAR'l'MENT .OF JUS'l'ICE, 
October 22, 1894. 
Sm: Certain phenacetine, smuggled into the United States 
from Canada, bas been seized by the collector of customs at 
Cape Vincent. It appears that the article is patented in 
this country. You do not inform me as to its status in Can-
ada. I will assume, however, that a sale of the article in 
this country by the importer would be an infringement upon 
the rights of the patentee. 
You ask my opinion whether this phenacetine can be law-
fully sold by the collector. 
Section 3077 of the Revised Statutes requires the collect-
ors to sell goods seized for violation of the revenue laws. 
Section 4884, indeed, if literally applied to this case, would 
operate as an agreement on the part of the United States 
not to make such a sale. In my opinion,however, this section 
is not to be applied to the case of smuggled goods, but that 
the section first cited requfres the collector to sell them 
whether patented or unpatented. I do not undertake to 
state :what rights the purchaser would obtain upon such a 
sale. He could at least reexport the goods or resell them 
to the patentee. 
Very respect.fully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
I DIAN TERRITORY-USE OF MILITARY. 
The troops of the United States can not be employed in the Indian Ter-
ritory to aid in the preservation of peace and the arrest of alleged 
"outlaws" ancl "bandits," unless such persons are trespassing or are 
ab, conding offenders within the provisions of Revisecl Statutes, sec-
ti n 2152. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, . 
October 27, 1894. 
JR: _I have your of the 25th instant, informing me that 
the Indian agent at Mu cogee, in the Indian Territory, through 
he mmi ioner of Indian :ffair , reports frequent rob-
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beries of individuals and corporations by "bandits," causing 
express companies to refuse to carry money and other valu-
ables on the Missouri Pacific Railroad and producing general 
alarm and interruption of business in the Indian Territory. 
The Commissioner recommends that United States troops 
be sent to the agency to aid in the preservation of peace and 
the arrest of the '' outlaws," and you inquire whether the 
United States troops can be used as requested by the Com-
missioner, and add that, as the Secretary of the Interior Jias 
requested special action, you desire an immediate reply. 
Without undertaking to discuss the matter at length, there-
fore, I hasten to say that my conclusions agree with those of 
the Major-General of the Army and of the Acting Judge-
Ad vocate-General, and that unless the persons variously 
described by the Commissioner as "bandits" and "outlaws" 
are illegally intruding or attempting to intrude upon the 
Indian country, or are absconding offenders within the pro-
visions of section 2152 of the Revised Statutes, the United 




The SECRET.ARY OF W .AR. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-SOUTH CAROLINA DISPENSARY LAW. 
The Attorney-General is not authorized to give an official opinion as to 
"the course which should be taken" by another Department, as that 
involves questions of fact and considerations of expediency. 
Distilled liquors in a United States bonded warehouse can not be seized 
under State process. 
The Sot1th Carolina dispensary law of December, 1893, does not author-
ize any officer of that State to tender the taxes due to the United 
States on such liquors. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
October 29, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 
18th instant, inclosing copies of letter of Governor Tillman, 
of South Carolina, to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
and of letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to 
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yourself, and concluding as follows: "I have, therefore, the 
honor to request that you furnish this Department with an 
opinion as to the course which should be taken by the Office 
of Internal Revenue in the event that the State officers of 
South Carolina seize spirits in the bonded warehouses iu 
that State." 
If the request thus framed is to be literally construed, it 
is out of my power to comply with it. The course to be pur-
sued by your Department, in the event specified, may involve 
matters of fact of which I have no knowledge and consider-
ations of expediency upon which it is not for me to pass 
judgment. I assume, however, that what is meant to be 
inquired about is a question of law arising or sure to arise 
in the administration of your Department, and which may be 
thus stated: If the officers of the State of South Carolina 
undertake to enter a United States bonded warehouse in 
South Carolina and to seize distilled liquors therein under 
the dispensary law of December, 1893, simultaneously ten-
dering to the collector of internal revenue any tax lawfully 
dne on such Uquors, is such action to be acquiesced in as not 
in conflict with any laws or rights of the United States Y 
1. The legal status of distilled liquors in a bonded ware-
house of the United States, and under the control of the col-
lector of internal revenue, is definitely stated and settled 
by section 934 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, 
which declares that "All property taken or detained by any 
officer or other person under authority of any revenue law of 
the United States, shall be irrepleviable, and shall be deemed 
to be in the custody of the law, and subject only to the orders 
and decrees of the courts of the United States having juris-
diction thereof." 
2. It need not be held, as has been suggested, and perhaps 
might well be, that since the tariff act of August 27, 1894, 
the tax due on distilled liquors in a United States bonded 
war bou an be paid only by the di tiller. Whether that 
o or not, a tender of uch taxe by a sheriff or other like 
tat fficer i ne · arily ineffectual a again t the tatute 
b e <JU ted, inc 't i b yond the pow r of an internal 
oll tort a c pt it and thu nullify the provisions 
he Ioli y f a ta ut whi h , im. to ab. olutely 
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 75 
Assignment of Claims Against United States. 
exempt shch liquors from the operation of the process of a 
State court. Such tender, which, for the reason stated, the 
collector is incompetent to accept, must be also ineffectual, 
because no officer of South Carolina has been given the right 
or power to make it; the legislation of South Carolina not 
authorizing any such tender, nor providing any fund which 
can be used for that purpose. 
The result is that the provisions of the South Carolina 
dispensary law of 1893 must be regarded as ineffective and 
inoperative as against distilled liquors held in a United 
States bonded warehouse under the control of the collector 
of internal revenue. 
I send herewith for your information a copy of a courteous 
letter from Governor Tillman, written me in answer to my 
inquiry-made through the Uommissioner of Internal Rev-
enue-respecting the authority of any officer of South Caro-
lina to make payment or tender of the United States taxes 
due on such distilled liquors. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
~he SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES. 
An assignment of an indebtedness admittedly due by the United States 
is not inhibited by Revised Statutes, section 3477. (17 Opin., 545, 
approved.) 
A disbursing officer who holds a Treasury draft payable to the order of 
the original contractors should not deliver it to a receiver appointed 
in an action between contesting claimants. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 2, 1894. 
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of a communication 
of October 29, from Hon. Joseph B. Doe, Acting Secretary 
of War, transmitting certain papers relating to the claim of 
J. J. Leonard and others against Whaley & Taylor, late 
Government contractors. 
From this letter and accompanying papers it appears that 
the United States is indebted to Whaley & Taylor in the 
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sum of $17,350, that being the b·alance due upon the contract 
for work performed by them as . Government contractors, 
That a Treasury draft for $17,350, payable to the order of 
Whaley & Taylor, dated August 30, 1894, has been and is 
now in the hands of Lieut. Edgar Jadwin, post quartermaster 
at Willets Point, N. Y. That it is alleged tliat by an agree-
ment entered into between the firm of Whaley & Taylor of 
one part and Hammond and Leonard and Schofield, of the 
other part, all of the money coming to Whaley & Taylor 
from the United States under their ·contract was assigned by 
them to Hammond, Leonard, and Schofield. And it further 
provided therein that all drafts and checks, payable to 
Whaley & Taylor on said contract should be by them 
assigned by proper indorsement. 
That in a suit now pending in the supreme court of Kings 
County, N. Y., of John J. Leonard and George Schofield 
against Whaley, Taylor, and Hammond, an injunction was 
awarded restraining the said Whaley & Taylor from col-
lecting or receiving, in whole or in part, the proceeds of the 
Treasury draft above mentioped. 
And on the 19th of March, 1894, by an order made in said 
cause, the People's Trust Company was appointed receiver 
"of any check, draft, order, or warrant which the defendants, 
Whaley & Taylor, or either of them, may receive from the 
United States, etc. * * * And the said defendants, 
Whaley & Taylor, are hereby directed to surrender and 
deliver any such check, draft, order, or warrant upon receipt 
thereof to said receiver." 
Upon the foregoing state of facts the Acting Secretary of 
War asks my opinion as to whether he "would be authorized 
tJ direct the said disbur ing officer to pay over or deliver to 
tlle aid receiver the said Treasury draft." 
I am of the opinion that the disbursing officer, who, as an 
offic r of the U. S. Government, holds the draft payable to 
tbe order of haley Taylor, can not, with propriety or 
afi ty, b dire ted to turn that draft over to the receiver of 
th tat court in the proceeding referred to. 
he nit d St te i not a party to that proceeding and 
. ' 1t n ent an n t be made a party. 
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Lieutenant Jadwin, the quartermaster and present custo-
dian of the Treasury draft, is not a party and can not in his 
official character be proceeded against in that cause. 
The State court appears to have obtained jurisdiction over 
all the contending parties, and has restrained the payees of 
the draft from receiving or collecting the proceeds of it. 
On the 8th of October, 1894, Whaley & Taylor filed their 
petition against the United 8tates in the Court of Claims for 
the recovery of the amount of this Treasury draft. 
· It appears that there is no dispute as between the United 
States and the contractors, Whaley & Taylor, as to the 
amount due to them on their contract; that the United States 
has no other interest in this matter than to pay over this 
ascertained amount to whoever may be legally and properly 
entitled thereto. And if it be true that Whaley & Taylor 
have actually assigned this debt to Leonard and others, then, 
upon that state of facts, I concur in the views expressed in 
the opinion of a former Solicitor-General, which are approved 
and adopted by the Hon. Benjamin Harris Brewster, my 
predecessor in office, that such an assignment is not in viola-
tion of section 3477, Revised Statutes. (17 Opin., 545.) 
I do not feel at liberty to express any further opinion upon 
the merits of this · controversy, or as to the course which 
should be pursued by the parties, having fulJy responded to 
the only inquiry submitted to me, as to the propriety of the 
delivery by Quartermaster Jadwin of the Treasury draft to 
the receiver of the court. 
I herewith return all of the inclosures which accompanied. 
the letter of the Acting Secretary. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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LIENS-PROPERTY OF UNITED ST ATES. 
Mechanic's liens can not be acquired upon property of the United States. 
(Opin. of May 11, 1894, followed.) 
DEP AR'l'MEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
November 7, 1894. 
SIR: I have your two favors of the 2d instant, relating to 
the claim of Mr. ,James Bigler against Messrs. Byron Barlow 
& Co., contractors for the construction of a dry dock on 
Puget Sound, and requesting my opinion upon the questions 
whether, in view of the contract provisions quoted and 
referred to, your Department has become obligated to pro-
tect Mr. Bigler in the premises or has the legal power to 
enforce payment of his claim against Byron Barlow & Co., 
arising by reason of his construction and furnishmg of a 
caisson for said dry dock. 
In my judgment, both questions must be answered in the 
negative, the opinion of this Department of May 11, 1894, 
cited in your letter, being directly applicable so far as any 
mechanic's liens are concerned. It is plain that any repre-
sentations of Commodore Farquhar, however much Mr. Big-
ler may have relied upon them, must be regarded as wholly 
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WAR DEPARTMENT-MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT. 
The contract with Edwards, Howlett & Thompson for the improvement 
of the Hudson River may be legally modified, so as to provide for the 
acquirement by the United States, through condemnation, of the lands 
necessary for dumping grounds, to be maintained at the cost of the 
contractors. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 10, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 7th 
in tant, inclo ing copy of contract with Edwards, Howlett 
Tbomp on, of ew ork City, for the improvement. of the 
Hu on iv r; caning attention to the clau e by which the 
ntra tor und rtake to 1 rovide th ir own dumping grounds 
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at their own expense and to a proposed modification of the 
contract by a supplemental contract of the tenor following: 
"The Secretary of War will, whenever he deems necessary 
and proper and for the best interests of the United States, 
authorize proceedings to be taken in the name of the United 
States with the same force and effect as if such work was 
being performed directly by the Government for the acquire-
ment by condemnation of lands, right of way, and material 
to enable the work to be maintained, operated, or prosecuted, 
but all expenses incurred in and about the maintenance of 
such dumping grounds will be defrayed by the contractors 
without reimbursement by the Government"; and requesting 
my opinion upon the point whether the proposed modifica-
tion is such an one as can legally be made under the original 
· advertisement. 
The advertisement under which the original contract was 
made can no longer be regarded as of any material impor-
tance, since the work contracted for has been partially exe-
cuted, while unforeseen obstacles have arisen which threaten 
to greatly hinder and probably prevent its complete execu-
tion. Under such circumstances, what the contractors pro-
pose is a modification of the contract, which, while it relieves 
them of their difficulty, is m reality more favorable to the 
Government than the original contract. Under its terms the 
contractors were to furnish the necessary dumping grounds. 
But under the terms as modified, not only will the contract-
ors practically furnish the dumping grounds by paying the 
United States all they cost, but when the contract has been 
fulfilled the United States will own the dumping grounds, 
and will be pecuniarily benefited to the extent of their value. 
Without approving the precise terms of the proposed sup-
plemental contract-which I think may be advantageously 
changed in some particulars-the advertisement, pursuant to 
which the contractors bid for and were awarded the original 
contra.ct, does not, in my judgment, offer any legal difficulty 
to the making of substantially such a supplemental contract 
as is suggested. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR. 
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DUTY-IMPORTED. SALT-TREATY WITH PRUSSIA. 
The treaty of May 1, 1828, between the United States and the Kingdom 
of Prussia, is to be taken as operative as respects so much of the Ger-
man Empire as constitutes the Kingdom of Prussia. Semble, that 
it is not effective as regards the rest of that Empire. 
The "most-favored-nation clause" in that treaty is not violated by para-
graph 608 of the tariff act _of August 27, 1894, laying a discriminating 
duty on salt imported from a country which imposes a duty on salt 
exported from t,he United States. 
In case of conflict between a treaty and a subsequent statute, the latter 
governs. 
The laws of a foreign country are not known to the Attorney-General, 
but are facts to be proved by competent evidence. 
As to when the discriminating duty aforesaid applies to a country which 
imposes a duty on salt exported from the United States but lays a 
countervailing excise tax on domestic salt. QuaJre. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November J 3, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of October 27, asking my official opinion upon the question 
whether salt imported from the Empire of Germany is dutia-
ble under paragraph 608 of the tariff act of A.ugust 27, 1894. 
That paragraph, which puts salt in general on the free list, 
contains the following proviso: 
"Provided, That if salt is imported from any country 
whether independent or a dependency which imposes a duty 
upon salt exported from the United States, then there shall 
be levied, paid, and collected upon such salt the rate of duty 
existing prior to the passage of this act." 
.As Germany imposes a duty upon salt exported from the 
United States, German salt is apparently subject to the pro-
viso just quoted. The German ambassador, however, claims 
it is entitled to come into the United States free on two 
grounds. 
One is the "most-favored-nation clause," so called, which 
i em bodied in the following provisions of the treaty of May 
1, 1828, between the United States and Prussia: 
"ARTICLE V. 
ther dutie hall be impo ed on the impor-
tate of any article the produce or 
f Pru ia and no higher or oth r duties hall 
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be imposed on the importation into the Kingdom of Prussia of 
anx article the produce or manufacture of the United Stat~s 
than are or shall be payable on the like article being the prod-
uce or manufacture of any other foreign cop.ntry. * * * 
''ARTICLE IX. 
'' If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation 
any particular favor in navigation or commerce it shall im-
mediately become common to the other party freely, where 
it is freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the 
same compensation, when the grant is conditional." 
It should be noted that while this treaty is to be taken as 
operative as respects so much of the German Empire as con-
stitutes the Kingdom of Prussia no facts or considerations 
with which I have been made acquainted justify the assump-
tion that it is to be taken as effective as regards other por-
tions of the Empire. Neither am I informed whether the 
German salt, for which free admission into this country is 
demanded, is a product or manufacture of Prussia proper, or 
of some other part or parts of the German Empire. 
If it be assumed, however, for present purposes, that the 
treaty of 1828 binds the United States as regards all the 
constituent parts of the German Empire, the claim of the 
German ambassador, founded upon the~" most-favored-nation 
clause," must be pronounced untenable for at least two con-
clusive rea.sons. 
In the first place, the "most-favored-nation clauses" of 
our treaties with foreign powers have from the foundation 
of our Government been invariably construed both as not 
forbidding any internal regulations necessary for the protec-
tion of our home industries, and as permitting commercial 
concessions to a country which are not gratuitous, but are in 
return for equivalent concessions, and to which no other 
country is entitled except upon rendering the same equiva-
lents. Thus, Mr. Jefferson, when Secretary of State in 1792, 
said of treaties exchanging the rights of the most-favored 
nation that "they' leave each party free to make what inter-
nal regulations they please, and to give what preference they 
find expedient to native merchants, vessels, and productions." 
In 1817 Mr. John Quincy Adams, acting in the same offici~l 
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capacity, took the ground that the ''most-favored-nation 
clause only covered gratuitous favors and did not touch con-
cessions for equivalents expressed or implied." Mr. Clay, 
Mr. Livingston, ~fr. Evarts, and Mr. Bayard, when at the 
head of the Department of State, have each given official 
expressi9n to the same view. It has :1lso received the sanc-
tion of the Supreme Court in more than one well-considered 
decision, while in Bartram v. Robertson (122 U. S., 116), 
Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the whole court, expounded 
the stipulations of the "most-favored-nation clause" in this 
language (p. 120): 
"They were pledges of the two contracting parties, the 
United States and the King of Denmark, to each other, that, 
in the imposition of duties on goods imported into one of the 
countries which were the produce or manufacture of the other, 
there should be no discrimination against them in favor of 
goods of like character imported from any other country. 
They imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid 
hostile legislation in that respect." 
This interpretation of the "most-favored-nation clause," 
so clearly established as a doctrine of American law, is be-
lieved to accord with the interpretation put upon the clause 
by foreign powers-certainly by Germany and Great Britain. 
Thus, as the cfause permits any internal regulations that a 
country may :find necessary to give a preference to "native 
merchants, vesi;;els, and productions," the representatives of 
both Great Britain and Germany expressly declared, at the 
International Sugar Conference of 1888, that the export sugar 
bounty of one country might be counteracted by the import 
sugar duty of another without causing any discrimination 
which could be deemed a violation . of the "most-favored-
nation clause." So both Germany and Great Britain acqui-
e ced in the position of the United States, that our treaty 
with Hawaii did not entitle those nations to equal privileges 
in regard to imports with those thus obtained by the United 
State , the privileges granted to the United States being 
in on ideration of conce ions by the United States which 
rmany and Great Britain not only did not offer to make, 
but, in he nature of thing , could not make. 
If th e e tabli bed principle be app ied to the ca e in 
ha but oner ult eem to be po ·sible. The form which 
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the provisions of our recent tariff act relating to salt may 
have assumed is quite immaterial. It enacts, in substance 
and effect, that any country admitting American salt free 
shall have its own salt admitted free here, while any country 
putting a duty upon American salt shall have its salt duti-
able here under the preexisting statute. In other words, the 
United States concedes "free salt" to any nation which con-
cedes "free salt" to the United States. Germany, of course, 
is entitled to that concession upo:n returning the same equiva-
lent. But otherwise she is not so entitled, and there is noth-
ing in the ''most-favored-nation clause" which compels the 
United States to discriminate against other nations and in 
favor of Germany by granting gratuitously to the latter 
privileges which it grants to the former only upon the pay-
ment of a stipulated price. 
In the next place, even if the provisions of our recent tariff 
act under consideration could be deemed to contravene the 
''most-favored-nation clause" of the treaty with Germany-
as they can not be for the reasons stated-the result will be 
the same. The tariff act is a sta_tute later than the treaty 
and, so far as inconsistent with it, is controlling. The prin-
ciple is too well settled to admit of discussion, and if any 
relief from its operations is desirable it can be obtained only 
through proper modifying legislation by Congress. 
While the :first proposition of the German ambassador 
proceeds upon the basis that Germany does levy an import 
duty on American salt,- his second · proposition is that in 
reality it does not do so. The duty, it is said, should be 
regarded as in fact an internal excise tax, since a tax equiva-
lent to the duty is levied upon all salt in the country when-
ever and however it appears, and is the same upon salt pro-
duced in Germany as upon salt coming from the United 
States. It is matter of convenience merely that the tax 
upon American salt is collected immediately upon its arrival 
in port. In short, the claim is that there is no discrimina-
tion against American salt, w hieh is the evil our statute aims 
to prevent; that American salt and German salt are in 
reality treated on a footing of entire equality. 
The validity of this proposition I do not think I am in a 
position to judge of, for want of sufficient data. The laws of 
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Germany I do not and can not be expected to know, and, like 
other foreign laws, are facts to be proved by competent evi-
dence. The statement respecting them made by the German 
ambassador in a communication to the Secretary of State 
( copy of which you inclose) are undoubtedly correct, but 
they leave me in doubt upon what seems to me a vital point, 
viz, whether the internal excise tax on salt referred to is 
imperial in character-that is, is levied by and belongs to the 
Imperial Government-or is local, and is levied by and be-
longs to one or more constituent states of the Empire. If it 
is of the latter character, it probably can not be considered 
in relation to the matter in hand any more than a like domes-
tic tax of any one or more of the States of the United 
States could be considered in the same relation. If, however, 
it could be considered under auy circumstances, then it is obvi-
ously material to know whether such tax is levied by all of 
the constituent states of the Empire, without exception, and 
actually or necessarily at the same rate. 
As at present advised, therefore, salt imported from the 
Empire of Germany is, in my judgment, legally dutiable 
under the statute above quoted. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD _OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
NAVY-SPEED PREMIUMS. 
The appropriation for special speed premiums, made uy the act of 
July 26, 1894, chapter 165, is not limited in its application to pre-
miums earned prior to Janmtry 1, 1894. 
DEP .A.RTMEN'.1.1 OF JUSTICE, 
November 16, 1894. 
IR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 9th 
in, taut, replying to mine of the 6th instant, in which I made 
·erta.in inquirie bearing upon the question respecting the 
paym nt of pr minm earned by certain naval ves els, as to 
whi h my pinion wa reque ted by your previous favor of 
h ... d rn ·taut. 
If h < t f 1894 had not contained the pecial-premium 
, 11 rr minm lawfully am d aud b comiug due under 
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contract during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895, would 
have been payable from the appropriation therein made. 
That clause must have been added either to enlarge the 
scope of the act or to narrow it; either to make it cover pre-
miums that might otherwisel>e held not to be covered, or to 
limit its operation to the particular class of premiums spe-
cifically mentioned. The choice is between one ·or the other 
of these constructions, and the exact purpose of Congress 
may not be entirely clear. But no reason can be assigned, 
that I am aware of, why Congress should desire to exclude 
from the operation of the act of 1894 premiums earned after 
January 1, 1894, and during the fiscal year 1894-95. On the 
other band, Congress niay well have considered that an 
appropriation for the naval service for the fiscal year 1894-95 
might not necessarily be held to embrace premiums earned 
during the year 1893 or earlier, and may well have added the 
special-premium clause to preclude any doubt on that point. 
The best result I can reach, therefore, is that the latter is the 
true construction, and that the appropriation for speed pre-
miums made by the act of 1894 is not limited in its appli-
cation to premiums earned prior to January 1, 18U4. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.l'HE NAVY. 
GENERAL APPRAISERS-CHARGES-INVESTIGATTON. 
The general appraisers appointed under the customs administration act 
of Juno 10, 1890, are officers of the Treasury Department. 
If inefficien cy, neglect of duty , or malfeasance in office is charged 
against one of them, it is the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
investigat e the matter. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 17, 1894. 
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication asking my 
official opinion as to whether you have the power to investi-
gate the action of one of the General Appraisers in valuing 
an invoice of goods. 
It appears that certain merchandise recently imported at 
the port of New York was advanced in value by the local 
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appraiser; tbat on reappraisement by one of the General 
.Appraisers, under section 13 of the customs administrative 
act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, the action of tbe local 
appraiser was not sustained; and that you bave reason to 
believe tbat investigation should be made as to the propriety 
of the General Appraiser's conduct. You state that you <lo 
not claim the right to review the decision on this case, but 
that you wish simply to ascertain the facts on which the 
General Appraiser based his conclusion; but that the latter 
has refused all information on the subject, and stated that he 
does not recognize your right to make the investigation. 
It is true that by the terms of the customs administrative 
act decisions of the General Appraisers upon valuat,ion are 
final, and their decisions as to classification and charges 
are final, unless appealed from, in which case they can be 
reviewed only by the court, and that, on occasion, the 
General Appraiser acts as an officer of the court. (Secs. 
13, 14, 15.) 
On the other hand, they are placed, to a great extent, 
under your direction and control. (Secs.12, 18.) It was held 
by Attorney-General Miller, in his ·opinion of July 6, 1891, 
that the General Appraisers are officers of your Department, 
and in that opinion I concur. 
They are appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and may be removed from 
office by the President only. ( Sec.12.) They may be removed 
by him, however, at any time for inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
or malfeasance in office. · As they are officers of your Depart-
ment, I think it is your duty, if inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office is charged, to investigate the matter, so 
that if the facts seem to require you may report the matter 
to the Pre ident for his action. There are many officers h1 
the Government Departments who have quasi judicial func-
tion independent of the head of the Department. I do not 
think that tbi make them so independent that they can not 
be inve. tigat ed y their chief if malfeasance is suspected. 
Your que tion, t herefore, is answered in the affirmative. 
V ry r pectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-STRONG A WARD. 
Questions arising in settlement of an award made under a joint resolu-
tion of Congress approved July 10, 1888 (25 Stat., 1248), to . arbitrate 
and settle certain questions at issue between the District of Colum-
bia and Samuel Strong, considered and answered. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 20, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 8th 
instant, in which you submit for my consideration and opin-
ion certain questions arising in the settlement of an award 
made under a joint resolution of Congress approved July 10, 
1888 (25 Stat., 1248), to arbitrate and settle certain questions 
at issue between the District of Columbia and Samuel 
Strong. 
The questions stated are: 
1. What amount of money is required to be paid under 
the decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, 
and to whom is the money to be paid¥ 
2. What rate of interest is to be · allowed on the award 
from the date fixed by the arbitrators, November 10, 187 4, to 
date of rendition, January 11, 1889 ¥ 
3. At what rate and for what period is interest to be 
allowed on the award¥ 
4. Whether the amount paid to the arbitrators and $1,000 
taxed as costs for printing are to be paid from the amount 
awarded and charged pro rata to the beneficiaries of the 
award. 
I construe your first question to inquire what amount of 
money is to be paid, not under the decree of the supreme 
court of the District of Columbia, but under the award, the 
United States having assented to be bound by the latter, but 
not by the former, except so far as it may be consistent with 
the award. 
In that view, questions 1 and 2 may be answered together, 
and my opinion is as follows: · 
1 and 2. The amount of money to be paid under the award 
is $28,257.38, togethP-r with interest thereon at the rate of 
6 per cent per annum from November 10, 187 4, to J auuary 11, 
1889. 
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This amount, less $500, to be paid the receivers, William F. 
Mattingly and A. B. Duvall, is to be paid as follows: 
To William A. Cook, $8,869; 
To Frank T. Browning, $8,869; 
To George E. Kirk, $12,500, and 
To Paul Butler, administrator, $22,323.15, or so much of 
said sum as may remain after paying the sums above named 
to Messrs. Cook, Browning, and Kirk. 
3. No interest is payable on said award of January 11, 
1889, the- money for the payment of the award being appro-
priated by the statute authorizing the arbitration as of and 
from the time of the making of the award. 
4. The amount paid the arbitrators and the $1,000 taxed 
as cost of printing are not chargeable to the beneficiaries of 
the award. 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ARTICLES ·oF WAR-CITY ORDINANCE-ARREST. 
A city ordinance is within the expression "laws of the land," .i,s used 
in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a soldier violating such an ordi-
nance and escaping to a military reservation should be delivered to 
the civil authorities for trial on demand. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 26, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 21st 
in taut, quoting the fifty-ninth article of war, and asking my 
opinion upon the following points: 
1. Doe the expression" laws of the land," as used in the 
fifty-ninth article of war, include city ordinances and by-laws 1 
2. May a soldier be arrested, tried, and punished by a 
civil authority for the violation of a city ordinance1 
3. f h capes to a military reservation can a demand 
be Ille y the civil on he military authorities for his sur-
r nd r · and if o, will it be the duty of the commanding 
ffi r t urrender him 
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If the first question is answered affirmatively, I see no 
escape from the conclusions that a soldier may be arrested, 
tried, and punished by the proper civil authorities for the 
violation of a city ordinance, and that if he escape to a mili-
tary reservation his surrender may be demanded by the 
proper civil authorities, and should be made by the military 
officer in command. 
The real inquiry, then, being whether a municipal ordi-
nance is comprehended by the phrase'' laws of the land,'' as 
used in the fifty-ninth article of war, I have no hesitation in 
saying that, in my judgment, it is so comprehended. 
The general reasoning on the subject by the learned Act-
ing Judge-Advocate-General, as contained in his elaborate 
memo~andum of January 25, 1875, can not, I think, be suc-
cessfully controverted, and need not be here repeated. But 
it may not be amiss to make special reference to a class of 
adjudications which clearly define the nature of municipal 
ordinances and apparently render the result reached by Mr. 
Lieber inevitable. They are illustrated by a recent case in 
Vermont in which the facts were that a village charter 
granted to the village certain powers in the matter of licens-
ing eating houses which were repugnant to a general statute 
already in force. The village made a by-law or ordinance, 
pursuant to its charter, and the question arose which pre-
vaile.d-the ordinance or the general law1 Did the general 
law nullify the ordinance, or did the ordinance nullify the 
general law pro tanto and as regards that particular village1 
The decision was that the ordinance, conforming as it did to 
the charter, repealed for that village the preexisting general 
law. It was held to do so because, though in form an ordi-
nance, yet being authorized by the village charter, it was in 
reality a special statute of the State of Vermont. The same 
principle is affirmed in numerous well-considered adjudica-
tions of the highest authority. But if valid municipal ordi-
nances are in substance and effect special statutes of the 
State chartering the cities or towns making the ordinances, 
they are certainly to be regarded as among the "laws of the 
land,'' unless that phrase is to be construed as covering the 
general legislation of the State only and is exclusive of its 
special legislation. But . no distinction of that sort, it is 
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believed, has ever been attempted or has any foundation in 
reason or precedent. The result is, as already sta.ted, that 
the by-laws or ordinances of a town or city are to be taken 
as part of the "laws of the land" within the meaning of 
that phrase as used in the fifty-ninth article of war. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
TREASURY-FRAUD OF PARTNER-PENALTY. 
Fraud committed by a partner in a transaction which be is conducting 
on behalf of the firm is regarded by the law as fraud committed by 
the firm, although it be unsuccessful, and although it was the inten-
tion of the partner to cheat his own firm as well as the other party. 
The Secretary of the Treasury can not remit a penalty imposed on the 
:firm under such circumstances. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 27, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of November 16, asking my official opinion upon a point 
relating to the application of Messrs. Pitt & Scott for a 
remission of penalties under section 5293 of the Revised 
Statutes. 
That section authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to 
remit any penalty imposed under authority of the revenue 
laws not exceeding $1,000, "if, in his opinion, it was incurred 
without willful negligence or fraud." The sums asked to be 
remitted in the present case were imposed as penalties or 
so-called "additional duties" for undervaluation of imported 
goods, under section 7 of the customs administrative act of 
June 10, 1890, chapter 407. 
The e good were as igned to Messrs. Pitt & Scott, who 
are forwarder of foreign freight, :1nd thus came into the 
hand of the managing partner at New York. You are of 
the opinion that the undervaluation attempted by him was a 
d liberat fraud again t the nited States. s a general 
rul , h n a , ucce ful fraud has been committed by one 
memb r of a partner hip in a tran action which he is conduct-
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ing on behalf of the :firm, it is not regarded by the law as bis 
individual fraud simply, but the :firm, as -, :firm, is regarded 
as guilty. (Strang v. Bradner, 114 U. S., 555.) I think the 
rule must hold good when the fraud is unsuccessful as well as 
when it is successful. You are of the opinion, however, that 
the managing partner intended to cheat his own firm as well 
as the United States; that is, that he intended to appro-
priate to his own use the amount thereby realized, and in 
fact made no entry of the goods on the :firm's books. If, 
therefore, the fraud had been successful, the firm would have 
reaped no benefit. I do not think, however, that this would 
materially affect the case. 
Since, therefore, you are of opinion that one member of 
the :firm in entering goods consigned to the :firm committed 
a fraudulent undervaluation, I advise you that you are not 
authorized to remit the consequent penalty. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CIVIL SERVICE. 
The phrase "no person appointed to a place," as used in the civil-
P.iervice rule substituteu by the President November 2, 1894, for sec-
tion 4 of departmental Rule II, affects those holding places as well 
as those thereafter appointed. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 27, 1894. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 17th 
instant, in which you quote the departmental civil-service 
rule substituted by the President November 2, 1894, for 
section 4 of Departmental Rule II (Tenth Report, U. S. Civil 
Service Commission, p. 45), viz: 
"No person appointed to a place under the exceptions to 
examinations made by any departmental rule shall be trans. 
ferred from such place to a place not also excepted from 
examination." 
You inquire whether this section is to be construed so as 
to affect persons appoint~d prior to November 2, 1894. 
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In my judgment, the phrasP "no person appointed to a 
place," as used in the rule above quoted, describes every 
person either holding a place at the time the substituted 
rule took effect, viz, November 2, 1894, or thereafter holding 
it by subsequent appointment. 
Yours, respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY. 
CUSTOMS-WAREHOUSED COAL-REFUNDS. 
"Sea stores" in our tariff legislation are the stores contained in incom-
ing vessels which are necessary for their use for the purposes of the 
voyage; articles which, brought into port aboard ship} are to be con-
sumed aboard or carried off again in the outward voyage, or, if put 
ashore at all, landed only for the convenience of the ship. 
"Merchan<lise" is a word used in different senses in different parts of 
sai'd legislation. In Revised Statutes, sections 2766, 3111, it covers 
any tangible personal property; in sections 2795, 3113, it means prop-
erty imported into the country, whether for sale or not. In the act 
of March 3, 1875 ( chap. 136, sec. 1), it has n, narrower meaning, but 
still includes all personal property not imported for the use or enjoy-
ment of the importer himself. 
Said act of 1875 has no application to a case where the duties were 
correctly assessed, but the claim is that something happening subse-
quently has relieved them from payment of the exaction. 
The written protest or notice provided for by the customs administra-
tive act of June 10, 1890, is required only for the purpose of instituting 
a proceeding before the Board of General Appraisers, to review the 
decision of a collector or appraiser. The collector's decisions so 
reviewed are decisions made in pursuance of a duty imposed upon 
the collector personally by the statute, not to decisions made by him 
under authority delegated to him by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Tho decision of an application to withdraw warehoused goods or sup-
plies for ve els under the statute of June 26, 1884 (chap. 121, sec. 
16), is confided by the law in the ecretary of the Treasury. 
DEP A.RTME T OF JUSTICE, 
December 1, 1894. 
ha e the honor to acknowledge your communica-
ovemb r 2 , a king my official opinion upon ques-
d b. the appli ation of Kenneuy & Moon for a 
u i up n ·ertain warebou ed coal withdrawn 
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It appears that the coal in question was imported under 
the tariff act of 1890; that the duties thereon were duly liqui-
dated, but that the coal was warehoused, so that the duties 
were not at the time paid. Subsequently, in May, 1894, an 
application was made to withdraw this coal free of duty under 
the provisions of the merchant shipping act of June 26, 1884 
( chap. 121, sec. 16). This application was refused by the 
collector, who held coal not to be one of the articles covered 
by that section. The applicants then paid the liquidated 
duties in order to get possession of the coal, but, as you 
inform me, '' without forma-1 protest." You have ruled that 
the applicants ought to have been permitted to withdraw 
the coal free of duty, and the practice has been changed to 
conform with this ruling, as to whose correctness you do not 
ask my advice. 
You ask me first, however, whether you can refund the 
duties thus erroneously collected under the provisions of 
the act of March 3, 1875 (chap. 136, sec. 1). That section 
provides that duties may be reliquidated aud refunded by 
the Secretary of the Treasury when they "have been assessed 
and collected under an erroneous view of the facts in the 
case." The act then proceeds as follows : 
'' But no such reliquidation shall be allowed unless pro-
test and appeal shall have been made, as required by law: 
Provided further, That the restrictive provisions of this act 
shall not apply to such personal and household effects, and 
other articles not merchandise, as are by Jaw exempt from 
duty." 
The protest and appeal referred to in that section were 
plainly the protest and appeal described in section 2931 of 
the Revised Statutes; and since the latter provision was 
superseded by the customs administrative act of June 10, 
1890, chapter 407, the reference must be construed as made 
to the corresponding provisions of the latter act. You have 
therefore no authority to reliquidate and refund under the 
act of 1875, unless the coal can be brought within the mean-
ing of the proviso above quoted. 
It is claimed by the applicant that the coal is within this 
proviso, because it is "not merchandise," and they base this 
claim mainly on an argument that it can not be merchandise, 
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because, having been withdrawn for use in fueling ocean 
steamers, it comes within the class of '' sea stores." This 
claim, however, is based upon a misunderstanding. "Sea 
stores," in our tariff legislation, are the stores contained in 
incoming vessels which are necessary for their use for the 
purposes of the voyage. These stores are plainly enough 
merchandise when purchased, and they .are so treated by the 
statutes (Rev. Stat., sec. 3111) until put aboard ship. They 
then become, practically speaking, part of the equipment of 
the ship, which equipment, like the ship itself, is exempt 
from duty, because, though personal property, it is not 
regarded as an import. (The Conqueror, 49 Fed. Rep., 99, 
103, 105.) This seems to have been assumed from the very 
beginning of our Government, it being taken for granted 
that sea stores were exempt from duty even before they were 
expressly made exempt. The name was always restricted 
to articles which, brought into port aboard ship, were to be 
consumed aboard or carried off again on the outward voy-
age; or, if put ashore at all, landed only for the convenience 
of the ship itself. (See act of .Aug. 4, 1790, chap.35, sec. 22; 
act of Mar. 2, 1799, chap. 22, sec. 45; Rev. Stat., secs. 2795, 
2796, 2797.) .Articles do not become "sea stores" until they 
have thus become part of the ship's equipment. 
The word "merchandise" is used in different senses in 
different parts of our customs legislation. In Revised Stat-
ute , sections 2766 and 3111, it covers any tangible personal 
property. In section 2795 and 3113 it means property 
imported into the country, whether for sale or not. In the 
a t of 1 75 it has a narrower meaning, but still includes all 
p r.·onal property not imported for the use or enjoyment of 
th import r Lim elf. 
I reover, the r triction in the act of 1875 do not apply 
to merchancli e al ne. I think they apply as well to all 
dutia l g cl imr orted. The word "exempt from duty'' 
t h ta u of the article at the time of its importa-
Iu f: ·t 11 a ·t f 1 75, a i plainly hown by the por-
qu t d, wa intended only to apply to ca"es 
lu i were improperly a e ed and therefore 
· 1l t <1. ha no application to a ca e where 
ly a · d, but the claim 1s that 
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something happening subsequently has relieved them from 
payment of the exaction. 
Your first question, therefore, is to be answered in the 
negative. 
You further ask whether, apart from the statute of 1875, 
you are authorized to refund the duties without protest. I 
assume the meaning of this question to be whether you are 
authorized to make the refund in the absence of a written 
protest or notice such as required by the customs adminis-
trative act. In your statement of the facts you inform me 
that there was no '' formal protest," from which I infer that 
there was an informal verbal protest or notice of objection 
at the time, probably such as in the absence of any statutory 
provision to the contrary would have been sufficient to sup-
port a suit against the collector. ( Swartwout v. Gihon, 3 
How., 110.) 
The protest or notice required by the customs administra-
tive act is .a step preparatory to a submission of the question 
at issue to the Board of General Appraisers. If such a pro-
test was required, then it follows that the question of the 
right to withdraw this coal free of duty is not a question for 
yourself to decide, but one which must be left with the General 
Appraisers, subject to review by the courts. Is this, then, one 
of the cases which the customs administrative act includes 
within the jurisdiction of the administrative board thereby 
established, The cases confided to the General Appraisers 
are two: First, the decisions of the appraiser of the port, 
or person acting as such, as to the value of merchandise 
imported; second, the decisions '' of the collector as to the 
rate and amount of duties chargeable upon imported mer-
chandise, including a,ll dutiable costs and charges." (Secs. 
13, 14.) The collector's refusal to allow a withdrawal of the 
coal was a decision as to the rate and amount of duties 
chargeable thereon. Was it, however, a "decision of tlie 
collector" within the meaning of the statute, I think not 
The decisions thus referred to, in my opinion, are decisions 
made by the collector in pur~mance of a duty imposed upon 
him personally by the statute. In other words, they are the 
decisions made by him under the provision that" the col-
lector, or the person acting as such, shall ascertain, fix, and 
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liquidate the rate and amount of duties to be paid on such 
merchandise, and the dutiable costs and charges thereon, 
according to law.'' (Sec. 13.) He is, however, given no 
authority by statute to pass upon such questions as those 
here presented. When he does so, it is not in pursuance of 
any independent authority, but solely because you depute 
him to act as your agent for that purpose. The decision of 
the question presented by this application is confided by the 
law in yourself personally. 
"All articles of foreign production needed and actually 
withdrawn from bonded warehouses for supplies, not includ-
ing equipment of vessels, * * * may be so withdrawn 
free of duty under such regulations as the Secretary of the 
Treasury may prescribe." (Stat. of June 26, 1884, sec. 16.) 
You might prescribe that suGh applications be made 
directly to you at Washjngton, or you might depute the 
duty of passing upon such applications to some officer other 
than the collector. I do not think, therefore, t,hat the cus-
toms administrative act has any application to the present 
case. This is apparently the opinion of the General Apprais-
ers themselves, who have disclaimed jurisdiction over the 
analogous question of drawbacks. (Syn. Dec., No. 14522.) 
Without considering the question, which does not now 
arise in the administration of your Department, whether you 
can properly refund duties paid on withdrawal entries by 
mutual mistake of law, I advise you that under the circum-




The ECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
A.TT R EY-GE ERAL-CO TRACT ARTICLES-INFRINGEMENT 
OF PATE T . 
An opinion upon question of fact refused. 
Injun tion will not lie ag~in t a Department of the Government to 
re tram h u of an arti le alleged to be an infringement of a pat-
nted rnv n ion, and the ov rnment ·an not be held liable in dam· 
ag for such u e. 
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Where loss may result to the Government or its officers from the use hy 
contractors of patented inventions, or other property of third persons, 
a board of indemnity should be required. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 18, 1894. 
SIR: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your communication 
of the 8th instant, inclosing copy of a contract of 26th of 
October, 1894, between the Chicago Car Seal and Manufac-
turing Company of Chicago, Ill., of the one part, and the 
United States of America, by Charles W. Dabney, ... i\.cting 
Secretary of Agriculture, of the other part, for furnishing 
c~rtain supplies of lead car seals for the Government, with 
a letter from E. J. Brooks & Co. to the Secretary of Agri-
culture of November 28, 1894, and a letter from A.H. Pierce 
to the Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry of November 
17, 1894. 
Your several inquiries will be considered in the order in 
which they are propounded. 
"1. Does the seal contracted for and furnished this Depart-
ment, manufactured under patent No. 464174, infringe upon 
patents No. 323649, 481892, or 2986651" -
This inquiry calls for my opinion as to matters of fact, and 
as to such matters it has been the uniform practice of this 
Department, for reasons that must be obvious, to decline to 
give opinions. 
Whether or not one patent infringes upon others is a mat-
ter of fact upon which the opinion of officers connected with 
the Patent Office would be more valuable as a practical guide 
than any which I would feel authorized to express. 
"2. If contractor is manufacturing under a patent, would 
he be subject to injunction prior to a determination by the 
courts of the question of an infringement, and will an injunc-
tion lie against this Department, or its officials as individuals, 
as parties to such suit 1" 
Upon a proper case, aptly stated in a bill, a judge may 
grant the preliminary injunction to restrain the manufacture 
or use of a patented invention prior to a final determination 
of the case. Such restraining order may be directed against 
one who, as a contrator, is manufacturing articles under the 
2638-voL 21, PT 1--7 
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alleged infringing patent, or it may be directed against any 
individuals charged with using such articles, who may be 
parties to such bill. It will not lie against one of the Depart-
ments of the Government. 
"3. Will any claim. for damages lie against the Govern-
ment for using all the seals that might be obtained by the 
Department under the contract prior to any judicial decree, 
supposing such decree be adverse to claims of contractors!" 
No action for damages for the infringement of a patent 
will lie against the Government. No contract to pay for the 
use of a patented invention will be implied as between the 
Government and the owner of such patented device, unless 
such use has been exercised and enjoyed by the Government 
under circumstances from which it would be fairly and reason-
ably inferred that the two parties had actually intended a 
contra~t, as., for example, where the Government uses a pat-
ented invention, fully recognizing and admitting the rights 
of the true owner therein and using it with his knowledge 
and consent. 
In the case of Schillinger v. The United States, decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States November 19, 1894, 
the Architect of the Capitol invited proposals for a concrete 
pavement in the Capitol grounds and entered into a contract 
with Cook for laying such pavement. He was admonished 
by the owners of the Schillinger patent that the pavement 
described in the contract with Cook was an infringement of 
the Schillinger patent; and upon a petition filed by the 
owners of the Schillinger patent in the Court of Claims it 
was held there and by the Supreme Court that if the pave-
ment laid by Cook, under his contract, did embrace the 
Schillinger patent, that that at most was an infringement 
of such patent, and that the circumstances of the case did 
not raise a contract by implication. It was also held in 
that ca e that "when a contractor, in the execution of his 
contract, uses any patented tool, machine, or process, and 
the Government accepts the work done under such contract," 
that it can not be said to have appropriated and be in pos-
s ion of any property of the patentee in such a sense that 
he pat ntee may waive the tort and sue as on an implied 
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Where loss and injury may result to the Government from 
the appropriation by its contractors of the patented inven-
tions or other property of third persons it is desirable and 
practicable to · require from the contractor, as part of his 
contract, or as collateral or supplementary thereto, a bond of 
indemnity, in a sufficient penalty conditioned to save the 
Government and all persons representing or acting for it 
against loss or injury arising from such wrongful use by the 
contractor of such patented device. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE. 
CHINESE MERCHANTS-RETURN TO UNITED STATES. 
Chinese merchants residing in the United States prior to November 3, 
1893, can depart from and return to the United States under the same 
conditions as prevailed prior to the taking effect of the Chinese 
exclusion act approved May 5, 1892. (Lee Kan v. United States, 62 
Fed. Rep., 914, cited, and opinion of May 14, 1894, supra, p. 21, reaf-
firmed.) 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 19, 1894. 
SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communi-
cation of the 4th instant, in which you refer to a difference 
of opinion between certain customs officers of the United 
States "as to the right of Chinese merchants to leave the 
United States to return thereto," and say that you have 
"called the attention of the officers at New York to your 
opinion of 14th of March last, wherein it was held that 
Chinese merchants residing in the United States prior to 
Novemb~r 3, 1893, on which date the act entitled 'An act to 
amend an act entitled "An act to prohibit the coming of Chi-
nese persons into the United States,"' approved May 5, 1892, 
took effect, were not affected by said law, and that they 
could depart and return to the United States under the same 
conditions as prevailed prior to the passage of said act." 
You also call attention to the fact that the district court 
of the northern district of California bas decided "that tho 
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evidence required by the act approved November 3, 1893, 
shall be produced, notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese 
merchant may have departed from this country prior to the 
passage of said act." 
You ask to be "advised whether or not appeals were taken 
from the decisions above referred to, and also if officers of 
this · Department charged with the enforcement of the Chi-
nese exclusion laws should continue to be governed by the 
opinion rendered by you, as herein before stated, on l\farch 14; 
1894.'' 
On May 21, 1894, the circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, 
reversed the judgments of the district court for the north-
ern district of California in the case of Lee Kan v. Dnited 
States (62 Fed. Rep., 914). 
I am now advised by the U. S. district attorney in Cali-
fornia that in consequence of that decision the petitioners in 
the two cases to which you refer-In re Yee Lung and In re 
Loo Yue Loon, reported in 61 Federal Reporter, pages 641 
and 643-have been discharged from custody. 
I do not find in the records of this Department any opinion 
given by me on this subject on March 14, 1894. I do find, 
· however, that on May 14, 1894, in reply to your letter of May 
8, 1894, I did give an opinion, in which I said: 
"I am constrained to the conclusion, therefore, that this 
third paragraph of section 2 of the act of November 3, 1893, 
is to be regarded as wholly prospective in its operation and 
as applying exclusively to Chinese merchants who both came 
into the United States for the first time since November 3, 
1893, and having carried on business here, afterwards leave 
the couutry, and return, as if the act of November 3, 1893, 
had not been passed." 
A reexamination of this opinion discloses to me no reason 
for recalling or modifying it. 
I :find that on May 14, 1894, a telegram was received by 
tbe Chine e minister in Wa hington from the Chinese Mer-
hant ' change of San Francisco, calling his attention to 
hi subj ct, and that on l\lay 16, 1894, this telegram wa 
·ommuni at d to you from the ecretary of State, and that 
n y 1 , 1 94, Mr. C. S. Hamlin, A sistant Secretary, etc., 
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by telegram, instructed the collector of customs at San 
Francisco as follows. 
'' You are authorized to permit landing, without exacting 
stipulation from steamship company, of such of the forty 
Chinese now on vessel at your port as can prove to your 
satisfaction that they are merchants domiciled here and who 
left this country prior to November third last with intention 
of returning. This ruling in harmony with opinion rendered 
by Attorney-General." 
I see no reason why the course pursued with reference to 
the 40 Chinese · referred to in that telegram should not be 
adopted as to all Chinese persons of a like class, and 
embodied in a general instruction to that effect to the collect-
ors of customs at all the ports of entry. This would avoid 
the necessity of recourse to the courts by returning Chinese · 
merchants in cases such as those referred to. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES-REMITTING PENALTIES-PRACTICE. 
Section 17 of the anti-moiety act of June 22, 1874, supersedes section 
5292, Revised Statuj es, as to all cases arising under the customs-revenue 
laws, except those of vessels and merchandise seized or subject to 
seizure and of l ess value t.han $1,000. 
Penalties not over $1,000 in customs-revenue cases may be remitted 
under section 5293, Revised Statutes, without a proceeding before the · 
district judge. 
Said limit of $1,000 refers to the amount of tho penalty -to be remitted 
and not to the value of merchandise. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 20, 1894. 
Sm: Your letter of December 1,5 informs me that appli-
cations are pending before you for remission of penalties 
incurred under the provisions of section 7 of the customs 
administrativ~ act of June 10, 1890, wh·ere the penalties 
amount to more than $1,000, though the appraised value of 
the merchandise imported was less than $1,000. You refer 
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me to sections 5292 and 5293 of the Revised Statutes and 
sections 17 to 20 of the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chap-
ter 391,and ask my official opinion whether you have author-
ity to remit the penalties "without a petition having first 
been presented to the judge of the district in which the 
alleged violation occurred." . 
Your difficulty seems to have arisen from section 17 of the 
antimoiety act, which provides for a proceeding before the 
district judge instituted by petition of" any person who shall 
be charged with having incurred any fine, penalty, forfeiture, 
or disability other than imprisonment, or shall be interested 
in any vessel or merchandise seized or subject to seizure, 
when the appraised value of such v~ssel or merchandise is 
not less than $1,000," this section being confined to matters 
· arising under the customs-revenue laws. I do not think that 
this $1,000 limit applies to anything besides vessels or mer-
chandise seized or subject to seizure. I do not think, there-
fore, that it bas any application to merchandise imported by · 
reason of which the penalties of section 7 above referred to 
have been assessed. 
Construing together the sections cited from the Revised 
Statutes, the act of Febr'uary 27, 1877, chapter 69, amending 
those sections among others, and the antimoiety act, my con-
clusions are as follo.ws: That section 17 of the antimoiety act 
supersedes section 5292 of the Revised tatutes as to all 
cases arising under the customs-revenue laws, except those 
of vessels or merchandise seized or subject to seizure and of 
Jess value than $1,000 (see In re Laidlaw, 42 Fed. Hep., 401); 
that sections 19 and 20 of the antimoiety act, however, recog-
nize the continued operation of section 5293 of the Revised 
Statutes m customs-revenue cases involving not over $1,000; 
that ~be latter class of cases form, therefore, an exception to 
th . general language of section 17 of the antimoiety act, and 
do 11ot r quire a proceediug before the district judge, but 
that th limit of 1,000, r ferred to in section 5293 of the 
R vi:ed tatute and in section 20 of the antimoiety act, 
r ~ r · t the amouut of tbe penalty to be remitted, and 11ot 
th alu f b m rcltandi e who e importation led to the 
impo ·i ion of hep nalty. · 
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I therefore ad vise you that' you are not authorized to remit 
the penalties now in question until after the proper proceed-
ing before the district judge. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
rrhe SECRETARY OF '.l'HE TREASURY. 
NA VAL OFFICER. 
Status of Commander Joshua Bishop considered, and held, that he must 
be regarded as still on the active list of the Navy. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 21, 1894. 
SIR: I have·the honor to acknowledge yours of the 13th 
instant, by which it appears that Commander J .oshua Bishop 
entered the Navy September 20, 1854; February 8, 1868, was 
dismissed from the service; pursuant to a joint resolution of 
Congress was reappointed lieutenant-commander by the 
President as of Ma.rch 1, 1871; and, having applied August 
22, 1894, to be put on the retired list, pursuant to section 1443 
of the Revised Statutes, was notified by an order of the Act-
ing Secretary of the Navy of September 13, 1894, that he 
should regard himself as detached from duty ~t the Na val 
Observatory on the 20th of said September, and from that 
date would be transferred to the retired list in accordance 
with the provisions of said section 1443. On this state of 
facts you make two inquiries: 
First. Whether Commander Bishop, having been dismissed 
from the service February 8, 1868, and not restored till 
March 1, 1871, had on September 20, 1894, "been forty years 
in the service of the United States 0? '' and, 
Second. What is his present status 1 
1. I fully concur in the opinion of your Department, that 
September 20, 1894, Commander Bishop had not been in the 
service of the United States for forty years, and that on no 
theory can the period between February 8, 1868, and Ma.rch 
1, 1871, when he was not in fact in the naval service, be 
counted as part of said forty years. The act of March 3, 
1883 (22 Stat., 472), which closes the gaps in intermittent 
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service so as to make it operate as continuous, shows con-
clusively that actual service and none other is contemplated 
by the law. 
2. I assume-it not appearing to the contrary in your 
communication-that there has been no appointment to the 
place on the active list supposed to be vacated by the attempt 
to put Commander Bishop on the retired list. On that 
assumption Commander Bishop must be regarded as still on 
the active list of the Navy-the retiring order above referred 
to having no effect upon bis status, because of the nonexist-
ence of the jurisdictional fact of forty years of actual service. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.ARY OF THE NAVY. 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANIES. 
Sundry questions as to the principles to be adopted in the settlement of 
accounts between the United States and the Pacific railroad com-
panies answered. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 21, 1894. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 6th 
instant, relating to the accounts between the O nited States 
and the Pacific railroad companies, and submitting the fol. 
lowing questions respecting the principles to be adopted in 
the settlement of said accounts : 
"1. Whether, under the language of section 8 of the Thur-
man .Act, the first mortgage bondholders have a lien prior to 
that of the United States on the sinking fund. 
"2. Whether the whole amount falling due in January,. 
1895, of principal and interest, can be paid from the proceeds 
of the siuking fund, or only in the proportion which that 
amount bears to the whole amount of bonds to fall due 
hereafter with intere t already advanced and paid by the 
Gov rnment. 
hether the maturity of all the i. sues must be awaited 
b fi r any l im i made n the inking fund for the payment 
f any in l i u and the intere t accru ct thereon. 
h th r .: d mand i n ce ary to fix th liability of 
h railroa m any to r imbur e the United State for the 
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principal of the bonds which they failed to pay; and if so, 
how, when, and upon whom should such demand be made. 
"5. Whether the method of accounting heretofore used in 
making up the account is correct, or whether all the credits 
should be charged against the debt as it matures, and not 
apportioned in the ratio which the issue falJing due in Jan-
uary, 1895, bears to the whole issue." 
Taking these questions in their order, I answer them, 
respectively, as follows: 
1. The language of the Thurman A.ct, section 8, does not 
create a lien on the sinking funds prior to that of the United 
States in favor of first mortgage bondholders. 
2 and 3. The entire sinking fund belonging to the Central 
Pacific, or its proceeds, may, if necessary, be used to pay the 
indebtedness of the Central Pacific to the United States 
maturing in January, 1895. 
4. A demand upon the railroad company is not necessary 
to fix its liability to reimburse the United States for all sums 
paid by the latter on account of principal and interest of 
subsidy bonds. 
5. I do not understand that the United States has thus far 
determined upon or adopted any method or rule in accord-
ance with which the accounts between itself and the sub-
sidized Pacific roads.are to be stated and adjusted. If I am 
rightly informed, all that has been done is to charge each 
road wjth the amounts paid from time to time as interest on 
the subsidy bonds, and to credit it with the several amounts 
(1) earned from time to time by each road for transportation 
service, and (2) annually paid to the United States under 
section 6 of the act of 1862 as amended by section 5 of the 
act of 1864. 
Whether the foregoing assumption be or be not correct, I 
shall, when requested, be ready to express an opinion eitlier 
upon the correctness of such method of settling the accounts 
as the Treasury Department may have decided upon, or 
upon such method as in my judgment the Treasury Depart-
ment should adopt. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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SEA COLLISIONS-CONSTRUCTION OF ACT-ATTORNEY-
GENERAL. 
The Great Lakes are "high seas'' within the meaning of the act of 
August 19, 1890, chapter 802. 
The regulations for preventing collisions at sea in said act are appli-
cable to the Great Lakes and to all waters navigable for seagoing 
vessels connecting therewith, or with the ocean, whet.her the connec-
tion be by a navigable river or canal, and are applicable to every 
kind of steam vessel. .t?.ules 6 and 7 of section 4233, Revised Stat-
utes, are thereby abrogated or repealed. 
The Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels have power to 
make regulations not inconsistent with the regulations aforesaid. 
Said Board is not a "local authority" within the meaning of section 
30 of said act. 
The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion except on a ques-
tion presently arising. · 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 22, 1894. 
Sm: Your communication of December 10 asks my official 
opinion upon certain questions raised by the act of August 
19, 1890, chapter 802, entitled "An act to adopt regulations 
for preventing collisions at sea," which statute is to take 
effect by proclamation of the President March 1, 1895. 
This act commences by providing certain regulations which 
"shall be followed by all public and private vessels of the 
United States upon the high seas and in all waters con-
nected therewith, navigable by seagoing vessels." Section 
2 repeals all inconsistent regulations '' for the navigation of 
all public and private vessels of the United States upon the 
high seas, and in all waters connected therewith navigable 
by seagoing vessels." This language in both places is new. 
It very materia1ly differs from the language of the preceding 
act in pari materia, that of March 3, 1885, chapter 354. 
In my opinion the questi<;>ns asked by you should be 
an wered as follows: 
The reat Lakes are to be regarded as " high seas " within 
the meaning of thi statute, whatever may have been tbe 
under the act of 1 5. (See United States v. Rodgers, 
. S. 2 O· The orth Star, 62 Fed. Rep., 71, 75-76.) 
are therefore applicable to all waters 
a oino- v el and connected either with 
'th the r a LakeR. Tt i. immaterial whether 
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such connection is made by a navigable river or a canal. 
(See Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S., 629.) What the standard 
seagoing vessel is may be a question of some doubt. (See 
Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S., 674, 695.) 
The new regulations are applicable to every kind of steam 
vessels including ferry boats, coal boats, etc. _The Board of 
Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels will, however, con-
tinue to have power to make such further" regulations to 
be observed by all steam vessels in passing each other as 
they shall from time to time deem necessary for safety." 
(Rev. Stat., sec. 4412.) These regulations must not be incon-
sistent with any of the regulations of the act of 1890, and 
should be drawn with great ca.re to avoid embarrassment. 
( The Grand Republic, 16 Fed. Rep., 424; The B. B. Saunders, 
19 Fed. Rep., 118; The Lisbonense, 53 Fed. Rep., 293, 298-299.) 
Whether the present regulations of the Board of Super-
vising Inspectors will be superseded March 1, 1895, or whether 
they will continue in force without readoption by· the Board 
is a question not presently arising in the administration of 
your Department. It is therefore not a question which I am 
authorized to answer. (18 Opin., 77.) If there is doubt the 
doubt may be dispelled by reenacting such regulations as 
are not inconsistent with the act of 1890. 
In my opinion, Rules 6 and 7of section 4233 of the Revised 
Statutes, relating to river steamers navigating waters flow-
fog mto the Gulf of Mexico and their tributaries, and to 
coasting steam vessels, etc., navigating the bays, lakes, riy-
ers, or other inland waters of the United States, are abro-
gated or repealed by the act of 1890. 
In addition to the special questions referred to, you ask in 
general for my "opinion as to the scope and force of article· 
30 and of section 2 of the act of .August 19, 1890." I am not 
authorized to give any opinion as to the scope of a statutory 
provision, further than to imswer questions which presently 
arise thereunder in your Department; nor do I perceive that 
any questions under article 30 of the act of 1890 arise in 
your Department. That article provides as follows: 
"Nothing in these rules shall interfere with the operation 
of a special rule duly made by local authority relative to the 
navigation of any harbor, river, or inland waters." 
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The "local authority" therein referred to does not, in my 
opinion, include the Board of Supervisin_g Inspectors of 
Steam Vessels. I entirely concur i~ your view that" a plain 
provision of Congress, embodying the requisite rules for 
harbors, rivers, and inland waters, is desirable; but in the 
absence of such legislation it is important that the private 
persons concerned should know what is required of them." 
I do not th_iuk, however, that I can be asked to give this 
desired information, even were it in my power to do so. 
Congress is now in session, and will remain in session until 
after the act of 1890 takes effect. Whatever ambiguity is 
found in its provisions can meanwhile be remedied by the 
legislative branch of the Government. If there be ambi-
guity and it be not so remedied, I fear that the private 
persons concerned will be obliged to wait for the necessary 
information until some collision shall have occurred and the 
opinion of the courts thereon subsequently obtained in the 
ordinary course of admiralty proceedings. I can give no 
opinion that would protect them. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
CUSTOMS .A.DMINISTRA.TIVE A.CT-EXPORT DUTY. 
A.n export tax levied by a foreign Government js not one of the "costs, 
charges, and expenses," referred to in sectfon 19 of the customs 
administrative act of June 10, 1890. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 26, 1894. 
SIR: Your communication of December 21 asks my official 
opinion whether an xport tax impo ed by a foreign Gov-
ernment upon merchandi. e . ubj ct here to an ad valorem 
rate of duty or to a duty ba , cl upon or regulat d in any 
mann r y the value of the merchandi e is to be regarded 
a on of h ' o. t · har an cl exp en e. ' r ferred to in 
e ·ti n 1 of he "U tom ad.mini trative act of June 10 1890. 
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While the point is not entirely clear, especiaUy in view of 
the provisions of section 2907 of the Revised Statutes, now 
repealed, I am of the opinion that the export duty is not to 
be taken under consideration. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
DRAWBACK-OIL CAKE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Under the tariff act of August 27, 1894, a drawback is allowable on oil 
cake made from imported linseed. 
The Attorney-General can only advise on cases actually and presently 
arising. He can not undertake to give a general definition of a word 
applicable to all cases possibly arising. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
.December 27, 1894. 
Sm: Your communication of December 19 asks my official 
opinion whet.her a drawback is allowable, under the tariff act 
of August 27, 1894, on oil cake made from imported linseed. 
You call to my attention arguments which have been sub-
mitted before you to the effect that such oil cake is not an 
article "manufactured or produced in the United States" 
within the proper construction of section 22 of that act. 
Under the drawback provisions of the act of August 5, 
1861 ( chap. 45, sec. 4), this oil cake was held by the Treasury 
Department to be a manufactured article; and under that 
act its right to a drawback seems never to have been ques-
tioned. The claim for drawback upon oil cake under this 
section was carried to the Supreme Court and argued there 
by able counsel as late as 1882, but it seems to have been 
assumed without doubt that the oil cake was within the 
meaning of the act of 1861. 
By the tariff act of July 14, 1870, chapter 255, it was 
specially provided that "no drawback shall be allowed on 
oil cake made from imported seed." This clause, as a pro-
viso to the paragraph imposing a duty upon imported linseed 
or :flaxseed, was repeated in the Revised Statutes and in the 
tariffs of 1883 and 1890. It remained in the tariff bill of 
1894 as passed by the House of Representatives, but was 
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stricken out by amendment in the Senate. (Cong. Rec., June 
10, 1894, p. 7170.) 
Under these circumstances, I think that the intent of Con-
gress in the premises is clear, and that drawback upon this 
article is to be allowed. 
My authority to advise you officially is confined to cases 
actually and presently arising in the administration of your 
Department. I can not, therefore, undertake to give a gen-
eral definition, appficable to all cases possibly arising, of the 
term "materials," or the term "articles manufactured or 
produced," appearing in section 22 of the tariff act of 
August 27, 1894. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DRAWBACK-IMPORTED LEAD. 
Section 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, applies only to articles 
made of two or more materials. 
In a mass of lead, of which 90 per cent is foreign in origin, and 10 per 
cent domestic, the domestic lead can be regarded neither as a mere 
incident to the other nor as small enough in amount to be disregarded. 
DEPARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE, 
December 28, 1894. 
Srn: Your communication of November 16, asking my 
opinion with relation to the claim of the Kansas City Smelt-
ing and Refining Company for drawback upon imported lead, 
has received my careful attention. 
It appears that the lead in question was imported in ihe 
months of September, 1893, to March, 1894, iuclusive, from 
the Republic of Mexico, contained in silver-lead ores known 
commercially as lead carbonates. Silver being the compo-
nent material of chief value in these ores, they are regarded 
a silver ore , and the duty upon the lead therein contained 
wa exacted uuder the proviso to paragraph 199 of the 
McKinley Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, chapter 1244, which 
provi o i a follow : 
"That ilver ore an<l all othel' ore containing lead shall 
p a duty of 1~ cent per pound on the lead contained therein 
ording to ample and a ay ct the port of entry." ' 
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It appears that this ore was of the kind known as fluxing 
ore, containing a large quantity of lead, and used in this 
country for the purpose of SQJ.elting in combination with the 
refractory or dry domestic ores; that is, ores containing little 
or no lead. It appears that the imported and domestic ores 
go together into the furnace. The main product in value is 
the silver. An important by-product,however, is lead. The 
lead in the ores which go into the furnace is about 90 per 
cent foreign and 10 per cent domestic. Some of this lead is 
wasted. It is presumable that the waste of foreign and 
domestic lead, respectively, is in the proportions above 
stated, and that therefore 10 per cent of the resulting by-
product is domestic in origm. Each molecule of domestic 
lead being precisely like each molecule of foreign lead in this 
product, it is, of course, utterly impossible to distinguish 
between them by any examination of the completed article. 
The importers claim a drawback under section 25 of the 
McKinley Act, which provides: 
"That where imported materials on which duties have been 
paid, are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured or 
produced in the United States, there shall be allowed on the 
exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount to 
the duties paid on the materials used, less one per centum 
of such duties." 
The section, however, contains the following important 
proviso: 
"Provided, That when the articles exported are made in 
part from domestic materials, the imported materials, or the 
parts of the articles made from such materials shall so 
appear in the completed articles that the quantity or measure 
thereof may be ascertained." 
The importers claim that they have sufficiently complied 
with this proviso, because they have kept accurate records 
showing the amount of foreign lead and also the amount of 
domestic lead which went into the furnace, and because 
they are thus able to state the proportions of each in the 
mass of lead resulting from their operations with substan-
tial accuracy. Your letter assumes, however, that this is 
not the case. You assume that the proviso forbids the 
allowance of a drawback except in cases where the article 
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manufactured or produced can be so separated chemically 
or mechanically into its component materials that the rela. 
tive proportions of each material may be ascertained with-
out reference to past books of account. This assumption, in 
my opinion, is entirely correct. The section is intended to 
apply only to cases where an article is made of two or more 
different materials. The possible existence in commerce of 
a mere mixture or melting toget her of articles identically 
the same, though part domestic and part foreign, does not 
seem to have been contemplated by Congress. It is a casus 
omissus. 
You ask my opinion "whether the presence of a slight 
incidental percentage of domestic lead in the metal entered 
for drawback should be regarded as a bar to the allowance 
thereof," or "whether the lead produced as above described 
may properly be considered as an article wholly manufac-
tured from materials imported." I think that in no proper 
sense can any portion of the lead entered for drawback be 
regarded as incidental to any other portion thereof or to the 
whole. Nor is the proportion of domestic lead in the total 
product small enough to be disregarded. (Magone v. Lucke-
meyer, 139 U. S., 612.) 
It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the question 
whether this lead, in view of the various statutory provisions 
above quoted, is an "article manufactured or produced in the 
United States." (See United States v. Hathaway, 4 Wall.,404; 
Junge v. Hedden, 146 U.S., 233,239; Seeberger v. Castro, 153 
U.S., 32, 35; Attorney-General v. Lorman, 59 Mich., 157.) 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The ECRET.A.RY OF 'l'HE TliEASURY. 
INCOME TAX-ARMY OFFICERS. 
In construing the new income-tax law, mileage and commutation of 
quarter pai<l to officer of the U.S. Army are to be considered as parts 
of th inc m of n h offi ers, and are to be added to other income 
in or<l r to a certain the total income. 
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The amount of the tax on the excess over $4,000 of salary or compensa-
tion payable for the calendar year should be deducted by the pay-
master or other disbursing officer of the Government from the first 
installment of salary or pay after the aggregate amount paid such 
officer in any calendar year has reached the sum of $4,000. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 2, 1895. 
Sm: I have to acknowledge yours of the 13th ultimo, mak-
ing the following inquiries respecting the construction and 
effect of the new income-tax law, to wit: 
"1. Whether 'mileage and commutation of quarters' paid 
officers of the U. S. Army are to be considered as parts of 
the incomes of such officers; 
"2. Whether, if they are to be so considered, they are to 
be added to, and held to be a part of, the salaries or 'pay-
ments for services' within the meaning of section 33 of the 
act and therefore to be taken account of by paymasters 
under said section; and 
"3. Whether, in the case of an army officer subject to an 
income tax on his salary, the tax is to be collected in install-
ments by deductions from his monthly pay or be collected in 
bulk annually and be based on the amount of salary received 
in the calendar year preceding the time of the collection of 
the tax." · 
Replying to these questions in their order-
First. The answer to the first question is found in Division 
V, page 33, "Regulations Relative to the Income Tax," just 
issued by the Treasury Department, wherein it is expressly 
provided that paymasters and disbursing officers shall deduct 
the 2 per cent" from all salaries and payments of every kind 
made in money to officers or other persons in the civil, mili-
tary, naval, and any other employment in the service of the 
United States upon the excess of said salaries over the rate 
of $4,000 per annum." 
In this particular, and though the phraseology of the two 
statutes is not the same, the Treasury ''Regulations" con-
strue the existing law to be the same in meaning and effect 
as section 86 of the act of July 1, 1862 ( see Treasury Regula-
tions, Dec.1, 1862), distinction being drawn between suppJies 
in kind which are not assessable, and pecuniary payments 
2638-V0L 21, P'.l' 1--8 
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whi0h, though representing such supplies, are nevertheless 
assessable. This ruling of the Treasury Department has 
been promulgated since yours of the 13th ultimo, and will, 
I assume, be accepted as satisfactory. 
· Second. Under, the existing statute a salary in excess of 
$4,000 is taxable as such at the rate of 2 per cent upon the 
excess. If the recipient thereof has other income exceeding 
$4,000 such excess is also taxable at the same rate. But if 
the salary or other compensation is $4,000 or less, or is 
uncertain or irregular in amount, or in the time of its accrual 
or being earned, then nothing is taxed as salary, but the 
salary is one item of the total income which becomes taxable 
when exceeding $4,000. The answer to the second question, 
therefore, is that commutation moneys received by an officer 
are to be added to other income (includmg a salary of $4,000 
or Jess) in order to ascertain the total income, the excess of 
which over $4,000 is subject to a tax of 2 per cent. 
Third. The third question seems to be completely answered 
by the following paragraph of income ·tax "Regulations," 
Division V, page 33: 
"Paymasters and disbursing officers of the Government 
will make no deduction for taxes from the salary or pay of 
any officer or person in the employ of the United States for 
the year 1895 or thereafter, until the amount paid to any 
such officer or Government employe on account of such 
salary or employment has reached in the aggregate, for that 
calendar year, the sum of $4,000, when, from the first pay-
ment on the excess of said amount, or any part thereof, the 
paymaster or disbursing officer making the payment shall 
deduct and withhold the tax of 2 per cent on the entire 
amount of such excess of salary or compensation payable to 
such officer or employe for said year. The excess upon 
which the tax of 2 per cent is payable shall be ascertained 
by deducting the sum of $4,000 from the fixed annual salary 
or compen ation." 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The ECRET.ARY OF WAR. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 115 
illodification of Contracts. 
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS. 
By virtue of his general authority, the Secretary of the Treasury has . 
not ·the power to change binding contracts entered into with the 
United States by responsible parties, secured by responsible sureties, 
in the interest of private parties thereto, without consideration 
inuring to the Government. 
The express stipulation in certain contracts that the Secretary of the 
Treasury may annul for cause, implies some fact or state of facts 
inducing or justifying an abrogation of the contract for the benefit of 
the United States. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January7, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the . 
29th ultimo, asking my opinion upon the question whether, 
in view of the facts and contracts accompanyi?g your com-
munication, the Secretary of the -Treasury can lawfully mod-
ify certain contracts between the United States on the one 
band and Me::;srs. Livingstone, French, and Silberman · & 
Joseph on the other, whereby each of said parties, in con-
sideration of certain rentals or other stipulated payments, 
secures for a term of years the enjoyment of certain exclusive 
privileges in connection with the immigrant station at Ellis 
Island. Your letter states that the parties '' have prayed 
for relief under said contracts," and no suggestion is made, 
as I understand, that any variation of the existing contracts 
is desired on behalf of the United States or will be in -its 
interest. 
My attention is called to the fact that each contract con-
tains an express stipulation that the Secretary of the Treas-
ury may annul it for "cause." But by "cause," as used in 
each of said contracts, must be meant in all probability some 
fact or state of facts inducing or justifying -an abrogation of 
the contract fe:>r the benefit of the United States. The right 
to break the contract can hardly luwe been reserved to the 
United States for the benefit of the contractor. Further, 
the desired changes in the existing con tracts can not be 
accomplished by the process of first putting an end to them 
and then making others, since, being once canceled, new 
ones could be made only in a prescribed statutory method; 
that is, "after public competition." 
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The single legal issue presented, then,iswhetherthe United 
States, having contracts with responsible parties, secured by 
responsible sureties, it is competent for the Secretary of the 
Treasury, by virtue of his general authority, to change those 
contracts in the interest of the private parties thereto with-
out consideration inuring to the United States, and simply 
because unforeseen circumstances make the operation of 
their provisions unprofitable or even disa·strous to such 
parties. Substantially the same question has recently been 
passed upon by this Departmeut in the case of the North 
.American Commercial Company. .An abatement of the rent-
als due from the company to the United ·states, made on 
purely sentimental grounds and because such an abatement 
was thought to be equitable and fair between the parties, 
was held to be beyond the power of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. There seems to be no ground for doubting the 
soundness of that ruling, and the inquiry with which your 
letter concludes, "whether the Secretary of the Treasury has 
the power to grant the relief prayed," is therefore answered 
in the negative. 
Returning herewith the nine inclosures accompanying 
your I etter, I am 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICH.ARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
RATES OF DUTY-WAREHOUSED MERCHANDISE. 
The new rates of duty imposed by the tariff act of August 27, 1894, do 
not apply to any goods theretofore entered for warehouse, uuless the 
goods are withdrawn for consumption within three years from the 
date of original importation. 
Goods imported before that act and then deposited in store as "un-
claimed merchandise," under section 2965, Revised ·Statutes, may be 
withdrawn for consumption at the new rates of duty at any time 
withm three year from the date of original importation, as Jong as 
they remain unsold. If sold, however, the duties to be deducted 
from the proceeds of sale are tho e of 1890. 
IR: 
inion 
DEPART ME T OF JUSTICE, 
January 17, 1895. 
our communication of December 26 a k my official 
t the rate of duty chargeable on certain goods 
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which were originally imported while the provisions of the 
tariff act of 1890, chapter 1244, were still in force, but which 
goods remained in custody of the Government until after 
the passage of the tariff act of 1894, chapter 349. I under-
stand your questions to relate to goods still dutiable, but 
upon which the rate of duty has been changed by section 1 
of the latter act. The goods you describe are resolvable 
into two classes. 
First, those which have' been entered for warehouse and 
deposited in bond prior to the act of 1894, but not withdrawn 
for consumption within three years from the date of original 
importation. SBction 54 of the tariff act of 1890 (supersed-
ing section 2970 of the Revised Statutes) provides as follows: 
"That any merchandise deposited in bond in any public or 
private bonded warehouse may be withdrawn for consump-
tion within three years from the date of original importation, 
on payment of the duties and charges to which it may be 
subject by law at the time of such withdrawal: Provided, 
That nothing herein shall affect or impair existing provisions 
of law in regard to the disposal of perishable or explosive 
articles." Section 2971 of the Revised Statutes provides, 
among other things, as follows: "Any goods remaining in 
public store or bonded warehouse beyond three years shall 
be regarded as abandoned to the Government, and sold 
under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury 
may prescribe, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury." 
Under prior tariff acts the question has arisen whether the 
provision last quoted transfers to the Government the own-
ership of the abandoned goods, subject to a discretionary 
power of remission under section 2972, similar to that given 
by sections 5292, 5293, 1841, 2858, 3001, 3078, 3461, etc., or 
whether the goods are to be regarded as still warehoused for 
the benefit of the importer until the Government shall fore-
close its lien by selling them. There is no such question, 
however, under the tariff act of 1894. By the express Ian. 
guage of section 1 of that act, the new rates apply not to all 
warehoused goods, as by section 50 of the act of 1890, but 
only to "articles [thereafter] imported from foreign countries 
or withdrawn for consumption." The latter clause should be 
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construed with the prior legislation above quoted so as to 
constitute a harmonious whole. 
In my opinion, therefore, goods imported and entered for 
warehouse prior to the act of 1894, and not withdrawn for 
consumption within three years from the date of original 
importation, are unaffected by the new rates of duty, and 
the ''duties" mentioned in section 2972 of the Revised Stat-
utes are the duties to which they were previously subject, 
whatever be the construction to be put upon this section 
in other respects. My opinion applies not only to goods 
imported within three years before the act of 1894 took 
effect, but to all goods theretofore imported and then subject 
to the tariff rates of 1890. 
The second class of goods to which you refer are those not 
entered ·by the importer either for warehouse or consump-
tion, but deposited in store as "unclaimed merchandise" 
under the provisions of section 2965 of the.Revised Statutes. 
These goods, like the others, are regarded as abandoned to 
the Government after three years (sec. 2971). There is no 
other limitation, however, upon their entry for warehouse or 
consumption so long as they remain in the custody of the 
Government. In my opinion, therefore, so long as they 
remain unsold, they may be withdrawn for consumption upon 
payment of the new rates of duty at any time within three 
years from the date of their original importation, If sold, 
however, under the provisions of section 2973, they can, of 
course, 110 longer be withdrawn for consumption; wherefore 
the new rates of duty are inapplicable, and the duties to be 
deducted from the proceeds of sale by the terms of that sec-
tion are those of 1890. As merchandise of this class is 
directed to be sold after one year, I assume that there is 
none now in your hands unsold which is not withdrawable 
by the importer. 
Very respectfully~ 
RIOBARD OL}S"EY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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"Special•Reciuest'' Envelopes. 
"SPECIAL-REQUEST., ENVELOPES. 
The provisions of the proviso contained in section 96 of the act of Con-
gress, approved January 12, 1895 (Public, No. 15) when construed in 
connection with Revised Statutes, section 3915, constitutes no sub-
stantial limitation upon the power to print and supply "special-
req nest " envelopes. 
One ~tatute should not be held to have been impliedly repealed by 
another, unless the inconsistency and antagonism between the two 
was such that they could not stand together. · 
DEP AR'fMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 18, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 16th 
instant calling my attention to a proviso contained in section 
96 of an act of Congress approved on the 12th instant (Pub-
lic, No. 15 ), which proviso reads as follows: '' Provided, That 
no envelope furnished by t.he Government shall contain~any 
business address or advertisement." You inquire whether 
this proviso applies to and prevents your Department from 
supplying in the future what are technically known as 
"special-request envelopes." 
To give the proviso that effect would be to repeal by impli-
cation the provisions of section 3915 of the Revised Statutes. 
While one statute may impliedly repeal another, the incon-
sistency and antagonism between the two must be such that 
they can not stand together. Otherwise, if by any fair and 
reasonable construction the provisions of both can be given 
a harmonious oper•ation, that construction is to be adopted, 
and there is no repeal. 
Further, it is plain from other legislation. on the subject 
that when Congress did intend a repeal of that part of sec-
tion 3915 now in question, it realized what provisions were 
required to unquestionably accomplish that result, and 
adopted them accordingly. Thus the act of July 13, 1892, 
enacted as follows: "Provided, That it shall not be lawful 
after the thirtieth day of September, 1894, for the Posmaster-
General to have requests for the return of letters printed 
upon any envelope sold by any postmaster or by the Post-
Office Department." It is only reasonable to infer that 1f 
Congress had attempted to reach the same result by the 
above-quoted proviso to the act of 1895, it would have 
adopted the same or equiva.Ien t provisions. 
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The foregoing considerations clearly indicate that the pro-
viso to the act of 1895 should, if it can reasonably be done, 
receive such an interpretation as will not interfere with the 
legitimate operation of section 3915. Such a construction, 
in my judgment, is not only feasible, but is the just and true 
construction. When the proviso prohibits the furnishing of 
Government envelopes containing a '' business address or 
advertisement," the thing aimed at is not "special-request 
envelopes" proper, but envelopes which, purporting to be 
such, are disingenuously and improperly made the adver-
tising mediums of some trade or business. In other words, 
what is condemned is not the use of "special-request envel-
opes" for their true purposes, but the abuse of them for other 
purposes not contemplated. In this particular the proviso 
to the act of 1895 is entirely in accord with section 3915. 
That section expressly declares that" No stamped envelope 
furnished by the Government shall contain any lithographing 
or engraving nor any printing, except a printed request to 
return the letter to the writer." The proviso to the act of 
1895 is simply a more specific enactment, intended to accom-
plish the same general end as the first clause of this provi-
sion of section 3915. 
My conclusion, therefore, is that the proviso of the act of 
1895 constitutes no substantial limitation upon the power 
of your Department to print and supply "special-request 
envelopes," and has no other end or aim than to guard 




A VAL RE ERVATION-RESTORATION TO PUBLIC DOMAIN. 
Congre s alone is competent to subject to general governmental uses 
land heretofore reserved from the public domain for the use of the 
avy Department. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 19, 1895. 
the honor to acknowledge yours of the 17th, 
wrm , beth r he land lying within the States of Ala-
nd i i i pi r rv d from the public domain for 
of h J"avy D par ment b order of the Pre ident 
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pursuant to an act of Congress can now be restored to the 
public domain by Executive order without Congressional 
action. 
In my judgment, an order of the President is not sufficient. 
Congress alone is competent to exercise the discretion by 
which the land in question shall cease to be held for the 
special purposes of the Navy Department and be made sub-
ject to general governmental uses. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
DUTY ON SUGAR TAKEN FROM WRECK. 
Section 2928, Revised Statutes, only applied to goods wrecked while on 
the voyage to the United States. Whether that section was repealed 
by the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890. Qucere. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 21, 1895. 
Sm: On June 1, 1894, the vessel Windsor sailed from Iloilo, 
in the Philippine Islands, with a cargo of sugar for the 
United States. On the following day the vessel was wrecked. 
The sugar was taken back to Iloilo and the vessel repaired. 
On October 9, the sugar having been again loaded on the 
same vessel, it sailed from Iloilo for the second time. 
The importers of the sugar claim the right to have it ap-
praised under section 2928 of the Revised Statutes as mer-
chandise taken from a wreck. You ask my opinion whether 
the sugar is so classifiable. 
Assuming that the vessel was a wreck in June, never-
theless the wreck did not occur in the course of the voy-
age which ended in the importation of these goods into the 
United States. I do not think, therefore, that the sugar 
comes within the purview of section 2928. It is consequently 
unnecessary to consider the question whether, as assumed 
by the editors of the Supplement to the Revised Statutes, 
that section has been repealed by the customs administrative 
act of June 10, 1890, section 23~ 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS-RULES. 
It will not be unlawful for the Commissioner of Patents, with the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to promulgate a rule limit-
ing appeals to six months from the time when the matter is in condi-
tion for appeal. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 29, 1895. 
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your ... letter of 
January 19, inclosing a copy of a communication addressed 
to you by the Commissioner of Patents, "wherein he pro-
pounds certain questions as to the power of the Commissioner 
of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, 
to make and enforce such rules as will require of applicants 
of patents for inventions greater diligence and the more 
rapid prosecution of their claims." 
You say: "Before answering the Commissioner's ques-
tions I have deemed it proper to submit the matter to you 
for your consideration, and respectfully request that I be 
furnished with your opinion on the questions in the letter 
herewith inclosed." 
The communication of the Commissioner of Patents sub-
mits to you the form of a " propose<l rule " designed to pre-
vent the recurrence of the evil complained of, and the ques-
tion submitted by him to you is: 
"Has the Commissioner power to make rules, subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, providing that no 
appeal will be entertained by any tribunal in the office unless 
taken within six months from the action which puts the case 
in condition for appeal, unless it be shown to the satisfaction 
of the Commissioner that such delay was unavoidable'" 
I beg to say in reply that a rule or regulation made by the 
Commissioner of Patents and adopted and approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior, under section 483, Revised Stat-
utes, is a " regulation prescribed by the head of a Depart-
ment," within the meaning of section 161, Revised Statutes, 
and hat every uch regulation, when "not inconsi tent with 
law, ha the for e of law and is taken judicial notice of by 
the courts." (Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S., 13.) 
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Chinese: 
Section 4894, Revised Statutes, is as follows: 
'' All applications for patents shall be completed and pre-
pared for examination within two years after the filing of the 
application; and in default thereof, or upon failure of the 
applicant to prosecute the same within two years after any 
action therein, of which notice shall be given to the appli-
cant, they shall be regarded as abandoned by the parties 
thereto, unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Com-
missioner of Patents that such delay was unavoidable." 
This appears to be the only provision of law as to the limi-
tation upon the time of completing an application for patent. 
I do not think that the proposed rule submitted by the 
Commissioner of Patents in his communication is inconsist-
ent with the law or beyond his power under the authority 
given him to prescribe regulations for the conduct of pro-
ceedings in the Patent Office. 




The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR. 
CHINESE. 
A certificate of naturalization issued to a Chinese person by the circuit 
court of tho district of Montreal, Canada, and a passport issued by 
the Governor-General of Canada, upon which the right is claimed as 
a merchant to enter into and travel through the United States, can 
not be accepted as a substitute for the certHicate prescribed by sec-
tion 6 of the act approved July 5, 1884. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 30, 1895. 
Sm: I have yours ·of the 28th instant, from which it 
appears that a Chinese person named Lee Bow, now at Mont-
real, Canada, claims the right as a merchant to enter into 
and travel through the United States on a certificate of 
naturalization issued to him by the circuit court of the dis-
trict of Montreal, Canada, and a passport issued by the 
Governor-General of Canada. 
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You inquire whether the papers above mentioned may be 
properly accepted in lieu of the certificate prescdbed by sec-
tion 6 of the act approved July 5, 1884, amending an act 
entitled "An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relat-
ing to Chinese, approved May 6, 1882," and you inclose an 
opinion given by the Solicitor of the Treasury to the effect 
that the papers referred to can not be accepted as a substi-
tute for such certificate. 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
LIFE-SA YING MEDALS. 
The phrase "saving persons from drowning," for which, by section 12 
of the act to organize the Life-Saving Service, approved June 18, 1878, 
the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to oestow the life-saving 
medal of the second class, has reference to the rescue of persons who 
are subjected to the perils of the sea in any of the waters of the United 
States and in the vicinity of any life-saving station, lifeboat station, 
or house of refuge, either by shipwreck, or from ·being upon or con-
nected with any vessel in distress. 
Such medals of honor can not be awarded to any other persons than 
those who are members of the regular or volunteer life-saving crew. 
In construing a doubtful passage in a statute, resort can be had to the 
immediate context and the legislation in pari materia. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 30, 1895. 
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 
the 21. t instant, transmitting the papers in three cases now 
pending in your Department, to wit, that of John W. Kelly, 
for the rescue of Gustav Heffler, that of Everett Bates, for 
the re cue of Mary Dout, and that of Frank Sweezey, for 
the re cue of two boys; and requesting my opinion "on the 
proper con truction of ection 12 of the act to organize the 
Life-Sa ing Service, approved June 18, 1878, in the following 
particular . 
The' particular "are stated in a serie of questions pro-
pound d in your lett r, which I will endeavor to answer in 
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the order in which they are stated, without repeating the 
questions here. 
It may be well to notice generally that the legislation under 
which a few life-saving stations were established on the coast 
of Long Island and New Jersey many years ago has since 
then extended so far as to establish a general Life-Saving 
Service, under which life-saving stations are now established 
on all the lake and sea coasts of the United States; and 
ample provision is made for an adequate supply of apparatus 
and crews at all of such stations. 
This body of legislation comprises a great many separate 
acts passed at nearly every session of Congress during the 
past twenty years, and it will be observed that careful 
rega,rd bas not always been bad to perspicuity and accuracy 
of expression in these acts, and from this cause has arisen 
the doubt which your letter expresses as to the true mean-
ing and intent of Congress in certain sections of these acts. 
One simple and obvious rule of construction is to cast upon 
the doubtful passage all the light which the immediate con-
text and all the legislation in pari materia afford. 
Your :first inquiry is: 
'' Does the word 'persons,' in the clause of said section 
which reads as follows: 'And saving persons from drowning,' 
extend to or enlarge the class of persons, or apply to other 
persons than those embraced in the word 'shipwrecked,' in 
the clause immediately preceding the clause just quoted, as 
follows: 'In rescuing and succoring the shipwrecked '1 Or 
does said first-named clause extend the scope of the latter to 
other than shipwrecked persons; and if so, to what other per-
sons does it refer 1" 
Section 12 of the act of June, 1878, is as follows: 
" That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized 
to bestow the life-saving medal of the second class upon per-
sons making such signal exertion in rescuing and succoring 
the shipwrecked and saving persons from drowning as, in 
his opinion, shall merit such recognition." 
The legislation on the subject of Life-Saving Service will 
be found collated in a note at the bottom of page 190 of the 
Supplement to the Revised Statutes. 
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. The enacting clause of the act of June 20, 1874, is as 
follows: 
"That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized 
to establish life-saving stations, life-boat stations, and houses 
of refuge, for the better preservation of life and property from 
shipwreck, at or in the vicinity of the following-named points 
upon the sea cind lake coasts of the United States." 
And the enacting clauses of the acts of June 18, 1878, of 
May 4, 1882, of June 19, 1886, and indeed of all subsequent 
acts, are substantially the same. · 
Again, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to em-
ploy crews of experienced surfmen at such of the stations as 
he may deem necessary and proper; and he is also author-
'ized to accept the services of volunteer crews at any of tbe 
lifeboat stations herein authorized. 
Again, the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to have 
prepared medals of honor to be "bestowed upon any persons 
who shall hereafter endanger their own lives in saving or 
endeavoring to save lives from perils of the sea, within the 
United States or upon any American vessel." 
And in section 10 of the act of June 18, 1878, provision is 
made for "extending the compensation of enrolled members 
of volunteer crews of lifeboat stations therein named to occa-
sions of actual and deserving service at any shipwreck or in 
· the relief of any vessel in distress," etc. 
From all which legislation it appears-
:First. That the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 
is to establish the_se life-saving stations, etc., "at points upon 
the sea and lake coasts of the United States." That is, on 
waters over which the United States has jurisdiction by 
virtue of it authority to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce, and not upon any other waters. 
S cond. That the means provided are, crews of experi-
enc d mfmen and volunt er . The field of their duties is 
nece , arily confined to the vicinity of the life-saving stations 
at w hi h they are appointed to serve. . 
Third. The ervic to b performed is "at any shipwreck 
or in h reli f f any ve el in di tre ." 
I hink then that the two term employed in section 12, 
o i ' uccoring th hipwre ked and " aving per ons 
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from drowning," were intended to embrace those persons, and 
only those, who were suffering from the perils of the sea, 
either by actual shipwreck or from being upon or connected 
with any vessel in distress. 
One may, without too great refinement, perceive how a 
person may be suffering at sea from the effect of shipwreck 
and yet be m no immediate danger of drowning-in an open 
boat at sea without provis10ns, etc.-and that may have 
been in the mind of the framer of this section and led to the 
employment of these two forms of e~pression. 
Your next inquiry is: 
"Does the statute apply to the rescue or saving from 
drowning of persons who accidentally fall from public or pri-
vate docks, wharfs, or other places into the waters of har-
bors, landings, or other w_aters of the United States; or to 
such persons likely to drown in such waters from the cap-
sizing of any skiff, row, sail, or other small boat, not con-
nected with ships or commerce; or who may accidentally fall 
or be precipitated overboard from any steamboat or other 
vessel plying the waters of the United States; or to such 
persons as may be drowning or about to drown while bath-
ing in .any such waters 1" etc. 
I think the statute applies to those only who, in the vicinity 
of any life-saving station, lifeboat station, or house of refuge, 
are in danger of drowning in any of the waters of the United 
States. 
Your next inquiry is: 
'' Do the statutes relating to the award of any of the life-
saving medals in cases where the accident or casualty or 
the person saved come within their contemplation yet still 
limit or restrict the persons making the rescue to any par-
ticular class of persons with reference to their . calling or 
occupation 1" · 
I take that question to mean simply whether those medals 
of honor can be awarded to any other persons than those 
who are members of the regular or volunteer life-saving crew. 
The question is not without difficulty. 
Section 7 of the act of June 20, 1874, provides that such 
medals of honor "shall be bestowed upon any persons who 
shall hereafter endanger their own lives in saving or endeav-
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oring to save lives from perils of the sea within the United 
States or qpon auy American vessel." 
Now the term "any persons," taken alone, is certainly as 
comprehensive as any form of expression can be. And yet, 
that it is not safe to rely upon the form of expression alone 
is shown by the next preceding section of the act, which pro-
vides that-
" Such volunteers, * * * for every occasion upon which 
they shalJ have been instrumental in saving human life, 
shall receive s'uch of the medals herein authorized as they 
may be entitled to under the provisions hereinafter made." 
Yet surely, by th·e expression "every occasion upon which 
they shall have been im;trumen tal in saving human life," 
was not intended to embrace occasions that arose upon land, 
but must be limited to occasions arising in the discharge of 
their duty as a life-saving crew on the sea or lake coast. 
I think the true meaning and intent of the statute was to 
cause such medals of honor to be bestowed upon the mem-
bers, whether regular or volunteer, and whether permanent 
or temporary, of the. life-saving crews. 
Finally, by "perils of the sea" is meant'' all losses which 
occur from maritime adventures." (Hazard's Admr. v. New 
England M. I. Go., 8 Pet., 557.) 
In cases of marine insurance the term receives a much 
more restricted meaning, but in its larger sense it embraces 
every danger to which person and property are exposed at 
sea and from which they would be free on land. 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
MEAT I PECTION-FALSE LABEL. 
ongrea has n t provided for the punishment of persona who falsely 
state iu a label placed upon canned meat that the meat contained m 
th can ha b en inspected according to law. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
February 4, 1895. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your favor of the 31st ultimo, call-
. ing attention to a label for canned corned beef used by Mr. 
William Manning Hardy, of Victor, Cal., which label con-
tains the statement that the meat contained in the can has 
been inspected according to law enacted by Congress March 
3, 1801, regulating inspection of meats. I understand you 
to say that this statement is an entire misrepresentation and 
to inquire whether or not it can be made the subject of a 
criminal prosecution. 
I regret to say that a careful examination of the statutes 
of tpe United States fails to show that Congress has pro-
vided for the punishment of such a fraud as that committed 
by the false statement contained in the label above referred to. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF AGRIOULTURE. 
ATTOHNEY-GENERAL-REIMPORTATION OF LIQUORS. 
Questions of fraud, or intent or colorableness in a transaction are ques-
tions of fact not within the authority of the Attorney-General to 
determine. 
Whether goods exported was immediately reimported, in order to evade 
a provision of the customs laws, are an ''original importation".-
Q,uawe. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 5, 1895. 
SIR: Your communication of December 6, asking my offi-
cial opinion as to the reimportation of certain liquors at the 
port of Ogdensburg, has received my careful attention. It 
appears that the goods in question were imported and 
entered for warehouse November 14, 1891; that they were 
withdrawn for exportation in the regular wa.y on November 
13, 1894, and exported across the St. Lawrence River to 
Prescott in Canada; that proper papers for reimportation 
were then obtained, and they came back on the next boat 
2638-voL 21, PT 1--9 
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from Prescott, and a new warehouse entry was made Novem-
ber 17, 1894. You ask me "whether or not the case pre. 
sented by the special inspector should be regarded as a 
mere colorable transaction in which there was no real expor-
tation and importation of the goods!" 
Whether the good faith of any such transaction can be 
reviewed by the Treasury Department was a question 
referred to by me in my opinion of May 19, 1894, with rela-
tion to certain wool reimported at Philadelphia, but it was 
not found necessary to give an answer. The question turns 
upon the definition of the phrase "original importation" in 
section 2971 of the Revised Statutes. This topic has been 
recently the subject of discussion by the Supreme Court 
(Saltonstall v. Russell, 152 U. S., 628; Seeberger v. Schweyer, 
153 U. S., 609), but the question whether goods exported for 
the mere purpose of extending the three years' warehousing 
period provided by the statutes, and immediately reimported, 
can be regarded on the second arrival as an" original impor-
tation" is still an open one. It is a question which, in view 
of the opinions of my predecessors (14 Opin., 574; 17 Opin., 
579; 18 Opin., 381), should, I think, be left to the courts to 
decide. 
Whatever the true construction of this phraseology may 
be, the advice which you ask is not. within my authority to 
give. · The transaction described by you may bear the most 
distinct marks of an intent to evade the statute. But such 
an intent would be a fraud on the statute. Questions of 
fraud or intent or colorableness in a transaction are in so 
far questions of fact that by familiar principles they are not 
within my authority to determine. 
Very respectfully, 
RICH.A.RD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
DI CHARGE FROM ARMY-CERTIFICATE. 
The Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia was not in the mili-
tary arvice of the United tates in such sense as to entitle Capt. 
• r cl rick IIuidekoper to a certificate of discharge from the 'Gnited 
'tat . 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 6, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 12th 
ultimo, requesting my opinion upon the question whether 
Frederick Huidekoper, of the Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania 
Regiment of Militia, is entitled to a certificate of discharge 
from the military service of the United States. 
It is to be assumed, as I understand, that the state of 
facts respecting the Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment is 
the same as that existing in the cases of the Thirty-sixth and 
Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania Regiments, respectively, and con-
sidered by Acting Judge-Advocate-General Lieber in his 
opinion of September 12, 1890. If that assumption is cor-
rectly made, then I concur in the legal result reached by the 
Acting Judge-Advocate-General, and am of the opinion that 
the Fifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia can not 
be regarded as having been so far and in such sense in the 
military service of the United States as that Captain Huide-
koper's request for a certificate of discharge should be 
acceded to. 
I return the inc1osures of yours, and remain, 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
INDIAN DEPREDATION JUDGMENTS. 
The President is not charged with any power or duty of approval or 
disapproval respecting the payments of Indian depredation judgments 
from annuitites and property of Indians or from appropriations on 
their account, but all authority and discretion in the premises are 
vested in the Secretary of the Interior. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 6, 1895. 
SIR: In the matter (?f the application of the Secretary of 
the Interior for your approval of the payment of Indian 
depredation judgments against the Osage Indians from the 
interest on the proceeds of their lands in Kansas and for 
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your approval of the payment of Indian depredation Judg-
ments against the Ute Indians from a trust fuud held by the 
United States for the benefit of the Ute Indians under the 
fifth section of the act of June 15, 1880, I have the honor to 
report as follows: 
Section 12 of the act of July 15, 1870, referred to by the 
Secretary, provides that the annual interest on tlrn proceeds 
of sale of the Osage Indian lands shall be "expended by the 
President for the benefit of said Indians in such manner as 
· he may deem proper." But section 4 of the same statute 
distinctly declares "that no part of the moneys appropriated 
by this act or which may hereafter be appropriated in any 
general act or deficiency bill making appropriations for the 
concurrent and contingent expenses of the Indian Depart-
ment, to pay annuities due to, or to be used and expended 
for the care and benefit of, any tribe or tribes . of Indians 
named herein, shall be applied to the payment of any claim 
for depredations that may have been or may be committed 
by such tribe or tribes, or any member or members thereof; 
and no claims for Indian depredations shall hereafter be 
paid until Congress shall make special appropriation there-
for.'' It is apparent, therefore, that payments of Indian dep-
redation claims can not be regarded as payments for the 
''benefit" of the Osage Indians within the meaning of said 
section 12, and can not be authorized by the President under 
its terms. 
The same considerations apply in the case of the Ute 
Indians, and the annuity secured to them by the fifth section 
of the act of June 15, 1880. Though the President is directed 
by said ection to disburse or invest the annuity for the use 
and henefit of the Ute Indians forever at his discretion, the 
section mu t be interpreted not iudependently but in connec-
tion with ection 2098 of the Revised Statutes, which is the 
ame in , ubstance and effect as section 4 of the act of July 
15, 1 70, already above cited. The presumption is against 
r p al of tion 209 by the act of June 15, 1880, and 
nly r onable con truction of the two statutes taken 
CT h r i ha tl:e ati fa tion of Indian depredation judg-
m hin n fi r he ' u e and henefit" of the te 
u cl th et 1·m in th act of 1 80. 
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The payment of such judgments· against an Indian tribe is, 
'however, specifically provided for by section 6 of the act of 
March 3, 1891, which the Secretary of the Interior in his 
communication to you quotes verbatim and by which they 
are to be paid by the United States, are to be charged against 
the Indian tribe concerned, and thereafter are to be deduc.ted 
from any annuities, funds, or appropriations either then or 
thereafter belonging to such tribe or inuring to its benefit. 
But the act of August 23, 1894 (Stat.1894, chap. 307), enacts 
that the deductions provided for by section 6 of the act of 
1891 are to be ascertained and duly certified by the Secretary 
of the Interior to the Secretary of the Treasury, and further 
declares that "such deductions shall be made according to 
the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, having due 
regard to the educational and other necessary requirements 
of the tribe or tribes affected; and the amounts paid shall 
be reimbursed to the United States at such times and in such 
proportions as the Secretary of the Interior may decide to be 
for the interests of the Indian service." To the same effect 
is section 5 of the act of July 28, 1892 (Stat. 1892, chap. 311.) 
The inevitable result would seem to be, therefore, that the 
President is not charged with any power or duty of approval 
or disapproval respecting the payments of Indian depreda-
tion judgments from annuities and property of Indians or 
from appropriations on their account, but that all authority 





ATTORNEY-GENERAL-CUTS OF FOREIGN POSTAGE STAMPS. 
The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion regarding the act 
of May 16, 1884, chapter 52, or the provisions of the act of February 
10, 1891, chapter 127, except section 4, because they relate only to 
criminal proceedings, and whether or not a crime has been committed 
is a q110stion that in but rare instances can arise except in the Depart-
ment of Justice. 
Whether certain material or apparatus come within the scope of the 
fourth section of the act of 1891 is a question of fact, and an opinion 
thereon is declined. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 12, 1895. 
· Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of February 7, asking my official advice as to whetller 
certain " cuts and plates adapted to and used for the making 
of sketches and pictures of foreign postage stamps'' come 
within the terms of the act of May 16, 1884, chapter 52, '' to 
prevent and punish counterfeiting within the United States 
of notes, bonds, or other securities of foreign Governments;'' 
or within the terms of the act of February 10, 1891, chapter 
127, "further to prevent counterfeiting or manufacture of 
dies, tools, or other implements used in counterfeiting,'' etc. 
I am not authorized to give you an official opinion regard-
ing the act of 1884, because that act relates only to criminal 
proceedings. Whether or not an act constitutes a crime is a 
question that in but rare instances can arise except in the 
Department of Justice. If there is reason to suppose that 
acts coming to the attention of another Department are crimi-
nal in their nature, it is the duty of that Department to 
report these acts to the proper officials of the Department of 
Justice. It becomes, then, the duty of this Department to 
consider whether or not the matter should be brought to the 
attention of the courts. Criminal prosecutions are conducted 
by U.S. attorneys, who are officers of this Department a::id 
who are under the supervision, in nearly all matters, of the 
Attorney-General. There are, indeed, rare instances (of 
which this is not one) where the U.S. attorneys are placed 
under your supervision instead of under mine. Such an 
instance was the Cutajar case. (20 Opin., 715.) Even in such 
ca e , however, the question whether certain acts constitute a 
crime could not be presented in such a way as to warrant an 
official opinion from the Attorney-General in the premises. 
The que tion pre 'entecl to you in cases like that of Cutajar, 
and to me in mo t ca es, whel'e prosecutions for crime are 
uuder con ideration, i whether there is ufficient probability 
f eooring a verdict to warrant a pro ecution. This is not a 
qu tion of pure I w. I mu t, therefore, refrain from giving 
m pinion on thi ca for the ' ame reason which com-
p 11 d my refr ining from giving au opinion upon the ad vis-
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ability of instituting a civil suit to recover money due the 
United States. (20 Opin., 714; see also 19 Opin., 56, 670; 
20 Opin., 277, 314, 539, 702.) 
My predecessor declined to .advise the then Secretary of 
the Treasury whether certain articles were in violation of 
these acts of 1884 and 1891. (20 Opin., 210.) I think that 
his declination was proper; and therefore the opinions which 
were rendered to you on December 30, 1893, and January 16, 
1894 (20 Opin., 691, 697), except so far as they may bear upon 
the statutory provision below cited, must be regarded as 
extra-official. 
The same remarks apply to the provisions of the act of 
February 10, 1891, except those of section 4. That section 
authorizes any authorized agent of the Treasury Department 
to seize '' all counterfeits of any of the obligations or other 
securities of the United States. or of any foreign Govern-
ment, or counterfeits of any of the coins of the United 
States, or of any foreign Government, and all material or 
apparatus fitted or intended to be used or that shall have 
been used in the making of any of such counterfeit obliga-
tions or other securities or coins hereinbefore mentioned, 
that shall be found ~n the possession of any person without 
authority from the Secretary of the Treasury or other proper 
officer to have the same." 
I can not advise whether the material or apparatus now 
under consideration comes within the scope of this statutory 
provision, because such advice would involve my de.ciding 
questions of fact, such as similitude (20 Opin., 697, 698~, intent 
(Opin. of Feb. 5, 1895), or fitness for a particular use. 
Very respectfµlly 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ARKANSAS-INTEREST ON BONDS. 
Certain interest-bearing bonds of the State of Arkansas held not to 
bear interest after maturity. ( United States v. No1·th Carolina, 136 
U. S., 211, followed.) 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 14, 1895. 
GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge your joint 
communication of the 12th instant, calling my attention to 
certain coupon 6 per cent interest-bearing bonds of the State 
of Arkansas, all dated January 1, 1838, and a portion of 
which matured October 26, 1861, and another portion Jan-
uary 1, 1868. A copy of one of said bonds is inclosed, and 
you inquire whether the State of Arkansas is liable for 
interest on said bonds from and after their maturity. 
In my judgment the question must be answered unhesitat-
ingly in the neg·ative. The rule laid down in the case cited 
by you ( United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S., 211) has 
been explicitly declared to be the law of Arkansas by the 
highest court of that State; and I find nothing in the terms 
of the bonds themselves, or in any legislation of Arkansas, 
having any tendency to show that the State has consented 
to pay interest on the principal of these bonds aner such 
principal became payable. 
Respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RIES OF THE TREASURY 
.A.ND OF '.I.'HE INTERIOR. 
FOREIGN POSTAGE STAMPS-COUNTERFEITING. 
A counterfeit of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp is within the 
meaning of the phrase "obligations or other securities " " " of 
any Government" in section 4 of the act of February 10, 1891, chap-
ter 127. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 18, 1895. 
IR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of February 15, askillg my official opinion whether the coun-
terfeit of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp comes within 
the ru aning of the phra e '' obligations or other securities 
• • of any foreign Government " in section 4 of the act 
of bruary 1 , 1 91, chapter 127. I have already advi ed 
you th t , n uu an 1 d dome tic po tage stamp i an obli-
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gation or security of the United St~tes. (20 Opin., 697.) 
That advice was largely based upon section 5413 of the Re-
vised Statutes, which does not apply to foreign representa-
tives of value. I think, however, that the words "obliga-
tions or other securities" should be given the same meaning 
in the act of 1891, whether domestic or foreign, and there-
fore answer your question in the affirmative. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECR~TARY OF THE TREASURY. 
SUPPLIES FOR PUBLIC PRINTER. 
Revised Statutes, section 3709, inhibiting purchases and contracts for 
supplies by the Departments of the Government except after due 
advertisement for proposals, did not apply to paper and materials for 
the Government Printing Office, and the acts arnendatory of the section 
(Jan. 27, 1894, chap. 22, and Apr. 21, 1894, chap. 61, pp. 33, 62; Stat. 
1893-94) enlarged it in respect to this office only so as to apply to fuel, 
ice, stationery, and miscellaneous supplies. 
The purchases by the Public Printer contemplated by the act of Janu-
ary 12, 1895, are paper and materials for printing and binding public 
documents and such as do not come within Revised Statutes, section 
3709. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 15, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 14th 
instant, inclosing a copy of a letter dated March 11, 1895, 
.from the Public Printer, and asking whether, in my opinion, 
sections 15, 16, 18, and 38 of the act approved January 12, 
1895, relieve the Public Printer from a compliance with the 
requirements of the acts approved January 27 and April 21, 
1894, amending section 3709, Revised Statutes of the United 
States. 
Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes declares that all pur-
chases and contracts for supplies in any of the Departments 
of the Government shall be made by advertising a sufficient 
time previously for proposals respecting the same when the 
public exigencies do not require · the immediate delivery of 
the articles. 
By the act _approved January 27, 1894 (p. 32, Stat.' 
1893-94), the section just referred to was so amended that 
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advertisements for proposals must be ruade on the same 
days by the Executive Departments, including the Govern-
meut Printing Office. But this act excepts from its opera-
tion " paper and materials for the use of the Government 
Printiug Office, and materials used in the work of the Bureau 
of Engraving and Printing, which shall continue to be adver-
tised for and purchased as now provided by law." This act 
reaches all supplies of the Government Printing Office except 
"paper and materials for the use" of tliat office. 
By section 2 of the act approved April 21, 1894 (p. 62, 
Stat. 1893-94), the operation of the act of January 27, 
1894, was limited to advertisements for proposals for fuel, 
ice, stationery, and other miscellaneous supplies, to be pur-
chased at Washington for the use of the Executive Depart-
ments and other Government establishments. The result 
is, therefore, that these acts, taken together, have no effect 
whatever upon the Government Printing Office, except in 
respect of proposals for fuel, ice, stationery, and other mis-
cellaneous supplies to be purchased at Washington, and do 
not change, but expressly recognize as in force, the law pre-
viously existing in regard to advertisements for paper and 
materials for the use of that office. 
Section 15 of the act of January 12, 1895, is, with the 
exception of substituting '' $1,200 " for "$250," and "Public 
Printer" for" Congressional Printers," and leaving out the 
words '' on public printing" after the words "joint commit-
tee," a literal copy of section 3780 of the Revised Statutes. 
Sectio_n 16 of said act is, with like changes, not affecting 
the question under consideration, a copy of tbe provisions of 
an act approved July 31, 1876. (See 19 Stat., 105.) 
Section 18 of said act is, with like changes, a literal copy 
of section 3760 of the Revised Statutes. 
These provisions existed and operated independently of 
section 3709, and the acts above cited, amendatory of this 
section, recognize independent regulations affecting the 
'' pap r and materials for the use of the Government Print-
ing Office" a in existence. 
My conclu ion, therefore, i that section 3709 did not .apply 
to pap rand materials for the Government Printing Office, 
aud that the act amendatory th reof enlarged it in respect 
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to this office only so as to apply to fuel, ice, stationery, and 
miscellaneous supplies . 
.As the act of January 12, 1895, only provides for printing 
and binding public documents, the purchases by the Public 
Printer therein contemplated are paper and materials for 
that purpose an·d such as do not come within section 3709 as 
amended. If section 3709 and the acts amendatory thereof 
applied in terms to such purchases for the Government Print-
ing Office, they would, in respect of the supplies and materials 
specified in the act of January 12, 1895, be repealed by that 
act, since it provides for such purchases in special ways 
wholly repugnant to the method provided in the act approved 
January 27, 1894. 
Respectfully, yours, . 
RICH.ARD OLNEY. 
The SEORETA.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
CONTRACT-REMISSION OF PENALTY. 
The provision in contract with Jeremiah J. Kennedy, providing for a 
forfeiture of $20 for each day's delay in completing the work, is to 
be regarded as a penalty; and it is lawful to assess against the 
contractor only the actual damages sustained. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 16, 1895. 
SIR: 1 have yours of the 26th ultimo, referring to a con-
tract for remodeling and enlarging the gas plant at the 
Military .Academy, West Point, N. Y., entered into February 
22, 1803, with Jeremiah J. Kennedy, and containing a provi-
sion that the work shall be completed within a certain time, 
and that" for each day, excluding Sundays, required after 
expiration of that time to complete this contract, the con-
tractor shall forfeit to the United States twenty (20) dollars 
per day, to be deducted from the final payment to be made 
him." 
There was a delay of one hundred and fifteen days in the 
completion of the work, and you inquire whether it is com-
petent for the Secretary of War to retain the actual dam-
ages arising from such delay, to wit, $225, or whether he 
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must enforce the penalty according to the strict letter of the 
contract. 
The inquiry can be answered only by determining whether 
the $20 a day forfeiture provided for by the contract is to 
be regarded as in the nature Jf liquidated damages, or as a 
penalty. The latter must, I think on the whole, be deemed 
to be its true character, though the circumstances from 
which a conclusion can be arrived at are, it must be admitted, 
few and indecisive. 
I am therefore of the opinion that it is competent for you 
to settle with the contractor by retaining from the final pay-
ment a sum representing the actual damages sustained. 
I return the con tract, and remain 
Respectfully, yours, 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
CIVIL- SERVICE-REMOVALS. 
Certain removals of superintendents and clerks in the Baltimore post-
office helll to have been properly made, and the appointment of their 
successors to have been legal. (19 Opin., 411, cited.) 
DEPARTMENT OF tTUS'.1.'ICE, 
}lf arch 18, 1895. 
SIR: Your communication of February 4 asks my opinion 
whether certain removals of superintendents and clerks in 
the B,iltimore post-office were properly made, and whether 
the appointment of their. successors was legal. The facts 
submitted relevant to this inquiry are as follows: 
Prior to November 1, 1894, the postmaster at Baltimore 
notified c rtain person that he had appointed them respec-
tively to tbe po ition of uperintendents of divi ions and 
clerk to he po t-office, and notified the incumbents of their 
r m val. 
On ovembe.r 1 h enter d the removals and appointments 
in a privat mem randum book kept by him in the post-
offic :£ r hat purp e. 11 the per OD then incumoents 
r main d in ffic un il ovember 7, and on that day the 
pp int ualifi cl by taking the oath of office. On 
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November 2 the President's order covering these places into 
the civil service took effect. On November 7 the Post-Office 
Department received official notification from the postmaster 
of the removals and appointments as above stated, which 
notification was dated November 1, but was not received 
until November 7. 
The Post-Office Department declined to approve the 
appointments. Thereupon the postmaster appointed seven 
of the original eight appointees as watchmen, intending, as 
he stated, "to apply for their classification, and then to pro-
mote to the positions which I I he l had originally appointed 
them by direct appointment on November 1." 
The notification to the Post-Office Department of their 
appointment as watchmen was dated November 8, and on 
November 9 the Acting First Assistant Postmaster-General 
notified the postmaster that the changes were approved if 
made in accordance with the civil-service rules. On N ovem-
ber 14 the postmaster notified the Post-Office DepartmeJ?-t of 
the promotion of the eight persons above referred to from 
watchmen to superintendents of divisions a1id clerks, and on ' 
the same day the Post-Office Department approved the 
changes in the roster if in accordance with the civil-service 
rules. Thereafter the postmaster withdrew the appointments 
of watchmen and promotions, as above stated, and in a letter 
to the Post-Office Department of November 24 indicated his 
purpose of standing upon his prior action. 
The new appointees received compensation and performed 
duties as clerks and never performed the duties of watch-
men. The removals and appointments in question were up 
to November 2, 1894, regulated by section 419 of the Postal 
Laws and Regulations. In this section it is provided as 
follows: 
"The number, grades, and compensation of clerks for 
post-offices, where allowance for clerk hire is made, are 
fixed by the Postmaster-General. They are employed and 
are under the direct supervision of the postmaster ( except 
as proyided in section 452), who is held responsible for their 
acts. * * * All removals and new employments must be 
reported to the First Assistant Postmaster-General as soon 
as made." 
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The postmaster was empowered to employ the clerks in 
question, and no formal appointment or approval was requi-
site. He was also empowered to make removals without 
restriction. 
The provision that a report of removals and employments 
must be at once made to the First .Assistant Postmaster-
General is not a condition precedent to the employment nor 
of the consummation of the removal. They are to be re-
ported after they have been made. It appears that prior to 
November 1 the new employes were notified "that they 
were appomted," and that the then incumbents were notified 
of their removal. Thi~ completed the appointments and the 
removals, and they were effected before the order · of the 
President operated upon these positions. The fact that the 
new employes did not qualify or enter upon their new 
duties before the order of the President took effect does not 
impair the validity of the perfected employment. 
In an opinion given on October 14, 1889 ( 19 Opin., 411), 
Mr . .Attorney-General Miller held that a railway postal clerk, 
duly appointed before the civil-service rules for the Railway 
Mail Service went into effect, who did not take the oath of 
office and enter upon its duties until after such rules went 
into effect, was entitled to the office unaffected by such rules. 
The fact that the incumbents of the clerkships held over by 
permission of the postmaster after they had been notified 
that they had been removed could not give them any title 
to positions which had already been filled by the appointing 
power. 
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REGISTRY OF WRECKED FOREIGN-BUILT VESSEL. 
A British steamship was wrecked outside the limits of the United 
States, was finally towed to New York, and sank in or near Erie 
Basin. The wreck was purchased by an American citizen at three 
times the cost of the wreck. Held, that the vessel was "wrecked in 
the United States," within the meaning of the Revised Statutes, sec-
tion 4136; that the word ''cost" in said section is to be construed 
literally, and that if the actual cost of the repairs is three times the 
actual purchase price of the wreck, it is entitled to registry. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 21, 1895. 
SIR: Your communication of March 14 informs me that 
the British steamship Southery, which went ashore in the 
Gulf of Mexico, outside the limits of the United States, and 
was there al;>andoned by her crew and turned over to the 
underwriters, was subsequently towed to Key West, where 
she received further injuries, and :finally towed to New York, 
where she sank in or near the Erie Basin. I assume from 
your letter that her disasters at Key West and New York 
were suffered bona fide and were not created for the purpose 
of obtaining American registry. ( The Mohawk, 3 Wall., 566.) 
You further inform me that the vessel~' was repaired and 
purchased by an American citizen at three times the cost of 
the wreck, * * * but evidence is submitted that the cost 
was below the value of the vessel." An application has been 
made for American registry under section 4136 of the Revised 
Statutes, which is as follows: 
"The Secretary of the Treasury may issue a register or 
enrollment for any vessel built in a foreign country, when-
ever such vessel shall be wrecked in the United States, and 
shall be purchased and repaired by a citizen of the United 
States, if it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Secre-
tary that the repairs put upon such vessel are equal to· three-
fourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired/' 
You ask me whether tbe vessel was "wrecked in tht 
United States" within the meaning of that section, and also 
whether the word ''cost" therein is to be interpreted liter-
ally, or as equivalent to "value." 
The section under consideration has been very liberally 
construed by my predecessors. (9 Opin., 424; 15 Opin., 402; 
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20 Opin., 253.) Construing it liberally, I am of the opinion 
that this vessel was" wrecked in the United States," whether 
01 not it was in the eye of the law a wreck when first beached 
iu the Gulf of Mexico, as to which I am not supplied with 
sufficient information to judge. 
Answering your further question, I am clearly of the opin-
ion that the word "cost" in said section is to be construed 
literally If the actual cost of the repairs is three times the 
actual purchase price of the wreck, then in my opinion it is 
entitled to registry. Whether the present case comes under 
the law as so interpreted is not clear from your letter. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRE'.I.'ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
GENERAL APPRAISERS-RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION. 
A protest under the customs administrative act of 1890 was overruled 
by a, Board of General Appraisers on September 26, 1892. On July 6, 
1894, the attention of the Board was called to the fact that it had 
inadvertently overlooked some of the grounds of the protest, and a 
review of its decision was requested. Held, that it was the duty of 
the importer to watch for the decision of the Board, and that, after 
the lapse of time stated, the Board was without further jurisdiction 
in the premises. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 22, 1895. 
Sr&: Your communication of March 5 informs me that a 
protest under the customs administrative act of 1890, filed 
by one L. Englelhorn, an importer, was overruled by the 
Board of General Appraisers on September 26, 1892. This 
decision was made in part inadvertently, the Board over-
looking some of the grounds of the protest. On July 6, 1894, 
Mr. Engelhorn first called their attention to this. The Board 
thereupon requested the collector to return the invoice and 
entry in the ca e, in order that consideration might be given 
t th objection theretofore overlooked. The question thus 
ar1 . wh th r the Board have the right, after such lap e 
f tm , t r con icl r a deci ion. The Board is divided in 
pini n n hi qu ion, and ou a k my official opinion 
up i. 
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It is my opinion that the reasons of the Board of GeneraJ 
Appraisers for their decision in overruling the protest can 
not now be looked into even by themselves. Their d,ecision, 
as I understand your letter, overruled the whole protest. It 
was Mr. Engelhorn's duty to watch for the decision of the 
Board, and no notice to him was necessary. (Compare 
Westray v. United States, 18 Wall., 322.) Even a court, 
after such lapse of time, would have no power to grant a 
rehearing. (Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S., 410.) I there-
fore advise you that the Board have no further jurisdiction 
in the premises. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMP ANY. 
Views of counsel for the Central Pacific Railroad Company upon the 
principle to be applied in the· accounting between that company and 
the United States as to subsidy bonds loaned to the company, which 
became due January 16, 1895, stated, considered, and not concurred in. 
Construing the acts of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, and of July 2, 1864, 
chapter 216, in the light of the Thurman Act of May 7, 1878, chapter 
96, and sundry decisions of the Supreme Court: Held, that the one-
half of the earnings of the cotnpany on Government business and its 
yearly payments of 5 per cent of its net profits can not be treated as 
having liquidated the whole or any part of the company's indebted-
ness on account of the principal of the subsidy bonds maturing Jan-
uary 16, 1895; but, on the other hand, must be regarded as paying 
interest debts exclusively. Held fur·ther, applying the familiar rule 
that in case ·of payments by a debtor to a creditor up0n distinct trans-
actions for distinct accounts, when neither party makes an appropri-
ation at the time, the payments are applied by law to the liabilities 
of earliest date; that the sums applicable in any one year to the pay-
ment of the company's interest debts for that yea,r must be applied in 
the order in which such debts arise, and the fact that bonds have been 
issued at various times is of no consequence. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 25, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of January 9 
last, which incloses a letter of the counsel of the Central 
Pacific Railroad Company, containing his views upon the 
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principle to be applied· in the accounting between that com-
pany and the United States, ·made necessary by the loan to 
the company of subsidy bonds of the United States, of which 
bonds to the amount of $2,362,000 became due January 16, 
1895. 
The rule laid down by the learned counsel is that credits 
for transportation and for the 5 per cent of net profits referred 
to in the act of 1862 are applicable, first, against the interest, 
and second, against the principal of the first maturing bonds, 
and thereafter first as against the interest, and second as 
against the principal of subsequently maturing bonds in the 
order of their maturity. You inquire" whether, in liquidat-
ing the subsidy bonds falling due January 16, 1895, it [ the 
Department l should be governed by the principle laid 
'down in the company's statement; or if not, what method 
in your f my] opinion should be followed in finally disposing 
of the matter," 
The United States loaned the railroad company not money, 
but semiannual interest-bearing bonds maturing in thirty 
years. As it would itself not have to pay the principal of 
the bonds until tlie end of the thirty years, it could not and 
did not require the company to pay the _principal or any part 
thereof before that time. But it went further. Though it 
would have to pay interest on the bonds semiannually, it 
agreed with the company that (with an exception to be pres-
ently noted) the amounts paid by it as such interest should 
not become due to it from the company until the principal of 
the bonds themselves also became due. While this was the 
general plan, it was foreseen that the company would annu-
ally earn money by transportation service for the Govern-
ment, and that after the completion of the road there might 
be annual net pro.fits applicable to dividends. It was not 
deemed neces ary that while the Government was actually 
paying out money for interest it should also actually pay iuto 
the company's treasury for its transportation all the money 
hereby earned. either wa it deemed wise that in tlie 
c me year the Government was di bur ing money for inter-
t all th ompany net pro.fit 'hould be di tributed among 
h ·kholder . It was therefore provided, a the combined 
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effect of the acts of 1862 and 1864, that one-half of the money 
annually earned by the company on Government business 
should be annually retained and applied to the payment 0f 
the company's indebteduess on account of the subsidy bonds 
and interest, and that 5 per cent of the net pro:fi ts of any 
year should also be applied in the same manner. 
The correctness of the foregoing statement is not, 1t is 
believed, controverted. The difficulty arises when it is 
sought to ascertain exactly what the statute means in pre-
scribing an annual application to the company's indebtedness 
of one-half of annual earnings from Government busi.J.ess and 
of the 5 per cent fund. Is it that these annual credits and 
receipts shall annually appear in proper accounts, but shali 
actually extinguish debt only after the company;s entire debt 
for both principal and interest of the subsidy bonds has 
matured, Upon that construction the statutes in question 
simply create a sinking fund, available to pay the whole debt 
when matured, but not extinguishing any portion of it while 
maturing. Upon that construction the controlling words 
"annually applied,'' if not practically eliminated, lose their 
natural meaning and operate as a simple requirement for 
annual statements of account. Yet the Thurman Act of 
1878 shows that Congress must be credited with appreciating 
the difference between a sinking fund accumulating against 
a thereafter maturing indebtedness and moneys applicable 
to the actual reduction of a debt as fast as received. And, as 
in the Thurman Act and other like acts, if the statutes of 1862 
and 1864 bad merely intended to create a sinking fund they 
would naturally have contained a provision for its interim 
investment pending its application. 
The construction in question is·, therefore, to be rejected, 
and the alternative view adopted, . to wit, that the annual 
application contemplated by the statutes in question is a real 
application, one in fact annually extinguishing debt. But 
what debt is to be thus extinguished, The debt of the com-
pany for the principal of the subsidy bonds does not arise 
until their maturity and the payment of such principal by 
t.he Government, and before that time is not susceptible of 
actual extinguishment. The Government's payments for 
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annual interest, on the other hand, create absolute debts, 
whether payable in future, in whole or m part, is immaterial, 
from the moment of each payment. It follows that when the 
statutes of 1862 and 1864 direct one-half of the earnings 
from Government business and 5 per cent of the net profits 
for any year to be applied in such year to the company's 
indebtedness growing out of the loan of the subsidy bonds, 
the indebtedness referred to can be no other than that arising 
from the Government's interest payments for the same year. 
In short, what tlley in effect enact is that, though the com-
pany's debts for interest shall in general mature only when 
its debt for prrncipal matures, yet so much of such debts 
arising in each year as can be paid by one-half the earnings 
from Governmeut business and 5 per cent of the net profits 
for tllat year shall be held to ma.ture in that year, and shall 
be paid and discharged accordingly. 
The views above stated of the true construction of tile 
statutes of 1862 and 1864 derive the strongest confirmation 
from the provisions of the Thurman Act of 1878, wbicll, 
indeed, if it were repugnant to the previous statutes, would 
have to be regarded as amendatory thereof. Thus, the pre~ 
amble recites, as respects the Central Pacific, that tlrn United 
States bad paid interest to the sum of more than thirteen 
and one-half millious "which has not been reimbursed," and, 
as respects the Union Pacific, that the United States lulid 
paid over $10,000,000 interest "over and above all reimburse-
ments." The enacting portions of the act of 1878 mark the 
distinction between a sinking fund and credits and receipts 
at once extinguishing debt in the most emphatic manner. 
Thus section 7 declares that the sinking fund established by 
the act ~hall, at the maturity of the bonds, be used for the 
sati faction thereof. On the other hand, section 2 explicitly 
provides that one-half the compensation due the two com-
panies on Government business "shall be presently applied 
to the liquidation of the interest paid and to be paid by the 
nited :-.tat on the bonds." Aud section 4 provide , as 
r pect ea h of th companie , that there bould be carried 
to the r dit of the iuking fund one-half of the co·mpensa• 
ti n a cruin · fr m ervic • for the Government "not applied 
to li uid· ti n f int re ts." 
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The doctrine that against current debts- for interest aris-
ing in any year are to be applied current credits and receipts 
from the sources specified accruing the same year is also 
strongly supported by the language used by the Supreme 
Court when discussing and declaring the meaning and intent 
of Congress, as evinced by the statutes in question and other 
legislation in pari materia. Thus, in Union Pacific Railroad 
Company v. United States (91 U.S., 72) the court (p. 78) says: 
"The Union Pacific Railroad Company, conceding the 
right of the Government to retain one-half of the compensa-
tion due it for transportation of the mails, military, and 
Indian supplies, and apply the same to reimburse the Gov-
ernment for interest paid by it on bonds issued to the Gov-
ernment to aid in the construction of its railroad and tele-
graph line, seeks to establish by this suit its claim to the 
other moiety." On pages 87 and 89 the court adds: "This 
Congress did not choose to do, but rested satisfied with the 
entire property of the company as security for the ultimate 
payment of the principal and interest, and in the meantime, 
with special provisions looking to the reimbursement of the 
Government for interest paid by it, and to the application of 
the surplus, if any remained, to discharge the principal." 
And, "There could, however, be no reasonable objection to 
the application 'of all compensation for services rendered for 
the Government, from the outset and of, 5 per cent of the net 
earnings after the completion of the road' to the payment of 
the bonds and · interest. These exactions were accordingly 
made.'' 
So, in the Sinking Fund Cases (99 U. S., 700, 719) occurs 
the following _: "The contract of the company in respect 
to the subsidy bonds is to pay both principal and interest 
when the principal matures, unless the debt is sooner 
discharged by the application of one-half the compensation 
for transportation and other services rendered for the Gov-
ernment, and the five per cent of net earnings as specified 
in the charter. This was decided in Union Pacific Railroad 
Company v. United States (91 U.S., 72)." And again (p. 723), 
"On the subsidy bonds, as has been seen, no interest is pay-
able, except out of the half of the earnings for Government 
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service and the five per cent of net earnings, until the matu-
rity of the principal." (See also Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany v. United States, 99 U. S., 426.) 
The result is that I am unable to concur in the opinion of 
the counsel of the Central Pacific above stated. The one-
half of the yearly earnings of the company on Government 
business and its yearly payments of 5 per cent of its net 
profits can not be treated, in my judgment, as having liqui-
dated the whole or any part of the company's indebtedness 
on account of the principal of the subsidy bonds maturing 
January 16, 1895. They must be regarded, on the other band, 
as paying interest debts exclusively; and the only remaining 
question is exactly what interest debts have been thus paid. 
It being borne in mind that every year is to stand by ifa,elf-
that there is to be in each year an accounting and settlement 
by which the interest debts for that year are to be paid off 
by the designated means-the answer to the question would 
not seem to be difficult. It is a familiar rule that in case of 
payments by a debtor to a creditor upon distinct transac-
tions and for distinct accounts, when neither party makes an 
appropriation at the time, the payments are applied by law to 
the liabilities of earliest date. Hence the sums applicable 
in any year to the payments of the company's interest debts 
for that year must be applied in the order in which_ such 
debts arise; must be applied, for example, to the interest 
debts arising in January in preference and priority to those 
arising in July of the same year. The fact that bonds have 
been issued at various times is of no consequence. Neither 
is it important to determine on what issues of bonds the 
interest disbursements of the Government for any year are 
made. The indebtedness of the company arises at the 
moment of each disbursement, is of the same nature, what-
ever be the bond i ue on account of which it is made, and 
i each year u~ject to the same liquidation by the applica-
tion thereto of one-half the P,arning on Government tran -
p rtation plu 5 per cent of the net profits for the same year. 
If in any y ar th fund applicable to uch liquidation is 
in uffi i nt t pay all the indebt dne ari ing from interest 
di bur ment in that year, it i to be applied o as to first 
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cancel the January interest indebtedness accruing in that 
year, and upon all interest indebtedness accruing at the 
same time in any year is to be applied pro rata. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DISPOSAL OF USELESS PAPERS. 
The disposition of useless papers which have accumulated in the office 
of the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department is gov-
erned by the act approved February 16, 1889, chapter 171 (25 Stat., 672). 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 28, 1895. 
SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 26th 
instant, stating that there is a large accumulation of papers 
in the office of the Auditor for the Post-Office Department 
which can and should be disposed of under an act of Con-
gress approved .August 5, 1882 (First Supp. Rev. Stat., p. 373), 
unless said act has been repealed by the act of February 16, 
1889, entitled "An act to authorize and provide for the dis-
position of useless papers in the Executive Departments." 
Your communication incloses an opinion upon the question 
by the Solicitor of the Treasury, dated the 26th instant, and 
I do not deem it necessary for me to do more than to say 
that I concur in the conclusion reached by the Solicitor. 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
No·rE.-The conclusion of the opinion of the Secretary of 
the Treasury was that a special act of Congress of August 
5, 1882 (22 Stat., 219), by which the Secretary of the Treasury 
was authorized to sell or otherwise dispose of useless papers 
which might accumulate in the office of the Auditor of the 
Treasury for the Post-Office Department, was impliedly re-
pealed by the general and comprehensive statute of Feb-
ruary 16, 1889, which provided for the disposition of useless 
papers in the Executive Departments, for the reason that 
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there was an insuperable repugnancy between the two stat-
utes. He said: "In order that they both might stand and 
operate together, we should . have the somewhat anomalous 
and inconsistent practice of disposing of files of useless papers 
in one bureau of the Treasury Department under a special act 
and the disposition of such files and papers in all the other 
bureaus of the same Department under the general law pro-
viding an entirely different method."-W. H.P. 
CUSTOMS DUTIES-RELIQUIDA'fIO:N" OF ASSESSMENT. 
On an importation of mohair goods, made after August 28, 1894, the 
importer appealed from the classification of the appraiser, and, pend· 
ing action by the Board of General Appraisers, upon notice by the 
appraiser that a mistake of fact had been made, the collector-requested 
a return of the papers for reconsideration, but the Board declined to 
comply. Held, that section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 136, 
is still in force and that the Secretary of the Treasury has the power 
to order a reliquidation of the assessment of duties in the interest of 
the importers and to direct the return of the papers to the collector. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 30, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of March 6 and of certain correspondence relating to an 
importation of mohair goods by Messrs. S. Babbit & Co. at 
the port of New York. It appears that the goods were 
imported after August 28, 1894, and were returned by the 
appraiser as composed of wool or worsted derived from the 
sheep; that duty was assessed thereon by the collector 
accordingly; that the importers protested, or, more accu-
rately speaking, gave notice in writing, as required by sec-
tion 14 of the cu toms administrative act of June 10, 1890, 
a a result of which the papers were transmitted to the 
:Board of General .Appraisers; that subsequently the ap-
prai er informed the collector that he had made a mistake 
of fact and that the good were in fact composed of mohair 
deriv d from the goat, and hence were liable to lesser duty 
und r th opinion of this Department of October 9, 1894; 
that the ollector thereupon requested a return of the papers 
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for reconsideration, the protest being at that time pending 
before the Board and undecided, but that the Board 'have 
declined to comply with this request. 
I understand from your communication that you have 
authorized the collector to make a reexamination and reliqui-
dation in this case. You ask my opinion whether the Board 
of General .Appraisers is justifi~d under the provjsions of 
the customs administrative act in further withholding the 
protest from the collector. 
In my opinion, section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, chap-
ter 136, is still in force. That act expressly provides that 
whenever the Secretary of the Treasury shall be of opinion 
that duties "have been assessed and collected under an erro-
neous view of the facts in the case he may authorize a reex-
amination and reliquidation in such case" when protest and 
appeal have been made, as required by law, and recognizes 
the right to correct "errors in liquidation, whether for or 
against the Government, arising solely upon errors of fact 
discovered within one year from the date of payment." 
The error in this case being one of fact, I am therefore of 
opinion that you have the power to direct a reliquidation in 
the interest of the importers and that it is not necessary to 
make the importers go through the form of a bearing before 
the Board of General· .A pp raisers. As the collector acted 
under a mistake of fact, and there is no further controversy 
between him and the importers, there is no reason for any 
further proceedings before the Board. Their functions are 
quasi judicial, and for a court to proceed with a case when 
the parties are agreed and desire a discontinuance would be 
an absurdity. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that you, as the head of the 
Department, have the right to direct the return of the papers 
to the collector. 
Very respectfully, 
RICH.ARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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EXAMINATION OF OFFICIAL .BONDS. 
Attorneys for the United States are not required or authorized to make 
the examination into the sufficiency of sureties upon official bond8 
provided for in section 5 of the appropriation act for the next fiscal 
year. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 30, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 28th 
instant, referring to that provision of section 5 of the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial appropriation act for the next 
fiscal year, which provides that" every officer required by 
law to take and approve official bonds shall cause the same 
to be examined at least once every two years for the purpose 
of ascertaining th'e sufficiency of the sureties thereon," and 
asking an expression of my views upon "the question of 
having the necessary examination into the character and 
value of the property of the sureties on the official bonds 
approved by this Department made by the U. S. attorneys 
for the respective districts in which the various bondsmen 
reside." 
Iain not advised of any statute which either requires or 
authorizes a U. S. attorney to make an examination of the 
character suggested, and am of the opinion that he can not 
be called upon to render any such service to any officer of 




The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
DISBURSEME 'T OF "GENERAL ARMSTRONG" FUND. 
Directions given as to proper method of stating account with owners, 
etc., of the U. S. brig of war General Arrnstrong, under the acts of 
May 1, 1882, chapter 115, and March 2, 1895, chapter 187. Held, also, 
that th ecretary of State can not apply any part of the unexpended 
balance to the payment of the claim of amuel C. Reid, jr., for 
"axp n and charges" incurred in the recovery of the amount 
appropriated. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 9, 1895. 
Sm: I have your communication of the 3d instant, with 
eighteen iuclosures, asking me to advise you as to what 
amount, if any, you are authorized to pay to Mr. Samuel C. 
Reid from the unexpended balance of the appropriation made 
by the act of May 1, 1882, for the relief of the captain, owners, 
officers, and crew of the U.S. brig of war General Armstrong, 
under the act of March 2, 1895, entitled "An act making 
appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895, and 
for prior years, and for other purposes." 
Under the act of 20th of April, 1882, the Secretary of State 
is authorized and directed to examine and adjust the claims 
of the captain, owners, officers, and crew upon the evidence 
established before the Court of Olaims "and to settle the 
same on principles of justice and equity." 
Under this authority the Secretary of State, Mr. Freling-
huysen, ascertained that the amount originally appropriated 
for the payment of these claims was $70,739. 
That by an instrument of writing dated the 12th of Sep-
tember, 1835, the owners of the vessel, comprising fifteen 
persons and firms, made an assignment in the words and 
figures following: 
"In consideration of one dollar, to each of us paid, and in 
further consideration of the undertaking of Samuel C. Reid, 
of New York, to bear all the expenses and charges and to per-
form all necessary services for the collection of the demands 
hereafter mentioned, we, the subscribers, do assign, transfer, 
and set over unto the said Samuel C. Reid, his heirs and 
assigns forever, all our right, title, and interest in the late 
private-armed brig the General Armstrong, captured and 
destroyed at Fayal during the late war with England, sub-
ject to the payment to each of us of the one-half of any monies 
that he may recover for or on account of said vessel." * * * 
That $43,000 was the amount awarded by the Court of 
Claims as indemnity for the losses of the owners of the 
vessel. 
That the said Uapt. Samuel C. Reid, by an instrument 
executed _by him dated the 31st of October, 1851, assigned to 
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Samuel C. Reid, jr., * * * "all my right, title, and inter-
est to and in the undivided half of sixteen shares of stock 
in the late privat_e-armed brig General Armstrong.'' 
That by a further instrument in writing dated the 12th of 
December, 1856, the said Capt. Samuel C. Reid, assigned to 
Samuel C. Reid, jr.-
" .A.11 my right, title, and interest whatsoever to and in the 
late private-armed brig of war General Armstrong, captured 
and destroyed in the port of Fayal by a British squadron on 
the 27th day of September, 1814, as assigned to me by the 
stockholders and owners of said brig, in addition to the 
shares of stock in said brig made over by me unto the said 
Samuel C. Reid, junior, by deed dated 31st October, 1851; 
and also all monies in virtue thereof which shall or may be 
recovered from the Government of the United States, or the 
payment of which may be provided for by the Congress of 
the United States, in virtue of the claim of the said brig 
General Armstrong now pending before the United States 
Court of Claims.'' 
That the award made for the losses of the officers and crew 
was $27,739. 
That the award made as indemnity for the losses of the 
owners of the vessel was $43,000. 
Upon these facts the Secretary of State ascertained and 
determined that Samuel C. Reid, jr., was entitled to recover 
50 per cent of the amount awarded the owners of the vessel, 
being $21,500, and to 40 per cent of the amount awarded 
to officers and crew as compensation for his services, being 
$11,095.60, making the total amount to which Samuel 0. 
R~id, jr., was entitled $32,595.60. 
It will be observed that in ascertaining the amount due to 
the claimant for his services to be 40 per cent of the amount 
awarded to the officers aud crew the Secretary of State 
appear to have overlooked the fact that of those officers 
apt. Samuel C. Reid had him elf been allowed by the Court 
of Claims the nm of 1,037, which entered into and formed 
part of th total award of 27,739. 
could not have been intended that he should be allowed 
40 per nt of th 1,037 a certained to be due him, nor 
coul it ha b en intended that he hould be deprived of 
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this amount which the Court of Claims had ascertained was 
due him. 
I think a proper statement of this branch of. the account 
should be-
Forty per cent of ($27,739-$1,037) $26,702 ....•••••...••.. * $11,080.80 
To which add Captain Reid's share .......••.......••.. ---- 1,037.00 
* 12,117.80 
The statement of the entire account would then be-
F ifty per cent of $43,000 .........•.. : .•.............. - - - - . $21, 500. 00 
Forty per cent of $26,702 ...........•... - - - - . . . . • . . . . . • • • • . * 11, 080. 80 
Captain Reid's share ... _.. . . . . . . . . • . . . • . • . . . . . . . . • • . . . . • . . 1, 039. 00 
* 33,619.80 
Which amount Samuel 0. Reid, jr., the present claimant, 
was entitled to receive from the appropriation of $70,739. 
It appears that Samuel C. Reid, jr., the present claimant, 
has made assignments to various persons ,and that payments 
have been made to these assignees in the amounts appearing 
in the tabulat,ed statement in Senate Executive Document 
No, 164 of the first session of the Forty-ninth Congress. 
It further appears that payments have also been made to 
Samuel C. Reid, jr., the claimant, himself. 
The sum of the payments made to Samuel C. Reid, jr., and 
to his assignees, being deducted from the $33,619.80, would 
leave the balance whieh he is entitled to receive out of the 
unexpended balance which the act of March 2, 1895, directs 
shall be applied for the liquidation and settlement of the 
claims of Samuel C. Reid. 
It appears, however, that Samuel 0. Reid, jr., now insists 
that the unexpended balance shall be applied to reimburs-
ing him the amounts which have been paid to his assignees, 
on the ground that such amounts were so expended by 
him in the expenses necessarily incurred in securing the 
appropriation. 
* Instating the account with reference to the amount awarded to the 
officers an<l. crew, 40 per cent of $26,702 was carried out as $11,080.80 
inst ead of $10,6~0.80, thus making the footing $12,117.80 instead of 
$11,719.80. The footing of the "entire account" should, consequently, 
be read $33,219.80, instead of $33,619.80. The attention of the State 
Department was called to the errors indicated.-W, H.P. 
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But the obje~tion to this is obvious and twofold. 
First. The assignment of 12th of September, 1835, from the 
owners of tJ:ie vessel to Capt. Samuel C. Reid, is subject to 
the express condition that he shall "bear all the expenses 
and charges and perform all necessary services for the col-
lection of the demands hereafter mentioned." 
Second. That the act of Congress approved March 2, 
1895, under which alone the Secretary of State bas authority 
to disburse the unexpended balance, expressly provides that 
it" shall be applied for the fiquidation and settlement of the 
claims of Samuel C. Reid, according to the vouchers now on 
file in said Department. 
And further, the claims of all the officers and crew of the 
. brig, as well as those of the owners, have been recognized 
by the Court of Claims and by Congress. And should the 
Secretary of State now, without further authority than that 
conferred upon him by the act of March 2, 1895, apply any 
part of this unexpended balance to the payment of the 
"expenses and charges" incurred in the recovery of the 
amount appropriated, the Government woulrl still remain 
liable to the officers and crew and the owners of the brig, 
whose recognized claims have not yet been paid out of the 
amount appropriated. 
I am therefore of opinion that you have not the authority 
to apply any part of the unexpended balance to the payment 
of such " expenses and charges," or to the reimbursement of 
Mr. Samuel C. Reid, jr., or anyone else who may have paid 
them, but that the account should be stated as above indi-
cated, and any balance left remaining should be reserved for 
the yet unascertained claimants, or for further disposition 
by Congr:ess. (Opinions on other features of this case will be 
fouud 17 Opin. Att'y-Gen., 590,600; 20 Opin. Att'y-Gen., 373.) 
The inclo ure are herewith returned. 
Very re pectful1y, 




RIO.II.A.RD OL EY. 
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CUSTOMS DUTIES-DRAWBACKS. 
Camel's-hair noils, resulting from the separation of imported camel's 
hair into hair and noils, were not entitled to drawback under sec-
tion 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as a manufactured article. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 17, 1895. 
SIR: Answering your communication of April 6, I have 
the honor to advise you that, in my opinion, camel's-hair 
noils, resulting from the separation of imported camel's hair 
into hair and noils, were not entitled to drawback under 
section 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as a manufac-
tured article. My opinion of December 27, relating to oil 
cake, to which you refer, was based upon special considera-
tions not applicable to any other by-product. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRE'l'A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
COPYRIGHT ACT. 
Section 3 of the copyright act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1106), prohib-
iting the importation into the United States of foreign editions of any· 
book copyrighted in this country, 1s applicable to books copyrighted 
prior to the passage of the act; and the exceptions in the case of per-
sons purchasing for use and not for sale, who import, subject to the 
duty thereon, not more than two copies of such book at any one time, 
is not limited in its application to the'' authorized editions" of ·such 
book. 
DEP A.R'rMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 19, 1895. 
SIR: I have your letter of the 15th instant, inclosing a let-
ter from Messrs. Harper & Bros., of February 15, 1895, with 
a copy of your reply thereto, dated February 28, 1895, and 
a further letter from said firm, dated March 2, 1895, and the 
opinion of the Solicitor of tlie Treasury ;:ts to the application 
of section 7 of the copyright act of March 3, 1891, to books 
copyrighted before said act went into effect. 
You ask my opinion " as to whether section 3 of said act 
is applicable to books copyrighted prior to the passage of 
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said act; and if so, whether the exception therein of two 
copies of copyrighted books is limited to what are known as 
'authorized editions,' as claimed by Messrs. Harper & 
Bros.'' · 
The act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1106), is entitled ''Au 
act to amend title 60, chapter 3, of the Revised Statutes of 
the United States, relating to copyrights." 
It win be observed as to this act that, although entitled 
"An act to amend title 60, chapter 3," yet, in-fact, it amends 
only certain specific enumerated sections of that chapter. 
It will be observed further that it does not repeal the then 
existing statutes on the subject, but that the amendments 
consist solely in the addition of .uew provisions. 
The rule of construction, as stated in Sutherland on Statu-
tory Construction, section 133, is as follows: 
"The portions of the amended sections, which are merely 
copied without changes, are not to be considered as repealed 
and again enacted, but to have been the law all along; and 
tlle new parts, or the cllangecl portions, are not to be taken 
to have been the law at any time prior to the passage of the 
amended act. The change takes effect, prospectively, accord-
ing to the general rule." 
.And in Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, section 
195: 
"An amendment of a statute may or may not operate as 
an implied repeal of the original law. If it does not change 
the same, but merely adds something to it, it is not, in gen-
eral, a repeal thereof." 
The act of March 3, 1891, was intended, as is well known, 
to protect domestic authors against foreign infringements of 
their copyrights. .And, as appears by section 13 of that act, 
it invited reciprocity in this matter from foreign Governments. 
Section 2 is an amendment of section 4956, Revised Stat-
ute . It does not operate to repeal any provision of section 
4956, but amend it only "by adding something new." It 
provide £ r the <lepo, it in the mail or the delivery at the 
office f the Librarian of ongre of a printed copy of the 
itl of th work produced and al o two copie of such work; 
ith the provi o, how ver, that '' during the existence of 
uch 01 right the importa ion into the Uniwd States of 
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any book * * * copyrighted, or any edition or editions 
thereof, * * * shall be and is hereby prohibited." 
Does this apply only to such books as shall have been 
copyrighted since March 3, 1891 f I think not. It secures 
to the owner of the copyright of every book which shall 
have been copyrighted in accordance with the requirements 
of this statute, whether before or after its passage, protec-
tion against the sale in this country of foreign publications 
of his book by prohibiting the importation of such foreign 
publications. The act is prospective only as to this new 
security which it affords to the owner of the copyright, and 
is not prospective as to the books to which that security 
applies. 
He can not claim indemnity for losses sustained by reason 
of such importation and sale prior to the passage of the act; 
but while his copyright continues, whether it was acquired 
before or since March 3, 1891, the benefit of the act extends 
to him. 
Neither the letter, the spirit, nor the reason of the act con-
fines the application of the protection it affords to those 
books that have been copyrighted since its passage. 
Tariff laws are prospective. But an amended statute 
which places on the free list certain articles theretofore sub-
ject to duty is not limited in its application to those articles 
of that class which have been produced or manufactured 
since the passage of the amendatory act. 
To this proviso there is an exception, as follows: 
"And except in the case of persons purchasing for use and 
not for sale, who import, subject to the duty thereon, not 
more than two copies of such work at any one time." 
Does this refer to two copies of an " authorized edition" 
of such book, 
The statute certainly does not say so, and the proviso to 
which this exception is made provides that "during the 
existence of such copyright the importation into the United 
States of any book so copyrighted is hereby prohibited." 
I am unable to see on what ground it can be claimed that 
the exception refers to those books only the foreign publica-
tion of which has been authorized by the owner of the 
copyright. 
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ram therefore of opinion-
1. That section 3 of the act of March 3, 1891, applies as 
well to books which have.been copyrighted before as to those 
which have been copyrighted since the passage of the act. 
2. That the exceptions in the case of persons purchasing 
for use and not for sale, who import, subject to the duty 
thereon, not more than two copies of such book at any one 
time, is not limited in its application to the '' authorized 
editions" of such book. 
I herewith return the inclosures accompanying your letter. 
Very respectfully, 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
. Solicitor- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
Approved: 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
PURCHASE OF SEEDS. 
The seeds purchasable out of tho appropriation made in the act 
approved March 2, 1895, chapter 169, for the purchase, propagation 
and distribution, as required by law, of valuable seeds, bulbs, trees, 
shrubs, vines, cuttings, etc., are limited to those described in section 
527 of the Revised Statutes, and must be such as are adapted to gen-
eral cultivation and to promote the general interests of horticulture 
::md agriculture throughout the United States. 
It is competent for the Secretary of Agriculture to make the purchases 
of seeds referred to conformably to section 3709 of th·e Revised Stat-
utes, tho right to reject any and all bids being reserved. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 20, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 18th 
in tant, in which you call my attention to a portion of the 
act making appropriations for the Department of Agricul-
ture for the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1896, and approved 
farch 2, 1895, and running as follows: "Division of seeds: 
Purcha and di tribution of valuable eeds, and for the 
printing, publication, and di tribution of Farmers' BulJetins: 
r h pur ·ha. e, propagation, and di tribution, as required 
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by law, of valuable seeds, bulbs, trees, shrubs, vines, cut. 
tings, * * * one hundred and eighty thousand dollars." 
You make two inquiries, as follows: 
'' Can the Secretary of .Agriculture legally purchase any 
other seeds than those described in section 527 of the Revised 
Statutes, to wit, seeds ' rare and uncommon to the country, 
or such as can be made more profitable by frequent change 
from one part of our own country to another,' under author-
ity of the act of March 2, 1895 ~ " 
"Would it be proper and lawful for the Secretary of .Agri-
culture, in view of the verbiage of the act of March 2, 1895, 
and the wording of section 527 of the Revised Statutes, to 
advertise for proposals to furnish the Department of .Agri-
culture seeds, bulbs, trees, vines, cuttings, and plants 'rare 
and uncommon to the country, and for such as can be made 
more profitable by frequent changes from one part of our 
own country to another,' reserving the right to reject any 
and all bidsP 
1. The seeds purchasable under the act of March 2, 1895, 
are limited to those described in section 527 of the Revised 
Statutes, there being no reasonable ground for claiming that 
the act of March 2, 1895, operates or was intended to operate 
as a repeal of the earlier statutes. 
2. If not obligatory on the Secretary of .Agriculture to 
purchase seeds, trees, etc., conformably to section 3709 of the 
Revised Statutes, it is certainly competent for him to make 
the purchases conformably to said statute, the right to reject 
any and all bids being reserved. But tl;le form of the ques-
t.ion is such that I think it proper to call attention to the 
_fact that while seeds purchased must be such as are "rare 
and uncommon to the country, or such as can be made more 
profitable by frequent changes from one part of our own 
country to another," the trees, plants, shrubs, vines, and 
cuttings to be purchased are such "as are adapted to gen-
eral cultivation and to promote the general interests of horti-
culture and agriculture throughout the United States." 
Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF .AGRICULTURE. 
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NAVAL ACADEMY-APPOINTMENT OF CADETS. 
The proviso to the naval appropriation act of March 2, 1895, chapter 
186, permitting and authorizing every Representative or Delegate in 
Congress "whose district or Territory is not now represented at the 
Naval Academy" to make recommendation on or before March 4, 1895, 
of a candidate for appointment as a cadet at the Naval Academy of 
the United States, was intended to apply to Members of the then 
existing Fifty- third Congress. 
To be valid, it was essential that a recommendation should be made 
before 12 o'clock noon of March 4, 1895; and, in consequence, three 
recommendations considered · in the opinion are held to be ineffective 
to deprive the successors in office of the signers of the recommenda-
tions of the general privileges granted to them by the Revised Statutes, 
sections 1513 and 1514. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 24, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 
30th ultimo, in which you ask my opinion as to the filling of 
certain vacant cadetships at the Na val Academy under the 
following clause of the naval appropriation act of March 
2, 1895: 
"Provided, That every Representative or Delegate in Con-
gress whose district or Territory is not now represented at 
the Naval Academy for any cause by a cadet shall be per-
mitted and authorized to recommend a candidate for appoint-
ment as a cadet at the Naval Academy of the United States, 
said recommendation to be made on or before the fourth day 
of March, eighteen hundred and ninety-tive, subject to the 
qualifications now prescribed by law. Nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to increase the number of cadets 
at said Naval Academy as now provided by law." 
It seems that about 9 o'clock on the evening of the 4th day 
of March last a Member of the late House of Repre enta-
tives handed to the A sistant Secretary of the Navy a paper 
dat d farch 4, 1895, 11.30 a. m., iu terms appointing (but 
undoubtedly to be construed as recommending) his son for a 
cadet hip, that two other Members of aid House made rec-
mmen ation al o dated March 4, 1895;• and tbat all three 
r ommend ti n were not r ceived at tbe Department until 
far h . our inquiry i , ~ beth r you are authorized to 
h m a alid recommend tion und r the provi ions of 
f 9 above quoted. 
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1. The recommendation contemplated by the statute is to 
be made by a "Representative or Delegate in Congress." 
Further, such Representative or Delegate is to be a Mem-
ber of the then existing Congress, the language being that 
"every Representative or Delegate in Congress whose dis-
trict or Territory is not now represented at the Na val .Acad-
emy" may recommend. "Now," as thus used, designates 
the time of the passage of' the act; it is nonrepresentation at 
that time that gives the right of recommendation, and, in the 
absence of language expressive of a contrary intent, must be 
held to give the right to such persons as were Representa-
tives or Delegates at the same time. .Any other construction 
would be forced and unnatural. 
2. If, however, there could be a doubt on that point, it is 
settled. by the prescribed time within which a recommenda-
tion must be made. It must be made on or before March 4, 
1895. But March 4, 1895, is not selected as the limit of t:b.e 
::-.llotted time haphazard, n·or without obvious reason. It 
was undoubtedly chosen because by legislative usage, begin-
ning with the foundation of the Government, never departed 
from, and now having the force of law, the life of each Con-
gress comes to an end at noon of the 4th day of March. The 
different parts of the statute are thus mutually explanatory. 
March 4 is prima facie the official March 4, because a Con-
gressman is authorized to act on or before that time. On the 
other band, the Congressman so authorized is prim a f a-cie a 
Representative or Delegate in the Fifty-third Congress, 
because otherwise there would be no reason for restricting 
his action to a period bounded by March 4, 1895. 
3. It being assumed, therefore, tbat a recommending Rep-
resentative or Delegate in Congress under the statute of 1895 
must at the time of his recommendation be a Member of the 
Fifty-third Congress, the only remaining question is, Were 
the three recommendations under consideration made before 
12 o'clock on the 4th clay of March, 1895 f 
It is clear that the O'Neill recommendation was not so 
made. Though ben,ring date, and probably written, March 
4, 11.30 a. m., nothing was done with it until 9 o'clock of the 
evening of that day. Until then it was in the writer's pos-
session . and csmtrol, and there is no ground upon which it 
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can be he]d to have been made to the :Navy Department 
until after the expiration of the prescribed time. 
The recommendations from the two other Representatives 
mentioned, also dated March 4, were received at the Depart-
ment March 5. But I am not informed how or when they 
were transmitted to the Department, nor do they bear any 
indorsement throwing light on this question. The date of a 
recommendation is of shgbt consequence. If it be true 
that under some circumstances a recommendation might be 
regarded as made before its receipt at the Department, still 
uo such circumstances are develope·d in the papers submitted 
to me. The result is that the writers of these letters, whose 
terms of office had expired before their receipt, do not show 
themselves to have taken the steps necessary to secure the 
special privileges granted to themselves by the act of 1895 
and to deprive their successors in office of the general privi-
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The act approved June 26, 1884 (amending section 4131 of the Revised 
Statutes), commonly known as the Dingley bill, was obviously 
designed to make provision for a class of persons who, though aliens, 
might be officers of the United States under peculiar circumstances 
and for brief periods; and the provisions of the act not being in con-
flict or inconsistent with the provisions of the act approved April 17, 
1 74, entitled "An act to authorize the employment of certain aliens 
a ongin era and pilots," uoth statutes are to be regarded as m force. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 9, 1895. 
I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 23d 
a king my opinion upon the question whether the 
known a tbe ' Dingley bill,' approved June 26, 
m ndmg ·ect1011 4131 of the Revised Statutes, 
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repealed an act entitled "An act to authorize the employ-
ment of certain aliens as engineers and pilots," approved 
April 17, 1874, 
As the law stood prior to the act of 1884, above cited, two 
classes of persons were competent to receive licenses as en-
gineers or pilots on United States vessels. Citizens of the 
United States were one class. Aliens on the way to citizen-
ship by having declared their intention to become citizens 
and by permanent residence in the United States for six 
months prior to the granting of licenses constituted another 
class. The amendatory act of 1884 did not affect, and was 
not meant to affect, either of these classes. Leaving them 
undisturbed, it was obviously designed to make provision for 
a third class of persons who might be officers of United 
States vessels under peculiar circumstances and for brief 
periods. · 
The members of both the classes first named are regarded 
as in effect citizens of the United States and as being eligi-
ble as such to permanent employment as officers of United 
States vessels generally under Revised . Statutes, section 
4131, and as engineers or pilots of such vessels under the 
act of April 17, 1874. The members of the third class, on 
the other hand, are aliens, whom the law excludes from gen-
eral and permanent employment on United States vessels, 
and permits to serve on such vessels only temporarily and in 
emergencies. 
The provisions of the act of June 26, 1884, being thus in 
no way in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of the 
act of April 17, 1874, both statutes must be regarded as in 
force, and the later did not have the effect of repealing the 
former statute. · 
. Respectfully, yours, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF TI-IE TREASURY. 
MEAT INSPECTION-REGULATIONS-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
Whenever power is given to ·public officers, to be exercised for the 
public interest, the language used, though permissive in form, is 
mandatory. 
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The provisions of the act of March 2, 1895, chapter 169, authorizing the 
Secretary of Agriculture to make such rules and regulations as he may 
deem necessary to prevent the transportation, etc., of condemned car-
casses or parts of carcasses of cattle, sheep, and swine, which have 
been inspected in accordance with the provisions of the act, imposes 
the duty to make su_ch rules and regulations. 
A regulation requiring that inspected articles found to be diseased and 
unfit for human food ·shall be at once removed and rendered in such 
manner as to prevent its withdnawal as a food product, under the 
supervision of employeR of the Department of Agriculture, is not 
authorized by the grant of power to make regulations to prevent 
transportation. 
The Secretary of Agriculture is not required to effect the prevention of 
the consumption of diseased meat as human food within the Stat,e of 
its origin and without its having been carried out and brought back 
into such State; nor, if the Secretary decides that pork affected with 
trichinrn is unfit for human food, does the law provide for or author-
ize its destruction as food or grant authority to license its use under 
limitations or restrictions. 
Following 19 Opinions, 332,412, and 20 Opinions, 703, 729, the Attorney-
General declines to express an opinion upon a question propounded, 
because not based upon a case which has actually arisen in the 
administration of the Department of Agriculture. 
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 10, 1895. 
SIR: I have :vour letter of May 4, 1895, inclosing a copy of 
"An act to provide for the inspection of live cattle, hogs, 
and the carcasses and products thereof, which are the sub-
jects of interstate commerce, and for other purposes," 
approved March 3, 1891; also a copy of "An act making 
appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the 
fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and 
ninety-six," approved March 2, 1895; also a copy of "Regu-
lations for the .inspection of live stock and their products," 
made by you February 7, 1895: 
Section 7 of the Regulation provides that-
"The in pee tor or his as i tant shall carefully inspect at 
time of laughter all animal laughtered at aid establish-
m nt and make a post-mortem report of the same to the 
D partn nt. hould the carca of any animal on said 
po t -mort m examin tion be found to be di ea ed and unfit 
fir human fo d h ai area hall be marked with the 
ond ta nd di eased organ, or part 
if r 1 id c· , ball be immediately 
TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICUL'rURE. 169 
Meat Inspection-ltegulatious-Attorney-General. 
attached to same. The entire carcass shall be at once 
removed, under the supervision of the inspector or that of 
some other reliable employe of the Department of Agricul-
ture, to tanks on the premises, and deposited therein, and 
rendered in such manner as to prevent its withdrawal as a 
food product. Should the establishment have no facilities 
for tbus destroying the said carcass it must be removed from 
the premises by numbered permit from the inspector to 
rendering· works designated by him, and there destroyed 
under his supervision in such a manner as to make it unsala-
ble as edible meat." 
You ask whether the act of March 2, 1895, is "mandatory 
to such a degree" that you are "legally compelled to pre-
vent such transportation of said carcasses, thereby necessi-
tating such regulations and their · strict enforcement." 
The provision of said act upon this point is as follows: 
'' The Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized to make 
such rules and regulations as he may decide to be necessary 
to prevent the transportation from one State or Territory or 
the District of- Columbia into any other State or Territory 
or the District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, of the 
condemned carcasses or parts of carcasses of cattle, sheep, and 
swine which have been inspected in accordance with the pro-
visions of this act." 
When power is given to public officers, whenever the public 
. interest calls for its exercise, the Ia,nguage used, though 
permissive in form is in fact peremptory. ( Supervisors v. 
United States, 4 Wall., 446.) In Regina v. Tithe Omnmis-
sioners (14 Q. B., 459),. Mr. Justice Coleridge observed: 
"The wor<ls undoubtedly are only empowering, but it has 
been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in 
public statutes words only directory, permissory, or enabling 
may have a compulsory force where the thing to be done is 
for the public benefit or in advancement of public justice." 
The general rule is that permissive words in a statute are 
peremptory when used to clothe a public officer with power 
to do an act which concerns the public interest. 
In my opinion, the words " hereby authorized to make such 
rules," etc., though permissive in form, confer a power, coupled 
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with a duty, to make regulations to prevent such transpor-
tation of carcasses so inspected and condemned. 
You ask " where such i:r;ispection is instituted for export 
or interstate trade, and animals are presented for inspection 
and found diseased and condemned by inspector, is this 
Department legally compelled to render the carccisses of such 
ani11ials unfit for human food, or does the packer or owner 
have the right to claim said carcasses for local trade or home 
consumption as a food product'" 
You say, referring to section 7 of the Regulations, '' In my 
opinion, such method is absolutely necessary to insure the 
destruction of condemned carcasses." 
The law does not provide for the destruction of condemned 
carcasses. It contemplates that they will not be destroyed 
for section 5 of the act approved March 3, 1891, which is 
unamended by the act approved March 2, 1895, imposes a 
penalty for transporting the carcasses or the food products 
thereof which have been declared by the inspector to be 
unsound or diseased. 
You are only authorized to make regulations to prevent 
transportation. If <lestruction of the carcasses had been 
intended, it is probable that such power, being in derogation 
of property rights, would have been expressly given. 
Rules and regulations to prevent transportation would not 
have been necessary after such summary process. Such 
power would hardly be implied, and certainly not unless it 
appeared that no rules or regulations short of such destruc-
tion would be adequate to carry out the purpose of the law. 
You state that, in your opinion, the method provided is abso-
lutely necessary to insure the destruction of condemned car-
casses but not that it is absolutely necessary to prevent 
their transportation. 
My conclusion is that you are not "legally compelled to 
render the carcasses of such animals unfit for human food." 
You a k, " Does the law in tend to prevent the consumption 
of di eased meat as a human food and require this Department 
to e:ffi ct uch prevention regardless of where consumed, 71 
Th law intend to prev nt the transportation of diseased 
me t a a human food a a part of interstate commerce or 
e p r t foreign countries. 
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Your Department is not required to effect the prevention 
of the consumption of diseased meat as human food within 
the State of its origin and without its having been carried 
out and brought back into such State. 
You ask," If this Department decides that pork affected 
-with trichinre is unfit for human food, does the law compel 
1ts destruction as a food, or is it left optional with the 
Department to destroy it or permit its use under limitations 
or restrictions¥" 
The law does not compel its destruction as a food. I do 
nut think any power to destroy it is conferred. You have 
no authority to license its use under limitations and restric-
tions. If it bas been inspected and pronounced unsound or 
diseased, your duties are confined to rejecting it for trans-
portation and preventing the same by necessary regulations. 
You ask, "Does the packer or owner have the right to 
claim said carcasses for local trade or home consumption as 
a food product¥" You do not state that any such case is 
before you in the administration of your Department . 
. It is respectfully submitted that, in accordance with the 
interpretation put upon the statute by the settled practice 
of this Department, it will not be proper for me to express 
an opinion on this question until the case shall actually 
arise. (19 Opin., 332, 412; 20 Opin., 703, 729.) 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF AGRICU;L'I.'URE. 
LOTTERY-LE PETIT JOURNAL. 
An advertisement in a French publication styled Le Petit Journal, con-
sidered, and held to fall within the prohibited class defined in section 
3894 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act of September 19, 
1890, chapter 908. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 14,1895. 
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communi-
cation of the 3d instant, inclosing a copy of Le Petit Jour-
nal, published in Paris, containing advertisements concerning 
the premium bonds of the Credit Foncier de France, and of 
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France; also. a copy of a communication from the Assistant 
Attorney-General of the Post-Office Department, dated May 
3, 1895; also a communication from the Secretary of State, 
under date of April 16, 1895, accompanied by a copy of a 
communication from him to the French ambassador, bearing 
the same date; also a copy of a communication from your 
predecessor in office to the Secretary of State, under date of 
April 1, 1895, accompanied by copies of certain correspon-
dence. · 
You ask my opinion as to whether the advert_isement pub-
lished in Le Petit Journal falls within the prohibited class 
defined in section 3894 of the Revised Statutes, as amended 
by the act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 465). 
The following is a translation of the advertisement, from 
which it clearly appears, in my opinion, that it comes within 
the meaning and descriptive terms of the statute as construed 
by the Supreme Court in Horner v. The United States (147 
U.S., 449), and in McLaughlin et al. v. The National Mutual 
Bond and Investment Company (64 Fed. Rep., 908): 
PREMIUM SERVICE OF TIIE LITTLE JOURNAL, 
The Little Journal bolds at the disposition of its readers and delivers 
or sends immediately the values following: 
Net prices at the wicket. 
Francs. Francs. 
3 franc annuity, 3 per cent .. 103. 90 Communals, 1880 .......... 505. 60 
15 franc, 30/0, redeemable .. 509. 00 Land bonds, 1885 .. ........ 505. 60 
3 franc 50 annuity, 31/20/0. 108. 30 Communals, 1891, freed .... 406.10 
City of Paris, 1865 ......... 579.10 Communals, 1891, fr. p ...... 361. 55 
City of Paris, 1869 ......... 432.10 Communa]s, 1892 .......... 507.10 
City of Paris, 1871 ......... 422. 60 Communals, 1892, fr. p ...... 257. 55 
Quarters, 1871...... . . . . . . . 110. 30 East, new...... . . . . . . . . . . . 480. 60 
City of Paris, 1875 ....... .. 589. 10 Paris L. M., new fusion .... 486.10 
ity of Paris, 1876 ......... 592.10 North, 3 per cent, old ...... 484. 60 
City of Paris, 1886 . ..... ... 421. 60 OrJeans, 1884 ..•........... 482. 60 
Quarters, 1886 ............. 107. 80 West, new ................. 485. 60 
City, 1 92, 90 fr. p...... . . 137. 05 outh, new ................ 481. 35 
Quart rs, 1 92, fr. 50 p...... 36. 55 Press bonds...... . . . . . . . . . . 14. 55 
ity of L , ons, .1 0 ........ 104. 55 Bonds, 1887, red. Pone.... 17. 30 
Land bond 1 77. . . . . . . . . . 403. 60 Bonds, 1888, Cred. Fonc.... 59. 80 
onimuna.1 , 1 79 .......... 505.10 Exposition bonds.......... . 75 
Land ncl .......... 505. 10 Panama bonds, by lot...... 131. 80 
and bond fran . Intere t payment, 1 October. Net price, 101 
fr. 25. 
TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 
15 March. l 
22d March, f 
Fr e e Delivery Service. 
Next dtawings. 
{
City of Paris, 1865. 
Land bonds, 1887. 
Cornmunals, 1892. 
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In consideration of a postage stamp for answer we make known, e.ach 
t ime that one requests it, whether the numbers which one indicates 
have come out at the drawings. 
To receive the titles free by mail, add to the above net prices 1 franc 
for the first title and 50 centimes for each additional title. 
Address the funds to the administrator appointed either i11 bank notes or 
in a registered letter, or by means of a postal order, or check upon Paris, 
payable to t he order of The Little Journal. 
Write on the envelope: Service of premiums. 
NoTE.-As an exceptional thing and by special agreement with the 
Credit Foncier, the land bonds of 100 francs , 3 per cent, 1885, suffices, 
then, to send 101 francs 25 per title, interest payment October, 1894. 








An extension of the free-delivery service of the Detroit })Ost-office, so as 
t o permit t he delivery of mail to vessels in Canadian waters, is not 
legally authorized. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE, 
May 18, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge yours of the 15th 
instant, from which, when taken in connection with yours of 
the 10th instant, relative to the same subject-matter, I under-
stand the only question presented for my opinion to be 
whether the "free-delivery service" of the Detroit post-
office can be so extended as to permit the delivery of mail to 
vessels in Canadian waters. 
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In my judgment, such an extension of the free-delivery 




ATTORNEY-GENERAL-COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS. 
It is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an opinion on ques-
tions submitted to him, except when needed for the guidance of the 
head of a Department, and relating to some matter calling for action 
or decision on his part. (20 Opin., 609, 723, followed.) 
When, for the proper discharge of the duties of his office, the Commis-
sioner of Patent,s desires lega.l advice, resort should be had to the 
legal force assigned to the Department of the Interior. 
The Attorney-General is not permitted to render an official opinion upon 
questions of fact. (20 Opin., 697, 711, 717, and 7401 followed.) 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 20, 1895. 
Sm: I am in receipt of your communication of the 17th 
instant, transmitting a copy of a letter to you of May 16, 
1895, from the Commissioner of Patents, together with a 
copy of correspondence between the Commissioner of Pat-
ents and Hon. A. P. Gorman, chairman Joint Committee on 
Printing. 
The Commissioner of Patents submits to you the follow-
ing questious: 
"First. May the Commissioner of Patents lawfully con-
tract for the production of the Official Gazette, including the 
weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual indexes therefor, 
exclusive of expired patents, as a whole, upon proper adver-
tisement, with the Jowest acceptable bidderf In another 
form the question is, whether the Official Gazette, including 
thew ekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual indexes therefor, 
exclu ive of expired patents, is, as a whole, 'printing for 
the atent Office, making use of lithography or photolith-
oo-raphy, together with the plate for the same. 
' nd. fa the Oommis ioner of Patent ·, upon the 
ip of · al d pror al , pur uant to hi public adver-
m n ther for, I wfully award the contract to a bidd r 
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who, being the lowest available bidder, proposes to do the 
work by printing from type all parts Jf the text, inctuding 
briefs and claims, and proposes to do the illustrated portion 
by zinc or other suitable plates made by photo-engraving; 
that is to say, are the words lithography and photolithog-
raphy generic words, including processes of similar char-
acter, in which the transfer is not made to stone, and may 
such liberal construction be put upon those words for the 
purpose of saving as much as $22,000 in the production of 
this work, or must the production of those pages be by lithog-
ra,phy or photolithography in the most restricted meaning 
which may be attached to thos.e words, 
" Third. Are the communications received from Senator 
Gorman, copies of which are herewith transmitted, limita-
tions and conditions of the Joint Committee on Printing, 
such as that ·committee may from time to time prescribe for 
the conduct of the Commissioner of Patents in contracting 
for and performing the work hereinbefore mentioned 1 
" Fourth. Is there at the present time, or at the dates of 
any of the letters herein before referred to, a Joint Committee 
on Printing in existence for the purpose of prescribing lim- ' 
itations and conditions to the Commissioner of Patents for 
his guidance in contracting and performing the work herem-
before mentioned," 
You in turn submit all ·of said questions to me for my 
opinion. 
By section 8 of the act approved January 12, 1895 (Public 
No. 15, p. 21); it is made the duty of the Commissioner of 
Patents, under certain conditions, to have done the printing 
referred to, and hence the questions submitted arise in the 
administration of his office. 
On June 7, 1893, upon a request from you, involving in 
respect of my duties a similar case, I said as follows: 
" It has been held frequently that the statutes prescribing 
the duties of the Attorney-General (Rev. Stat., secs. 354 and 
356) do not authorize or require him to give an official opin-
. ion except to the President or to the head of an Executive 
Department; and it would seem to follow that the opinion 
should be needed for the guidance of the head of a Depart-
ment, and should relate to some matter calling for action or 
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decision on his part. The reasonableness of this limitation 
upon the authority of the Departments to call upon the 
Attorney-General for official opmions is manifest when we 
remember that the Attorney-General must personally pass 
upon every question so submitted to him; for although he 
may, under Revised Statutes, section 358, refer the question 
to a subordinate for a written opinion, the action of the sub-
ordinate must be examined and approved by the Attorney-
General to give it effect. 
"For the guidance of the beads of bureaus and other 
officers of the Departments in the discharge of their duties, 
provision is made by section .361 of the Revised Statutes· for 
assistance from the officers of the Department of Justice, 
under the direction of the Attorney-General; and an assist-
ant attorney-general, and law clerks have accordingly been 
assigned to the Department of the Interior, to whom, it 
seems to me, the Commissioner of Patents should submit 
his question. 
"The power of disbarment given by·section 487 is con-
ferred upon the Commissioner of Patents. It is only after 
he has made a decision that his opinion is submitted to 
review by the Secretary of the Interior. In determining 
whether he shall make a reference, and if so to whom, he 
acts in the first instance upon his own responsibility, and 
not under the supervision or direction of the Secretary of 
the Interior. An answer to the question submitted by the 
Commissioner of Patents can not, therefore, at the present · 
stage of the proceeding, be required for the guidance of the 
Secretary of the Interior; and the Attorney-General, if he 
should make an answer, would not only overstep the bound-
aries which appear to be prescribed for him by a long line 
of deci ions and by uniform practice, but would commit him-
self upon a question which may be properly submitted to 
him hereafter by the Secretary of the Interior if the action 
of the Commissioner of Patents shall come under his review." 
Thi view wa adhered to in 20 Opinions, 723. 
I further call to your attention that the first question asks 
me to determine "whether the Official Gazette, including the 
kly m nthly uart rly, and annual ind xe therefor, 
xclu ·i of expired I tent , is, a a whole, 'printing for the 
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Patent Office making use of lithography or photolithography, 
t ogether with the plates for the same;'" and that the second 
question asks, "are the words lithography and photolithog-
rapby generic words, including processes of similar char-
acter in which the transfer is not made to stone." 
I am not permitted by the statute to render an official 
opinion upon questions of fact. (20 Opin., 697, 711, 717, 740.) 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
SEAL FISHERIES-DEPOSIT OF BONDS BY LESSEE. 
The Secretary of the Treasury can not rightfully require of the North 
American Commercial Company, in addition to the deposit of $50,000 
in bonds of the United States already made pursuant to section 1963 
of the Revised Statutes, security to the amount of the indebtedness 
of the company for the years 1894: and 1895. 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 21, 1895. 
SIR: I have yours of the 18th instant, in which the inquiry 
is made whether or not the Secretary of the Treasury may 
exact from the North American Commercial Company, as 
lessee of the seal islands, in addition to the deposit of $50,000 
in United States bonds already made pursuant to section 
1963 of the Revised Statutes, a further deposit of such bonds, 
or of other security, to the amount of the indebtedness of 
said company, to wit, for the year 1894, $132,187.50, and for 
the year 1895, $214,298.37, and in the event of the failure to 
furnish such additional bonds, or other security, whether the 
Secretary of the Treasury may annul the contract with said 
company, made in 1890. 
In my judgment, the Secretary of the Treasury can not 
rightfully require the North American Commercial Company 
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ATTORNEJ-GENERAL-COMPTROLLER OF TREASURY . 
The question whether or not the Secretary of"the Treasury, in view of 
sections 192 and 3683 of tlrn Revised Statutes, is authorized by the 
appropriation acts for the present fiscal year to purchase newspapers 
or other articles for use outside of Washington, belongs to a class 
of questions which, since the going into effect of section 8, chapter 
· 174, of the legislative appropriation act of July 31, 1894, should not 
be asked of the Attorney-General, at least except in matters of great 
importance, but should be submitted to the Comptroller of the Treas-
ury, whose opinion will form a complete protection. 
DEP .AR'l'MEN'.l.' OF JUSTICE, 
May 22, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of May 17, in which you ask my official opinion whether 
section 192 of the Revised Statutes is limited in its applica-
tion to the purchase of newspapers for the bureaus and 
offices at the seat of Government, or applies to all bureaus 
and offices under the Treasury Department, no matter where 
situated; and also whether section 3683 of the.Revised Stat-
utes applies to all offices and bureaus of the Treasury Depart-
ment, whether situated in Washington or elsewhere, or js 
limited only to those located in Washington. 
Questions upon which the official opinion of the .Attorney-
General is asked must be questions actually arising in the 
administration of one of the other Executive . Departments. 
The questions actually arising in your Department are 
whether, in view of the sections above mentioned, you are 
authorized by the appropriation acts for the present fiscal 
year to purchase newspapers or other articles for use outside 
this city. 
These are questions which, prior to October 1, 1894, could 
properly be asked of the Attorney-General. But by the 
legi lative appropriation act of July 31, 1894 ( chap. 17 4, sec. 
8), it was provided as follows: 
'' The head of any Executive Department * * * may 
apply for, and the Comptroller of the Treasury shall ren-
der, hi deci ·ion upon any que tion involving a payment 
to be made by fhim l or under I him J, which deci ion, when ren-
d red, hall govern the Auditor and the Comptroller of 
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the Treasury in passing- upon the account containing said 
disbursement." 
By section 24 of the same act this provision took effect on 
tbe 1st day of October. 
The questions which you now ask me could ha-ve been 
asked of the Comptroller of tue Treasury under this pro-
v1s1on. I thmk that they belong to a class of questions 
which, now that an opinion of the Comptroller forms a com-
plete protection, should no longer be asked of the Attorney-
General, at least except in matters of great importance. 
They are questions which the Comptroller, by bis greater 
experience, iR better qualified to pass upon, and it is desir-
able to avoid any possible conflict of precedents. 
Therefore it seems to me inadvisable for me to attempt to 
pass upon these inquiries. 
Very respectfu1ly, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRE'l'ARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-MORTAR 
STEEL. 
Questions submitted to the Attorney-General for his opinion must be 
definitely formulated. (20 Opin., 711, 713.) 
If a technical usage is not definite, uniform, and general, it is entitled 
to no weight iil statutory construction. 
Assuming that the term "mortar steel," as employed in the fortifica -
tions appropriation act of March 2, 1895 (chap.162, sec. 2), has not a 
settled technical meaning, it is properly construable as including any 
steel of such quality as is considered by experts to be adapted for use 
in the construction of mortars. 
The assertion on behalf of a certain firm or corporation that the term 
in question refers to steel of their manufacture, and that the section of 
the statute containing such term was introduced at the suggestion of 
their attorney, is not entitled to any consideration. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 23, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your commnnica 
tion of May 20, asking my opinion on certain questions pre-
sented by the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications and by 
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the Chief of Ordnance. It is necessary, upon such an appli-
cation, to formulate definitely the questions answers to which 
are desired. (20 Opin., 711, 713.) The only question which 
I find definitely formulated relates to the definition of the 
term '' mortar steel" in the fortifications appropriation act 
of March 2, 1895, section 2. 
That section provides for the purchase of certain breech. 
loading mortars, "built of mortar steel," in case they shall be 
found "to be at least equal in accuracy, range, power, endur. 
ance, material, and general efficiency to the best breech-
loading service mortar in use." 
It appears that a certain :firm or corporation, known as 
Cramp & Sons, claims that the term ''mortar .steel" is a 
technical one, confined to a certain quality of steel made by 
themselves by a secret process, not · patented, and whose 
nature can not be a·scertained from them. 
To define this term it is :first necessary to ascertain 
whether it has a settled technical meaning. If it has 
none, then the words must be regarded as used in the ordi-
nary sense. (Saltonstall v. Wiebusch, 156 U. S., 601, 602.) 
Whether the _term has such a technical meaning is a ques-
tion of fact (Seeberger v. Schlesinger, 152 U.S., 581,585); and 
questions of fact I am not authorized to decide. (20 Opin., · 
590, 592.) I think, however, that your letter sufficiently 
shows that whatever technical usage may exist concerning 
the words" mortar steel," it is not sufficient to ·establish such 
a technical definition of that term as could affect its statu-
tory construction. You say: ''The term can not be said to 
be one in general use." If the usage is not definite, uniform, 
and general, it i entitled to no weight. (Maddock v. Magone, 
152 U . S., 368; B erbeclcer v. Robertson, 152 U.S., 373.) 
So far, therefore, as the facts are stated by your letter, 
the term "mortar steel" is properly construable as including 
any teel of such quality as is considered by experts to be 
adapted for use in the construction of mortars. 
The laim t hat thi ection '' was introduced at the sug-
ti n of the a ttorney for Cramp & Sons" is not entitled to 
any n ideration. The ection wa introduced, whet.her as 
p rt f th original bill or by way of amendment thereto, 
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by some Member of Congress; and it can not be presumed 
01~ proved that any Member of Congress acted in the per-
formance of his duties on behalf of Cramp & Sons or any 
other :firm or corporation. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-
PURCHASE OF ENVELOPES. 
The provisions of section 8 of the appropriation act of July 31, 1894, 
chapter 174, make it obligatory upon the Comptroller of the Treasury 
to render a decision upon any question involving a payment to be 
made by or ~nder the head of any Executive Department, and con-
template the construction by him of statutes. (Opin. May 22, 1895, 
reaffirmed.) 
A question regarding the construction of section 96 of the act of January 
12, 1895, chap. 23, which provides that "The Postmaster-General shall 
contract for all envelopes, stamped or otherwise, designed for sale to 
the public or for use by his own or other Departments," held to be a 
general question, applicable to all the Departments, and to be.of suffi-
cient importance to warrant its submission to the Attorney-General 
for his opinion thereon. 
The conclusion that a statute is repealed by implication is only reached 
when there is irreconcilable conflict and when the two statutes can 
not by reasonable construction stand together; and, in measuring the 
legislative intent as to the. scope to be given to a statute in its oper-
ation upon previous statutes not specifically referred to, a consider-
ation of the effect upon the public welfare must necessarily be taken 
in view. (3 Opin., 438; 2 Opin., 260, cited.) 
Applying the rule of construction stated in the previous paragraph and 
construing the provisions of section 96 of the act of January 12, 1895, 
in connection with sections 3709 and 3710 of the Revised Statutes, 
helll, that the section of the act of 1895 referred to has no application 
when an exigency may require an immediate delivery of envelopes to 
a particular Department and the public service might be seriously 
1mpaired by the necessity of a requisition upon the Postmaster-
General. 
In the event of an exigency requiring an immediate delivery of envel-
0pes the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes govern, 
and the head of the Department in which . the exigency exists may 
make the purchases required by the exigency. 
· 1s2, HON. RICHARD OLNEY. 
Attorney-General-Statuto1·y Vonstruction-Purchase of Envelopes, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 23, 1895. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of May 20, 1895, ask-
ing whether or not se~tion 96 of the _act of January 12, 1895, 
providing for public printing, "is· intended to direct the 
purchase by the Postmaster-General of all envelopes designed 
for use in the Navy and .1J!Jarine Gorps, or whether- it is lim_ 
ited in its application to such envelopes as may be required 
for use by the Executive Departments at Washington." 
It is provided by 28 Statutes, 208, as follows: 
"All decisions by Auditors making an original construc-
tion or modifying an existing construction of statutes shall 
be forthwith reported to the Comptroller of the Treasury, 
and items in any account affected by such deci~ions shall be 
suspended and payment thereof withheld until the Comp-
troller of the Treasury shall approve, disapprove, or modify 
such decisions and certify his actions to the Auditor. .All 
decisions made by the Comptroller of the Treasury under 
this act shall be· forthwith transmitted to the Auditor or 
Auditors whose duties are affected thereby. 
"Disbursing officers, or the head of any Executive Depart-
ment, or other establishment not under any of the Executive 
Departments, may apply for and the Comptroller of the 
Treasury shall render bis decision upon any question involv-
ing a payment to be made by them or under them, which 
decision, when rendered, shall govern the Auditor and the 
Comptroller of the Treasury in passing upon the account 
containing said disbursement." 
This act makes it obligatory upon the Comptroller of the 
Treasury to make a decision upon any question involving a 
payment to be made by or under the head of any Executive 
Department, and it contemplates the construction by him of 
tatute ·. 
It app ar · by the file of papers transmitted with your let· 
ter that the omptroller, on pril 1, 1895, made the following 
ruling: 
ection 3709, Revised Statutes, purchase of 
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"Section 96, act approved J anu:ary 12, 1895, 'providing for 
the public printing and binding and the distribution of pub-
lic documents.' 
"Held, that where, therefore, the public exigency requires 
the immediate delivery of the envelopes they may be pro-
cured under the provision of section 3709, Revised Statutes, 
by open purchase, in the manner in which such articles are 
usually bought and sold between individuals, but in all cases 
where a contract can be made for the purchase of envelopes, 
such contract ·must, under the provisions of section 96 of 
the printed act, be made by the Postmaster-General." 
This is broad enough to cover the question presented by 
you, but it is suggested that the case is e~ceptional, and a 
further ruling is asked. 
In a recent opinion (May 22, 1895) I came to the conclu-
sion that the opinion of the Attorney-General should not be 
rendered upon questions which, under section 8, chapter 17 4, 
Statutes 1894, could be referred to the Comptroller for deci-
sion ( except in matters of great importance), inasmuch as a 
conflict of precedents might ensue. · 
The Comptroller himself, as appears from the file transmit-
ted by you, says: "As the question in the form presented is a 
general one, applicable to all the Departments, it is respect-
fully suggested that it would be expedient to have the mat-
ter determined by an opinion from the Attorney-General." 
This case falls within the exception stated in my opinion 
May 22, 1895, and I therefore, without departing from the 
precedent therein established, comply with your request. 
By section 3709, Revised Statutes, all purchases and con-
tracts for supplies in any of the Departments of the Gov-
ernment shall be made by advertising for proposals "when 
the public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery." 
When such delivery is required, such supplies may be pro-
cured "by open purchase or contract at the places and in the 
manner in which such articles are usually bought and sold 
between individuals." 
By section 3718 "all provisions, clothing, hemp, and other 
materials of every name and nature for the use of the Navy, 
and the transportation thereof, when time will permitJ shall 
be furnished by contract by the lowest bidder." 
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Under these sections supplies of every name and nature 
for the Navy are to be purchased by contract upon adver-
tisement, except in cases when the public exigency will not 
permit of delay, and then by open purchase as between 
individuals. 
By 28 Statutes, 33, section 3709 was amended so as to regu-
late the advertisements and award of contracts. It did not 
affect that portion of the section applicable when the public 
exigency requires immediate delivery. . 
Section 96 of the act of January 12, 1895, is as follows: 
"The Postmaster-General shail contract for all envelopes, 
stamped or otherwise, designed for sale to the public, or for 
use by his own or other Depart_ments, and may contract for 
them to be plain or with such printed ·matter as may be 
prescribed by the Department making req~isition therefor: 
Provided, That no envelope furnished by the Government 
shall contain any business address or advertisement." 
By this provision the several Executive Departments are 
deprived partially or entirely, according to the construction 
that may be given to the act, of all power to contract/or 
envelopes, and this authority is transferred to the Postmaster-
General. This act must be construed in pari materia with 
sections 3709 and 3718. By section 100 all laws in conflict 
with the provisions of this act are repealed. No part of 
section 3709 is expressly repealed. The conclusion that a 
statute is repealed by implication is only reached when there 
is irreconcilable conflict, and when the two statutes can not 
by reasonable construction stand together. In measuring 
the legislative intent as to the scope ·to be given to a statute 
in its operation upon previous statutes not specifically 
:referred to, a consideration of the effect upon the public wel-
fare must necessarily be taken in view. If holding a statute 
to be repealed by im1 lication would produce an impracti-
cable ituation and a erious embarrassment in the public 
ervice, the reasonable conclusion would be that such was 
not within the legislative intent, where effect, without such 
onflict, can be giv n the new tatute, and with uch range, 
a taking the ubject-matter of legislation into con idera-
tion i i f:: irly infer ble, was ont mplated. In Opinion , 
in con truing a tatut providing for purcha es for the 
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Navy, it was said: "These exceptions m_ust consist of cases 
which plainly and manifestly were not within the view and 
design of Congress when the law was passed, and which can 
not, without injury to the public service, be subjected to the 
operation of the rule laid down." 
In 2 Opinions, 260, Attorney-General Berrien, construing 
an act of March 3, 1809, said: " Where immediate delivery 
is necessary to the wants of the public service, the article 
required must be obtained by open purchase; that is, by pur-
chase at the places where articles of the description wanted 
are mmally bought and sold, and in the mode in which such 
purchases are ordinarily made between individual and indi-
vidual." Since that time (1829) this Government has sanc-
tioned the policy of permitting immediate i:>urchases in cases 
of emergency. Almost the exact language used by Mr. Ber-
rien was enacted into law by the act of March 2, 1861 (12 
Stat., 220), carried into the Revised Statutes as section 3709. 
It can not be assumed that Congress, in an act specially· 
treating of public printing, intended, in respect of any sup-
plies necessary for the public service in an emergency, to set 
aside a uniform policy extbllding over more than fifty years. 
The Departments of Government in their operation cover 
a wide territory, and even in the matter of envelopes exigen-
cieA may require immediate delivery, and the public service 
might be seriously impaired by the necessity of a requisition 
upon the Postmaster-General. 
My opinion is that this section does not apply in such 
cases, but that it was intended to apply in those cases in 
which contracts were to be made by advertisement, the 
Postmaster-General, in respect of envelopes thus procured, 
being charged with the duty which previously rested upon 
the heads of the several Departments. I entirely concur in 
the conclusion reached by the Comptroller of the Treasury 
as above ·set out. 
In my judgment, the fact of the use being for the Navy 
and Marine Corps does not constitute any ground for dis-
tinction, the only exceptions being those arising out of the 
public exigency and shortness of time. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE NAVY. 
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WITHDRAW AL OF BIDS-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
After a bid for the construction of public works has been accepted, the 
bidders have not the right to withdraw their proposal merely because 
of a mistake on their part which was not mutual and which was due 
to their negligence. (20 Opiu., 1, distinguished.) 
The Attorney-General will not answer questions propounded by the 
head of a Department not presently arising. (20 Opin., 728.) 
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 1, 1895. 
SrR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of May 27, asking my official opinion concerning the 
application of Messrs. Thomas H. Stanley & Co. for leave to 
withdraw a bid, after formal acceptance, for the construction 
of certain public works at the New York Navy-Yard. It 
appears that this firm, concerning whose competency and 
responsibility no doubt is entertained, responded to an 
advertisement soliciting proposals, and proved to be the 
lowest bidders, and that their "proposal was formally 
accepted by the Bureau by letter dated May 16." There-
after, and under date of May 18, the firm requested leave to 
withdraw its bid. The reason given is that in making its 
estimates two errors in calculation occurred, making a differ-
ence of over $6,000 in the result. You inform me that there 
is no reason for questioning the truthfulness of these state-
ments. You add, however, that" while not desiring to take 
advantage of the mistakes or carelessness of bidders, this 
Department feels somewhat reluctant to concede to them 
the privilege of withdrawing their proposals where miscal-
culations or other clerical errors appear, inasmuch as such 
decision might prove to be a precedent opening the door to 
fraudulent practices." 
You ask me, fir t, whether the firm have a right to with-
draw their propo al. I am clearly of the opinion that they 
have not uch right. The mistake was not a mutual one, 
and it wa due to negligence on their part. You refer to the 
pi ion of my predece or iu the ca e of the Western Elec-
tric ,ompany (20 Opin., 1). That opinion r lated to a cler-
i , 1 err r in a bid, b which the fl ure 4 was ubstituted for 
h figur 9, o that it r ad ' 4,350" in tead of " 9,350." 
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Whatever may have been the proper rule of the law appli-
cable to that case, I think the present one is very clear. 
You ask me also whether or not you are authorized, in your 
discretion, to permit such withdrawal. I understand from 
your communication that you do not intend to do so, even if 
you have the authority. The question, therefore, seems not 
to be one of those presently arising within the Department 




The SECRE'..L'AI-ff OF THE N .A. VY. 
CIVIL SERVICE-LAW CLERKS-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. 
The provisions of the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation 
act of March 2, 1895, chapter 177 (28 Stat., 776, 777), with reference 
to the offices of law clerk in the office of the Comptroller of the Treas- _ 
ury and in the offices of the Auditors of the Treasury, are to be con-
strued in connection with the prior act of July 31, 1894, chapter 174 
(28 Stat., 173 et seq.). 
The mode of appointment of the law clerks referred to above is :fixed 
by the act of 1894, and the provisions of that statute on the subject 
are not repealed by the later statute. 
The offices in question are not made the subject of competitive exam-
ination by the provisions of the statute of 1895. 
DEP .ARTMEN'r OF JUS1.'ICE, 
June 3, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the 
1st instant, inclosing a communication from the Civil Service 
Commission (herewith returned), in which the Commission 
asks for an opinion from the .Attorney-General upon the 
question whether the legislative, executive, and judicial 
appropriation act of March 2, 1895, is to be construed as 
making the offices of the law clerks in the office of the 
Comptroller of the Treasury and in the offices of the .Audit-
ors of the Treasury the subjects of competitive examination. 
There is no question, in my judgment, that the act of 
March 2 can not be given any such operation. It simply 
enacts that clerical services may be exacted of such law 
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clerks, leaving the mode of their appointment as fixed by 
the prior act of July 31, 1894. The provisions of both stat-
utes, though found in annual appropriation acts, are perma-
nent enactments which are to be construed as a whole and 
which, so construed, present no irreconcilable inconsistencies 
or incongruities. There is no basis, therefore, for the con-




ATTORNEY-GENERAL-COMPTROLLER OF TREASURY. 
The Attorney-General declines to advise upon a question submitted to 
him, for the reason that the question can now be asked of the Comp-
troller of the Treasury. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 8, 1895. 
SIR: Your communication of May 31 asks my official opin-
ion as to your right to refund certain duties claimed to have 
been collected through mistake of law. This is one of those 
questions which can now be asked of the Comptroller of the 
Treasury, and for reasons set forth in recent opinions I 
therefore feel that I should refrain from advising thereon. 
Very respectfully, 
RICHARD OLNEY. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
OPINIONS 
OF 
HON. JUDSON HARMON, OF OHIO, 
APPOINTED JUNE 10, 1895. 
WEATHER BUREAU. 
A vacancy in the office of Chief of the Weather Bureau can only be 
filled in the mode provided l>y section 4 of the act of October 1, 1890, 
chapter 1266 (26 Stat., 653). 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~ 
June 17, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receip~ of yours 
of the 15th instant, and to reply as follows: 
By section 4 of the act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat.,. 653), 
the W eatber Bureau is made to-
,, Consist of one chief of Weather Bureau," etc., who '' shall 
receive an annual compensation of four thousand five hun-
dred dollars, and be appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate: Provided, That the 
Chief Signal Officer of the Army may, in the discretion of 
the President, be ·detailed to take charge of said Bureau," 
etc. 
In my opinion, the clause in the act making appropriations 
for the Department of Agriculture for the ensuing fiscal year, 
to which you call my attention, namely, "and the Secretary 
is hereby authorized to make such changes or assignments 
to duty in the personnel or detailed force of the Weather 
Bureau for limiting or reducing expenses as he may deem 
necessary," does not affect the above provisions of the act of 
1890. No intention to have such effect is expressed, so both 
must stand if possible. By the former act the office of Chief 
of the Weather Bureau was created, to be filled by appoint-
ment by the President. It is not reasonable to suppose that 
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the authority given the Secretary of Agriculture in the latter 
act was intended to apply to the Chief of the Bureau, espe-
cially as its language appears to be directed rather to the 
''force" alone. 
My opinion, therefore, is that upon the expiration of the 
term of the present incumbent of the office of Chief of the 
Weather Bureau the vacancy can be filled only by appoint-
ment by the President, or by detailing the Chief Signal 
Officer of the Army under the proviso above quoted. The 
authority to fill the office of Chief of the Weather Bureau 
by detail from the Army being expressly limited to the Chief 
Signal Officer, no other officer can be detailed to fill that 
position, although other officers, not exceeding four, may be 
assigned to duty in the Bureau. As I understand Major 
Dunwoody i(S not the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, he 
can not be detailed to act as Chief of the Weather Bureau. 
I return herewith your inclosure. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE'.l'ARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
ENROLLED FISHING VESSELS-DEPOSIT OF SHIPS' PAPERS. 
The masters of :fishing vessels, enrolled but not registered, are not 
required by sections 4309 and 4310 of the Revised Statutes to deposit 
their ships' papers with the United States consul when they arrive at 
a foreign port where there is such a consular officer. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 9, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to submit my opinion, as requested 
by your letter of the 25th ultimo, upon the question '' whether 
the masters of :fishing vessels, enrolled but not registered, 
are required by ection 4309 and 4310 of the Revised Stat-
ut to depo it their ship ' papers with the United States 
con ul when they arriv at a foreign port where there is such 
a c n ular officer." 
The di tin tion betw en re!Ti tered ves el , being those 
n ag d in foreign ommerce, and enrolled and licen ed ves-
1 b in o- th employed in the c a ting trad or in fi bing 
i 1 laiul m rked in ur tatut and decision and ha been 
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well known for almost a century. It is kept up throughout 
the legislation of Congress on the subject and has been 
recognized by the courts. (The Mohawk, 3 Wall., 506.) 
I t would seem clear, therefore, that sections 4309 and 4310, 
which are found in Chapter XLIX, relating to "Regulation 
of vessels in foreign commerce," and whose terms do not 
include enrollment and license papers, could not be held to 
apply to merely enrolled and licensed vessels unless there is 
some other express provision or necessary implication of the 
statutes which so requires. 
It has been suggested that the last clause of section 4312, 
viz, " and vessels enrolled, with the masters or owners 
thereof, shall be subject to the same requirements as are 
prescribed for registered vessels," has such effect. But it 
was held in the case above cited that the provisions of sec-
t ion 2 of the act of February 18, 1793 (1 Stat. L., 305), of 
which section 4312 is merely the . revised form, applied only 
to matters connected with the act of enrollment and the 
proceedings therefor; and while the original act has been 
somewhat changed and abbreviated in the revision-notably 
by the omission of the phrase "in those respects," thereby 
suggesting a broader meaning of the last clause of section 
4312, above quoted-yet it is well settled that changes in 
meaning are not to be lightly inferred from me·re alterations 
in expression made in revision. And where there is doubt · 
as to the construction of a revised statute refere~ce may 
always be had to the original act. (Myer v. Gar Go., 102 
u. s., 11.) 
It is evident that no such change in the effect of section 
4312 was intended, from the fact that the original distinc-
tion between registered and enrolled vessels is carefully pre-
served in the Revised Statutes, and that section 8 of the act 
of F ebruary 18, 1793, was kept in force as section 4337, 
which provides for the seizure and forfeiture of any enrolled 
or licensed vessel which shall proceed on a foreign voyage 
without first giving up her enrollment and license and being 
duly registered. 
Se_ction 4309 is section 2 of the act of February 28, 1803, 
which relates to vessels engaged in foreign commerce only, 
and was supplementary to the act of April 14, 1792, concern-
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~ng consuls, etc. Section 1 of that act provided that before 
a clearance should be granted to any vessel bound on a for-
eign voyage the master should deliver a list of his crew and 
give bond to produce such list and the persons named 
therein on his return, excepting such as should have been 
discharged with the consent of a consul, etc., or have other-
wise properly been stricken from such list. On .April 4, 
1840, a Jaw was passed to make registers lawful papers for 
vessels employed in whale fishery, section 2 of which act 
provided that "all the provisions of the first section of the 
act of February 28, 1803, shall apply to whaling vessels." 
.A.s the language of such section 1 is no more mapplicable to 
a whaling vessel enrolled and Jicensed than the language of 
section 2 (now Rev. Stat., 4309) concerning the deposit of 
the register, etc., this law of 1840 shows that section 2 (now 
Rev. Stat., 4309), as well as the whole act of which it is 
a part, was not understood by Congress as applying to 
enrolled and licensed vessels. 
There are many considerations, which I think it unneces-
sary to discuss, which tend to show it extremely improbable 
that Congress intended the provisions in question to apply 
to any but vessels engaged in foreign trade. Such vessels 
always sail t~ foreign ports and do all their business in such 
ports. One of the expressed objects of the requirements in 
question was to protect seamen· from unlawful discharge 
without the payment of wages as required by law. Fishing 
vessels, on the contrary, are not bound for and do not visit 
foreign ports except accidentally or incidentally, their busi-
ness being carried on entirely at sea. The fact is well 
known that those engaged on fishing vessels are not usually 
hired on wages, but are interested in the catch. .Accord-
ingly, title 51, Revised Statutes, page 850, contains regula-
tions adapted to such ca es. 
Without further extending this opinion I will simply say 
that after careful examination of the subject I must answer 
your que tion no. 
ery re p t fully, 
J DSO H RMO . 
F ''.ATE . 
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QUARANTINED CATTLE. 
Under the provisions of chapter 839, act of August 30, 1890, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture may adopt and enforce regulations requiring that 
food and attendance should be provided to quarantined cattle by the 
owners. 
In cases where an outlay becomes necessary to prevent the loss of quar-
antined cattle, such outlay ma,y lawfully be made from the appropri-
ation" To establish and maintain quarantined stations, and to pro-
vide proper shelter for and care of neat cattle imported at such ports 
as may be deemed necessary," etc. ( chap. 169, act of March 2, 1895); 
and the Secretary of Agriculture may hold such cattle until such 
expenses are repaid, and sell them upon failure or refusal to repay 
within a reasonable time. 
DEP ..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 11, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following opinion in 
reply to your inquiry of June 26, whether your Department 
has authority to pay for the feedings, etc., of quarantined 
cattle; whether such expenses, if so paid, become a lien upon 
the animals, for which they can be sold; and if so, in what 
manner the sale is to be made. 
The law under which you now act in the matter is that of 
August 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 414), by section 7 of which the 
Secretary of Agriculture is "authorized, at the expense of 
the owner, to place and retain in quarantine all neat cattle, 
sheep, and other ruminants, and all swine, imported into the 
United States, at such ports as he may designate for such 
purpose, and under such conditions as he may by regulation 
prescribe, respectively, for the several classes of animals 
above described." 
Under the general quarantine laws (Rev. Stat., 4792-4796), 
cattle, as cargoes or parts of cargoes, were deposited at 
quarantine "at the risk of the parties concerned therein," 
and remained in the joint custody of the collector and "the 
owner or master or other person," etc. 
The making of regulations was provided for in the latter 
law as well as in the former, and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, on June 8, 1883 (Synopsis of Decisions, Treasury 
Department, p. 282), adopted '' regulations governing the 
treatment and quarantine of imported cattle," the four-
teenth of which required that food and attendance should 
be provided by the owners thereof. 
2638~VOL 21, PT 1--13 
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It is fair to assume that Congress was aware of these 
regulations when the law of 1890 was passed, and that the 
phrase '' at the expense of the owner,'' in section 7 thereof, 
above quoted, had reference to the existing practice. I 
recommend that you adopt and enforce a similar regulation. 
If you should undertake to advance the cost of food and 
attendance it can readily be seen that you might become 
involved in considerable outlays of money with some risk 
of loss, as well as of disputes with owners. Such a regula-
tion would, except in rare instances, such as the one which 
occasioned your letter, prevent cattle being unloaded until 
provision is made for the expense of their keep. 
It may, however, happen in some cases that an outlay for 
such cattle on the part of your Department may be required 
to avoid their loss. In my opinion such outlay may lawfully 
be made in such cases from the appropriation "To establish 
and maintain quarantine stations, and to provide proper 
shelter for and care of neat cattle imported at such ports as 
may be deemed necessary," etc. (Act of March 2, 1895, 
laws Fifty-third Congress, third session, p. 733.) While 
this act, like previous appropriation acts for the same pur-
pose, uses language which, taken alone, would seem to 
impose upon the Government the expense of such care, it 
must be taken in connection with the law of 1890, which 
expressly provides that it shall be" at the expense of the 
owner.'' But in cases where, by reason of the death of the 
owner or his agent, or some event making it impossible to 
secure provision for such expenses in advance, cattle must be 
cared for or lost, you may lawfully expend the necessary 
amount therefor, hold the cattle until such expenses are 
repaid, and sell them upon failure or refusal to repay within 
a reasonable time. 
I would suggest that, to save all question, you make a 
regulation providing for notice to owner in cases where, by 
any bane , you are compelled to advance money, and fixing 
a time within which uch expen es mu t be repaid or the 
attle old. To avoid all que tion about the notice the 
re<Yulati n hould pecify notice by po ting, publication, or 
a. you m y d m b t. 
n r m fi r di ut on the que tion whether 
uld 11 v Ii n for money advanced 
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and a right to sell on notice to enforce it, I think that the 
statutes on the subject are to be liberally construed in view 
of their nature, and that their fair intention and effect include 
the right not only to retain cattle to secure repayment of 
expenses, but also to sell them if such expenses are not 
repaid. Whatever doubt there may be will, in my opinion, 
be removed by the making and publication of such a regu-
lation as I have above mentioned. 
I repeat, however, the suggestion that the regulations 
should require the payment of such charges in advance or 
provide for feeding and care by the owner or his agent in 
person in all cases where some unavoidable event does not 
prevent. 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE. 
EMPLOYMENT OF COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED ST.A.TES. 
In view of the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 189, the Secretary 
of the Navy is not authorized to employ counsel in foreign countries 
to institute suit in behalf of the United States to recover for damages 
caused to a war vessel of the United States, but the case should be 
referred to the Department of Justice for attention. 
DEP.A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE, 
July 17, 1895. 
Srn: I am in receipt of your letter of July 10, 1895, with 
inclosed memorandum in the matter of the libel proceedings 
begun against the English steamer Azov before the Tribunal 
of Commerce, Antwerp, on account of a collision with the 
U. S. S. Chicago in the harbor of Antwerp on the 11th of 
June, 1894. 
It appears that the Navy Department, on June 11, 1894, 
received from Rear-Admiral Erben, by cable, a request for 
authority to libel the steamer Azov, and that the Depart-
ment immediately replied by cable, giving assent. 
The suit was instituted in the name of Alfred T. Mahan, 
who was the commanding officer of the Chicago, and upon 
the authority given by the Navy Department he employed 
counsel to represent him. 
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It further appears that the suit was dismissed with costs, 
ou the ground that Captain Mahan was not the proper party 
plaintiff, and that now the question of appealing the cause, 
or instituting a new suit in the name of the United States 
Government, is under consideration. 
The question upon which you request an opinion of this 
Department is thus stated: 
"I am, in view of the law establishing the Department 
of Justice and of the provisions of those sections of the 
· Revised Statutes relating to the employment of counsel to 
assist in the trial of any case in which the Government is 
interested, doubtful as to whether the circumstances in this 
case, the cause coming necessarily under the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts, are such as to warrant the Secretary of the 
· Navy in employing an attorney to proceed in the matter, 
and I have the honor, therefore, to request your opinion as 
to whether this Department should continue the conduct of 
this case, employing the necessary counsel, or whether the 
matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for 
its action and management." 
In 7 Opinion, 141, the Hon. Caleb Cushing said: 
"According to the traditional practice of the Government 
it has belonged to the attributes S)f any head of D~partment 
to employ counsel in his discretion for the conduct of legal 
business arising in his Department. The act of February 
26, 1853, for the regulation of fees in the legal business of 
the Government, expressly recognizes the existence of this 
power in any head of Department." 
Subsequent opinions, which affirmed the right of heads of 
Departments to employ special counsel in their discretion, 
founded it on the act of February 26, 1853. (10 Stat., 162; 
10 Opin., 43, 48; 12 Opin., 369.) 
On June 22, 1870 (16 Stat., 162), was passed "An act to 
establi h the Department of Ju tice." 
The provi ions of this act were carried into the Revised 
Statute under "Title III-Department of Justice." 
ectiou 7 provid a follows : 
' h ne r a ue tion of la ari e in the ad.mini tration 
he D rtment f War or the D partm ut of th avy, 
oguizauce of whi h i no given by tatute to ome 
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other officer from whom the head of the Department may 
require advice, it shall be sent to the Attorney-General, to 
be by him referred to the proper officer in his Department, 
or otherwise disposed of as he may deem proper." 
Section 365 provides as follows: 
"No compensation shall hereafter be allowed to any per-
son, besides the respective district attorneys and assistant 
district attorneys for services as an attorney or counselor to 
the United States, or to any branch or Department of the 
Government thereof, except in cases specially authorized 
by law, and then only on the certificate of the Attorney-
General that such services were actually rendered, and that 
the same could not be perfol'med by the Attorney-General, 
or Solfoitor-General, or the officers of the Department of 
Justice, or by the district attorneys." 
Section 17 of said act, carried into the Revised Statutes 
as section 189, provides: · 
"No head of BJ Department shall employ attorneys or 
counsel at the expense of the United States; but when in 
need of counsel or advice, shall call upon the Department of 
Justice, the officers of which shall attend to the same." 
The act of June 22, 1870, was construed to provide that 
the Secretary of War had no authority to employ counsel, 
without the consent of the Attorney-General, to appear in 
court in habeas corpus cases. (13 Opin., 583.) 
An opinion was also given to the effect that the Bureau of 
Animal Industry could not employ counsel for the defense 
of the employes of the Bureau for acts done by them in 
carrying out the duties of their office. (19 Opin., 328.) 
The question arises whether or not the above prohibition 
in the act establishing the Department of Justice 1s broad 
enough to forbid the employment of counsel in foreign coun-
tries by the Secretary of the Navy to institute a suit in 
behalf of the United States to recover money for injury to 
a war vessel of the United States. 
The right and duty of a commander of such a vessel, or of 
the Secretary of the Navy, to employ, in an emergency, 
counsel in a foreign country when necessary for the protec-
tion of such vessel and all that pertains to it are not within 
the contemplation of thif:3 opinion, and would involve prin-
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ciples other than those passed upon in determining the ques-
tion submitted. 
The act of June 22, 1870, was passed to correct what was 
considered an abuse by the heads of Departments of the 
power to employ counsel. Its terms are undoubtedly broad 
enough to cover any employment of counsel in cases like 
that now in question, although they have been so rare that 
they were probably not a moving cause of the enactment of 
the law. 
Congress, however, must have contemplated, inasmuch as 
ships of war are constantly on the high seas and in foreign 
ports, that questions of law would arise in respect of them 
in the administration of the Navy Department. No excep-
tion whatever is made of such cases in section 357 and none 
in section 189. 
I am of the opinion that the Navy Department should not 
continue the conduct of this case, and that the matter should 
be referred to the Department of Justice, which is charged 
with the duty of determining when the United States shall 
sue, for what it shall sue, and that such suits shall be brought 
in appropriate cases. ( United States v. San Jacinto Tin Com-
pany, 125 U.S., 273,279, 280; In re Neagle, 135 U.S., 65, 67.) 
I return, as requested, the memorandum sent by you, and 
ask that you will have me furnished a copy of same and of 




The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
REGISTRY OF WRECKED FOREIGN-BUILT VESSEL. 
In view of the express reo-ula.tion and long-established practice of the 
Tr , ury Department, which have put a narrow construction on the 
lau e "wre keel in the ni ted tates," an application, under Revised 
tatute. , s ction 41 6, for reo-istry of a foreign-built vessel wrecked and 
a.ban loned v ral hnndrecl mil s from the coast of the United tates, 
and ub qu ntl tow d into the United 'tates, where she was pur-
h. d and r pair d l, Am ricao itizens, the repairs amounting to 
mor ban hr time th pric paid for the wr ck at marshal's sale, 
pr p rl leni d 
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The Secretary of the Treasury has the undoubted right to change .the 
regulation and practice of the Department and adopt a more liberal 
construction of the clause in question. 
Following 15 Opinions, 402, it is held that tbe word "wrecked," in sec-
tion 4136, "must be taken in a very comprehensive sense * * * as 
applicable to a vessel which is disabled and rendered unfit for naviga-
tion, whether this state of the vessel has been caused by the winds or 
the waves, by stranding, by fire, by explosion of boilers, or by any 
other casualty"; an.d, to carry out the manifest intent of the statute, 
if any of the injuries which have made a vessel a wreck were 
received in the United States, in the absence of bad faith, she should 
be held to be embraced in the clause "wrecked in the United States," 
although other injuries had been received elsewhere. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 19, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to answer the questions in yours of 
the 10th instant. They are, first, whether the application 
for registry of the Southery, under section 4136, Revised 
Statutes, which has been denied by your Department on the 
ground that the vessel . was not "wrecked in the United 
States" was properly refused; and, second, "what, in law, 
is sufficient injury to answer the condition 'wrecked' ,,, 
It appears from your statement and the accompanying 
papers that the ship was wrecked and abandoned on Ala-
cran Reef, which is not in the United States, but several 
hundred miles from our nearest coast, and subsequently 
towed into the United States, where she was purchased and 
repaired by American citizens, the repairs amountmg to more 
than three times the price paid for the wreck at marshal's 
sale, which I presume you consider equivalent to "three-
fourths of the cost of the vessel when so repaired," as the 
application was refused on the ground that the "evidence 
did not show that the injuries to the vessel, constituting her 
a wreck, were received in the United States." 
In view of the extremely liberal construction which has 
been given to all the other provisions of section · 4136 (9 
Opin., 424; 15 Opin., 402; 20 Opin., 253), I should not hesi-
tate to say, if the question remained open, that the clause 
"wrecked in the United States" was not intended by Con-
gress to limit the benefit of that section to vessels which 
receive within the boundaries of this country the injuries 
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which constitute them wrecks, but intended them to apply 
to any foreign-built vessel in the United States in such a 
state of wreck as to require virtual rebuildmg, provided she 
should be purchased and repaired by American citizens. 
This construction certainly carries out the well-known object 
of the law, and can be given without doing violence to its 
language, although such language is capable of the other 
construction, and at first sight seems to Darry it. 
Your question, however, being whether you rightly denied 
the application, I am compelled to answer yes, because in 
so doing you merely followed the express regulation and 
long-settled practice of your Department, which have put 
the narrower construction on the clause " wrecked in the 
United States." And in 1875, in the case of United States 
v. The Brig Victoria Perez (8 Ben., 109), Judge Benedict, 
having the exact question before him, gave the language the 
same construction. He conceded the force of the opposing 
argument, but based his decision upon the long and well 
settled construction which your Department had given. 
The question, therefore, really is one for you to settle·your-
self, viz, whether you will change the regulations and prac-
tice of your Department. You undoubtedly have a right 
to do this, the true meaning of the law being at least doubt-
ful. Whether you should do it or not depends upon consid-
erations with which you are doubtless quite as familiar as I, 
and probably more so. 
Your second, so far as it is one of law, becomes a moot 
question unless I assume that you propose to change the 
practice of your Depai;tment or reconsider your finding of 
fact. .As you may do either or both, however, it would not 
violate the well-settled rule of this Department to answer 
it. It wa rightly held in an opinion given your Department 
many year ago (15 Opin., 402) that the word "wreck" in 
section 4136 "must be taken in a very comprehensive sense 
• • • a applicable to ave sel which is disabled and ren-
d red unfit for navigation, whether this state of the vessel 
ha b en au ed by the wind or the wave , by stranding, 
b fir , by e plo i n of b iler or by any other ca ualty." 
Thi d finition i n t bro d r than the intention of Congre , 
and y u :vill ju tifi d in holding av el to be wrecked 
TO THE SECRETARY OF S'TATE. 201 
· Consul-Attorney-General. 
when she is in a condition unfit for use, no matter how 
. brought about. For instance, without attempting to pass 
upon the disputed question of fact presented by the claims 
of the applicant and the resistant, if, as claimed by the 
former, the vessel, though somewhat leaky and injured 
before, struck ground on her way to Erie Basin, in conse-
quence of which she sank therein, necessitating raising, dry 
docking, and repairs to put her in such condition that she 
could go to the place where it had been decided to make the 
permanent repairs, this would undoubtedly constitute a 
· wrecking, and 'the vessel would also have been" wrecked in 
the United States." 
There is nothing in what has been said above to prevent 
the ruling, which I think is required to carry out the mani-
fest object of the statute, that if any of the injuries which 
have made the vessel a wreck were received in the United 
States she should be held to come within the law, although 
others had been received elsewhere. 
Nor would failure to use diligence or the best means of 
avoiding such further injuries prevent the above conclusion, 
always assuming the absence of bad faith with respect to 
the registry law in question. 
This opinion is to be taken as supplementary to that · of my 
immediate predecessor, with respect to the same case at an 
earlier stage, to which your letter did not refer, and to which 
my attention was not called until the above opinion was 
written. 
Respectfnlly, 
· JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
CONSUL-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
When a consul intervenes in a controversy between master and seamen, 
by mutual consent of the disputants, he acts as an arbitrator and not 
as .consul. 
The Attorney-General can not be called upon for an opinion unless 
specific questions of law are formulated which relate to an existing 
question calling for the action of the ~epartment requesting it. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 26, 1895. 
Sm: I have your letter of July 24, 1895, inclosing a 
statement of the United States consul at Havre that the 
steam yacht Barraconta, a foreign- built vessel, owned by a 
citizen of the United States and unregistered, arrived at 
that port from the Mediterranean, destination, foreign ports, 
and that he had intervened on account of disputes and dif-
ferences that had arisen between the master and first officer 
on the one side and the chief engineer and cook on the 
other side. · 
You request ''an opinion upon the facts presented" in the 
communication from the consul. 
You further state: "I should have no hesitation in approv-
ing the action of the consul at Havre if the yacht in ques-
tion were a registered American vessel, but I am unwilJing 
to assume the responsibility of determining the legal status 
of a foreign-built yacht." 
It is not entirely clear to me upon what points you wish 
an opinion. 
It is against the settled practice of this Department to 
give an opinion upon a general statement of facts without a 
specification presenting special questions of law. (14 Opin., 
367; 20 Opin., 259, 493, 699, 711, 723.) 
The Attorney-General can not properly give an opinion 
where it does not appear that some question exists calling 
for the action of the Department requesting it. (20 Opin., 
383, 420, 465, 618.) 
It appears from the consul's statement that what he did 
was "by mutual consent of master and seamen." It would 
seem from this that he has exercised no consular authority, 
and that he in effect act d a arbitrator by consent of parties, 
and therefore it i not apparent to me that any question 
arising out of his action i now pending in the admini tra-
tion of your Department. 
If ther b no que tion pending in your Department 
r quirin · ffi ial action nece arily involving a determina-
ti n of ' th l gal . tatu of a foreign-built yacht," I would 
n t e rrant <l in i ino· to y u an opinion upon that 
u d t. 
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If, in the administration of your Department, any action 
is necessary in respect of what the consul has done in this 
case, I request that you will formulate specific questions of 
law upon which you wish to have my opinion. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
CONTROL OF CUSTOMS OFFICERS. 
A collector of customs is merely a subordinate of the Secretary of the 
Treasury; and section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890 (chap. 407, 26 
Stat., 131), authorizing a collector or the Secretary of the Treasury, 
if dissatisfied, to apply for a review of the conclusions of law and 
fact involved in the decision of a Board of General Appraisers, does 
not mean that the collector may appeal against the decision or wish of 
the Secretary. 
The provisions of section 2652, Revised Statutes, making conclusive upon 
all customs officers the decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury upon 
all questions as to the construction and meaning of any part of the 
revenue laws, remain unaffected by the act of 1890 referred to. 
DEP .A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 27, 1895. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of July 26, 1895, request-
ing an opinion whether or not in a case in which the General 
Appraisers have decided that an article is not dutiable, sec-
tion 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, (26 Stat., 138), in so far as 
it confers upon the collector the power, in case he is dissatis-
fied with the decisions of the Board of General .Appraisers, 
to apply for a review of their decisions, repeals the authority 
conferred by section 2652 of the Revised Statutes upon the 
Secretary of the Treasury to control the officers of customs 
in the administration of the revenue laws. 
Section 2652, Revised Statutes, is as follows: 
"It shall be the duty of all officers of the customs to exe-
cute and carry into effect all instructions of the Secretary of 
the Treasury relative to the execution of the revenue laws; 
and in case any difficulty shall arise as to the true construc-
tion or meaning of any part of the revenue laws, the deci-
sion of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be conclusive and 
binding upon all officers of the customs." 
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The decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury upon all 
questions as to the construction or meaning of any part of 
the revenue laws are by this section i:p.ade conclusive upon 
all customs officers. 
This law has been in force since 1842, and still remains part 
of the revenue system of the United States. 
A later statute does not abrogate a prior one unless such 
intention is expressed, or the two are so entirely inconsistent 
that they can not stand together. 
Section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, provides that "the 
collector or the Secretary of the Treasury," if dissatisfied, 
may apply for a review of the questions of law and fact 
involved in decisions of the Board of General" Appraisers. 
This does not mean that the coUector may appeal against 
the decision or wishes of the Secretary, but that, as either 
may be the officer who ultimately acts for the Government, 
the right of appeal is given to either, as the case may be. But 
if the Secretary bas decided any matter no collector can by 
appeal question such decision. 
A coUector is merely a subordinate of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and no intention to give him such right as against 
his superior is to be gathered from the act in question. 
My opinion is that section 2652 is in full force, notwith-
standing anything that is in section 15, and that it is the 
duty of the collector to follow the decision and instructions 
of the Secretary of the Treasury in all matters relating to 
the revenue laws. 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE TREASURY. 
COURTS-MARTIAL-U. S. PE ITENTIARIES. 
A prisoner sentenced by a con rt-martial to confinement in a penitentiary 
of the nit t1 tates bould not be turned over to a marshal, but 
houlcl b conducted to the prison by the proper officer of the Depart-
m nt of War. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 27, 1895. 
Srn.: R plying to your letter of the 20th in tant, with 
in ·l ur , in hi h y u re ue t my opinion whetlier orpl. 
John T. <l , of 'ompany ll, Fourth Infantry, who h a 
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been sentenced by court-martial to confinement in the U. S. 
penitentiary at Fort Leavenworth, is to be transported there 
by the proper officer of your Department or turned over 
tp the U. S. marshal of the State of Washington, where 
the court-martial sat, I have the honor to say: 
By the provisions of the act of March 2, 1895, which trans-
ferred the military prison at Fort Leavenworth to the De-
partment of Justice, to be known and used as a U. S. peni-
tentiary, it is provided that the same is to be conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 
of the act of March 3, 1891, entitled "An act for the erection 
of United States prisons," etc. Said section 5 provides that 
the transportation of all U. S. prisoners sentenced to impris-
onment in a U. S. penitentiary and their delivery thereat 
shall be by the marshal of the District or Territory where 
the conviction occurs, and makes provision for his actual 
expenses, including transportation, etc., to be paid, on the 
approval of the Attorney-General, out of the judiciary fund. 
This provision, however, applies, in my opinion, only to pris-
oners convicted by the civil courts of the United States, 
and does not apply to prisoners sentenced by courts-martial. 
The provision in the act of March 2, 1895, that prisoners 
sentenced by courts-martial may be confined in the U. S. 
penitentiary merely puts such prisoners in charge of the 
civil authorities on their delivery at the prison, which must 
be made by the proper officer of the. Department to which 
the sentencing tribunal belonged. 
The prisoner named should therefore be conducted to the 
prison at Fort Leavenworth by the proper officer of your 
Department, where he will be duly received. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 




HON. JUDSON HARMON, OF OHIO. 
APPOINTED JUNE 10, 1895. 
A'rTORNEY-GENERA.L-MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS. 
A question of the legality of a provision of long standing in contracts 
of the War and Navy Departments determined, as presented, in gen-
eral terms, though a strict regard to the rule of the Department of 
Justice which forbids the expression of an official opinion upon any 
question of law which has not arisen in an existing case and presented 
upon a definite statement of facts, might warrant a refusal of an 
opinion thereon. 
A clause contained in contracts of the War Department providing for 
future modifications of the contract, set out, and held to be reasonable 
and proper, and that a modification of such a contract, which does not 
prejudice the interests of the Government or violate any statutory 
provision, is not such a new contract as must be preceded by an 
advertisement for proposals from bidders. 
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 13, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a let-
ter of Brig. Gen. W. P. Craig hill, Chief of Engineers, of July 
27, 1895, addressed to you, and, by your indorsement thereon 
of August 1, 1895, referred to the .Attorney-General, "with 
request that he will please favor this Department with an 
opinion upon the question within presented." 
A strict regard to the rule of this Department, which for-
bids the expression of an official opinion upon any question 
of law which has not arisen in an existing case and presented 
upon a definite statement of facts, might prevent compliance 
with your request did it not appear that the provision in the 
contract upon which the question arises appears to be one 
3513-V0L 21, P'.l' 2--1 207 
208 HON. HOLMES CONRAD. 
Attorney General-ltlodification of Contracts. 
of long standing in the contracts both of the War and Navy 
Departments of the Government. The provision referred to 
is as follows : 
"If, at any time during the prosecution of the work, it be 
found advantageous or necessary to make any change or 
modification in the project, and this change or modification 
should involve sach change in the specifications as to char-
acter and quantity, whether of labor or material, as would 
either increase or diminish the cost of the work, then such 
change or modification must be agreed upon in writing by the 
contracting parties, the agreement setting forth fully the rea-
sons for such change, and giving clearly the quantities and 
prices of both material and labor thus substituted for those 
named in the original contract, and before taking effect must 
be approved by the Secretary of ·war: Provided, That no 
payments shall be made unless such supplemental or modi-
fied agreement was signed and approved before the obliga-
tion arising from such modification was incurred." 
The objection urged against it is stated in the letter of the 
Chief of Engineers to be that such modification operates to 
form a new and independent contract between the parties-
such a contract as is contemplated and provided for in sec-
tion 3709, Revised Statutes, as to which advertisements for 
proposals from .bidders are required before the contract can 
be entered into. 
This objection seems to give to the word "modification" 
the same meaning as "formation" or "creation." '' Modi-
fied," as defined by Stormonth, is ''· to change slightly, as in 
the form or in the external qualities of a thing; " and by 
Webster, "to change somewhat the form or qualities of.'' 
It would be remarkable, indeed, in view of the diversity 
of subjects-matter and conditions under which public con-
tracts of the Government are made, that modifications to 
meet the infinite contingencies to which the limits of the 
human forecast and sagacity subject us could not, even by 
con ent of the contracting parties, be made without rescind-
ing and abrogating the entire contract. ertainly no su h 
ml i kno n in the general law of contra t . The minds 
whi h gr d to form may in like manner a ree to modify. 
But h re, in recognition and contemplation of uch con-
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tingencies, the provision for the future modification is made 
part of and expressed in the very contract itself. The objec-
tion, however, appears to be directed to the power of the 
Executive Department of the Government to make such 
contract, because, as is said, the modification made in pursu-
ance of such provision in the contract-whether as to sub. 
ject-matter or as to term~-is a departure from what was 
advertised in the proposals; that the bidders are not, there-
fore, put upon equal terms, and that the beneficial object of 
advertising for proposals from bidders is impaired, if not 
defeated, by such subsequent modifications. 
It will be seen, however, that those provisions of the stat-
ute which require advertisements for proposals of bidders 
impose no such rigorous or restricted limitations to the 
power of the executive officer by whom the contract was to 
be made. 
It is true, as was held by the Attorney-General in 1869 (13 
Opin., 174), that where an advertisement for proposals for 
furnishing the Government with stamped envelopes, etc., 
stated a definite term and did not 
1
provide for any extension 
of the contract beyond the term, but the contract contained 
a provision that it might be extended or modified by mutual 
agreemeut, and it was subsequently modified and extended 
repeatedly so as to embrace several successive years, that 
such extensions were each new contracts, which should have 
been preceded by advertisements for proposals. He said: 
" If a Postmast,er-General can extend a contract in this 
manner for four years without opportunity for anyone to 
compete for the supply of an article of such large consump-
tiou, I know no limit to his power in that respect. If it be 
a valid contract binding upon the Government, although 
extending beyond his own term of office, it binds his suc-
cessors and cuts off for the term for which he chooses to .fix 
the contract all advantage to the Government of any changes 
in the market by which a saving could be effected." 
The executive officers of the Government are expressly 
prohibited from making contracts to extend beyond one 
year and for which no appropriation by Congress has been 
made. 
The question now under consideration not arising from 
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any actual statement of facts, in an existing case, can be 
determined only as it is presented in general terms. 
In United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Cornpany (91 U.S., 
321) the question was presented as to the power of the Sec-
retary of the Navy to suspend work contracted for, when 
from any cause in his opinion the public interest requires 
such suspension, and to settle with the contractor upon such 
terms as may be agreed on for the partial performance of 
the contract. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. 
Justice Field, said: 
"Contracts for the armament and equipment of vessels of 
war may, and generally do, require numerous modifications 
in the progress of the work where that work requires years 
for its completion. With the improvements constantly made 
in ship building and steam machinery and in arms, some 
parts originally c0ntracted for may have to be abandoned 
and other parts substituted, and it would be of serious detri-
ment to the public service if the power of the head of the 
Navy Department did not extend to providing for all such 
possible contingencies by modification or suspension of the 
contract and settlement with the contractors." 
.And on the basis of that decision, Mr . .Attorney-General 
Brewster, in a case submitted for his opinion (18 Opin., 101 ), 
held: 
"It is clearly competent to the Secretary of the Navy to 
assent to a modification of the contract for building these 
vessels where the interests of the Government wiU not be 
prejudiced or any statutory provision violated thereby." 
From which it would seem that at least the power to 
modify the terms of an existing contract on the part of the 
Secretary of the Navy has been judicially recognized. 
But in Ferris v. United States (28 C. Cls. R., 332) the con-
tract under consideration was the very contract and contain-
ing he identical provision which is the subject of considera-
tion here. And in that ca e the validity of tbe contract and 
th propriety of the provi ion, and the power of the Chief of 
n ineer on behalf of the Government, are not even ques-
ion d but were reco nized and cited approvin ly by court 
in it opinion. 
1 huponr a nand u horit ,then,Iam 1 rlyof pinion 
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that such provision for future modification was reasonable 
and proper and within the power of the Chief of Engineers 
to make. That a modification " where the interests of the 
Government will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision 
violated thereby" may well be provided for in every contract 
to which the Government is a party; and that a contract so 
modified is not such a new contract as must be preceded by 




The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
MEMBER OF CONGRESS-APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE. 
During the term of R. as a Senator of the United States, Congress 
increased the salary attached to a civil office under the authority of 
the United States. On February 23, 1895, the President nominated R. 
(whose term in the Senate would not expire until March 4, 1895) to the 
office in question, and, on the same day, such nomination was con-
firmed by the Senate. R. took the oath of office on March ·4, 1895, 
and his commission was delivered to him on the following day. Held, 
1. The nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate con-
stituted the appointrnent to the office in question; and 
2. Sn:ih appointment was a nullity, because in conflict with paragraph 2, 
section 5, Article I of the Constitution, which prohibits the appoint-
ment of a Member of Congress during the term for which he was 
elected, to an office, the emoluments whereof shall have been increased 
during such time. 
DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
Aiigust 1.5, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of August 10, inclosing a copy of the decision 
of the Auditor for the State and other Departments and 
requesting my opinion upon the following statement of facts, 
to wit: 
"Matthew W. Ransom wa.s the United States Senator 
from the State of North Carolina for the term beginning 
March 4, 1889. During the said term the salary of envoy 
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico was 
increased from $12,000 to $17,500 per annum by act of Con-
gress approved March 3, 1891, making appropriations for the 
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diplomatic and consula.r service. (26 Stat., 1053.) Congress 
has since continued to appropriate the latter sum. On Feb-
ruary 23, 1895, Mr. Ransom was nominated by the President 
as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to 
Mexico, and the nomination was confirmed the same day. 
The commission bears date of February 23. According to 
the statement of the President and his private secretary, 
Mr. Thurber, the commission was signed March 5. Mr. 
Ransom took the oath of office March 4, after the Senatorial 
term had expired, and his commission was delivered to him 
the following day." 
The occasion of your request for my opinion, as to the 
duty of the Department of State in the premises, appears to 
be a decision of the Auditor for the State and other Depart-
ments, holding that Mr. Ransom is not entitled to salary as 
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico, 
because of the constitutional prohibition of section 6 of 
Article I of the Federal Constitution. 
Paragraph 2, section 6, Article I of the Constitution is as 
follows: 
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for 
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under 
the authority of the United StateR, which shall have been 
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased 
during such time; and no person holding any office under the 
United States, shall be a member of either House during his 
continuance in office." 
Here is contained a prohipition ·against the appointment to 
office of Senators and Representatives; and also a prohibition 
against one holding an office from being a member of either 
House of Uongress. 
It ha been repeatedly held that the acceptance of any 
offi e under the United State' by a member of either House 
of ongre 'S operates a vacation of his eat. He i disabled 
b the Con titution from holding au office while a member or 
eith r Ilou. ·e. 
Th ca in band, however, i governed by the other prohi-
biti u which i again t the appointment to any civil office 
und r th , uthority of the nited tate the emolument 
h r of he b en increa ed durin tbe time for which the 
pr enta i eappointed to uch officewa elected. 
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Here, plainly, the prohibition is not against the holding, 
but against the appointment. 
Under section 2, Article II of the Constitution, power is 
given the President to-
" Nominate, and by and with the . advice and consent of 
the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers 
and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
officers of . the United States, whose appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established 
by law." 
He can appoint, however, only those who, under the Con-
stitution, are eligible to office. His appointment of one not 
eligible is a nullity. 
One who was a Senator or Representative during the time 
in which the emoluments of any civil office under the author-
ity of the United States was increased is eneligible to such 
office. 
Judge Story says: 
"The reasons for excluding persons from offices who have 
been concerned in creating them, or increasing their emolu-
ments, are to take away, as far as possible, any improper 
bias in the vote of the Representative and to secure to the 
constituents some solemn pledge of his disinterostedness. 
The actual provision, however, does not go to the extent of 
the principle, for his appointment is restricted only during 
the time for which he was elected, thus leaving in full force 
every influence upon his mind, if the period of his election 
is short, or the duration of it is approaching its natural 
termination." (Story on Constitution, sec. 667.) 
It is suggested in your letter that the commission of Mr. 
Ransom was not actually signed by the President until the 
5th of March, which was after the expiration of the time for 
which Mr. Ransom was elected a Senator in Congress. 
But it mus~, be observed that the language of the Consti-
tution is that "no Senator shall, during the term for which 
he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the 
authority of the United States." 
In Jlfarbury v. Madison (1 Cranch., 155) the Chief Justice, 
speaking for the court, after reciting the act of Congress, 
said-: 
"These are the clauses of the Constitution and laws of the 
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United States which affect this part of the case. They seem 
to contemplate three distinct operations: 
"1. The nomination. This is the sole act of the President, 
and is completely voluntary. 
"2. The appointment. This is also the act of the Presi-
dent, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be per-
formed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
"3. The commission. To grant a commission to a person 
appointed might, perhaps, be deemed a duty enjoined by the 
Constitution. 'He shall,' says that instrument, 'commission 
all the officers of the United States.' 
"The acts appointing to office and commissioning the per-
son appointed can scarcely be considered as one and the same, 
since the power to perform them is given in two separate and 
distinct sections of the Constitution." 
The vital question here, then, would seem to be, not when 
was Mr. Ransom commissioned, but when was he appointed? 
Although he might have been commissioned on the 5th 
day of March, yet if he was nominated and confirmed on the 
23d of February, that, under the rule stated, would seem to 
be the date of his appointment. 
And this view is confirmed by the facts stated by you, 
that, having been nominated and confirmed on the 23d of 
February, although not actually commissioned until the 5th 
day of March, yet on the 4th day of March Mr. Ransom took 
the oath as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 
to Mexico. 
I am of opinion, then, that Mr. Ransom's appointment as 
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico 
was made on February 23, 1895; that that was during the 
time for which he was elected a Seuator in Congress, and it 
appearing from your letter that it was during that time the 
emoluments of the office of minister to Mexico were increased, 
Mr. Ran om wa not, in my opinion, eligible ta:appointment 
to that office. 
ry re pe tfully 
Th 'l'.A.TE. 
HOLME CO RAD, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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WASHINGTON MONUMENT. 
Congress has made provision for the protection of the Washington 
Monument from chipping vandals, by the act of July 2Q, 1892, chapter 
320, section 1, which provides "a penalty of not more than $50 for 
each and every such offense," and in the police protection authorized 
by the appropriation act of October 2, 1888, chapter 1069, whereby the 
Secretary of War is "charged with the custody, care, and protection 
of the monument," and an appropriation is made for a custodian and 
other employees necessary for its care. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August :u, 1895. 
Sm: Replying to your request for information whether 
any action can be taken for the protection of the Washing-
ton Monument from chipping vandals, I have the honor to 
say that there appears to be none in the way of criminal pro-
ceedings except arrest and prosecution under the act of July 
20, 1892, chapter 320, section 1 (27 Stat., 332), which pro-
vides " a penalty of not more than $50 for each and every 
such offense." Section 18 of that act provides that prosecu-
tions " shall be conducted in the name of and for the benefit 
of the District of Columbia, and in the same manner as -now 
provided by law for the prosecution of offenses against the 
laws and ordinances of said District;" and that" any person 
who shall fail to pay the fine or penalty imposed, or give 
security where the same is required, shall be committed to 
the workhouse of the District of Columbia for a term not 
exceeding six months for each and every offense." 
The act of March 3, 1891, chapter 536 (26 Stat., 848), gives 
the police court originaljurisdiction of such prosecutions con-
currently with the supreme court of the District of Columbia. 
By the appropriation act of October 2, 1888 (25 Stat., 
chap. 1069), you are "charged with the custody, care~ and 
protection of the monument," and an appropriation is made 
for a custodian and other employees necessary for its care. 
The police protection thus authorized, with the penalty above 
named, seem to have been thought by Congress sufficient. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE'.rARY oF WAR. 
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WORLD'S l!"'AIR. 
The receipt and distribution of medals and diplomas awarded by the 
World's Columbian Commission at Chicago ip. 1893 are purely ministe-
rial acts. They could therefore be delegated by the Commission; and 
they were delegated, so that delivery can be made either to its execu-
tive committee or to the board of reference and control. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to make distribution to the 
exhibitors directly. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 26, 1,895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of .August 20, asking my official opinion as to the dis-
tribution of the medals and diplomas awarded to certain 
exhibitors at Chicago the World's Fair of 1893. Your 
letter states no facts, but I understand that the awards to 
successful exhibitors at the Fair have all been made, and 
that the validity of these awards is unquestioned. I under-
stand, further, from your inquiries that the medals and diplo-
mas have all been prepared, and that nothing remains to be 
done except for you. to deliver them to the proper person or 
body of persons who are in turn to deliver· them to the suc-
cessful exhibitors. 
Your third question is: "Can the World's Columbian Com-
mission authorize any committee or subordinate body thereof 
to receive and distribute the said medals and diplomas¥" 
Such receipt and distribution are purely ministerial acts, 
involving no exercise of flj scretion. (See Butterworth v. Hoe, 
112 U.S., 50.) I am very clearly of the opinion that these 
duties, which are entirely distinct from the discretionary 
function of making the awards, could be delegated by the 
Commission. That body had express authority to appoint 
committees by the act of .April 25, 1890, chapter 156, section 
4 (26 Stat., 63), and while the World's Fair was to close not 
later than October 30, 1803 ( ec. 9), it was contemplated that 
the Commis ion might remain in exi tence for over four years 
thereafter (sec. 14) for the purpose of winding up. It could 
not have been contemplated that the whole unwieldy body 
honld be brought together for purely mini terial acts. In 
fact, meeting of a full Commi ion were expressly di 'cour-
a ed b Congre . ( ct of .A.ugu~ t 5, 1 92, chap. 3 o, 27 
ta . 63.) In pr vidiug th r fir , that the "medal and 
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diplomas shall be delivered to the World's Columbian Com-
mission to be awarded to exhibitors" (act of March 3, 1893, 
chap. 208, 27 Stat., 587), I think that Congress intended that 
delivery to a duly authorized agent of the Commission should 
be sufficient. 
The Commission is not now in session, and the Treasury 
Department is ready to deliver the medals and diplomas. 
Your second question asks to what officer the delivery should 
be made. This depends upon the by-laws of the World's 
Columbian Commission and such prQceedings as may regu-
larly have been had thereunder. You furnish me with two 
pamphlets, one entitled "By-Laws (as amended) of the 
W orlcl's Columbian Commission," and bearing no date; the 
other entitled "Official Minutes of the Executive Committee 
of the World's Columbian Commission, from December 12 to 
December 19, 1893, inclusive." In a memorandum which 
you have presented to me with the papers, you refer me also 
to a certain rule adopted by the board of reference and con-
trol appointed by said Commission, and which, as you there 
state, is the rule referred to in the proceedings of the exec-
utive committee of December 18, 1893. I have no official 
knowledge of the by-laws or resolutions of this Coinmission, 
or of any of its subordinate committees, and must confine 
myself to the consideration of such as you furnish me with . 
.Article 5 of the by-laws provides for the appointment of 
an executive committee which, "when the Commission is not 
in session, shall have all the powers of the National Commis-
sion, except in cases in which the act of Congress requires 
the action of the Commission or a majority of the Commis-
sioners." It further provides that "the committee may make 
such regulations for its own government and the exercise of 
its functions through the medium of such subcommittees as 
it may consider expedient," and" shall select such employees 
and agents as may be necessary." .Article 17 establishes a 
"board of reference and control" of eight members, "upon 
which board are conferred all the powers and duties of the 
Commission when the said Commission or its executive com-
mittee shall not be in session, except in cases in which the 
act of Congress requires the action of the Commission or of 
a majority of the Commissioners." 
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After the close of the actual exhibition it became neces-
sary to provide in some way for the promulgation of the 
awards and the distribution of the medals and diplomas. 
You inform me that the board of reference and control 
adopted a rule, called "Rule XI," providing that this should 
be done by the Commission itself or by said board. On 
December 18, 1893, the executive committee amended this 
rule so as to provide that the committee of awards should 
report the result of the work of the judges" to the World's 
Columbian Commission or its P;xecutive committee, or, in its 
absence, to the board of reference and control, by whom the 
formal promulgation of the awards and the distribution of 
the medals and diplomas shall be made with appropriate 
ceremonies." 
It is my opinion, therefore, that you are authorized to de-
liver the medals and diplomas to the executive committee, 
and that if the executive committee shall not be in session 
you are authorized to deliver them to the board of reference 
and control. This answers your second question. As I do 
not understand that you desire a meeting of the full Com-
mission to be called, unless that course is unavoidable, the 
answers to your second and third questions dispense with 
the necessity of answering your fifth question. 
The first and fourth questions substantially put the inquiry, 
whether you are authorized to distribute these medals and 
diplomas to the exhibitors without first actually delivering 
them to the World's Columbian Commission. This inquiry is 
suggested by certain provisions of the act of March 2, 1895, 
chapter 189 (28 Stat., 928). The provisions referred to au-
thorize you to procure suitable cases for the medals, "and to 
pay for the same and also the expense of distributing said 
medals." They also authorize you to do certain work at the 
public expen e upon the diplomas. You are not directed to 
provide for the expense of distributing the diplomas. I do 
not think that these statutory provisions authorize you to 
di regard the ommittee appointed by the World's Colum-
bian ommi ion and deal yourself directly with the exhib-
itor . our :fir t and fourth que tion, are th refore answered 
. fi 11 w : That ou may make delivery to the World o-
m mi ·i n hrough it duly authorized agencie 
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above mentioned, but that you have no authority to make 
distribution to the exhibitors directly. 
I return herewith the amended by-laws and the December 
minutes of the executive committee; also the letters received 
by you from .the acting chairman of the executive committee 
on awards and from the president of the World's Columbian 
Commission. 
Very respectfully, 
EDWARD B. WHITNEY, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
The Attorney-General can give no opinion upon a case not actually 
arising in the Department the head of which requests the opinion. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 7, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of September 5, with inclosures, asking my official 
opinion concerning the ownership of certain machinery 
located in the sugarhouse of the Audubon Park Sugar 
School, at New Orleans, La. It appears that this machinery 
was paid for out of moneys of the United States, by author-
ity of the then Oommissioner of Agriculture, in 1888, but 
that it is not in your possession or control. It is in the 
hands of some person or corporation not connected with 
the United States Government. It further appears that, 
believing the title to this machinery to be in the United 
States, you have sold it at public auction, and that the pur-
chase moneys have been paid and are in the Treasury. The 
persons in possession of the machinery refuse to deliver 
it, claiming that it has become their property by gift from 
the United States or otherwise. I do not see that there 
is any official action which you can take in the premises. 
The question is at present one between the purchasers 
and the persons in possession. If any claim is made against 
the United States it will not be presented to your Depart-
ment. Under these circumstances, it is not a question upon 
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which the Department of Justice can officially advise yon. 
(20 Opin., 724.) 
Very respectfully, 
EDW A.RD B. WHITNEY, 
Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRE'.I.'ARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
When an opinion is desired by the head of a Department a statement 
of facts upon which th,l question arises must be submitted. The 
Attorney-General can not investigate the papers for the purpose of 
ascertaining these facts. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 10, 1895. 
Sm: Your indorsement upon the :file of papers of the War 
Department transmitted to me, in which you request an 
opinion ''whether the amount can be paid as recommended 
by the Board in their report of August 15, 1895, herewith, 
attention being especially invited to the written views of the 
Judge-Advocate-General and to the preceding remarks of 
the Chief of Engineers," was to-day received. 
It has been uniformly held by my predecessors that, when 
an opinion is desired by the head of a Department, a state-
ment of the facts upon which the question arises must be 
submitted. The Attorney-General can not investigate the 
papers for the purpose of ascertaining these facts. (12 Opin., 
206; 14 Opiu., ,'367; 19 Opin., 396-467, 696; 20 Opin., 270, 
493, 526, 711.) 
I re pectfully return the file and request that you will for-
mulate the fact and state the questions of law upon which 
you wi h an opinion. 
Re pectfully, 
Tb ECRETA.RY OF WAR. 
HOLMES OONRA.D, 
A cting A ttornezJ- General. 
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COMPTROLLER OF 'fHE TREASURY. 
Whether certain expenses of the Department of Agriculture are payable 
from a certain appropriation for that Department is a question which 
should have been addressed to the Comptroller of the Treasury. 
DEPARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
September 14, 1895. 
SIR: Replying to your request of September 3, for my 
official opinion whether certain expenses are payable from 
your appropriation for the distribution of seeds, I beg to say 
that your question comes within the rule and not within the 
exception stated by my predecessor (20 Opin., 655; 21 Opin., 
178, 183, 188) and should, therefore, be addressed to the 




The SECRE1'ARY OF AGRICUL'l'URE. 
SECRETARY OF WAR. 
The Secretary of War, under the river and harbor act of August 18, 
1894, and the act of April 24, 1888, has full authority to condemn 
whatever land may be needed for the construction of the boat railway 
provided for in the former act. 
If a change in the location of au existing railway is a necessity in the 
building of said boat railway, the acquisition by the Secretary of 
War of the necessary land to make such change is merely an incident 
to the enterprise intrusted to him. 
DEP ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
September 14, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the 
letter of the Acting Secretary of War of July 9, with the ac-
companying papers, upon which my opinion is asked whether, 
on the facts and circumstances shown thereby, you have 
authority, without further legislation, to acquire by condem-
nation the right of way for the boat railway provided for in 
the river and harbor act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 359). 
It appears that the right of way required for such boat rail . 
way crosses or encroaches at several points upon the right 
of way of the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, 
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now actually occupied in the operation of its railway; that 
said company is willing that such portions of its right of way 
may be taken on condition that it be furnished by the Govern-
ment with sufficient space to change the location of its rail-
way without impairing its continuity, and that such change 
be made without cost to it. 
You suggest a doubt, raised by the letter of the United 
States attorney which you inclose, as to your right, under 
existing laws, to condemn the land required for such changes 
in the line of said company's railway. 
I do not think any further legislation is required, or is 
possible. You have full authority under the act referred to 
and that of .April 24, 1888 (25 Stat., 94), to condemn what-
ever land may be needed for the construction of the boat 
railway. You state that it is impracticable to operate such 
railway with crossings of any other line, and that the pro-
posed location is required. The change in the location of 
the existing railroad is therefore a necessity in the building 
of the boat railway, and your apquisitiou of the necessary 
land to make such change is merely an incident to the enter-
prise intrusted to you. If it be not such incident, and there-
fore included within your present authority, I do not see how 
authority can be given you, because Congress has no right 
to condemn the property required upon any other theory 
than its necessity for the prosecution of your work. 
The statement and proof of the above facts and necessity 
in the application for condemnation of the laud will, in my 
judgment, give the court fuH authority to appropriate the 
land needed. 
If you desire to make the arrangement suggested with 
the railroad company, and institute condemnation proceed-
ing for the lands hown by the plat submitted to me, I will, 
if you de ir it, end additional in tructfous to the United 
States attorn y. 
Re p ctfully, 
J DSO HARMON. 
h F AR. 
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APPROPRIATION-DAMAGES. 
The appropriation by the act of March 2, 1895, for raising the height of 
the dam at Great :Falls, and for damages on account of flooding of 
land and other damages, was intended to cover all damages that might 
result from raising the dam 2½ feet higher than bad been contemplated 
under the act of July 15, 1882. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 14, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of September 12, relating to the expenditure of the appropria-
tion by act of Congress approved March 2, 1895, "for raising 
the height of the dam at Great Falls, together with the cost 
of such other work as may be found necessary in connection 
therewith, including the cost of strengthening the conduit, 
and for damages on account of flooding of land and other 
damages." 
I have considered the matter quite thoroughly and have 
examined the papers accompanying your communication, 
and am of opinion that the amount of $12,300 appropriated 
by the act approved July 15, 1882, was intended to cover 
the damages likely to result from raising the embankment 
between the Potomac River and the canal to the height at 
that time contemplated; and that the sum of $15,000 recom-
mended by the commission consisting of an officer of the 
Corps of Engineers and the engineer selected by the canal 
authorities to "report in regard to the damage that would . 
probably be sustained by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
by raising the W ashingtou .Aqueduct dam at Great Falls 
2½ feet" was inMnded to cover all the damages that might 
result from raising the dam 2½ feet higher than had been 
contemplated under the act approved July 15, 1882. 
The suggestion that the actual amount of the damages 
resulting from increasing the height of the dam 2½ feet can 
only be determined by waiting until injuries are actually 
inflicted does not commend itself as altogether practicable; 
and the suggestion of the Chief of Engineers, that "an ounce 
of prevention is better than a pound of cure," is approved 
by all past experience. 
I am of opinion, on the whole case as presented, that the 
Department is authorized to pay the $15,000 as recommended 
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by the commission and the Chief of Engineers from the 
money appropriated by the act of March 2, 1895. The in- . 




Solicitor- General . 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-ILLEGALLY STRETCHING WIRES. 
The stretching of wires without authority across the Iowa resel'.vation 
in the District of Columbia is governed by section 1818 of the Revised 
Statutes, and should be brought to the attention of the Secretary of 
the Interior. 
DEP ARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE, 
September 16, 1895. 
Sm: In reply to the question whether or not the Chief of 
Engineers is authorized to cut down wires stretched, without 
authority, across the Iowa reservation in the District of 
Columbia, and which was erected in the absence of the 
watchman, my opinion is that section 1818 of the Revised 
Statutes, which provides that '' the Secretary of the Interior 
is directed to prevent the improper appropriation or occu-
pation of any of the public streets, avenues, squares, or 
reservations in the city of W asbington, belonging to the 
United States, and to reclaim the same if unlawfully appro-
priated," governs in this case, and that this is a proper 




The SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR. 
ATTOR EY-GENERAL-DUTIE 
n opinion whi h ould have been a ked of the Comptroller of the 
Trea ur. j giv n by the ttornoy- 'en ral, it appearing that the 
qu tion i on of importance, and the omptroller joins in request-
in the opinion. 
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Cases stated in which duties can be refunded to the importer on the 
ground that they were collected by mistake. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 21, 1895. 
SIR: Your communication of September 10 asks an official 
opinion as to your power to refund customs duties in certain 
cases. 
This question, like other questions involving the right to 
disburse moneys, is one which belongs more properly to the 
sphere of the Comptroller of the Treasury since the act of 
July 31, 1894, chapter 174, section 8, and hence Attorney-
General Olney declined to answer it. (21 Opin., 188.) Mr. 
Olney bad, however, held that this Department might prop-
erly still consider questions of this class "in matters of great 
importance" (21 Opin., 179), and did so in one case, where 
the Comptroller himself joined in asking the opinion (21 
Opin., 183). His rulings in this regard have been approved 
by the present Attorney-General in an opinion rendered to 
the Secretary of Agriculture September 14, 1895. In sending 
the question here a second time, however, you state that the 
Comptroller advises you that under the circumstances the 
opinion of this Department will be followed by him. As 
the question is one of importance, and the Comptroller thus 
joins in asking that it be answered here, I proceed to its 
consideration on the merits. 
It appears that certain goods which were dutiable, accord-
ing to the rulings of your Department, under the tariff act 
of 1894, were actually subjected by the customs officials to 
higher rates of duty under the tariff act of 1890. The 
importers protested against this exaction, but their protests 
were insufficient, as held by the Board of General Apprais-
ers, in one case for insufficiency of specification, in the other 
for delay in filing. 
You now ask whether you have the power to refund the 
excess of duties, notwithstanding that no lawful protests 
were filed by the importers. 
Sections 3012½ and 3013 of the Revised Statutes have been 
repealed, but the act of .March 3, 1875, chapter 136, is still 
in force (21 Opin., 153), and, with the customs administrative 
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act of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, contains all of our legisla-
tion upon the subject of refunds for error in imposition of 
duties. 
The cases in which you il,re authorized to make such 
refunds, in the absence of a proper protest, are the follow-
ing. First, when the duties as provisionally :fixed and paid 
upon entry of the goods, called "unascertained duties," are 
reduced upon the :final liquidation (Oust. Adm. Act', sec. 24); 
second, for mere clerical error (id.); third, for "errors of 
fact." (Act of 1875, sec. 1.) The latter provision, in my 
opinion, refers to mistakes of fact in the meaning of the 
common law-that is, to mutual mistakes of fact-a mistake 
of fact on the Government's part alone being provided for 
elsewhere in the section last cited, under the name of '' an 
erroneous view of the facts in the case." In the latter con-
tingency the importer can ask for a refund only when he 
duly protested. This construction of the act of 1875 gives 
effect to all of its somewhat obscure provisions. A mistake 
of the customs officials, duly pointed out by the importer in 
his protest, may be remedied, if a mistake of law, after the 
importer's position has been sustained by a judicial decision. 
It may be remedied, if a mistake of fact, when a reexamina-
tion of the goods satisfies the Secretary that the officials 
were mistaken. For a mutual mistake of law, the importer 
has no remedy. For a mutual mistake of fact, he may have a 
remedy if he discovers the mistake within one year from the 
payment of the duties, and brings it to the notice of the 
collector within ten days after its discovery. 
As these importers come within none of the classes above 
mentioned, the mistake being a mistake of law, not duly 
protested against, your question must be answered in the 
negative. 
Very re pect fully, 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
A cting A ttorney- General. 
Th E RE TA.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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COLLISIONS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The provision of section 4234, Revised Statutes, requiring sailing ves-
sels to show a lighted torch on the approach of any steam vessel dur-
ing the nighttime, was not repealed by section 3 of the act of February 
19, 1895. 
Repeals by implication are permitted only in cases of absolute incon-
sistency. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 25, 1895. 
SIR: In a letter of 12th instant you ask my opinion 
whether the provision of section 4234, requiring saning ves-
sels to show a lighted torch on the approach of any steam 
vessel during the nighttime, was repealed by section 3 of 
the act of February 19, 1895, which reenacts portions of 
section 4234, but omits that relating fo torches. 
I have the honor to say that in my opinion there was no 
such repeal. 
Section 4234 is part of the general chapter 5 relating to 
navigation, and providing rules for preventing collisions, to 
be observed by American vessels on all waters. August 19, 
1890, an act was passed (26 Stat., 320) making regulations 
for preventing collisions, to be observed by American ves-
sels on the high seas and connecting waters. This act was 
passed pursuant to a plan for the adoption of a common 
code of regulations by maritime nations, and therefore sec-
tion 3 provided that it should take effect at a time to be fixed 
by the President's proclamation. Such proclamation has not 
been issued, and the act, therefore, is not yet in force. 
Congress, however, anticipating that such proclamation 
would be issued on or before March 1, 1895, passed two acts, 
which, with that of 1890, would cover the various navigable 
waters formerly dealt with together in the general chapter 
on navigation. 
The first was that of February 8, 1895 (28 Stat., 645) pro-
viding rules for preventing collisions, to be observed by 
American vessels "upon the Great Lakes and their connect-
ing and tributary waters as far east as Montreal." It was 
made to take effect on and after March 1, 1895. 
The other was that of February 19, 1895, to which you 
refer (28 Stat., 672), which covered "harbors, rivers, and 
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inland waters of the United States, except the Great Lakes 
and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as 
Montreal," and is stated in the caption to be supplementary 
to the act of August 19, 1890, above mentioned. Article 30 
of the act of 1890 ha.d provided for special rules for harbors, 
etc., and the act of February 19, 1895, undertook to provide 
these on and after March 1, 1895, by adopting as such spe-
cial rules the provisions of certain sections of the Revised 
Statutes which are mentioned by number and include 4233, 
but not 4234. In section 3 the first part of the first sentence 
of section 4234, requiring all sailing vessels to be furnished 
with proper signal lights, is literally quoted, but the last 
part of the sentence, requiring the showing of a lighted 
torch, is omitted. The last sentence of section 4234, provid-
ing the penalty, is also repeated, changing the expression 
'' navigated without complying with the provisions of this 
and the preceding sections" to "navigated without comply-
ing with the statutes of the United States or the regulations 
that may be lawfully made thereunder." 
The act of August 19, 1890, section 2, repeals all laws and 
parts of laws inconsistent with its own provisions, but such 
repeal, even if it applied to section 4234 in so far as that sec-
tion relates to harbors, has not taken effect. 
The act of February 8, 1895, likewise repeals all laws and 
parts of laws inconsistent therewith, so far as applicable to 
the navigation of the Great Lakes, etc. 
The act of February 19, 1895, contains no express repeal 
in any form. 
This state of legislation is novel, and the question presented 
is not easy to answer, but in view of the established rules 
which permit the declaration of repeals by implication only 
in case of absolute inconsistency (3 Howard, 646; 16 Peters, 
362), section 4234 can not be held to be repealed, and its pro-
vi ion therefore applied to the case of the schooner Wm. A. 
teelm,an in the harbor of Baltimore, to which your question 
relate . 
pe tfully, 
J DSO II.A.RMO . 
Th ETA.RY OF 'l'HE TRE URY. 
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DUTIES. 
21 Opinions, 110, reaffirmed as to drawback of duties on lead in imported 
silver ores. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1'ICE, 
September 25, 1895. 
SIR: You were advised (21 Opin., 110) that lead made in 
this country in a smelter from a mixture of domestic and 
imported silver lead ores was not entitled, upon exportation, 
to any drawback under section 25 of the tariff act of 1890, 
chapter 1244, because that part of the lead which came from 
the imported ore did not so appear that its quantity or 
measure could be ascertained in the method contemplated 
by that act. 
Your letter of September 19 inquires whether "white 
lead'; (carbonate of lead) manufactured in the United States 
from pig lead produced as aforesaid is entitled, on exporta-
tion, to drawback under the section above named or under 
section 22 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894, chapter 349. 
You do not state the ingredients of this manufacture other 
than lead, and I understand your question to be whether 
any drawback can be allowed by reason of the existence of 
product of foreign ore in the lead of which the manufactured 
article is partly composed. The reasons given in the opin-
ion above cited fully cover the case now presented, which is 
really the same in another form. I therefore answer no. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF 1'HE TREASURY. 
EXPORTS-MEAT-INSPECTION. 
An act of Congress providing for the inspection of beef intended for 
exportation, and that no clearance shall be given to any vessel having 
on board for exportation uninspected beef, does not authorize the 
making of a regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring that 
meats other than beef products shall be so marked as to show the spe-
cies of animal from which it was produced, classifying all unmarked 
packages of meats as nninspected beef, and refusing clearance to ves-
sels having on board such unmarked pac_kages. 
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DEP ..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 28, 1895. 
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of September 19, 1895, inclosing a copy of an "Order 
concerning the exportation of meat," of August 28, 1891, and 
asking whether or not that portion of the regulation requir-
ing the marking of packages of meats other than beef prod-
ucts, providing for classifying such unmarked packages as 
uninspected beef, and the refusal of clearance because of the 
assumption that such unmarked packages contain unin-
spected beef, is consistent with the law. 
The regulation in question is as follows: 
"It is ordered that from and after September 16, 1895, all 
beef offered for transportation, whether fresh, salted, canned, 
corned, or p~cked, shall be accompanied by a certificate 
showing t,hat the cattle from which it was produced were 
free from disease and the meat sound and wholesome, by an 
inspector of this Department. And in order that it may be 
determined whether all beef has been so inspected and found 
to be wholesome, it is further ordered that the meat of all 
other species of animals which for ariy reason does not bear 
the inspection tags and stamps of this Department, shall be 
packed in barrels, cases, or other packages, which are legibly 
marked in such manner as to clearly indicate the species of 
animal from which the meat was produced. Meat which is 
not so marked, and which is not accompanied by a certificate 
of inspection, will be classed as uninspected beef and will 
not be allowed exportation. 
"Notice is hereby given to exporters of meat, whether said 
meat is fresh, salted, canned, corned, packed, or otherwise 
prepared, and to owners and agents of vessels upon which 
aid meat is exported, that no clearance can be given to any 
ves el having on board said meat until the provisions of this 
ord r are omplied with." 
Thi order is ba d on ection 2 of the act approved March 
2 1 95 (2 tat., 7 ..,), which i a follow : 
That th e r tary of griculture shall al o cau e to be 
d areful in p tion of all Ii e cattle the meat of which, 
h It I, cauu d orned, packed, cured, or otberwi e 
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prepared, is intended for exportation to any foreign country, 
at such times and places and in such manner as he may think 
proper, with a view to ascertain whether said cattle are free 
from disease and their meat sound and wholesome, and may 
appoint inspectors who shall be authorized to give an official 
certificate clearly stating tlie condition in which such cattle 
and meat are found, and no clearance shall be given to any 
vessel having on board any fresh, salted, canned, corned, or 
packed beef being the meat of cattle killed after the passage 
of this act for exportation to and sale in a foreign country 
from any port in the United States until the owner or ship-
per shall obtain from an inspector appointed under the pro-
visions of this act a certificate that said cattle were free from 
disease and that their meat is sound and wholesome." 
This section relates alone to live cattle and the meat of 
cattle. 
Any reasonable regulation affecting these and these alone 
is authorized by the statute. 
However desirable it might be to effect the object of the 
statute, this result can not be reached by regulating com-
merce in respect of commodities not embraced in the statute. 
The fact that the purpose of the statute may practically 
fail of realization, unless the regulations be extended to 
other articles of commerce, would be no warrant for such 
extension. 
The order in question, for the purpose of identifying the 
products of cattle, directs that meat of all other species of 
animals shall be marked in such manner as to clearly indi-
cate the species of animal from which the meat was produced. 
Thus, in aid of the regulation of commerce in beef, and to 
give practical effect to the inspection provided for, jurisdic-
tion is assumed over other meats not embraced in the statute. 
On the same principle an order might be made regulating 
the marking of all other artic]es of commerce contained in 
barrels, cases, or other packages, and on the ground that 
this is necessary for the purpose of segregating and ide~ti-
fying the beef, so that the rule not permitting a vessel hav-
ing on board beef, unaccompanied by a proper certificate, to 
clear could be enforced. 
This is an extreme illustration, and I do not mean to 
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suggest that there is any probability of such an extension, 
but it tests the soundness of the regulation in question . 
. The provision in question, coupled with the restriction 
upon the clearance of vessels, is a regulation affecting com-
merce in respect of commodities not controlled by the statute. 
Under it a vessel having no beef on board, but other meat, 
could not clear unless such meats were marked as provided 
for in this order. 
I am of the opinion that the provision in question is not 
warranted by the statute. 
This opinion does not cover by implication the question of 
your authority to make regulations affecting the clearance 
of vessels, as the proposition presented in your letter did 
not necessarily involve that issue. 
Respectfully, _ 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
DUTIES.:_DELIVERY TO IMPORTERS. 
After the duty on imported goods which have been deposited in a 
private bonded warehouse has been paid and a withdrawal permit 
issued, the Government has no further concern with the goods, and 
the right to withhold or deliver same rests with the warehouseman 
alone. 
The collector of customs has no authority to interfere or direct the United 
States storekeeper to interfere in a controversy between the importers 
and the warehouseman and deliver the goods. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE7 
September 28, 1895. 
Sm: Yours of September 23 states the following facts: 
Importers of whisky deposited it in a private bonded ware-
hou e under the provisions of sections 2961 and 2962, Revised 
Statutes, taking a negotiable warehouse receipt therefor, 
which they afterwards pledgea to a bank. The importers 
having afterwards paid the duties, the collector issued to 
them a withdrawal permit, which they filed with the United 
Stat toreke r in such warehouse, but allowed the whi ky 
iro ided in Revi ed Statutes, section 2977. 
hi ky a o tored, all dutie paid, the bank 
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sent the warehouse receipt, indorsed in blank, to the ware-
houseman, directing him to deliver ten barrels which had 
been sold by the owner, and to return the receipt after 
indorsing such delivery thereon. The warehouseman deliv-
ered the ten barrels, and claims that he mailed the receipt to 
the bank with such delivery indorsed thereon, but the bank 
claims it never arrived. The importers having, with the 
consent of the bank, sold other portions of the whisky, the 
warehouseman refuses to deliver unless the importers either 
produce the warehouse receipt or give a bond of indemnity. 
The importers have thereupon applied to the collector of 
customs requesting him to direct the storekeeper to deliver 
the whisky, in which request the bank has joined. 
You ask my opinion whether, in view of these facts, your 
Department, "having issued the delivery permit, can law-
fully direct the delivery of the whisky as requested, in the 
absence of said warehouse receipt." 
When imported goods are deposited in a private bonded 
warehouse they are in the joint custody of the United States 
storekeeper and the warehouseman, as expressly provided 
in Revised Statutes, 2960. The custody of the former is to 
secure the Government's rights. The custody of the latter 
is to secure his own. Neither is concerned with the origin 
or enforcement of the rights of the other, and neither may 
interfere with the custody of the other. As the custody is 
joint, action of both custodians is required for delivery. In 
the case put, all duties having been paid and the delivery 
permit issued, the Government has no further concern with 
the whisky, and the right to deliver or withhold delivery 
rests with the warehouseman alone. The collector of cus-
toms has no authority to take any further action in the mat-
ter or to interfere or direct the storekeeper to interfere in the 
controversy between the importers and the warehouseman. 
You also refer me to the letter of the collector and that of 
counsel for the bank, which you inclose, in which attention 
is called to the hardship resulting to the importers by reason 
of Revised Statutes, section 934, which forbids the replevin 
of the whisky. The collector well says: "As a matter of 
administration, the presence of sheriff's officers in Govern-
ment warehouses where large quantities of dutiable goods 
234 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
Seizure of Sealing Vessels-Liability for Wrongful Seizure. , 
are stored and where the Government's power should be 
paramount, would lead to constant complication and be a 
source of danger to the revenue." I beg to say, however, 
that in the case of a private bonded warehouse, where the 
custody is joint as above stated, the Government's custody, 
after all duties are paid and a withdrawal permit is issued, 
is merely nominal. The right to drawback in case of export, 
or refunder in case of destruction, to which the collector 
refers, which are secured by leaving the goods in the ware-
house, is waived when the owner demands delivery, and, the 
goods in that case being really detained by the warehouse-
man and not by the Government, it is open to question 
whether section 934 applies. I see no reason why you may 
not instruct the collector to waive objections to replevin in 
this instance so that the parties may be free to settle their con-
troversy in the courts. But any question which may arise 
as to the effect of such waiver can also be there determined. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
SEIZURE OF SE.A.LING VESSELS-LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL 
SEIZURE. 
British sealing schooners, having on board prohibited and unsealed 
firearms, together with a large number of seal skins, were seized by 
American cruisers in Bering Sea and the Nortlt Pacific Ocean for 
alleged violations of the laws for the preservation of fur seals passed 
in pursuance of the award of the tribunal of arbitration at Paris and 
delivered to British naval officers, with a written statement of the 
facts upon which the seizures bad been made, but which did not spe-
cifically assert that seals bad been taken contrary to law, which offi-
cer , without in anywise invoking the action of the courts, released 
them, having reached the conclusion, after investigation and legal 
advice, that no case could be made out against them. The Briti h 
Government presented claim for damages on account of such seizure . 
Held: 
1. That nothing in the British statut or in the orders and instructions 
i ued for th due execution thereof require any formal charge by 
officer making eizures. n indorsem nt of the grounds upon which 
they were eized on th c rtifi.cate of th ve els is required to enable 
th e ls t pr eed to port f r trial. 
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2. The mode provided by the Bering Sea award act for dealing with 
vessels so seized is to subject them to legal proceedings in the British 
courts. Delivery to the naval authorities in place of the judicial 
authorities was merely for convenience, and not for the purpose of 
dispensing with legal proceedings or for a trial by such naval author-
ities instead. 
3. A naval officer to whom delivery is made of a vessel seized under the 
provisions of the treaty has no authority to investigate the seizure or 
release the vessel. 
4. There being nothing in the acts of either country about liability for 
wrongful seizures, if such liability exists it is governed by the well-
settled principles of law common to both countries relative to such 
liability. 
5. The right to seize, conferred by the acts of both countries, was not 
limited to vessels caught in the act. In all other cases action must 
depend upon evidence and indications. In any case where reasonable 
grounds for the seizure are shown there is no liability for damages on 
account of such seizure. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 3, 1895. 
SIR: In the matter of the claims presented by the British 
Government for damages on account of the seizure by United 
States cruisers of the British sealing schooners Wanderer and 
Favorite, I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested 
by your letter of September 27. 
It appears from the letters of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to yourself, dated June 12 and September 24, which you 
inclose, that these schooners were seized by American 
cruisers, one in the North Pacific Ocean June 9, 1894, the 
other in Bering Sea August 24, 1894, and delivered to 
British naval officers with a written statement of the facts 
upon which the seizures had been made, which officers, 
without in anywise invoking the action of the courts, 
released them, having reached the conclusion, after investi-
gation and upon legal advice, "that no case could be made 
out against them." 
The British naval officers in releasing the schooners appar-
ently proceeded on the theory that they were invested with 
the authority of an ordinary examining magistrate or court 
to determine whether the accused vessels should be sub-
jected to regular judicial inquiry or not. So acting, they 
seem to have held that the statements of the United States 
commanders, as well as the facts developed by their own 
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investigation, failed to show even probable cases of violation 
of the laws for the preservation of the fur seals passed in 
pursuance of the award of the tribunal of arbitration at 
Paris under the treaty between _the United States and Great 
Britain concluded at Washington February 29, 1892. (See 
act of Parliament, April 23, 1894, 57 Viet., chap. 2, 31 L. R. 
Stat., 4.) 
The statements made and delivered by the United States 
officers were to the effect that prohibited and unsealed fire-
arms, together with large numbers of seal skins, were found 
on board the seized schooners. In the case of the Wanderer, 
at least, there were other circumstances of suspicion, such as 
evasion and concealment. The alleged defects in these state-
ments were that they merely set forth as grounds of seizure 
the facts above stated, but did not specifically assert that 
seals had actually been taken contrary to law. In other 
words, considering the statements as pleadings, they set 
forth mere evidence and not the ultimate fact. 
• I find nothing in the British statutes, or in the orders and 
instructions ·issued for the due execution thereof, which 
requires any formal charge by officers making seizures. 
"An indorsement of the grounds on which it was seized" on 
the certificate of the vessel is required when it is returned, 
to enable the vessel to proceed to port for trial. (57 Viet., 
chap. 2, sec. 2 (1).) Section 12 of the act of Congress 
authorizing seizures of .American ships by British officers 
provides for the delivery with the ship of "any witnesses 
and proofs on board." ( Act approved April 6, 1894, 28 
Stat., 52.) The instructions of the Secretary of the Navy 
to the commander of the United States naval force in Bering 
Sea, dated May 4, 1894, a copy of which was sent by the 
Seer tary of State to the British minister (Senate Ex. Doc. 
67, Fif y-thir<.l Congres , third session, p. 124), required 
th ·ommandillg officer making the seizure to draw up a 
d claration in writing and deliver the ame with the ves el, 
wheth r uch delivery bou1d be made to Briti h or meri-
can auth ritie (id., 126). I have found no imilar require-
m nt in the Briti ha t, order in council, or in truction and 
b declaration directed by the instruction to American 
ollic r' w re m r ly int nded to carry out ection 12 of the 
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act of Uongress. These, as well as the indorsement on 
the certificate above mentioned, were manifestly required, 
not for t.he purpose of justifying the seizures to other naval 
officers to whom delivery might be made, but to indicate evi-
dence for use in the courts, where proper charges would be 
formulated from the evidence produced. As all seizures are 
to be made by naval officers and the vessels seized delivered 
to other naval officers, when not taken direct to the judicial 
authorities, it could not have been expected that the niceti~s 
of legal procedure should be observed in such statements. 
The authority of American cruisers to seize British ships 
is found in the act of Parliament above cited and in the 
orders in council authorized thereby, which bear date April 
30, 1894. Section 1 of such orders provides that American 
officers may "seize and detain any British vessel which .has 
become liable to be forfeited to Her Majesty under the pro-
visions of the recited act, and may bring · her for adjudica-
tion before any such British court of admiralty as is referred 
to in section 103 of 'The merchant shipping act, 1854' (which 
section is set out in the second schedule to the recited act), 
or may deliver her to any such British officer as is mentioned 
in the said section for the purpose of being dealt with pur-
suant to the recited act." 
The mode provided by the Bering Sea award act for deal-
ing with vessels so seized is to subject them to legal proceed-
ings in the British courts (second schedule, section 103). 
Section 2 of said orders in council, which relates to the 
conduct of British cruisers seizing American vessels, pro-
vided that" such officer, after seizing and detaining a ship 
of the United States in exercise of the said powers, shall take 
her for adjudication before a court of the United States 
having jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter, or deliver her 
to any naval or revenue officer or other authorities of the 
United States." While it is not explicitly stated, it is mani-
fest that the intention was to substitute delivery to the 
naval authorities of the country to which the vessel belongs 
in place of delivery to its judicial authorities, merely for con-
venience and not for the purpose of dispensing with legal 
proceedings or having a trial by such naval authorities 
instead. Such delivery is a mere transfer of custody. 
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The law of each country requires tbat its vessels, when 
seized by its own cruisers, shall be brought into court for 
adjudication ( second schedule, act of Congress, supra, secs. 
9 and 11), and intended to give to the cruisers of the other 
country the same rights given those of its own. (Act of 
Parliament, 3 (3); act of Congress, sec.12.) 
It may be suggested that the commander of a cruiser con-
ducts an investigation in deciding whether to seize or not to 
seiz~, and further, that after seizure he may revoke his decision 
and release. But two things would prevent the conclusion 
that a naval officer, to whom delivery is made of a vessel seized 
under the provisions of the treaty, has power either to review 
or to investigate anew. One is the spirit of comity shown by 
the acts of both countries which requires a construction 
thereof not inconsistent with mutual confidence and respect. 
The other is that the power of British officers receiving seized 
vessels from American cruisers is expressly limited to bring-
ing them in to court for adjudication. ( Orders in council, sec.1, 
second schedule, Bering Sea award act, sec.103.) 
Nothing is said in the act of either country about liability 
for wrongful seizures. If it be conceded, upon principles of 
comity or otherwise, that such liability was contemplated, it 
must be assumed that both countries had in mind the well-
settled principles of the law common to both relative to such 
liability. 
While the acts of both countries are, of course, directed 
only against actual cases of unlawful seal :fishing, it would 
be absurd to limit the right of sefaure thereby conferred 
upon each other's crujsers to vessels caught in the act. In 
all other cases action must depend upon evidence and iudi-
~ation . This wa recognized by the authorities of both 
ountries. See instructions of Secretary of the Navy ( supra, 
p. 126), which adopts from "Instructions to British cruj ers 
a to eizur " ent by the British minister to the Secretary of 
tate ( enat E . Doc., supra, 116) the following: "Whether 
the s I has been engaged in hunting you must judge from 
the pre ence of seal skin or bodie of seals on board, and 
th r ircum tan e and indication ." The po sibility of 
mi ake in uch ca e i well known. Certainly it could not 
ha e been intended by Great Britain to have liability for 
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wrongful seizures by American officers depend upon any 
different rules from those expressly made applicable to sei-
zures by its own. These are merely the rules of the common 
law in the analogous case of groundless arrest or prosecution 
by the civil authorities. There is no liability in any case 
where reasonable grounds for the seizure are shown, even 
when the court has discharged the vessel. (Second schedule, 
supra, sec. 103.) 
Th~ schooners in question, having been seized by due 
authority, have never been lawfully discharged. It is not 
even suggested that the American officers who made the 
seizures did not act in good faith, and they seem to have 
acted on reasonable grounds of suspicion. My opinion, 
therefore, is that the Secretary of the Treasury is right in 
holding that there is no liability for damages on account of 
such seizures, assuming that there was, in. fact, no violation 
of law by either of the schooners seized. While voluntary 
release by the seizing officer might dispense with judicial 
discharge as one of the conditions of liability, this would 
result only because such release would be an admission of 
innocence. It will hardly be claimed that the release by 
British naval officers operated as an admission by the Amer-
ican officers who made the seizure. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.ARY OF S'l'.A'l'E. 
SEAL FISHERIES. 
Veesels engaged in fur-seal :fishing in other waters than those covered 
by the award of the Paris Tribunal and the act of Congress of April 
6, 1894, are not required to be licensed. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 4, 1895. 
Sm : I beg to say in reply to the letter of Acting Secretary 
W. E. Curtis, of October 3, that I think the construction 
your Department has placed upon tho articles of the award 
of the Paris Tribunal, and the act of Congress approved April 
6, 1894, to give effect thereto, is correct, and that licenses are 
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not required for vessels engaged in fur-seal :fishing in other 
waters than those covered by said award and act. Any 
doubt which there might be from the sections to which you 
refer seems to be removed by section 10, which recognizes 
both licensed and unlicensed vessels. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-MEMORIAL HALL AT WEST POINT. 
The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a matter not pending 
in the administration of a Department. 
The Attorney-General will not determine questions of fact. 
The method to be followed in selecting granite, marble, and plan and 
specifications for building a memorial hall at West Point. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 24, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours 
of the 21st instant, in the matter of the advertisement for 
the erection of a memorial hall at West Point, and to carry 
out the terms and conditions of the bequest made by Gen. 
George W. Cullum. 
Your :first question is as follows: 
"I. Is it necessary, under the act referred to, for a definite 
plan of the building and definite and certain specifications 
for the same to be absolutely determined upon by the board 
of trustees and approved by the Secretary of War before the 
advertising can be legally done 1" 
My opinion is that, if it would subserve the public interest, 
the board could adopt a definite plan, certain specifications, 
and an addendum with specifications certain in character, 
which may be, at the option of the board, substituted for 
p ification in the original plan particularly designated, 
and that, on the approval of said plan, specifications, and 
addendum by you, bid may be taken, and that then the 
board can adopt cle.finitely,from the original plans and speci-
fication and ub tituted peci:fi ation , a :fixed plan and 
for the building, and ·ubmit them for your 
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II. Inasmuch as you have rejected all of the bids made 
under the former advertisement, the second, third, and fourth 
questions submitted by you do not arise in a matter now 
pending in the administration of your Department, and they 
are therefore not such questions as can be submitted to the 
Attorney-General for his opinion. 
III. The fifth question is substantially answered in the 
answer to the first question. 
IV. The sixth question is as follows: 
"Should a considerable item of the building which is pat-
ented and controlled by a single person, .firm, or company, 
and which could be let in a separate contract, be advertised 
for separate from the rest of the building and let in a 
separate contracU" 
Whether or not this should be done involves the determina-
tion of questions of fact, in respect of which I can not express 
an opinion. I am of the opinion, however, that this could be 
done, and that such course would be legal. 
V. The seventh question is as follows: 
"Is it permissible to defer the selection of the particular 
kind of granite to be used until after the bids are opened 
and then select it by the samples presented by the bidders, 
or must the board, with the approval of the Secretary of War, 
determine in advance the particular kind of granite to 'be 
used; or that it would accept any one of a number of kinds 
to be named in the advertisement; or that it would accept 
any granite having color<>!'-' colors; and other qualities named 
or described or otherwise designated in the advertisementf" 
This also is a · mixed question of fact and law. If such 
procedure would be of any advantage to some bidders over 
others, it would not be lawful. It occurs to me that the safe 
way would be to designate certain fixed standards of granite 
and let each bidder bid upon these separate kinds, with the 
right to the board to make selection. 
I wish to call your attention to what seems to me to be an 
erroneous opinion on your part. 
On page 6 of your communication is the following: 
That the granite "is to be of the best quality of pink Mil-
ford, or other light-colored granUe equally satisfactory to the 
architeots and the bo~rd of trustees/' and that the m
0
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should '' be from either the Tuckahoe, Vermont, Lee, or Beaver 
Dam quarries, or other white marble equally satisfactory to 
the architect and the board of trustees,': 
You proceed upon the assumption that this language gives 
to the Government the right to select any other light-colored 
granite, or any white marble other than those specified, 
equally satisfactory to the archjtect and board of trustees. 
In my opinion, you would have a right to demand pink Mil-
ford granite or marble of the kinds designated, and if others 
than these should be tendered by'the contractor as a substi-
tute you could accept them; but I do not think you would 
have the right to demand any light-colored granite or any 
white marble other than those named. 
I return herewith the papers sent with your letter. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R. 
PARDON. 
Inasmuch a.s in some of the States a person convicted of an offense 
which the laws of the United States call a misdemeanor loses his 
right to vote, sit as juror, etc., if the action of the President on an 
application for a pardon depends simply on the question of necessity 
for pardon, such necessity exists, unless the applicant is to be pre-
vented from freely changing his residence under penalty of losing his 
rights of citizenship thereby. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 31, 1895. 
IR: I have investigated the question of the nece sity of 
a pardon in the ca e of Jacob Warren which you referred to 
me ye terday in connection with a letter from Judge Sage, 
of the nited State court for the outbern district of Ohio, 
and beg to report a follow : 
It i probably true that, owing to the language of the 
n titution and law of Ohio, Jacob Warren would not lose 
hi ri ·ht to vote, it a juror, etc., by reason of his convic-
tion fi ran offi n e whi h the law of the United tates call 
nor. n ome other States, however, such loss 
uld r ult. have not examined them all, but 
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this is true of Alabama, California, and Connecticut. If the 
case, therefore, be one in. which your action on the applica-
tion for pardon depends simply on the question of necessity 
for pardon, I should say that the necessity exists, unless 
Warren is to be prevented from freely changing his residence 





Dutiable articles purchased by the United States from the importers 
while in bond remain dutiable, and the duties must be paid before 
deliver y. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 2, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of October 25, asking an official opinion with relation to 
a recent purchase made by the Supervising Surgeon-General 
of the Marine-Hospital Service, who is an officer of your 
Department. It appears that he purchased certain goods 
for the use of that Service, after advertisement for proposals, 
and that the proposals specified that the price named was for 
the article "in bond." He now asks you to authorize the 
collector of customs to allow these goods to be delivered to 
him free of duty. They are goods which under ordinary 
circumstances would be dutiable. You ask whether you 
can lawfully give the authorization requested. 
The free list in the tariff act of July 14, 1870, chapter 255, 
contained the following paragraph: 
'' Articles imported for the use of the United States: Pro-
vided, That the price of the same did not include the duty." 
This provision remained in force until the tariff act of 
October 1, 1890, when it was entirely omitted. It was 
restored by the tariff act of August 27, 18.94, chapter 349, 
but with a material change of form. It now appears in the 
free list as paragraph 385, as follows: "Articles imported 
by the United States." · 
The answer to your question depends upon this clause, 
because the articles in question are not included among 
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those enumerated in the only other clause in the free list of 
the present act relating to things for Government use, viz, 
paragraph 412: 
"Books, engravings, photographs, etchings, bound or 
unbound, maps and charts, imported by the authority or for 
the use of the United States or for the use of the Library of 
Congress." 
This was also in the act of 1890, paragraph 5~4, and that 
of June 6, 1872, chapter 315. My opinion is that the present 
clause in the free list applies only to articles· which are pur-
chased by the Government in foreign markets and imported 
for its own use. You therefore can not lawfully give the 
desired authorization. This seems to dispose of the case 
before you and to avoid the necessity of considering the 
other que~tions in your letter. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PUBLIC WORKS-CONTRACTS. 
After an appropriation is exhausted, a contract not for the completion 
of any specific work, as the erection of a building, the construction of 
a road, or rendering a channel adequate for the passage of vessels of 
a certain draft, is at an end. Work done after the appropriation is 
exhausted would not come within such a contract. Executive officers 
a.re prohibited by sections 3679, 3732, 3733, and 5503, Revised Statutes, 
from continuing the employment of the contractors. If further 
appropriations are made, there must be a new contract for their 
expenditure. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 4, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of October 14, with its inclosures, referring 
to the contract of October 10, 1892, between Maj. A. N. 
Damrell, Corps of Engineer , United States Army, of the 
fir t part, and .1: c tional Dredging Company of the second 
I art and u ubmit for my pinion the foJlowing question : 
1. D h w 1k whi h the ational Dredging Company 
r po d com ithin their contract, 
If the work i wi bin th contract, can the Secretary 
th am a required by the contr~ct 
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without waiting for further appropriation to be made by 
Congress i" 
It ~ppears from your letter that-
"The National Dredging Company has notified the Secre-
tary of War that it elects to carry on the work of dredging 
in the Mobile Harbor, at Mobile, .A.la., under its contract 
hereinafter referred to, without waiting for an appropriation 
to be made by Congress to pay for the same, and respectfully 
asks the Secretary to supervise the same." 
It appears from the contract-
" That the party of the second part shall excavate, remove, 
and deposit, in accordance with specifications hereunto 
attached, 17,000,000 cubic yards, more or less, of material 
from Choctaw Pass ( commencing at the intersection of the 
channel by a line parallel to Maryland street, halfway be_ 
tween Texas and Maryland streets) and the channel below 
down to the 23-foot curve in the bay. 
'' That the party of the fi_rst part shall pay to the party of 
the second part for such excavating, removing, and deposit-
ing the sum of 7.7 cents per cubic yard." 
The legislation by Congress on the subject of this improve-
ment is as follows: 
.A.ct of June 18, 1878 (20 Stat., 152, chap. 264): "For the 
improvement of Mobile Harbor, $10,000, to be applied to 
making tests, surveys, and borings to determine whether the 
ship channel now leading from the lower anchorage in Mobile 
Bay can be deepened so as to admit vessels drawing 22 feet, 
or any less draft above 13 feet, to the wharves at the city of 
Mobile." 
.A.ct of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 370): "For improving 
Mobile Harbor, to secure a 17-foot channel, one hundred 
thousand dollars." 
Act of June 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 181): '' Improving harbor 
at Mobile, .Alabama: Continuing improvement, one hundred 
and twenty-five thousand dollars." 
.A.ct of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat., 470): "Improving harbor 
at Mobile, Alabama, one hundred thousand dollars." 
Act of August 2, 1882 (22 Stat., 194): "Improving harbor 
and river of Mobile, Alabama: Continuing improvement, one 
hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars." 
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Act of July 5·, 1884 (23 Stat., 135) : '' Improving harbor 
and river at Mobile, Alabama: Continuing improvement, 
two hundred thousand dollars." 
Act of August 5, 1886 (24 Stat., 314): "Improving harbor 
at Mobile, Alabama: Continuing improvement, ninety thou-
sand dollars." 
Act of August 11, 1888 (25 Stat., 404): "Improving 
harbor at Mobile, Alabama. Oontinuing improvement on 
enlarged project for securing a channel twenty-three feet 
deep and two hundred and eighty feet wide, two hundred and 
:fifty thousand dollars." 
Act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 431): "Improving 
harbor at Mobile, Alabama, up to the mouth of Chickasa-
bogue Creek. Continuing improvement, three hundred and 
:fifty thousand dollars." 
Act of July 13, 1892 (27 Stat., 92): "Improving harbor at 
Mobile, Alabama. Continuing improvement, two hundred 
and twelve thousand five hundred dollars. Provided, That 
contracts may be entered into by tlie Secretary of War for 
I 
such materials and work as may be necessary to complete 
the present project of improvement, to be paid for as appro-
priations may from time to time be made by law; not to 
exceed in the aggregate one million one hundred and eighty-
one thousand three hundred dollars, exclusive of the amount 
herein and heretofore appropriated." 
Act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 603) : "For improving 
harbor at Mobile, Alabama. Continuing improvement, :five 
hundred thousand dollars." 
Act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 342): "Harbor at Mobile, 
Alabama. The Secretary of War shall cause a survey to 
be made to ascertain the cost of widening the channel 
of said harbor now in course of improvement, to obtain ' a 
width of one hundred feet at the bottom, with a proper slope 
therefor, and also a survey to ascertain the best point for and 
the co t of a u:fficient channel between Mobile Bay and the 
Mi i ippi Sound for the proper accommodation of com-
m r · and the xpen e of said two urveys shall be paid 
out of any ar propriation made for the improvement of the 
ch nn 1 f Mobile Harbor. 
he r tar f War i authorized, at hi di cretion, to 
u e n t exc eding ten thousand dolJars of the amount appro-
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priated for the improvement of Mobile Harbor in keeping 
the channel clear of timber, logs, and other obstructions." 
Act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 404): '' For improving 
harbor at Mobile, .A.labama. Continuing improvement, three 
hundred and ninety thousand dollars." 
.Act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 947): "For improving 
harbor at Mobile, Alabama. Completing improvement, two 
hundred and ninety-one thousand three hundred dollars." 
It will be observed from this course of legislation that the 
first appropriation of June 18, 1878, was to ascertain whether 
the improvement then proposed was practicable and that 
the appropriations from that date to August 11, 1888, were 
for the_ purpose of constructing the improvement as then 
projected. 
The appropriation of August 11, 1888, was for "continuing 
improvement on enlarged project for securing a channel 23 
feet deep and 80 feet wide." 
On J nly 13, 1892, there was appropriated the sum of 
$212,500, with the proviso : 
"That contracts may be entered into by the Secretary 
of War for such materials and work as may be necessary to 
complete the present project of improvement, to be paid for 
as appropriations may from time to time be made by law; not 
to exceed in the aggregate one million one hundred and 
eighty-one thousand three hundred dollars, exclusive of the 
amount herein and heretofore appropriated." 
The amounts thereafter appropriated were as follows: 
March 3, 1893 _ ... ___ . _ .............•...•..••. ...•••..•.• _ . _ _ $500, 000 
August 18, 1894 .. ............•••............•••.....•.. _ .. _ . 390, 000 
March 2, 1895 - - - . _ . ...............••••...•.••••..••• ___ .. _. . 291, 300 
Making in the aggregate. _ ...•..•• _ ...• _ •.... ___ . _ . __ . 1, 181, 300 
which was the limit prescribed by the act of July 13, 1892. 
By section 3679, Revised Statutes, it is provided: " No 
Department of the Government shall expend in any one fiscal 
year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress 
for the fiscal year; or involve the Government for the future 
payment of money in excess of such appropriations." · 
By section 3732, Revised Statutes: "No contract or pur-
chase on behalf of the Unite~ States shall be made unless 
the same is authorized by law or is under an appropriation 
248 RON. HOLMES CONRAD. 
Public Works-Contracts. 
adequate to its fulfillment, except in the War and Navy 
Departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quar-
ters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the 
necessities of the current year." 
By section 3733, Revised Statutes: ~, No contract shall be 
entered into for the erection, repair, or furnishing of any 
public building, or for any public improvement which binds 
the Government to pay a larger sum of money than the 
amount in the Treasury appropriated for the specific purpose." 
Section5503: "Every officer of the Government who know-
ingly contracts, for the erection, repair, or furnishing of any 
public building, or for any public improvement, to pay a 
larger amount than the specific sum appropriated for such 
purpose shall be punished by imprisonment not less than 
six months, nor more than two years, and shall pay a fine of 
two thousand dollars." 
The object of these provisions of the statute was, it is 
manifest, to prevent executive officers from involving the 
Government in expenditures or liabilities beyond those con-
templated and authorized by the lawmaking power. 
In Shipman v. United States (18 C. Cls. R., 146) that court 
said: 
"The liability in this case rests wholly upon the appropri-
ation, and is different from those cases which frequently 
ari e wherein Congress passes an act authorizing officers to 
construct a building or do other specified work, without 
restriction as to cost, and then makes an appropriation inad 
equate to do the whole of it or makes none at an. 
"In such cases the authority to cause the work to be done 
and to make contracts therefor is complete and unrestricted. 
All work, therefore, done under the direction of the officers 
thu charged with thee ecution of the law creates a liability 
on the part of the Government to pay for it, and if a written 
contract be made and work be done in exce of the contract 
pecification , or entirely outside of or in addition to the 
writt n contract, and uch work inures to the benefit of the 
nit d tat in th e ecution of the law, or is accepted by 
h pr 1 r publi officer a promi e to pay its rea onable 
alue i implied and nforced. 
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".Authority to contract for the completion of an entire 
structure, the pla.n of which has been determined on, can not 
be inferred from the mere fact that an appropriation of a 
certain sum to be expended on the structure has been made. 
Hence, a contract, though it might be good to the extent of 
such appropriation, could not be made to affix itself to future 
appropriations and control their expenditure. A contract of 
this character would be in violation of the spirit of section 
3733, Revised Statutes, if not of its express terms." (15 
Opin . .Att'ys-Gen., 236.) 
"After an appropriation is exhausted the contract is at an 
end. If further appropriations are made there must be a 
new contract for their expenditure." (9 Opin., 18.) 
It is plain that the contract here is not for the completion 
of any specific work, as the erection of a building, the con-
struction of a road, or rendering a channel adequate for the 
passage of vessels of a certain draft. 
It is, by its very terms, for the excavation, removal, and 
deposit, in accordance with certain specifications, of 17,000,000 
cubic yards, more or less, of material, within certain pre-
scribed limits. 
The result anticipated by the engineer officers from such 
removal may wholly fail. The removal of the mass may 
prove to be a total loss to the Government; and yet the con-
tractor, not having contracted to produce any certain results 
by such removal, would be entitled to the full consideration 
contracted for. 
Indeed, it appears from the letter of October 8, 1895, from 
the Acting Chief of Engineers, accompanying your com-
munication, that to carry out fully the object for which the 
aggregate appropriations of $1,181,300 were made, it was 
found necessary to contract with another dredging company, 
to wit, the Rittenhouse-Moore Dredging Company, to exca-
vate, remove, and deposit material from another section of 
the channel in Mobile Harbor; and that officer quotes from 
the official report of Maj. A. N. Damrell, of the Corps of 
Engineers, as follows : 
''lt is, however, estimated that the amount of work in the 
bay (Choctaw Pass) would be about 17,000,000 yards; and 
that amount was placed in the wording of the contract, and 
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the words 'more or less' were added to cover this uncer-
tainty. Since then it has been found that the amount nec-
essary to complete the bay part of the project is about 
16,000,000 yards." 
I think, then, the true construction of the contract as to 
· the work to be performed by the contractors is that they 
were to excavate from Choctaw Pass, within the limits defined 
in the contract, material, 17,000,000 cubic yards, more or less. 
The contract was made October 10, 1892, and evidently on 
the basis and in full view of the act of July 13, 1892, which 
prescribed $1,181,300 as the limit of the amount to be 
expended on the entire project. 
It appears from your letter and the accompanying papers 
that the amount has now been appropriated and expended. 
I am of opinion on the whole case, as presented, that 
the contract of 10th of October, 1892, has been fully per-
formed, and that you are without authority to continue the 
employment of these contractors on the work under that 
contract. That the work which they propose to do does not 
'' come within their contract." That you can not, through the 
engineer officers of the Army, continue any supervision of 
the work of which the National Dredging Company may 
hereafter perform; or extend to that company any recogni-
tion as a continuing contractor with the Government with-
out exposing the Government to the liability of an implied 
contract. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R. 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
Acting ..Attorney-General. 
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Prior to the custon;is administration act duties collected by mistake of 
law could not be returned after one year from the time of entry in 
the absence of a protest by the importer under Revised Statutes, sec-
tion 2931. 
Opinion of September 21, 1895 (21 Opin., 224), reaffirmed that duties paid 
by mistake can now be refunded only (1) when duties provisionally 
paid are reduced upon the final liquidation; (2) for mere clerical error; 
(3) for mutual mistake of fact. 
DEP .A.RT~NT OF JUSTICE, 
November 8, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of October 31, asking my official opinion as to whether the 
decision ·of the United States district court for the eastern 
district of Pennsylvania in the suit .of the United States v. 
Alfred Earnshaw requires or authorizes you to refund to said 
Earnshaw certain moneys claimed by him as customs duties 
unlawfully exacted. If I understand the facts aright, cer-
tain goods were imported by Earnshaw in 1881, and the 
duties thereon, as provisionally estimated by the collector, 
were paid by him and the goods received. Supsequently 
the collector liquidated the entry by raising the amount of 
duties on the goods, thus leaving a balance due the United 
States, for which an action was brought. Upon the trial of 
this action a special verdict was rendered, upon which the 
court directed judgment for the defendant, holding the col-
lector's liquidation to be erroneous. The United States 
acquiesced in this decision. Hence, I assume, for present 
purposes, the duty properly payable by Earnshaw was less 
than the amount actually paid by him to the collector, and 
therefore, had he taken proper steps to protect his rights, 
he could have sued the collector for a balance of $291.60, 
and recovered this amount for him in an action at law, or he 
could properly have applied to your Department for a refund. 
He, however, failed to prote_st against the collector's deci-
sion as required by section 2931 of the Revised Statutes, and 
for this reason the collector's decision was "final and con-
clusive" against him. The decision of the court was, there-
fore, clearly erroneous. ( Westray v. United States, 18 Wall., 
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322; Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U. S., 542.) Whatever dis-
pensing power the Secretary of the Treasury may have had 
und.er section 3013 of t.be Revised Statutes expired after the 
lapse of one year from the time of entry under section 21 of 
the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapt~r 391. Nor has 
your power in the premises been increased by subsequent 
legislation. Your power to refund in the absence of a proper 
protest has recently been the subject of careful consideration 
by .Acting .Attorney-General Conrad in an opinion rendered 
to you September 21, 1895, and he shows that the cases in 
which you can thus refund are the foll9wing only: First, when 
duties provisionally paid are reduced upon the final liquida-
tion; second, for mere clerical error; third, for mutual mis-
take of fact. You have· now no right to refund, in the 
absence of proper protest, either for mistake of · 1aw or for 
any mistake of fact which is not mutual. Your statutory 
powers were not enlarged by acquiescence in the erroneous 
decision aforesaid, nor was your power to refund involved 
at all in that decision. 
For these reasons you were advised by the then .Acting 
Attorney-General, on .August 7 last, that the decision in Mr. 
Earnshaw's case" does not carry with it the obligation of 
your Department to repay to him any part of the amounts 
paid or deposited by him at the time of entry of his goods, 
he having failed to protest at the time." You now inform 
me that the custom-house brokers representing Mr. Earn-
shaw have addressed you, arguing against the correctness of 
that decision, and that you thereafter referred the matter to 
the Solicitor of the Treasury, who expressed the opinion that 
the points raised by the brokers were well taken. You there-
fore return me the papers and ask me to review the opinion 
of the cting .Attorney-General. I have done o, and believe 
it to be correct, and therefore advise you that you have no 
pow r to make the refund desired. 
Th opinion of the olicit.or of the Treasury appears to be 
ba ed upon the :fir t clan of the act of March 3, 1875, 
hapt r G, e ·tion 1. That clau e appears to be restrictive 
and 11 nabling, o that whatev r power tor fund belong 
to th er tary of the Tr a ury must be found elsewhere. 
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But however this may be, that clause can not affect the 
present question, because the Solicitor is mistaken in pre-
suming that the .Attorney-General decided that no writ of 
error would be taken by the United States in the action of 
United States v. Earnshaw. The case appears never to have 
been reported to the .Attorney-General. The district attor-
ney's acquiescence in the decision was upon the advice of 
the then Secretary of the Treasury. 
Very respectfully, 
JDDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-WORLD'S FAIR-MED.A.LS. 
So much of section 3 o( the act of .A.ugust 5, 1892, as provides for the 
duplication of medals at the mints of the United States was repealed 
by the act of March 3, 1893. 
The express object of a later act being to amend an earlier act, a feature 
of the earlier act which was omitted from the later act was neces-
sarily repealed. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 11, 1895. 
SIR: Your letter of November 4 submits for my opinion 
the question whether section 3 of the act of Congress 
approved .August 5, 1892 (27 Stat., 389), which provides-
" That fifty thousand bronze medals and the necessary 
dies therefor, with appropriate devices, emblems, and inscrip-
tions commemorative of said Exposition celebrating the four 
hundredth anniversary of the discovery of .America by Chris-
topher Columbus, shall be prepared under the direction of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, * * * and authority may 
be granted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the holder of a 
medal properly awarded to him to have duplicates thereof 
made at any of the mints of the United States from gold, or 
silver, or bronze at the expense of the person desiring the same," 
is repealed by act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 587). 
The act of March 3, 1893, is in express terms an amend-
ment of the corresponding section 3 of the act of ,August 5, 
1892; and these two sections are manifestly identical, except 
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as to the provision in the act of .August 5, 1892, authorizing 
the holder of a medal to have duplicates thereof made at his 
own expense at any of the mints of the United States from 
gold, silver, or bronze, which is omitted from the act of 
March 3, 1893. 
In Tracy v. Tujfiy (134 U. S., 223), the court said: 
"And while it is true that repeals by implication are not 
favored by the courts, it is settled that without express 
words of repeal a previous · statute will be held to be modi-
fied by a subsequent one, if the latter was plainly intended 
to cover the whole subject embraced by both and to pre-
scribe the only rules in respect to that subject that are to 
govern." 
Here the express object of the statute of 1893 is to amend 
a specific section of the act of 1892. A comparison of the 
section in the two acts shows very plainly wherein the 
earlier act was amended by the later. It would be an excess 
of refinement to enter upon an argument to show that the · 
feature of the earlier act, which was omitted from the later 
act, was necessarily repealed. 
"Where two acts are repugnant in any of their provi-
sions, the later act, without any repealing clause, operates to 
the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the :first." (Dis-
trict Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U. S., 18.) 
I am, therefore, of the opinion that so much of s.ection 3 
of the act of Congress approved .August 5, 1892, as pro-
vides for the duplication of medals at the mints of the United 
States in gold, silver, or bronze was repealed by the act of 
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CUSTOM-HOUSE BROKERS-DRA WBACKS-:--ATTORNEY-
GENERAL. 
The word "broker" has now no definite legal signification. 
The term "custom-house broker" in section 23 of the tariff act of 1894: 
includes persons dealing in drawback matters exclusively. Such a 
broker, when his license has been revoked, can not thereafter deal 
directly with the customs officiaJs, except when acting for themselves 
as principals. 
Drawback moneys are duties repaid to the importer or the person to whom 
he has transferred his rights. 
The existence of a usage is a question of fact, of which the Attorney-
General can not take notice unless officially informed. 
The Attorney-General can not give an official opinion upon the construc-
tion of customs regulations which may be modified at any time by the 
Secretary of the Treasµry. 
In construing the main provisions of a statute too great weight should 
not be put upon exceptions and provisos which may have been inserted 
from e; cess of caution. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 14_, 1895. 
Sm: Your communication of October 18, asking my official 
opinion upon the question raised by Messrs. Des Brisay and 
Allen, has received very careful consideration, counsel have 
been heard on behalf of the parties interested, and inquiry 
has been made as far as possible into the custom-house prac-
tice in this and analogous cases. For these reasons the 
answer to your inquiry has been delayed. 
The question arises upon the construction of sections 22 
and 23 of th~ tariff act of August 27, 1894. Section 22 relates 
to drawbacks allowable upon ·exportation of articles made 
wholly or in part from imported materials. The section pro-
vides for the identification of the imported materials antl 
completed articles and the ascertainment of the facts neces-
sary to enable the duties which have been paid thereon to be 
estimated. It then proceeds as follows: 
"The drawback due thereon shall be paid to the manufac-
turer, producer, or exporter, to the agent of either, or to the 
person to whom such manufacturer, producer, exporter, or 
agent shall in writing order such drawback paid, under such 
regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe." 
3513-V0L 21, PT 2--4 
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Section 23 of the act is as follows: 
"That the collector or chief officer of the customs at any 
port of entry or delivery shall issue a license to any reputa-
ble and competent person desiring to transact business as a 
custom-house broker. Such license shall be granted for a 
period of one year, and may be revoked for cause at any 
time by the Secretary of the Treasury. From and after the 
first day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, no 
person shall transact business as a custom-house broker with-
out a license granted in accordance with this provision; but 
this act shall not be so construed as to prohibit any importer 
from transacting business at a custo1:11-house pertaining to 
his own importations." 
Messrs. Des Brisay and Allen w~re licensed custom-house 
brokers, but on account of certain alleged irregularities prac-
ticed by them, renewal of their license was refused. Although 
they are thus forbidden to do business as custom-house 
brokers, they nevertheless claim the right to receive payment 
of drawback as" agents" under section 22. Your inquiry is, 
whether a person in their position "can legally transact busi-
ness at the custom-house as agent for other persons." 
The first point to be settled is the definition of the phrase 
"custom-house broker" in section 23. This phrase has not 
as yet been legally defined. Its proper legal definition must 
therefore now be found. Counsel for the disbarred firm claim 
that it has acquired by usage a settled technical definition, 
and that this definition does not include persons dealing with 
the custom-house in relation to claims for drawback, nor does 
it include persons who do business in their own names. 
Evidence of this kind I can not consider. Nothing is better 
settled than that the existence of a usage affecting the legal 
definition of a statutory term is a question of fact, not of 
law. pon the trial of an action at law it would be left to 
the jury. Being a que tion of fact, I can not pass upon it. 
(21 Opin., 1 0.) A you give me no official information of 
any uch cu tom I as ume that there i none, and that the 
que ti n must be ettled by applying the legal principles of 
n tru tion the language of the act of 1894. 
l hou h the late t dition of the standard dictionarie 
nt in definition of the phra e "custom-house broker' I 
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do not think that these definitions are sufficiently well set-
tled or definite in their limitations to dispose of the present 
question. 
Nor is the word "broker" used with sufficient precision 
for this purpose. According to the Century Dictionary, it 
includes anyone" who attends to the doing of something for 
another." Webster's first definition is '' one who transacts 
business for another; an agent." Originally the term had a 
much more definite meaning than at present. It was con-
fined to persons negotiating sales who bad no possession 
of the goods sold and who did not act in their own name. 
These limitations are not now recognized. It is only neces-
sary to refer to the familiar cases of stock brokers, real-estate 
brokers, and insurance brokers. 
From the necessities of business at large centers transac-
tions between private parties and custom-house officials 
must mainly be done through agents. These agents, when 
devoting themselves wholly or mainly to that branch of work, 
are generally known as custom-house brokers. The main 
work of the customs officials is, of course, to collect moneys 
due the Government by way of impost duties. A consider-
able incident to their work, however, . is the repayment of 
moneys which have thus been paid in. Such moneys may 
happen to be repaid because of mistakes in the original esti-
mate, or by way of drawback. All of this business is done 
at the custom-house. All of it may be negotiated by custom-
house brokers. Whether the middleman's negotiation con-
cerns the amount of duties to be paid by the importer, or the 
amount to be repaid either to him or to the assignee of his 
rights, the negotiation relates to custom-house work, and is 
in the nature of a broker's business. Drawback moneys are , 
duties. They are a repayment to the importer, or the person 
to whom he has transferred his rights, of a part of the duties 
which have been paid by him upon receiving his goods, 
(Rev. Stat., secs. 3015, 3038, 3040, 3041; tariff act of 1894. 
sec. 22.) 
Hence, in my opinion, the term "custom-house broker" 
includes persons who deal in drawback matters exclusively 
as well as those who (like Des Brisay and Allen) combine all 
branches of custom-house work. The phrase, therefore, 
258 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
Custom-House Brokers-Drawbacks-A. ttorney-Gen eral. 
includes some of the persons mentioned in the :final clause 
of section 22, which section governs. Are, then, the class of 
agents referred to in section 22 excepted from the necessity 
of obtaining official recognition of their reputability and 
competence, or are they subject to the same regulations as 
other agents who do business at the custom-house¥ I think 
that the object of Congress in adopting section 23 was to 
protect the whole custom-house, the drawback department 
included, from the risks and annoyances of dealing with 
improper persons. It is, therefore, my opinion that section 
22 is to be construed as subject to an implied proviso, that 
persons actually transacting business with the Government, 
when acting as brokers for others and not as principals 
themselves, must be persons officially recognized by the 
chief officer of the customs as reputable and competent. 
It will be noticed that every agent referred to in section 
22 need not necessarily be a licensed custom-house broker. 
Authority to collect drawback may, for instance, be delegated 
by an inland manufacturer to his general selling agent in 
New York, or to some attorney at law; but the person so 
authorized must conduct his business at the custom-house 
through some licensed broker, unless he prefers to obtain, 
himself, for the occasion, a license, which, if he is a reputable 
and competent person, the collector is obliged by the law to 
give him. It has been suggested, indeed, that it would be 
unreasonable to require a license for a single transaction. 
This formality, however, need not be made oppressive; while, 
on the other hand, to admit such exceptions to the general 
language of section ~3 might give rise to abuses. An attor-
ney at law admitted to practice in the courts of one State 
occasionally wishes to argue in another. If he have but a 
single case, however, he must obtain special leave of the 
court to appear. I think that Congress intended, for the 
pro ection of importer , exporters, and manufacturers, and 
of the Government itself, to subject the business of custom-
hou e broking to re tri tion somewhat similar to tho e which 
court have impo ed upon practice at the bar. 
I ha 110t overlooked th la t clau e of section 2 , which 
I rovid that it hall not b o onstru d a to prohibit any 
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importer from transacting business at a custom-house pertain-
ing to his own importations." It is argued that this clause 
shows the whole section to be intended to apply only to 
importations and not to exportations. Care must always be 
had not to put too great weight upon such exceptions and 
provisos. They are apt to be thrown in upon a Congressional 
debate or in committee without full appreciation of the scope 
of the section under consideration, but in order to protect 
some particular class of persons from any possibility of 
embarrassment. This clause is entirely unnecessary, for an 
importer transacting business pertaining to his own importa-
tions is not acting- as an agent and therefore not acting as a 
broker. I do not think that the insertion of this unnecessary 
exception in the statute indicates an intent to exclude draw-
backs from its scope. 
Hence, it is my opinion that Des Brisay and Allen may 
collect, through the medium of licensed custom-house bro-
kers, any moneys due them as agents for others; that they 
may have complete access to the custom-house whenever 
they are acting for themselves as principals; but that they 
can not deal directly with the customs officials in any other 
case. 
You ask me a further question which seems to involve the 
construction or application of one of the Customs Regulations 
of 1892. These are regulations formulated by your prede-
cessor, and which you have the power to modify at anytime. 
For these reasons their construction is not a proper subject 
of an opinion by the Attorney-General. (18 Opin., 521; 20 
Opin., 649, 652.) Probably the principles hereinabove laid 
down will enable you to solve this question without further 
assistance from me. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-TRADE-MARKS. 
Whether one trade-mark simulates another is a question of fact upon 
which the Attorney-General can not give an official opinion. 
A foreigner who has simulated the trade-mark of a domestic manufac-
turer can not obtain the right to import his goods into this country 
merely by recording his fraudulent trade-mark under section 6 of the 
tariff act of 1894 before the latter has taken the steps necessary to 
protect himself. · 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 23, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of November 20, asking an official opinion with relation 
to the construction of section 6 of the act of August 27, 1894, 
which provides-
" That no article of imported merchandise which shall 
copy or simulate the name or trade-mark of any domestic 
manufacture or manufacturer shall be admitted to entry at 
any custom-house of the United States." 
The section further provides for registry, on books in 
your Department, by '' any domestic manufacturer who has 
adopted trade-marks," to aid in carrying out the purposes of 
the statute. 
It appears from your letter that the agents of a foreign 
manufacturer have registered an alleged trade-mark which 
is claimed to be a simulation of the trade--mark of a domestic 
manufacturer. Three days later the domestic manufacturer 
registered his own trade-mark. 
You ask me whether one of these is a simulation of the 
other. This presents a question of fact which I am not 
authorized to answer. (20 Opin., 698; 21 Opin., 135; Erhardt 
v. Steinhardt, 153 U.S., 177.) 
An wering your second que tion, I advise you that the fact 
that the foreign trade-mark was the one first filed in your 
Department has no bearing upon the question. A foreigner 
can not obtain the right to send fraudulently marked goods 
into the country merely by recording his fraudulent mark in 
your Department before the domestic manufacturer, who e 
go d are to be imulat d, has taken the teps necessary to 
pr t ct them. 
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Your third question does not seem to be one presently 
arising in the administration of your Department. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. 
Draftsmen temporarily employed by the Secretary of the Treasury under 
the act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189, may be appointed without cer-
tification from the Civil Service Commission. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 25, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of November 20, asking an official opinion whether you have 
the authority to make appointments, without certification 
from the Civil Service Commission, of the persons to be 
employed by you under the following provision of the sun-
<lry civil appropriation act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189 (28 
Stat., 911 ), relating to the proposed new Government build-
ing at Chicago: 
"The sum of thirty thousand dollars is hereby authorized 
to be expended by the Secretary of the Treasury to employ 
temporarily draftsmen and skilled service, which may be nec-
essary in the preparation of plans and specifications for the 
said building, this sum to be exclusive of any moneys that 
he may be authorized to expend for the services of engineers, 
draftsmen, and other persons employed in the preparation of 
plans and specifications for any other public buildings." 
Your authority to appoint persons employed is not condi-
tioned upon certification of eligibles by the Civil Service 
Commission except in the cases provided for by the rules 
which the President has made under the act of January 16, 
1883, chapter 27. It is my opinion that these rules do not 
apply to appointments under the statute above cited. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF 'I.'HE TREASURY. 
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BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS. 
The Board of General Appraisers has jurisdiction to decide whether 
cartage charges made by a collector of customs are proper. 
DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
November 26, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of November 21, asking an official opinion as to the pro-
test of R. Helwig with regard to cartage charges. It appears 
that certain goods imported by Mr. Helwig were carted to a 
warehouse, under the provisions of section 2926 of the Re-
vised Statutes, on account of defective entry. The carting 
was done by draymen duly hired according to the provisions 
of the antirnoiety act of June 22, 187 4, section 25. The col-
lector has paid the draymen at the regular contract rate, yet 
the importer protests, claiming it to be an overcharge. You 
ask whether this is a case of which the Board of General 
Appraisers have jurisdiction under section 14 of the customs 
administrative act of June 10, 1890. 
This is a case which under the former practice would have 
been a proper subject for an action against the collector under 
Revised Statutes, section 3011. For an example of such 
action see Kennedy v. Magone (158 U. S., 212). That action 
has been abolished, and I think that section 14 of the cus-
toms administrative act provides a substitute therefor which 
is applicable in the present instance, for it gives to the Board 
of General Appraisers jurisdiction to review the collector's 
decisions not only as to the "duties chargeable upon imported 
m rchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges," but 
al o ''a to all fees and exactions ofwhatevercbaracter(except 
dutie on tonnage)." Your questiou is therefore answered in 
the affirmative. 
bile holding that the Board of General Appraisers have 
juri diction, I do not xpre au opinion a to whether or not 
th oard ould be bound by the rates :fixed in the contract 
i h h draymen. 
ery r p ctfully 
JUDO HARMO . 
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WITNESS FEES. 
A Department clerk when subprenaed to testify on behalf of the United 
States has no right to witness fees, but his expenses are allowable. 
When subpcenaed by a private party he may demand and accept 
witness fees. 
DEP.A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
Noi•ember 26, 1895. 
SIR: Answering your communication of November 22, with 
relation to the case of Mr. Stewart, I have the honor to say 
that in my opinion he has no right to witness fees when sub-
pamaed in behalf of the Government. (Rev. Stat., sec. 850.) 
In that case his necessary expenses, including the exp,mse 
incident to the production of records for the court when he 
is served with a subpama duces tecum, are allowable. When 
subpamaed on behalf of a private party I am not aware of 
any rule of law which would prevent his demanding and 
accepting witness fees. If the ~egal fees should not be suffi- -
cient to pay him for the expenses incident to producing the 
records before the court, I presume that the persons at whose 
expense he is subpamaed would willingly pay the difference 
if you should call upon them to do so. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OP THE TREASURY. 
Same as above. 
WITNESS FEES. 
DEP .A.R'.L'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 26, 1895. 
SIR: Answering your communication of November 22, with 
relation to the case of Mr. Stewart. I have the honor to say 
that in my opinion he has no right to witness fees when sub-
pcenaed in behalf of the Government. (Rev. Stat., sec. 850.) 
In that case his necessary expenses, including the expense 
incident to the production of records for the court when he 
is served with a subpcena duces tecum, are allowable. When 
subpcenaed on behalf of a private party I am not aware of 
any rule of law which would prevent his demanding and 
264 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
Compromise-Attorney-General. 
accepting witness fees. If the legal fees should not be suf-
ficient to pay him for the expenses incident to producing 
the records before the court, I presume that the persons at 
whose expense he is subpamaed would willingly pay the dif-
ference if you should call upon them to do so. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The S:E;CRETARY OF WAR. 
COMPROMISE-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to compromise or release a 
judgment in favor of the United States from which there is no appeal 
and of whose collectibility in full there is no doubt. 
A claim once fully considered and held unlawful by one Attorney-
General can not, with proprjety, be reconsidered by his successor, at 
least except in some extraordinary case. 
There is a clear distinction between the compromise of a doubtful case 
and the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability. 
DEPARTMENT OF JVSTICE, 
November 27, 1895. 
Sm.: Your communication of November 25, asking my offi-
cial opinio..i in the matter of the petition of the International 
Cotton Press Company of New Orleans, has received my 
careful attention. 
The facts of this case are, in main, well known to this 
Department. One Snyder, a tobacco manufacturer, was 
indebted to the United States in the amount of several 
thousand dollars under the internal-revenue laws, and the 
claim of the United States, on or about November 20, 1879, 
became a lien upon his property by virtue of sections 3186 
and 3371 of the Revised Statutes. On February 5, 1881, he 
sold c rtain real property to the petitioner, failing to disclose 
the fact that there wa a lien thereon; and it was purchased 
without knowledge of uch lien. The United States has 
obt in d a de ree against the pAtitioner, under which it is 
ntitled to 11 thi r al e tate in s~ti faction of its claim. 
Thi,' d r e ha r ei ed the sanction of the highe t court 
( nit d tat . nyd r l 9 U. S., 210), and is not appeal-
I . It i n t laim d th t there i an doubt of the ability 
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of the United States to realize the amount due by a sale of 
the property. It is claimed that the decree established a 
new rule of law; but, in fact, it was merely a new applica-
tion of very familiar and elementary principles. 
The petitioner seeks to be relieved from this adjudged lien 
on its property on the ground of hardship, because, being 
protected by no recording act, it bought in ignorance of the 
Government's claim. This is a hardship shared with all per-
sons who, without sufficient inquiry, buy property subject to 
claims which the law does not require to be recorded, such 
as dower rights in estates. The petitioner also claims that 
the full amount could have been collected from Snyder if the 
Government had proceeded promptly against him individ- _ 
ually instead of relying (as it had a right to do) upon its lien 
on his property; and that Snyder has since become insolvent, 
so that, if petitioner's land were sold, it could have no 
recourse against him. 
Upon taking up this claim for consideration you were con-
fronted with the question, whether it is within your power 
to release, in whole or in part, a judgment recovered by the 
United States, from which there is no appeal and of whose 
collectibility in full there is no doubt. The petitioner claims 
that you have jurisdiction under section 3469 of the Revised 
Statutes, which is as follows: 
"Upon a report by a district attorney, or any special 
attorney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the 
United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim 
and the terms upon which the same may be compromised, 
and recommending that it be compromised upon the terms so 
offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to 
compromise such claim accordingly. But the provisions of 
this section shall not apply to any claim arising under the 
po~tal laws." 
This question was referred by you to my predecessor in 
office in 1894; and it was referred in connection with this 
very claim of the International Cotton Press Company and 
upon the same statement of facts. It was carefully con-
sidered by this Department, and an opinion rendered by 
Solicitor General Maxwell, ~hich opinion was approved by 
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Attorney-General Olney. Their conclusions are stated as 
follows (21 Opin., 51): 
"The section does not authorize the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to remit or release moneys due to the United States and 
clearly recoverable, but to 'compromise,' which implies a 
claim of doubtful recovery or enforcement. 
'' In the case which you submit there is nothing to 'com-
promise,' for the right of recovery and the amount have been 
:finally adjudged by the court of last resort, and the property 
is said to be sufficient to satisfy the debt." 
Whatever may be the power of an executive officer to 
·review the decisions of his predecessors, I think that a claim 
once fully considered and held unlawful py one Attorney-
General can not with propriety be reconsidered by his suc-
cessor, at least except in some extraordinary case. (2 Opin., 
8.) I should not feel justified in reversing the former action 
of this Department unless I were · convinced that it was 
clearly erroneous. 
I am, however, clearly of the opinion that the opinion 
already given is correct. The construction given to the 
statute accorded with that of Mr. Evarts (12 Opin., 543), 
and with that of Mr. Devens and Mr. Phillips (16 Opin., 
617). If the opinion of Mr. MacVeagh (17 Opin., 213) is to 
be construed as holding that a claim may be compromised 
when there is no doubt of its entire and ready collectibility, 
I am unable to concur with it. It appears to ignore the 
clear distinction between the compromise of a doubtful case 
and the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability. 
(Rev. Stat., secs. 3461, 5292.) The former power, as said by 
Mr. Evarts in the opinion above cited, is strictly a :fiscal one. 
The latter is in the nature of a pardoning power. ( The 
Lau,ra, 114 . S., 411, 413-414.) 
For the ab ve rea on I have the honor to advise you that 
pinion the application of the ln,ternational Cotton 
ompany hould not be granted. 
ry re pectfully, 
J D O H.A.RMO . 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-CUBAN INSURRECTION-EXECUTIVE. 
International law takes no account of a mere insurrection confined within 
the limits of a count,ry which has not been protracted or successful 
enough to secure for those engaged in it recognition as belligerents by 
their own government or by foreign governments. 
The rules of international law with respect to belligerent and neutral 
rights and duties do not apply to the present Cuban insurrection. 
Neither our Government nor our citizens have means of knowledge, and 
therefore are not bound to take notice, who are and who are not loyal 
subjects of Spain so long as their actions are confined to her own 
territory. 
A failure by the United States to pass neutrality laws would not 
diminish its international obligations; so passing them does not 
increase such obligations. 
The mere sale or shipment of arms and munitions of wa,r by persons in 
the United States to persons in Cuba is not a violation of international 
law, however strong a suspicion there may be that they are to be used 
in an insurrection against the Spanish government. Individuals in 
the United States have a right to sell such articles and ship them to 
whoever may choose to buy. 
The goods, and sometimes the ship carrying-them, are subject to seizure 
by the government within whose jurisdiction they may come, if its 
domestic laws or regulations are violated, but international law imposes 
no duty upon our Government with respect to such transactions. 
The sale and shipment or carriage of such articles to Cuba does not become 
a violation of international law merely because they are not destined to 
a port thereof which is r ecognized by the Spanish Government as open 
to commerce, nor because they are to be, or are, landed by stealth. 
If, however, the persons supplying or carrying arms and munitions from 
a place in the United States are in anywise parties to a design that 
force shall be employed against the authorities of Spain, or that, either 
in the United States or elsewhere before final delivery of such arms 
and munitions, men with hostile purpose toward the Spanish Govern-
ment shall also be t aken on board and transported in furtherance of 
such purpose, the enterprise is not commercial but military, and is in 
violation of international law and of the United States statutes. 
The duty of the United States, when a state of war is declared or recog-
nized by another country, is of its own motion to use diligence to dis-
cover and prevent within its borders the formation Qr departure of any 
military expedition intended to carry on or take part in such war. 
The Executive has no right to interfere with the judiciary in proceedings 
against persons charged with being concerned in hostile expeditions 
against friendly nations. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 10, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to comply with your request by letter 
of 5th ultimo for a full expression of my views on the legal 
propositions stated in the communication of the Spanish min-
ister ~o you of October 19, a copy of which you inclose. 
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Referring to the President's proclamation in June last, 
concerning the insurrection in Cuba, to opinions expressed 
by officers of this Government, to comments upon recent 
decisions in cases involving charges of violations of our 
neutrality laws, and to acts of which he has made complaint, 
the minister states at length the positions he takes with 
regard to the rules of international law by which the course 
of the United States should be directed. The acts com-
plained of were the shipping of arms and munitions of war 
from ports of the United States under circumstances show-
ing that they were destined for the use of the insurgent 
forces in Cuba. 
The minister says that commerce with that island can not 
be carried on except through Havana and six other ports 
which are open to commerce in general, and eight ports which 
are partially open to commerce; that all these ports are held 
by the Spanish Government with a sufficient force; that, in 
order to ship arms and•munitions to the insurgents, it is not 
sufficient to elude the Spanish cruisers about the island and 
the garrisons at such ports, but vessels carrying such supplies 
must have pilots who are advised of the movements of the 
insurgents and have a system of signals with them by means 
of which the cargoes are delivered to armed bodies prepared 
to use force; and that, in many cases, such vessels also carry 
men who are prepared to resort to force to effect the landing 
of the cargoes. It is therefore evident, he says, that aves-
sel carrying arms and munitions intended for the insurgents 
can not deliver them without committing acts of force which 
make the enterprise military and not commercial. Further, 
lte says, such vessel "may, if cleared for au intermediate 
port, or if its cargo be taken on board at one port and its 
men at another, whether that port be in the United States 
or another country, or if the munitions of war and arms go 
1 and the men in another, be simply a part of a 
ring xpedition, but it i , in my judgment, no less a 
xp dition. 
l, im n the auth rity of ' mo t eminent writers on 
int rn i nal 1 w, hat th dom tic law of tbi country 
1 d n t ider d by him in a kin o- for th fulfillment 
f ur iu rn ti n, 1 bli ati n , ud expre e the pinion 
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that when the departure of arms and munitions of which he 
has furnished information is permitted, or when the persons 
engaged have been arrested at the moment of embarking and 
are discharged, not only is international law violat~d, but the 
true spirit and meaning of the internal laws of the United 
States are disregarded. 
My views are as follows: 
1. Int ernational law takes no account of a mere insurrec-
tion, confined within the limits of a country, which has not 
been protracted or successful enough to secure for those 
engaged in it recognition as belligerents by their own gov-
ernment or by foreign governments. (Cobbett, Leading 
Cases on I nt. Law, 87; Glenn's Int. Law, sec. 75; Calvo, 
Droit Int. T., 1, p. 178.) 
This is said to result from the equality and dignity of 
nations, which prevent other nations from taking notice of 
what passes between a particular one and its own subjects 
within its own limits (Abdy's Kent's Int. Law, pp. 46-47), 
except in those rare cases where atrocity or barbarity pro-
voke intervention in the interest of humanity. 
'fhe facts, so far as they are known, do not bring the Cuban 
insurrecti9n within the principle of the Prize Cases. (2 
Black, 635.) No state of war is acknowledged by Spain 
and, if the insurgents are in possession of any seaports, no 
blockade has been declared. 
It follows, therefore, that the rules of international law 
with respect to belligerent and neutral rights and duties do 
not apply to the present case. Neither Spain nor any other 
country has recognized the Cuban insurgents as belligerents. 
They are, therefore, simply Spanish citizens with whom Spain 
is dealing within her own borders, and the fact that, by com-
mon report, they are engaged in armed resistance to her 
authority is· merely a circumstance of suspicion to be· con-
sidered in any inquiry which may be had concerning the 
conduct of persons within the United States who may be 
suspected of hostile intentions toward Spain. But neither 
our Government nor our citizens have means of knowledge, 
and therefore can not be bound to take notice who are and 
who are not loyal subjects of Spain, so long as their actions 
ar~ confined to her own territory. 
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The President's proclamation of June 12 did not change 
the situation in any respect, but was simply made out of 
abundant caution in view of the notorious fact that such 
insurrection existed and that, judging from experience dur-
ing former insurrections in Cuba, attempts to violate our 
laws might be made. 
While called neutrality laws, because their main purpose 
is to carry out the obligations imposed upon the United States 
while occupying a position of neutrality toward belligerent8, 
our laws were intended also to prevent offenses against 
friendly powers whether such powers should or should not be 
engaged in war or in attempting to suppress revolt. But as 
our failure to pass such laws would not diminish our inter-
national obligations, so passing them does not increase such 
obligations. 
2. The mere sale or shipment of arms and munitions of 
war by persons in the United States to persons in Cuba is 
not a violation of international law, however strong a suspi-
cion there may be that they are to be used in an insurrect10n 
against the Spanish Government. The right of individuals 
in the United States to sell such articles and ship them to 
whoever may choose to buy has always been maintained. 
The goods, and in some cases, perhaps, the ship carrying 
them, are subject to seizure by the government within whose 
jurisdiction they may come, if its domestic laws or regula-
tions are violated, but international law imposes no duty 
upon our Government with respect to such transactions. 
( The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton, 283 (340); The Ber-
rnuda, 3 Wall., 514; United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed. Rep., 
99; The Itata, 66 Fed. Rep, 505; Hendricks v. Gonzale,'I, 67 Fed. 
Rep., 351; 2 Pradier-Fodere Droit Int. Pub., sec. 469; Oob-
bett's Leading Oas son Int. Law, 167-171; Phillemore's Int. 
Law, Vol. III, 274; Snow's on Int. Law, 408-420; 11 
Opin. Atty-Gen., 451.) 
Thi principl applies the more trongly in a case like the 
pre nt than in one where insurgents have been recognized 
as b llig r nt . :1erchant can not follow their cargoe to 
uba in rd r to di co r th character of their cu tomer ; 
arrier condu ·t an inve tigation into the 
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motives or designs of consignees. Such restrictions on com-
merce would be most onerous and have never been recognized. 
The sale and shipment or carriage of such articles to Cuba 
does not become a violation of international law merely 
Lecause they are not destined to a port thereof which is 
recognized by the Spanish Government as open to commerce, 
nor because they are to be, or are, landed by stealth. If 
taking arms, etc., into Cuba, or landing them at particular 
times or places, be contrary to Spanish law _or regulations, 
so doing would nevertheless be mete smuggling, which must 
be prevented by the Spanish Government and in no wise 
concerns that of the United States. The revenue and police 
regulations of a country have never been recognized by inter-
national law as coming within the rules regulating the con-
duct of other nations. (The Steamsli-ip Florida, 4 Ben., 452; 
..A.bdy's Kent Int. Law, 491; Snow's Cases on Int. Law, 497.) 
3. If, however, the persons supplying or carrying arms and 
munitions from a place in the United States are in any wise 
parties to a design that force shall be employed against the 
Spanish authorities, or that, either in the United States or 
elsewhere, before final delivery of such arms and munitions, 
men with hostile purposes toward the Spanish Government 
shall also be taken on board and transported in furtherance 
of such purposes, the enterprise is not commercial, but mili-
tary, and is in violation of international law and of our own 
statutes. (Rev. Stat., 5286; United States v. Rand, 17 Fed. 
Rep., 142; United States v. The Mary N. Hogan, 18 Fed. Rep., 
529; United States v. 214 boxes of arms, etc., 20 Fed. Rep., 50; 
The Oonserva, 38 Fed. Rep., 431; United States v. Lumsden, 
1 Bond, 105.) 
4. The duty of the United States, when a state of war is 
declared or recognized by another country, is of its own mo-
tion to use diligence to discover and prevent, within its bor-
ders, the formation or departure of any military expedition 
intended to carry on or take part in such war. (3 Whart. 
Dig. Int. Law, pp. 630, 637.) It is by no means certain that 
knowledge of the existence of a mere insurrection, even 
when its location or alleged motives may be thought likely 
to lead to violations of our laws in its behalf, imposes any 
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general duty of watchfulness, the neglect of which would be 
just ground of complaint by the nation involved which does 
not itself acknowledge a state of war. Actual notice, how-
ever, of hostile expeditions against a friendly nation, under-
taken or threatened, creates tte duty of vigilance to prevent 
them; and the fact that the _different elements intended to 
constitute a hostile expedition are separately prepared or 
transported does not change such duty, but merely renders 
it more difficult to perforiµ. But the obligation is one of 
diligence and not a guaranty against ~uch expeditions; and 
what constitutes diligence must always depend on the cir-
cumstances in each case. (3 Whart. Dig. Int. Law, p. 639; 
Creasy Int. Law, pp. 160-164.) 
5. It can not be truly said that our laws, which have been 
tested by the. experience of a century, do not fully cover and 
adequately punish all violations of the duties imposed both 
by international law and by treaty on all persons within the 
United States. Nor can it be charged that our courts are 
either unfair or inefficient. I do not understand the expres-
sions in the minister's letter to indicate anything more than 
dissatisfaction at the result of some recent prosecutions 
wherein strong suspicion appeared to lack convincing proof. 
It is therefore, ordinarily, due diligence to cause the arrest 
and trial by our courts .of persons charged with engaging in 
enterprises against the authority of Spain which our laws 
forbid. 
If there should be a manifest failure of justice in such a 
judicial proceeding, resulting in the consummation of a hos-
tile enterprise against Spain causing her damage capable of 
proof, the question would arise .whether under the ruling 
of the Geneva tribunal (III Whart. Int. Law Dig., sec. 329, 
p. 193; id., sec. 238, pp. 672-673; and 11 Opin., p.117) Spain 
would be concluded by the judgment. This question would 
be omewhat differently presented in cases where such pro-
ceeding are commenced on the complaint of the Spanish 
authorities and they are afforded and embrace the opportu-
ni y to pre ent evidence or attend by counsel. I do not 
und r tand, how ver, that I am now required to determine 
thi u tion. 
h ' b n held that p r on ju ly u pe ·ted of an inten-
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tion to engage in such enterprises may be required by the 
courts to give bond not to do so. ( United States v. John A. 
Quitman, 2 Am. Law Reg., 645.) Persons in charge of any 
armed vessel may be required to give like security as a con-
dition of clearance. (Rev. Stat., secs. 5289, 5290.) 
It is certain, however, that the Executive has no right to 
interfere with or control the action of the judiciary in pro-
ceedings against persons charged with being concerned in 
hostile expeditions against friendly nations. The President 
may employ the military and naval forces to disperse or pre-
vent the departure from our territory of any such expedi-
tfon, or of any men, arms, or munitions which are manifestly 
parts thereof; and, being a coordinate authority, he would 
not be precluded from so doing, in a proper case, by the 
action of the judiciary. But it is plain that such means are 
practicable only when there is open defiance of the authority 
of the Government by an organized body of men. 
Occasions may be imagined when the summary process of 
martial law might perhaps be resorted to against the per-
sons composing such a body. But in all such cases as those 
which have come to the notice of the Government these con-
ditions do not exist, and the judicial authority is the only 
one which can be properly or efficiently invoked. (See Mr. 
Bayard to the Spanish minister, 3 Whart. Dig. Int. Law, p. 
625.) Our Government possesses all the attributes of sover-
eignty with respect to the present subject, and has for their 
exercise the appropriate agencies which are recognized among 
civili7,ed nations; but our Constitution forbids the arbitrary 
exercise of power when the liberty or property of individual 
citizens is involved. It can not therefore resort to some 
measures which are still possible in some· countries. But I 
do not think that it can be held chargeable with lack of 
diligence for not taking steps which would be inconsistent 
with the principles on which all republics are founded. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
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TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO-INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
Article VII of the treaty of February 2, 1848, between Mexico and the 
United States, known as the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, is still in 
force, so far as it affects the Rio Grande. 
The taking of water for irrigation from the Rio Grande above the point 
where it ceases to be entirely within the United States and becomes 
the boundary between the United States and Mexico is not prohibited 
by said treaty. 
Article VII is limited in terms to that part ot the Rio Grande lying 
below the southern boundary of New Mexico, and applies to such 
works alone as either party might construct on its own side. 
The only right the treaty professed to create or protect with respect to 
the Rio Grande was that of navigation. Claims against the United 
States by Mexico for indemnity for injuries to agriculture alone, cause<l. 
by scarcity of water resulting from irrigation ditches wholly within 
the United States at places far above the head of navigation, find no 
support in the treaty. 
The rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no 
duty or obligation upon the United States of denying to its inhabit-
ants the use of the water of that part of the Rio Grande lying entirely 
within the United States, although such use results in reducing the 
volume of water in the river below the point where it ceases to be 
entirely within the United States. 
The fact that there is not enough water in the Rio Grande for the 
use of the inhabitants of both countries for irrigation purposes does 
not give Mexico the right to subject the United States to the burden 
of arresting its development and denying to its inhabitants the use of 
a provision which nature has supplied, entirely within its own terri-
tory. The recognition of such a right is entirely inconsistent with 
the sovereignty of the United States over its national domain. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 12, 1895. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of the 5th ultimo in which you refer to the concurrent 
re olution of Congress passed .April 291 1890, providing for 
negotiations with the Government of Mexico with a view to 
the remedy of certain difficulties mentioned in the preamble 
to u h resolution, which ari e from the taking of water for 
irrigation from the Rio Grande above the point where it 
es to be entirely within the United States and becomes 
boundary between the nited State · and Mexico. I 
al o the opy which you iuclo e of the note of the Mex-
annum r to your If, dat d O tober 21 1895, in which he 
I neth h p ition t ken by hi o ernmeut. 
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You say: "The negotiations with which the President, 
acting through the Department of State, is charged by the 
foregoing resolution, can not be intelligently conducted 
unless the legal rights and obligations of the two Govern-
ments concerned and the responsibility of either, if any, for 
the disastrous state of things depicted in the Mexican min-
ister's letter are first ascertained. 
"I have the honor, therefore, to call your attention to the 
legal propositions asserted in Mr. Romero's letter and to 
inquire whether, in your judgment, those propositions cor-
rectly state the law applicable to the case-in other words: 
(1) Are the provisions of article 7 of the treaty of February 
2, 1848, known as the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, still in 
force so far as the river Rio Grande is concerned, either 
because never annulled or because recognized and reaffirmed 
by article 5 of the convention between the United States 
and Mexico of November 12, 1884¥ (2) By the principles of 
iuternational law, independent of any special treaty or con-
vention, may Mexico rightfully claim that the obstructions 
and diversions of the waters of the Rio Grande iu the Mex-
ican mini~ter's note referred to, are violations of its rights 
which should not continue for the future and on account of 
which, so far a,s the past is concerned, Mexico should be 
awarded adequate indemnity¥" 
I reply as follows : 
(1) Article VII of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, while 
it was declared to have been rendered nugatory for the most 
part by the first clause of Article IV of the treaty concluded 
December 30, 1853, and proclaimed June 30, 1854, was, by 
the second clamse thereof, reaffirmed as to the Rio Grande 
(norn. Rio Brovo del Norte) below the point where, by the 
lines as fixed by the latter treaty, that river became the 
boundary between the two countries. Said Article VII is 
recognized as still in force by Article V of the convention 
concluded November 12, 1884, and proclaimed September 14, 
1886. 
So far, therefore, as it affects the subject now in hand, 
said Article VII, in my opinion, is still in force. I am una-
ble, howevp,r, to agree with the minister in the interpretation 
which he gives it. 
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His statement is that the city of El Paso del Norte has 
existed for more than threA hundred years, during almost all 
of which time its people have enjoyed the use of the water 
of the Rio Grande for the irrigation of their lands. A.s that 
city and the districts within its jurisdiction did not need 
more than 20 cubic meters of water per second, which was 
an almost infinitesimal portion of the volume of water even 
in times of severest drought, they had sufficient water for 
their crops until about ten years ago, when a great many 
trenches were dug in Colorado, especially in the St. Louis Val-
ley and in New Mexico, through which the upper Rio Grande 
and its affluents flow, so greatly diminishing the water .in 
the river at El Paso that, except when rains happen to be 
abundant, there is scarcity of water from the middle of June . 
untn March. In 1894 the river was entirely dry by June 15, 
so that no crops could be raised and even fruit trees began 
to .wither. The result has been to reduce the price of land 
and cause great hardships to the people, whose numbers in 
Paso del Norte, Zaragoza, Tres Jacales, Guadalupe, and 
San Ignacio diminished from 20,000 in 1875 to one-half that 
number in 1894. 
The minister further states that from a report of the assist-
ant quartermaster-general addressed to the General in Chief 
of the United States Army, dated September 5, 1850, it ap-
pear. that Captain Lowe (meaning Love), U.S. A.., ascended 
the river in a vessel to a point several kilometers above Paso 
del Norte, showing that it was then navigable at that place. 
The minister has been misinformed. The original report, 
which i now before me, hows that Captain Love was 
in tructed to carry '' to the highest attainable point in the 
Rio Grande ' hi 'mall keel boat, which "drew, with her 
er w, provi ions, arms, etc., on board, 18 inches of water." 
He found thi point at ·ome "impassable falls," which he 
11am d ' Brooke Fall .' Carrying around them '' the skiff 
whi h had accompanied hi boat," he rowed 47 mile farther 
tooth r fall , which he named "Babbitt Falls." "Beyond 
thi p int he fi und it impossible to proceed with the skiff 
ith r y land or at r and i wa "about 1 0 miles by 
land b 1 ◄ 1 Pa o. 
h mini t r c n end th t the irrigation di che in Colo-
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rado and New Mexico, which result in diminishing the flow 
of water at El Paso, come within the treaty prohibitions of 
"any work that may impede or interrupt, in whole or in part, 
the exercise of this right" ( of navigation), because, as he 
says, '' nothing could impede it more absolutely than works 
which wholly turn aside the water of these rivers." But 
Article VII is limited in terms to "the part of the Rio Brovo 
del Norte lying below the southern boundary of New Mexico." 
Article IV of the treaty of 1853 continues the provisions of 
said Article VII in force "only so far as regards the Rio 
Brovo del Norte below the initial of said boundary provided 
in the first article of this treaty." It is that part alone which 
is made free and common to the navigation of both countries, 
and to which the various prohibitions apply. It is plain that 
neither party could have had, in framing these restrictions, 
any such intention as that now suggested. The fact, if such 
it .were, that the parties did not think of the possibility of 
such acts as those now complained of would not operate to 
restrain language sufficiently broad to include them, but the 
terms used in the treaty are not fairly capable of such a con-
struction. 
They naturally apply only to the part of the river with 
which the parties were dealing, and to such works alone as 
either party might construct on its own side if not restrained. 
'fhough equally divided, in theory, between the two nations 
where it is their boundary, the river is in fact a unit for 
purposes of navigation, and therefore the treaty required 
the consent of both for the construction of "any work that 
may impede or interrupt" navigation, even though it should 
be "for the purpose of favoring new methods of navigation." 
(Art. VII.) Up to the head of navigation no such work 
could have been constructed save by one of the two Govern-
ments or by its authority. The prohibition was, therefore, 
appropriately made applicable to them alone, anrl not to the 
citizens of either-" neither shall, without consent of t,he 
other, construct," etc. Above the head of navigation, where 
the river would be wholly within the United States, differ-
ent rules would apply and private rights exist which the 
Government could not control or take away save by tbe exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain, so that clear and explicit 
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language would be required to impose upon £he United States 
such obligations as would result from . the construction of 
the treaty now suggested. · 
Moreover, the only right the treaty professed to create or 
protect with respect to the Rio Grande was that of naviga-
tion. The claim now made is for injuries to agriculture 
alone at places far above the head of navigation. Captain 
Love, in the report referred to, said~ "The mouth of Devils 
River, which is about 100 miles below the mouth of the 
Puerco (Pecos) and 617 above Ringgold Barracks, is the 
head of steamboat navigation," and that ,~ with some diffi-
culty" navigation by keel boats was possible "to a point 56 
miles above the 'Grand Indian Crossing,' or about 283 
miles above the mouth of Devils River." So far as appears, 
the large and numerous tributaries below El Paso supply a 
sufficient volume of water for the needs of navigation .. 
In fact, the part of the treaty now under consideration 
merely expresses substantially the same rights and duties 
which international law would imply from the :fixing of the 
middle of the river as the boundary, viz, free navigation of 
the entire stream below the point where it becomes common 
to both nations without any levy or exaction or the construc-
tion of any work which might impede or interrupt navigation 
without the consent of both. 
In my opinion, therefore, the claim now made by Mexico 
finds no support in the treaty. On the contrary, the treaty 
affords an effective answer to the claim by the well-known 
rule that the expression of certain rights and obligations in 
an agreement implies the exclusion of all others with rela-
tion to the same subject. 
It i not necessary in order to bring this principle into 
play that it shall appear that either party or both actually 
thought of the particular matter whose exclusion i asserted, 
although that fact, when it appears, may serve to emphasize 
the inferenc . I am not aclvi eel whether the subject of the 
u e of th~ water of the Rio Grande for irrigation was men-
tion d during the negotiation or not, but it is stated that 
u h u had long been made by the Mexican , and it was 
kn n ha agricnltur could not b carri d on in that region 
'thout it. lt wa known, too-certainly to Mexico-that 
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this necessity existed also throughout the entire region 
watered by the upper Rio Grande and its tributaries, for, as 
a province of Spain and then as an independent nation, 
Mexico had included both New Mexico and Colorado, and 
from the independence of Texas, in 1836, down to the treaty 
of 1848 Mexico's eastern boundary was the Rio Grande to 
its source. By this treaty Mexico ceded to the United States 
the territory west of the Rio Grande and north of the south-
ern boundary of New Mexico, just as she had abandoned to 
Texas all the territory east of that river, without any reser-
vations, restrictions, or stipulations concerning the river 
except those above mentioned. 
Settlements had long existed in the region of Santa Fe, and 
the probability of the ultimate settlement of the entire terri-
tory along the Rio Grande must have been apparent to both 
parties. Yet the treaty made no attempt to create or reserve 
to Mexico or her citizens any rights or to impose on the United 
States or their citizens any restraints with respect to the use 
of water for irrigation, although rights of property in the 
territory were secured to all Mexicans whether established 
there or not. (A.rt. VIII.) 
The treaty of 1848 was a treaty of peace; and a different 
rule for the construction of such treaties is laid down by 
some writers. (Vattel, Law of Nations, Ohitty's Ed., p. 433.) 
If it be suggested that the circumstances under which this 
treaty was made bring its terms, as against the United States, 
within the operation of such rule, it is a sufficient answer that, 
even if the existence of the rule be acknowledged, it simply 
subjects provisions in favor of the United States to strict 
construction; like all rules of construction, it has no applica-
tion except in cases of doubtful meaning of language used, 
and can not be made the means of introducing new terms. 
Moreover, the United States paid $15,000,000 for the territory 
acquired by the treaty (Art. XII), and by the treaty of 1853, 
which was not a treaty of peace, Mexico ceded further terri-
tory in consideration of $10,000,000 (A.rt. III), repeating 
without enlarging the stipulations of the former treaty as to 
rights on the Rio Grande. 
(2) I have given my opinion of the construction and effect 
of the treaty because it is responsive to your general request, 
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though not to your specific questions. That opinion, per-
haps, in strictness, makes it unnecessary for me to consider 
your second question, but as that question is not put alter-
natively or conditionally, I proceed. 
An extended search affords no precedent or authority 
which has a direct bearing. 
There have been disputes about rights of navigation of 
international rivers, but they have been settled by treaty. · 
(For a Ust of such treaties see Heffter Droit Int., Appendix 
VIII.) The subject is fully discussed by Hall (Int. Law, sec. 
39), who denies that the people on the upper part of a navi-
gable river have a natural right to pass over it through for-
eign territory to its mouth. But if such right be conceded, 
no aid is afforded for the present inquiry, because use for 
navigation, being common, would not curtail use by the pro-
prietary country, while in the case now presented, there not 
being enough water for irrigation in both countries, the ques-
tion is, which shall yield to the other. 
It is stated by some authors that an obligation rests upon 
every country to receive streams which naturally flow into 
it from other countries, and they refer to this as a natural 
international servitude. (Hefl'ter Droit Int., sec. 43; 1 Phil-
lemore Int. Law, p. 303.) Others deny the existence of all 
international servitudes, apart from agreement in some form. 
(Letters of Grotius quoted, 2 Hert., p. 106; Kluber Droit des 
Gens Moderne, sec. 139; Bluntschli Droit Int. Cod.; Wool-
sey' Int. Law, sec. 58; 1 Calvo Droit Int., sec. 556.) 
Such a servitude, however, if its existence be conceded, 
would not cover the present case or afford any real analogy 
to it. The servient country may not obstruct the stream so 
as to cause the water to back up and overflow the territories 
of tbe other. The dominant country may not divert the 
cour e of the stream so a~ to throw it upon the territory of 
th oth r at a different place. ( ee authorities supra.) In 
ither of uch cases there would be a direct invasion and 
injury by one of the nation of the territory of the other. But 
h nth u of ater by the inhabitant of the upper coun-
try r ult in r ducing the volume which enter the other, it 
i. diminn ion of the ervitude. Th injury no complained 
f i nd indir con equ n ·e of act which 
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operate as a deprivation by prior enjoyment. So it is evi-
dent that what is really contended for is a servitude which 
makes the lower country dominant and subjects the upper 
country to the burden of arresting its development and deny-
ing to its inhabitants the use of a provision which nature 
has supplied entirely within its own territory. 
Such a consequence of the doctrine of international servi-
tude is not within the language used by any writer with 
whose works I am familiar, and could not have been within 
the range of his thought without finding expression. 
Both the common and the civil law undertake to regulate 
the use of the water of navigable streams by the different 
persons entitled to it. Neither has fixed any absolute rule, 
but both leave each case to be decided upon its own circum-
stances. But I need not enter upon a discussion of the rules 
and principles of either system in this regard, because both 
are municipal and, especially as they relate to real property, 
can have no operation beyond national boundaries. (Creasy 
Int. Law, p. 164.) So they can only settle rights of citizens 
of the same country inter sese. The question must, therefore, 
be determined by considerations different from those which 
would apply between individual citizens of either country. 
Even if such a question could arise as a private one between 
citizens of one country and those of another, it is not so pre-
sented here. The mere assertion of the claim by Mexico 
would make tt a national one even if it were of a private 
nature. ( Gray v. United States, l C. Cls. R., 391-392.) But 
the use of water complained of and the resulting injuries are 
general throughout extended regions, so that effects upon 
individual rights can not be traced to individual causes, and 
the claim is by one nation against the other in fact as well 
as form. 
The fundamental principle of international law is the abso-
lute sovereignty of every nation, as against all others, within 
its own territory. Of the nature and scope of sovereignty 
with respect to judicial jurisdiction, which is one of its ele-
ments, Ohief Justice Marshall said (Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 7 Cranch, p. 136): 
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no 
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limitation not imposed by itself. .Any restriction upon it, 
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a 
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, 
and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in 
that power which could impose such restriction. 
".A.II exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power 
of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to 
the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other 
legitimate source." 
It would be entirely useless to multiply authorities. So 
strongly is the principle of general and absolute sovereignty 
maintained that it has even been asserted by high authority 
that admitted international servitudes cease when they con-
flict with the necessities of the servient state. (Bluntschli, 
p. 212; see criticism by Creasy, p. 258.) Whether this be true 
or not, its assertion serves to emphasize the truth that self-
preservation is one of the :first laws of nations. No believer 
in the doctrine of natural servitudes has ever suggested one 
which would interfere with the enjoyment by a nation within 
its own territory of whatever was necessary to the develop-
ment of its resources or the comfort of its people . 
. The immediate as well as the possible consequences of the 
right asserted by Mexico show that its recognition is entirely 
inconsistent with the sovereignty of the United States over 
its national domain. .A.part from the sum demanded by way 
of indemnity for the past, the claim involves not only the 
arrest of further settlement and development of large 1·egions 
of country, but the abandonment, in great measure at least, 
of what has already been accomplished. 
It is well known that the clearing and settlement of a 
wooded country affects the flow of streams, making it not 
only generally less, but also subjecting it to more sudden 
fluctuations between greater extremes, thereby exposing in-
habitants on their bank to increa e of the double danger of 
drought and flood. The principle now asserted might lead 
to on quence in other ca es which need only be , uggested. 
It will be remembered that a large part of the territory in 
ue tion po bli domain of M xico and was ceded a uch 
th nit d tate o that th ir proprietary a well as 
b ir o r ign right are in ol etl. 
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It is not suggested that the injuries complained of are or 
have been in any measure due to wantonness or wastefulness 
iu the use of water or to any design or intention to injure. 
The water is simply insufficient to supply the needs of the 
great stretch of arid country through which the river, never 
large in the dry season, flows, giving inuch and receiving 
little. 
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circum-
stances make it possible or proper to take any action from 
considerations of comity is a question which does not pertain 
to this Department; but that question should be decided as 
one of policy only, because, in my opinion, the rules, princi-
ples, and precedents of international law impose no liability 
or obligation upon the United States. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
REMISSION OF PENALTIES. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has the power to remit penal duties 
under Revised Statutes, section 5293, in the case of any invoice under 
$1,000, although it may be part of an entry whose total amount is 
over $1,000. 
Revised Statutes, section 5292, in its relation to penal duties, was 
repealed by the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391. 
DEPAR'.rMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 13, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of December 10 concerning the penal duties levied upon 
certain sugar imported at the port of New York. It appears 
that a firm of consignees representing two different princi-
pals made an entry covering two invoices of sugar imported -
by the same vessel. One invoice was from the island of 
Trinidad in the British possessions, the other from Para-
maribo in Dutch Guiana. Upon each invoice penal duty 
accrued under the provisions of section 7 of the Cl!Stoms-
administrative act of June 10, 1890. Upon each the penal 
duty was less than $1,000, but the duties if combined ex-
ceed $1,000. You ask me whether you are authorized to 
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remit these penal duties under the provisions of section 5293 
of the Revised Statutes. 
It is well settled that these penal duties are penalties 
which come within your general power of remission. (4 
Opin., 182; 20 Opin., 660; 21 Opin.1 90, 101.) Your power 
under section 5293° is limited to cases where the amount of 
the penalty does .not exceed $1,000. 
You ask me to advise you whether the invoice or the entry 
is to be treated as the unit. In my opinion the invoice is to 
be treated as the unit. One firm of consignees often, as in 
this case, has consignments coming from different principals 
who have nothing in common except that they employ the 
same agent at the port of importation. Section 5 of the cus-
toms-administrative act forces the agent to include all the 
invoices received by him in the same declaration. I do not 
think, however, that this requires the penal duties upon the 
various articles imported to be lumped together so as to 
deprive the principals of the benefit of the simple and easy 
proceedings for remission in small cases provided by section 
5293. 
As you refer to section 5292 of the Revised Statutes, I 
would call your attention to the fact that this section in its 
relation to penal duties was repealed by the antimoiety act 
of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, section 17. (21 Opin., 102.) 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF '.l'HE TREASURY. 
SEAMEN-REMUNERATIO 
ection 4609, Revised Statute , does not forbid the-demaud or receipt of 
r muneration, by any one, from any seaman or person seeking employ-
m nt as ·uch on ail or steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, 
except as stated in the opinion. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 23, 1895. 
he honor to give my opinion a reque ted in 
ptember .. A for your guidance in the i ue of 
nited tat hipping ommi ioners upon 
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the question" whether section 4609, Revised Statutes, should 
be construed to apply to seamen shipped in foreign trade, or 
should be applied generally for the protection of an seamen 
in both foreign and coasting trade.'' 
Section 4609 originated in section 11 of an act authorizing 
the appointment of shipping commissioners by the several 
circuit courts of the United States, etc., passed June 7, 1872· 
(17 Stat., 262.) Its terms were changed · in the Revised 
Statutes so as to apply to all persons instead of to shipping 
commissioners, their clerks and employees. This fact, in 
connection with the definitions given in section 4612, would 
lead to the conclusion that the prohibition in section 4609 
forbids the demand or receipt, by anyone, from any seamen 
or persons seeking employment as such in the coasting trade 
or otherwise, of renumeration, other than commissioner's 
fees, for obtaining such employment, but for the act of June 
9, 1874 (18 Stat., 64), which provides that none of the pro-
visions of the act of June 7, 1872, "shall apply to sa.il or 
steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade," except as 
therein stated, the exceptions stated being "the coastwise 
trade between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts," "the lake-
going trade touching at foreign ports or otherwise, or in the 
trade between the United States and the British North 
American possessions," and cases "where the seamen are by 
customary agreement entitled to participate in the profits or 
result of a cruise or voyage." 
Section 5601 declares that acts passed since the date of 
the Revised Statutes, December 1, 1873, shall have full effect, 
notwithstanding the revision, so that the reenactment in a 
changed form of section 11 of the nict of 1872 as section 4609 
does not prevent the application to it of tpe act of 1874. 
( United States v. Buckley, 12 Sawyer, 508; United States v. 
King, 23 Fed. Rep., 138-141; Scott v. Rose, 2 Lowell, 381.) 
That Congress so understood the effect of the act of 187 4 
appears from the acts of June 19, 1886, section 2 (1 Supp. Rev. 
Stat., 493), and August 19, 1890 (id., 780, chap. 80i), which 
extend to vessels in the coastwise trade certain sections of 
Title LIII, Merchant Seamen, of which section 4609 is a 
part, but do not include that section. The only other act 
upon the subject is that of February 18, 1895, which contains 
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nothing that restores the operation of section 4609 to vessels 
engaged in the coasting trade generally, or to seamen em-
ployed or seeking employment thereon. 
Your instructions, therefore, should not direct that section 
4609 be applied generally for the protection of all seamen in 
both foreign and coasting trade. · 
· Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE. 
Under the act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189, officers of the Revenue-
Cutter Service who have been placed upon permanent waiting orders 
are withdrawn from the line of promotion, but may be restored to the 
service in their former rank when their disability ceases. 
There is no legal limitation of the number of tliese officers. 
An officer is "permanently incapacitated" within the meaning of thi1:1 
act, as of the pension acts, when his disability appears to ue chronic 
or of indefinite future duration. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 23, 1895. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of December 5, asking an official opinion as to the con-
struction of that provision of the sundry civil appropriation 
act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189 (28 Stat., 910), which relates 
to the Revenue-Cutter Service. 
The President is authorized to procure a medical report 
upon all officers of that Service who "through no vicious 
habit of their own are now incapacitated, by reason of the 
infirmitie, of age or physical or mental disability, to effi-
ci ntly perform the duties of their respective offices." Those 
who "may be reported by said board to be so permanently 
in apacitat d ball be placed on waiting orders out of the 
line of promotion, with on -half active-duty pay, and the 
va anci tb reby created in the active Ii t of the officers 
h 11 b fill <l. by promotion in the order of seniority a now 
pro id l law et . 
b ·bi f n in r wa , arnin d la t "pring under the 
·t. nd 1· p rted a being p rman utl incapacitated. ou 
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inform me that he was thereupon placed upon "permanent 
waiting orders." You now ask my opinion, however, whether 
these" permanent waiting orders" were really" permanent;" 
or whether he ''can be restored to the active list without Con-
gressional action, should he be found upon a reexamination 
to be qualified physically to perform active duty." 
This act is so badly drawn that it is practically impossible 
to give it a satisfactory construction. 
Its use of the word "permanently" would ·tend to indicate 
that it was intended to provide for absolute retirement from 
the service. There is, however, a well-recognized distinction 
between retirement and "waiting orders." (See Rev. Stat., 
secs. 1443 et seq.; sec. 1556.) Moreover, it is unnecessary 
to give so sweeping ail interpretation to the word "perma-
nently." A disability may properly be said to be permanent 
when it appears to be chronic or of indefinite future duration; 
just as an innkeeper distinguishes the "permanents" from 
the "transients" among his guests. The term seems to be 
used in this sense in the statutes. Thus, the officers and 
seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service, when wounded or dis-
abled, are entitled to be placed on the navy pension list (sec. 
4741); and therefore they may be pensioned at various rates 
"in cases of permanent specific disability," while the pension 
is to "continue during the existence of the disability" (sec. 
4692). Hence it is held in the Pension Bureau that the 
granting of a pension for "permanent specific djsability" 
does not necessarily imply an adjudication that the disability 
is one which can not terminate. 
On the other hand, the "wa.iting orders" of this statute 
are not the same thing as the ''waiting orders" previously 
known in the Revenue Cutter Service. For instance, the pay 
of a captain under the old" waiting orders" is $1,800 a year 
(sec. 2753); under the new "waiting orders," $1,250. More-
over, the former "waiting orders" did not affect the line of 
promotion. 
On the whole, I think that the act should be construed as 
establishing a class of officers who may be properly termed, 
as you term them, upon "permanent waiting orders;" that 
this class are neither upon "waiting orders" properly so 
called nor upon a retired list; that while they are upon 
3513-V0L 21, PT 2--6 
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"permanent waiting orders" they are withdrawn from the 
line of promotion, but that in case their disability should be 
found to have ceased at any time they may be restored to 
the Service in their former rank. 
I have not referred to the proviso ''that the number of 
officers upon the active list now authorized by law shall not 
be increased by this act." It is impossible to give any effect 
whatever to this proviso, because there is no legal limitation 
of the number of such officers. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
PUBLIC WORKS. 
The Secretary of the Navy has no power to incur any obligation for 
work on an uncompleted dry dock when the appropriation has been 
exhausted, even though immediate action is very important. 
DEP .A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE, 
January 2, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of December 30 with relation to the new dry dock in the 
Brooklyn Navy-Yard. I assume that you have referred me 
to all the statutory provisions specially referring to this dry 
dock. It appears that the work upon the dry dock is not 
yet ~ompleted, but that the appropriations therefor have 
been exhausted; that by an immediate expenditure of about 
$1,500 the efficiency of the dock will be greatly promoted; 
but that the condition of the work is such that the change 
mu t be made at once in order to avoid a very great increase 
in the co t, amounting to many times the snm for which it can 
b now done. You inform me tha·t the contractors are will-
ing to und rtake the additional work and wait for an appro-
pria ion act for their pay; and you a k whether you have 
authori to incur any obligation. In view of the provisions 
of ion 7 2, 373 , and 5~03 of the Revi ed Statutes, I 
d to an wer in the n ati ve. 
r re p c full 
J DO H.ARMO . 
Th E. T.A.R THE 
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REMISSION O~, PENA_!-,TIES. 
In proceedings for remission of penalties under the act of June 22, 1874, 
chapter 391, the Secretary of the Treasury may return the findings to 
the United States commissioner for a further hearing before him upon 
a claim of newly discovered evidence. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 4, 1896. 
SIR: Your communication of December 31 asks my opinion 
whether it is within your discretion in remission proceedings 
under the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, sec-
tions 17 and 18, to return the findings to the United States 
commissioner for a further hearing before him upon a claim 
of newly discovered evidence. It was the opinion of the 
court in The Palo A.Ito (2 Ware, 343), that the Secretary had 
such power under the act of March 3, 1797, chapter 13, sec-
tion 1, which, so far as the present question is concerned, is 
similar to the act now in force. Your question is therefore 
answered in the affirmative. It would appear from the result 
of the case above cited that this power to order rehearings 
is one of much greater advantage to the claimant than to 
the Government. The question, however, whether any 
restrictions are needed, is one for the sole determination of 
the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Very respectful1y, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. 
An irregularity in the certification of the name of an eligible for appoint-
ment under the civil service is cured by the probational and absolute 
appointment of such a person. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 9, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of December 31, accompanying a letter from the Civil Serv-
ice Commission, asking my opinion upon the case of Mr. 
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Frank 0. Moore. It appears that on February 11, 1895, the 
surveyor of customs at St. Louis, Mo., in accordance with the 
civil-service rules, requested certifications of male eligibles 
for .filling two vacancies in the grade of clerk. Moore_'s name 
was the sixth on the eligible list, and should probably there-
fore not have been certified (Customs Rule IV, sec. 1), 
although possibly, had everything been done regularly, it 
would eventually have appeared. (General Rule IV, sec. 3.) 
The surveyor, assuming, as he had a right to do, that the 
certification made to him was in accordance with the civil-
service rules and regulatiom1, selected Moore, who was pro-
bationally appointed, served six months, and was then 
absolutely appoi~ted to .fill one of such vacancies. It is 
not suggested that the certifying of Mr. Moore's name was 
due to anything but a mere error or inadvertence on the part 
of the person who drew the certificate, or that Moore was 
in any wise responsible for or a party to the error. Nor is 
there any complaint as to his .fitness or .fidelity in the dis-
charge of his duties. You ask me, among other things, 
whether Moore's appointment "can be considered conclu-
sive, notwithstanding the fact that his place on the eligible 
list did not entitle him to certification." 
The civil-service act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, sec-
tion 2, relating to the civil-service rules, provides, among 
other things, as follows: 
"When said rules shall have been promulgated it shall be 
the duty of all officers of the United States in the Depart-
ments and offices to which any such rules may relate to aid 
in all proper ways in carrying said rules and any modifica-
tions thereof into effect." 
The same section provides that positions in the classified 
service " hall be filled by selections according to grade from 
among tho e graded highest as the results of such competi-
i ve examination ; " but it doe not specify the number of 
eligible from w horn a election may be made. That is left 
to be d termined by rule drawn by the President. 
Th r mu t be some point of time when the mere irregu-
laritie in certification mu t be regarded a cured. The civil-
s rvi e rul hav n great r dignity than the law which 
authorize h m, and it would be highly unreasonable that 
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persons who have· left other employments should be ousted 
from positions which they are satisfactorily filling simply 
because it is discovered that employees of the Civil Service 
Commission have made mistakes in their certifications. To 
hold that the irregularity in the present case has been cured 
by the probational and absolute appointments of Mr. Moore 
and by his long service is in line with the decisions of the 
courts upon cognate questions, and with the opinion of 
Attorney-General Miller in 20 Opinions, 274, in which it was 
held that an appointment made contrary to the rule of appor-
tionment enjoined by the statute should not be disturbed 
because the violation of the rule bad been due to mere inad-
vertence, though the fault was that of the appointee in fail-
ing to give notice cf a change of residence which occurred 
between his examination and his appointment. I therefore 
answer that the appointment should now be considered con-
clusive. The irregular certification should not, under the 
last paragraph of Customs Rule IV, section 1, be counted 
against the persons certified with Moore. This is the only 
correction of the error which is now possible. 
Answers to the other questions put by the Civil Service 





Revised Statutes, section 5294, as amended by the act of December 15, 
1894, chapter 7, applied to fines aud penalties only, and did not 
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to remit a forfeiture. 
A clear omission from a statute can not be supplied upon any considera-
tions of supposed oversight, inconsistency, or hardship. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 10, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of January 8 relating to the American schooners Winchester 
and Bowhead. It appears from your letter that libels for for-
feiture are pending against these vessels under the Bering 
Sea act of April 67 1894, chapter 57, section 8. Application 
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has been made to you for a remission of · the forfeiture, and 
you ask my opinion as to your authority to consider it. 
If these proceedings had been brought for the purpose of 
collecting pecuniary penalties, like that under consideration 
in The Laura (114 U. S., 411), you would have the power to 
remit under section 5294 of the Revised Statutes as amended 
by the act of December 15, 1894, chapter 7, which is as 
follows: 
"The Secretary of the Tr~asury may, upon application 
therefor, remit or mitigate any fine or penalty provided for 
in Jaws relating to vessels, or discontinue any prosecution to 
recover penalties denounced in such laws, except the· penalty 
of imprisonment or of removal from office, upon such terms 
as he in his discretion shall think proper." 
These proceedings, however, are not to collect penalties, 
but, as I understand, to enforce forfeitures of the_ vessels, 
together with their tackle, etc~ 
Section 5294 is contained in a chapter of the Revised Stat-
utes which includes other sections providing for remission 
in various cases. These sections recognize the well-known 
distinction between a penalty and a forfeiture. (Secs. 5292, 
5293, 5204, 5295.) Other sections of the Revised Statutes 
show that the distinction was observed by the revisers. 
(Secs. 1841, 1958, 2858, 3078, 3461; see also the anti moiety 
act of June 22, 187 4, chap. 391.) 
Section 5292 of the Revised Statutes provides for the miti-
gation or remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred 
under the customs and navigation laws. Section 5294 pro-
vided for the remission of fines or penalties provided for in 
law relating to steam vesse]s, but did not mention forfei-
tures. The amendment extended the section to all vessels, 
but did not broaden its terms so as to include forfeitures of 
e el . 
clear omis ion from a tatute, like this, can not be sup-
pli d upon any consideration of upposed ov rsight, incon-
si ten y, or hard hip. 
am th r fore compelled to advi e yon that you have no 
au hority to r mit in the pre n a e. 
ry r pectfull JUDSO HARMO . 
h EORETARY F THE TREA URY. 
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SECRE1'ARY OF WAR-BRIDGES. 
Where a State has granted authority to construct a bri<lge over a navi-
gable river, and the location and plan have been approved by the Sec-
retary of War, the question whether the purchasers of such right are 
authorized to proceed is one which does not concern the Government. 
The action of a State with reference to the rights of the parties among 
themselves concerning the construction of a bridge does not affect the 
interests of the United. States so long as the directions concerning the 
location and plan of the bridge are respected. 
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, . 
January 18, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of January 15 concerning the East River bridge commission. 
It appears that by an act of the legislature of the State of 
New York, approved March 9, 1892, chapter 101, the East 
River Bridge Company was incorporated for the purpose of 
constructing a bridge over certain navigable waters between 
the cities of New York and Brooklyn; and that by an act of 
May 27, 1895, chapter 789, a commission was provided for, 
representing the cities of New York and Brooklyn, which 
commission was authorized to purchase the rights and pow-
ers of any corporation which might possess a valid charter 
to build said bridge, it being the intent of the act that the 
bridge should be built by the commissioners as a public 
enterprise. 
By section 7 of the river and harbor act of September 19, 
1890, chapter 907, as amended by section 3 of the river and 
harbor act of July 13, 1892, chapter 158, it was made unlaw-
ful to commence the construction of any bridge in navigable 
waters of the United States under any act of the legislative 
assembly of any State untii the location and plan of such 
bridge be approved by the Secretary of War. 
You inform me that under this act your predecessor has 
approved a location and plan submitted by the East River 
Bridge Company for the bridge aforesaid. You now ask me 
whether, by purchase of the rights of the East River Bridge 
Company, the commission aforesaid is authorized to proceed 
to construct the bridge. This is a question which I do not 
think concerns the Government. The action of the State of 
New York with reference to the rights of the parties among . 
themselves does not affect the interests of the United States 
so long as your directions concerning the location and plan 
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of the bridge are respected by whatever corporat~on or com-
mission may actually perform the work of building it. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
RAILWAYS-SECRETARY OF WAR. 
The Secretary of War it1 not authOiized to approve a survey of a railway 
over lands of the United States, under the provisions of the act of 
July 29, 1892, chapter 322, where the inner rail of said railway will be 
less than the required distance from the point specified in said act. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 21, 1896. 
Sm: In your letter of January 15, 1895, you request an 
opinion from me as to whether or not you are authorized to 
approve a certain survey of the railway of the Washington 
and Great Falls Electric Railway Company over lands of 
the United States pertaining to the Washington Aqueduct, 
under the provisions of the act incorporating said company, 
approved July 29, 1892, as follows: 
"Wherever the said railway shall run over or across any 
of the lands of the United States or any of the accessory 
works of the Washington Aqueduct, as provided in this act, 
it shall be done only on such lines, in such manner, and on 
such conditions as shall be approved by the Secretary of 
vVar and accepted by said company, and no work shall be 
done on aid rail way on any of said lands until after such 
approval and acceptance in writing." 
You state that in the survey of which approval is asked 
'' the inner rail of said Washington and Great Falls Rail-
way will be "Jess than 100 feet of the middle of the paved 
I ortion of the Conduit road," but will not be le s than 50 
fi t from the am , and that the Wa biugton and Great 
FaJl I ailway omp ny ha purchased the property, rights, 
and fran hi of th (+Jen Echo Railroad Company, "incor-
p ra db , n a t f ougr approved Jun 15, 1 92, and 
Iaim b right of that purcha · , to be entitled to locate the 
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inner rail of its railroad less than 100 feet from the middle of 
the paved portion of the Conduit road, provided it will not 
be less than 50 feet from the same." 
_The act of July 29, 1892, entitled "An act to incorporate 
t he Washington and Great Falls Electri~ Railway Company," 
provides that "the inner rail of said Washington and Great 
Falls Railway shall not at any place on the line of said rail-
way be less than 100 feet from the middle of the paved por-
t ion of the Conduit road." 
This is a restriction upon your authority to approve, and 
I am of opinion that the language set out in your letter 
above quoted does not authorize an approval of the survey 
as submitted. 
The act of June 15, 1892 (27 Stat., 51), does not incorporate 
the Glen Echo Railroad Company. It merely gives it a 
license "to extend and operate its line of railway across the 
Washington Aqueduct and the land pertaining thereto in 
Mont gomery County in said State." The provision that "at 
no point on the line of said Glen Echo Railroad, except at 
the crossing aforesaid, or of any extension of said railroad 
under whatever name, shall the inner rail be less than 50 
foot from the middle of the paved portion of the Conduit 
road," is not a license but a restriction upon the license 
above given. 
Said act does not authorize the Glen Echo Railroad Com-
pany to parallel the Aqueduct upon land of the Government 
upon condition that the inner rail shall not come within less 
than 50 feet from the middle of the paved portion of the 
Conduit road. 
The papers accompanying your letter show that the loca-
t ion sought to be made by your approval on land of the Gov-
ernment is not incident to nor in any way connected with 
the exercise of the right to cross conferred by the act of June 
15, 1892. On the contrary, the portion of the road thus 
sought to be located would take merely a small strip on the 
south edge of the lands of the Government, entering and 
leaving such lands on the same side. 
I am. therefore of opinion that there is nothing in this act 
which affects the question submitted by you. 
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ACCOUNTS. 
The Dockery Act of July 31, 1894, chapter 174, does not require the Sec-
retary of the Treasury to report to Congress the bala:pces due on postal 
accounts for the past fiscal year. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 23, 1896. 
Srn: Section 12 of the so-called Dockery Act of July 31, 
1894, chapter 174, relating to the rendition of public accounts 
to the auditors of the Treasury, provides that you may waive 
delinquency of the accounting officers in certain cases. The 
following provisions also are contained in the same section: 
"And provided further, That this section shall not apply 
to accounts of the postal revenue and expenditures there-
from, which shall be rendered as now required by law. 
"The Secretary of the Treasury shall, on the .first Monday 
of January in each year, make report to Congress of such 
officers as are then delinquent in the rendering of their 
accounts or in the payment of balances found due from them 
for the last preceding fiscal year. Sections two hundred and 
.fifty and two hundred and seventy-two of the Revised Stat-
utes are repealed." 
Your communication of January 20 asks my official opin-
ion whether you are required to report to Congress the bal-
ance due on postal accounts for the past fiscal year. I 
think that thi question should be answered in the negative. 
ry re pectfully, 
J DO HARMO . 
Th 'E R TA Y THE T EA URY, 
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ACCOUNTS-TRANSPORTATION OF ENLISTED MEN OF THE 
NAVY-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The methods adopted in settling accounts for transportation of the · 
Army under the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 183, are not applicable 
to accounts for the transportation of enlisted men of the Navy and 
Marine Corps. 
An omission by Congress of some accounts from an act providing for 
the settlement of certain accounts for transportation shows that it 
was not the intention of Congress to make said act apply to all 
accounts for transportation furnished under preceding acts. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 24, 1896. 
SIR: I have examined the question which you submit to 
me by your letter of 22d instant and have the honor to give 
my opinion thereon as follows: 
The question is, "Whether or not the methods adopted in 
settling accounts for transportation of the Army under thA 
act of March 3, 1879, should not be regarded as applicable 
to accounts for the transportation of enlisted men of the 
Navy and Marine Corps." 
As you very properly put it, the act of March 3, 1879 
(:!O Stat., 420), dealt only with the settling of accounts-a 
mere matter of bookkeeping. It provides that the act shaU 
in nowise affect rights or duties under existing laws. · The 
opinion of the Attorney-General, to which you refer (20 
Opin., 11), related to the construction of the acts which 
created rights and duties. It he]d that the provisions of 
those acts that railroad companies to which the Government 
has furnished aid in construction, shall "transport mails, 
troops, and munitions of war, supplies and public stores," 
included the transportation of marines and seamen enlisted 
in the Navy as well as officers and men belonging to the 
Army, both being intended to be included in the word 
''troops." 
The act of March 3, 1879, however, applies in terms only 
to accounts ''for transportation of the Army and transporta-
tion of the mails." While it may be doubtful whether 
accounts for the transportation of "munitions of war" come 
under this act, it is clear that accounts for transportation of 
"supplies and public stores" do not, so that Congress omitted 
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from the accounts covered by the act of March 3, 1879, some 
accounts for transportation of articles under previous laws. 
The only possible theory upon which it could be held that 
accounts for transportation of the Navy were intended to be 
included in the expression "transportation of the Army," 
would be that the clear intention was to · make the act of 
March 3, 1879, apply to all accounts for tra.nsportation fur-
nished under preceding acts. That possibility is taken away 
by the undoubted omission of some accounts, so that, in my 
opinion, the act does not apply to accounts'for transportation 
connected with the Navy. 
While there is no apparent reason for this discrimination 
on the part of Congress, I see no escape from the conclusion 
I have expressed as to the meaning of the language which 
Oongress has employed. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. 
An agent of the Government who receives money to pay secret agents is 
not guilty of either receiving or being concerned in receiving a con-
trilmtion for a political purpose, within the meaning of the act of 
January 16, 1883, chapter 27, where he received and honored an order 
from one of said secret agents to pay money out of the next remit-
tance he should receive to a person not in the Government service as 
a contribution in aid of a political campaign, it appearing that said 
agent had nothing whatever to do with soli citing, inducing, or caus-
ing said secret agent to give the order, and had no relation or connec-
tion with the person to whom he paid the money, and had no concern 
in or control over the money after it was so paid, although he knew 
for what purpose it was paid. 
aid act does not forbid voluntary contributions for political purposes 
by p r ons in the employ of the Government, but protects such per-
son from solicitation or coercion with respect to such contributions. 
DEPAR'l'MEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
Jamiary 25, 1896. 
IR: I hav th honor to giv my opinion upon the qu stion 
whi h you ubmit in ur l tt r of 2 din tant with r lation 
the ca f . M. B llm n an agent of your D partment, 
TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 299 
Contributions for Political Purposes. 
against whom the Civil Service Commission have filed a 
charge upon which you are required to act. 
1t appears from your statement that prudential. reasons 
have led you to adopt a peculiar system with regard to secret 
agents. Instead of receiving their pay directly from your 
Department they receive it from postmasters in designated 
cities. Those postmasters send the money in envelopes by 
express to one of these agents located in the Department at 
Washington for that purpose, who&e duty it is to reship these 
packages by express to the various agents at the points 
where they may happen to be. Bellman was the agent 
detailed for this service." The established practice was for 
the agents to send orders to Bellman to open the envelopes 
so received by him directed to them, and make payments out 
of the money therein to their families, creditors, etc., which 
he did. One of the agents on duty at Chicago sent an order 
to Bellman at Washington to pay $50 out of the next remit-
tance be should receive to a person in Washington not in the 
Government service. Bellman honored the order and paid 
the money accordingly at the private office of this person. 
It is clear from your statement, which is based upon the 
transcript of evidence which accompanied your letter, that 
Bellman had nothing whatever to do with soliciting, inducing, 
or causing the agent in Chicago to give the order, and had 
no relation or connection whatever, direct or indirect, with 
the person to whom he paid the money, and no concern in or 
control over the money after it was so paid. Bellman's rela-
tion to the transaGtion was as purely mechanical as th~t of 
. a banker who simply pays the check of a depositor. 
It appears that the money was a contribution by the agent 
in Chicago in aid of a political campaign which the party to 
which he belonged was conducting in one of the States, arnl 
that this fact was known to Bellman when he received 
and carried out the order. The charge is that Bellman's 
action was a violation of sections 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, or of 
one or more of them, of the act "to regulate and improve 
the civil service of the United States." (1 Supp., 392.) 
It is well settled that the intention of this act was not to 
forbid voluntary contributions for political purposes by per-
sons in the employ of the Government, but to protect such 
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persons from solicitation or coercion with respect to such 
contributions. Knowing the difficulty of detecting the actual 
operation of means and influences whose employment had 
become a public evil, Congress absolutely prohibited the 
solicitation or receipt of political contributions by all persons 
in the Government service in any place or in any way, and 
forbade such solicitation or receipt by any person in any room 
or building occupied in the discharge of official duties. .All 
who are in the Government service are thus protected against 
the possibility of actual coercion and from that of the coer-
cion implied in the relation of the person soliciting or receiv-
ing to the Government or implied in solicitation or receipt 
in a public office; but Congress did not attempt to prohibit 
solicitation by or payment to persons not in the Government 
service otherwise than in Government offices. The agent in 
Chicago therefore had a right to make the contribution to 
the persou in Washington, either with or without the solici-
tation of such person; and if the agent had himself taken 
the money to such persou no question would have arisen. 
Sections 13 and 14 of the act clearly have no bearing what-
ever upon the question of Bellman's conduct. The only 
question is whether he received or was concerned in receiv-
ing a political contribution in violation of sections 11 and 12. 
Section 12 may be laid aside for the purpose of the inquiry, 
because, as Bellman was in the public service, the place 
where he received the contribution, if be received it at all, is 
quite immaterial. 
Bellman's action must therefore be judged by section 11 
alone. I can not see how it can fairly be said that it was a 
violation of the provisions of this section. It is admitted 
that he did not solicit the contribution. Nor can it be said, 
iu any proper sense of the term, that he received it. He 
pby ically took the money from the package, but he did so 
rn r ly as th agent of the owner, and so long a it remained 
in hi p ion be held it a the agent of the owner, who 
had a right at any time to revoke hi order and reclaim the 
m n . Thi right continu d until Bellman a ·tually hand d 
th mon yo r to the third per on, who alon can be said 
t h 1 it. Wh n he rec ived it it wa from th 
h b hand of B llman and uot from 
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Bellman. He was accountable to the agent in Chicago and 
not to Bellman for its use or misuse. Bellman had no more 
to <lo with the transaction than a mere messenger would have 
had to whom the owner had handed it for delivery. The 
receipt of money, etc., intended by the statute is acceptance 
of possession which confers a right of disposal, not possession 
which simply constitutes the taker a mere custodian without 
right on his own behalf or that of others. 
The phrase •' in any manner concerned in soliciting or 
receiving " was intended to cover evasions of the purpose of 
the statute and to punish all persons for whom or on whose 
behalf or at whose instance the person actually receiving 
the money is acting. Your statement excludes all relation 
whatever on the part of Bellman to the transaction other 
than the mere physical one which I have already described. 
In my opinion he was not guilty of either receiving or being 
concerned in receiving a contribution for a political purpose 





Books imported for the purpose of sale to any customers who may apply 
are dutiable under the tariff act of 1894. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 3, 1896. 
Sm: Answering your communication of January 31, I have 
the honor to say that, in my opinion, books imported for the 
purpose of sale to any customers who may apply are not free 
of duty under paragraph 413 of the tariff act of August 27, 
1894, even though imported to take the place of books which 
had been previously imported by the same person, and upon 
which duties had been paid by him, and which he had after-
wards sold to a State library. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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OPTION-SHILOH BATTLEFIELD. 
A contract of option for the sale of certain lands to certain officers of 
the Shiloh Battlefield Association considered and held not to consti-
tute a very serious cloud upon the title to the land referred to. 
DEP .ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE, 
February 3, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of January 17, with inclosures as stated, all 
of which are herewith returned. 
Referring to the contract of option of 22d of December, 
1893, from H. Duncan and J. R. and S. B. Duncan, by which 
they " agree to sell to John A. McOlernan, president, E. T. 
Lee, secretary, and J. W. Colman, treasurer, of the Shiloh 
Battlefield Association, certain land therein referred to," you 
request that I advise you "if tbis option would, in point of 
law, be considered valid and a sufficient cloud upon the title 
to preclude a purchase by the Government, supposing such 
purchase be consummated prior to the expiration of the 
option. In other words, can these options be disregarded, 
supposing that mutual agreements a.s to price be entered into 
satisfactory to the United States and to the owners, and 
supposing always that the titles are good in all other 
respects , ,, 
I have examined all of the exhibits accompanying your 
letter and have considered what I understand to be the sub-
ject upon which you desire my advice, and beg to reply as 
follows: 
The contract of option-a copy of which accompanies the 
letter of Cornelius Cadle of January 8, 1896, addressed to 
you, and one of the exhibits with your letter-does not, in 
my opinion, con~ titute any very erious cloud upon the title 
to tbe land referred to in it. It i hardly clear and explicit 
nough in its description of the land to put a purchaser upon 
llO i e. 
I tipulate for waiver and conveyance of borne tead and 
do er, wh n the wive~ of the vendors are not partie to the 
agreement. 
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It purports to have been duly admitted to record in the 
clerk's office of the State court, when, so far as it appears on 
its face, it has not been duly acknowledged by the vendors 
and is not attested by witnesses as to either of the vendors, 
and appears further to have been executed by a partnership 
firm. 
In addition to this, Mr. E.T. Lee, who appears from the 
exhibits with your letter to be the obdurate and recalcitrant 
party to the transaction, was not acting in his own rights 
in obtaining these options, but for the Shiloh Battlefield 
A ssociation, of which he was secretary. 
It must be that the association, then, in its corporate or 
partnership character, as the fact may be, is the only person 
who could assert a claim under this contract of option; and 
Mr. E.T. Lee must look to that association for the amount 
of his personal claim for services which he asserts in one of 
his letters. 
If all the contracts of option for these lands are like in 
form to the one submitted in your letter, I do not think that 
they afford ground tojustify serious apprehension of loss to 
the Government by disregarding them altogether. 
It would seem, however, especially in view of the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court in the Gettysburg cases, that 
the most comrenient and economical course for the Govern-
ment to pursue to obtain title to so much of these lands as 
may be desired would be by proceedings for condemnation 
in the Federal courts for the judicial district in which the 
land lies; and such proceedings may well be instituted after 
the 4th day of March, 1896, o_n which date all the contracts 
for option referred to expire. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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·suPPLIES-CONTRACTS. 
Contracts for the purchase by the Government of seals used to secure 
packages entered for transportation in bond must be awarded upon 
a,d vertisement. 
It is unlawful for the head of an Executive Department to make a con-
tract for such supplies for a longer term than one year from the time 
the contract was made. 
Locks and seals used to secure packages while being transported in 
bond, paid for and owned by common carriers, are not required to be 
. purchased upon advertisement. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 5, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of January 24, 1896, requesting an opinion as to.whether 
or not certain fastenings for bonded cars, and packages 
entered for transportation in bond, are such supplies as are 
governed by section 3709, which provides for awarding con-
tracts upon advertisement. 
It appears from your l(jtter that seals used to secure pack-
ages in transportation are purchased and paid for by the 
Government. 
As to these, I think there can be no question tbat section 
3709 applies, and also section 3735, which makes it unlawful 
for any Executive Department to make a contract for sup-
plies for a longer term than one year from the time the con-
tract was made. 
It appears from your letter that locks and seals use.d fqr 
securing cars are paid for by the common carriers. 
The purpose sought by section 3709 was to give the Gov-
ernment the advantage of competition in prices. 
The locks and seals for securing the cars never become the 
property of the Government. 
While sections 3001 to 3007, inclusive, Revised Statutes, 
and the act approved June 10, 1880 (21 Stat., 173), and sec-
ti n 2998, Revised Statutes, referred to in your letter, con-
template and authorize that bonded goods in transportation 
hall be ecured by eal and locks, there is nothing requiring 
that the eals and locks shall be furnished by the Govern-
men. 
The bject i to prevent the perpetration of frauds upon 
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the Government during transportation, and this is to be 
accomplished under the rules and regulations of the Treas-
ury Department providing for proper fastenings. 
If, by contract with the common carriers, the expense of 
these fastenings can be saved to the Go-l ernment, I see no 
reason why it should not be done. 
They are at all times under the control of the officers of 
your Department. 
The conclusion that these locks and seals are supplies 
within the meaning of section 3709 would carry with it the 
necessary result that they must be paid for by the Govern-
ment, for that section certainly was not intended to apply to 
what the Government did not purchase and own. 
I am therefore of the opinion that section 3709 does not 
apply to fastenings paid for and owned by common carriers. 
Respectfully, · 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
SECRETARY OF WAR-NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
It is the duty of the Secretary of War to act upon a petition to have 
designated the portion of a river within which refuse matter may be 
discharged, in accordance with the provisions of the act of August 18, 
1894, ch. 299, sec. 6, although the navigability of the river will not 
be affected. 
The Secretary of War, in deciding this question, should be governed 
only by considerations affecting. the navigation of the river, or which 
may affect future navigation. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 12, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of February 8, 1896, in which, after setting out section 
6 of the river and harbor bill (28 Stat., 363), you say: 
"New River in Virginia is a 'river of the United States, for 
the improvement of which money has been appropriated by 
306 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
Secretary of War-Navigable Waters of tlle United States. 
Congress,' and the Crozier · Iron Company and others have 
located on and near it extensive mining and ore-washing 
industries, to maintain and carry on which it is necessary to 
discharge into the river large quantities of ore-washing; a 
material of such a character that it is conceded to be a vio-
lation of the said section of law to discharge it into the river 
'elsewhere than within the limits defined and permitted by 
the Secretary of War.' 
''And the owners of the industries mentioned have peti-
tioned the War Department to designate a portion of the 
river as 'limits defined and permitted by the Secretary of 
War,' within which they may discharge ore washings into 
the river without violating the provision of law referred to. 
But it has been determined by investigation and report of 
the Chief of Engineers that the discharge of the ore wash-
ings into the river does not and will not affect the naviga-
bility of the river, and that therefore the navigation interests 
are not concerned in the matter of a portion . of the same 
being designated as they request. And your opinion is 
desired as to whether, in view of the fact that the naviga-
bility of the river is not and will not be affected by discharg-
ing the ore washings into the stream, and that therefore the 
navigation interests are not concerned, it is the duty of the 
Secretary of War to take action in the premises, and to 
either decide against the petitioners and reject their applica- · 
tion, or decide in their favor and designate a portion of the 
river, accordingly as the merits of the case may appear to 
him-that is, is it the duty of the Secretary of War to act 
on every petition presented under the circumstances involved 
in this case, or is it only his duty to act in cases in which the 
interest, of navigation will be affected? 
'' ow, while the navigability of the river would not be 
affected if the prayer of the petitioners should be granted, 
and th navigation int rest are therefore unconcerned as to 
wb ther it i granted or not, interested parties are urging 
that it hould not be granted because, as it is claimed, the 
di bar e of the ore wa bing into the river destroys the 
ft b, pollute the ater o a to destroy it usefulne for 
dom i purpo e and injure the cenery along the str am. 
nd iu c you d terrnine that it i tile duty of the ecre-
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tary of War to act on the petition, your opinion is requested 
as to whether it is his duty to take into consideration, in 
deciding the matter, only the interests and importance of the 
mining and ore- washing industries and Ila vigation and the 
navigation interests, and decide iu favor of the petitioners 
and designate a portion of the river when he :finds that this 
will not injuriously afl'ect•navigation to a greater extent than, 
in his opinion, the interests and importance of the mining 
and ore-washing industries warrant, or whether it would be 
proper for him to also take into consideration the matter of 
the discharge of ore washings into the river injuriously 
affecting the :fish and the water of the streain and the scen-
ery along the same, and decide to grant the petition or not 
accordingly as he found the merits of the case to be with 
these things considered along with the others mentioned 
above." 
Section 6 is as follows: 
"That it shall not be lawful to place, discharge, or deposit, 
by any process or in any manner, ballast, refuse, dirt, ashes, 
cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other 
matter of any kind other than that :flowing from streets, 
sewers, and passing therefrom in a liquid state, in the waters 
of any harbor or river of the United States, for the improve-
ment of which money has been appropriated by Congress, 
elsewhere than within the limits defined and permitted by 
the Secretary of War." * * * 
First. I am of the opinion that it is your duty to act upon 
the application. 
If you should decline to act in this and similar cases the 
above section would operate as an absolute prohibition. 
This was not the intention of Congress. The fact of lodg-
ing a discretion with the Secretary of War clearly shows 
that the prohibition is to be removed when it is not neces-
sary to effect the purposes contemplated by Congress in the 
exercise of the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. 
Second. The discretion given to the Secretary of War is 
very broad, and no principles governing it are declared. · 
There is no appeal from his action. These facts impose the 
obligation of a careful scrutiny of the considerations which 
should control his judgment. 
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The jurisdiction of Congress over New River, so far as this 
question is concerned, is based alone upon the power to reg-
ulate commerce between the States, and it must be assumed, 
notwithstanding the broad language used in the act, that 
Congress has not sought to exceed its powers. 
If Congress had passed a statute to protect the fish or 
scenery of New River, or the purity of its water, if it bore no 
relation to navigation, and to that end bad prohibited the 
acts referred to in your letter, its invalidity would be con-
ceded, because these are subjects which belong to the States 
alone. 
As Congress could not directly legislate for these pur-
poses, it could not and has not sought to reach them indi-
rectly through the discretion committed to you. 
You should, therefore, be governed only by considerations 
affecting the navigation of the river, and if there be none 
now, then by considerations which may affect future naviga-
tion, whether it is likely to become important or not, which 
Congress must be presumed to have had in mind in author-
izing the frequent and large expenditures which have been 
made in the improvement of the river. 
Respectfully, · 
JUDSON HARMO . 
The SECRET.A.RY OF W A.R. 
PUBLIC WORKS-SECRET.A.RY OF W A.R. 
If in the judgment of the Secretary of War justice either to the Govern-
ment or to the contractors on the works at tlle outh Pass channel of 
the Mississippi River requires him to determine the actual height of 
average :flood tide as a datum of measurement, he h as the right to 
determine sucll height. 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 13, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to give my opinion upon the matter 
ubmitted by our letter of December 2, viz, "the applica-
ti n of the executor of the estate of James B. Eads for 
r adju tment of the datum plane of average flood tide to 
hl h he ounding in the channel at the South Pas Jet-
ti . re referred by the in pecting officer." 
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By the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 463), Eads was '' to 
construct such permanent and sufficient jetties and such 
auxiliary works as are necessary to create and permanently 
maintain, as hereinafter set forth, a wide and deep channel 
between the South Pass of the Mississippi River and the 
Gulf of Mexico." He was to secure a navigable depth of 
20 feet of water through the pass within thirty months, and 
an additional depth of not less than 2 feet during each suc-
ceeding year thereafter. He was to receive $5,250,000 "for 
constructing said works and obtaining a depth of thirty feet 
in said channel, and the annual sum of one hundred thou-
sand dollars for each and every year that said depth of 
thirty feet shall be maintained by the jetties and auxiliary 
works aforesaid in said South Pass during twenty years 
after :first securing the said depth." 
Payments were to be made on certified statements of an 
engineer officer to be detailed by the Secretary of War, re-
porting the depth of water and width of channel secured 
and maintained from time to time. Partial payments, aggre-
gating $4,250,000, were provided for when certain depths of 
channel should be produced and maintained, and "when a 
channel thirty feet in depth and three hundred and fifty 
feet in width shall have been obtained by the effect of said 
jetties and auxiliary works aforesaid the remaining one 
million dollars shall be deemed as having been earned." 
But this amount was to be retained as security, interest 
at 5 per cent per annum being payable semiannually "from 
the date when a channel of thirty feet in depth and three hun-
dred and fifty feet in width shall have been first secured." 
Further, after securing the said channel, $100,000 per 
annum was· to be paid in equal quarterly payments every 
year that it should be maintained by the effect of said je_t-
ties and auxiliary works for a period of twenty years. At 
the end of the :first ten years one-half of the $1,000,000 re-
tained was to be paid, and the other half at the end of the 
second ten years, " the said channel of thirty feet in depth 
and three hundred and fifty feet in width having been main-
tained" continuously during such periods. 
The Government reserved the right to pay the sum so 
reserved at any til_Ile, thereby terminating its liability for 
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interest and Eads's liability for the maintenance of the jet-
ties, but has never exercised this right. 
The Chief of the Coast Survey was directed to cause a 
careful topographic and hydrographic survey to l,e made of 
said pass and bar and submit the same to the Secretary of 
War, "in order to facilitate the proper location of said jet-
ties * * * and to correctly determine such effects as 
may be produced by them." The results of such surveys 
were to be furnished to Eads . 
.At the end of the recital of the various depths of channel 
which were to entitle Eads to the partial payments amount-
ing to $4,250,000 is this clause: "The respective depths and 
widths of channel being measured at average flood tide, as 
ascertained and determined by the Secretary of War." But 
while no directions are given for measurements during the 
period of maintenanr-e, the only fair construction is that 
they were to be made in the same manner. 
It was made the duty of the Secretary of War to report 
payments and all important facts relating to the progress of 
the works, their character and permanency, to the end that 
Congress might be kept fully ad vised as to the faithfulness 
and efficiency with which the works were being executed, 
"it being expressly understood that while said Eads shall 
be untrammeled in the exercise of his judgment and skill in 
the location, design, and construction of said jetties and aux-
iliary works, the intent of this act is not simply to secure 
the wide and deep channel :first above named, but likewise 
to provide for the construction of thoroughly substantial and 
permanent works by which said channel may be maintained 
for all time after their completion." 
The act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 376), made some slight 
changes as to tbe payment of the installments, its relevant 
provisions being as follows: 
"When a channel thirty feet in depth, without regard to 
width, hall have been obtafoed through the jetties, there 
hall be paid :five hundred thousand dollars; and the one 
million dollar provided for by the hereinbefore recited act 
t b p id by he nit d States in ten and twenty year 
hall e, rned by ai l Ead and bi associate , and the 
c m ith intere t, shall b paid to said Eads or bi legal 
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representatives at the times and in the manner provided by 
said act. 
"The one hundred thousand dollars per annum provided 
by said recited act to be paid to said Eads and his associ-
ates during a period of twenty years shall be paid at the 
times and in the manner therein provided, upon the main-
tenance by said Eads and his associates of a channel through 
. the jetties twenty-six feet in depth, not less than two hun-
dred feet in width at the bottom, and having through it a 
central depth of thirty feet without regard to width." 
The jetties and other works were completed, the required 
depth of channel was produced and has been maintained, 
Eads receiving the stipulated yearly payments. 
The present application is based upon the alleged fact that 
the average flood tide is now, and has been for several years, 
about 1 foot higher than the plane established in 187 5, and 
that the u~e of the plane so established as a datum necessi-
tates the maintenance of a channel 1 foot deeper than was · 
contemplated by the law, resulting in needless additional 
expense, delay of payments, and loss of interest. 
From the letter of General Craighill, Chief of Engineers, 
which you inclose, it appears that when the height of aver-
age flood tide was ascertained in 1875 bench marks and a 
gauge were established as a basis for future measurements; 
but from the reports of the officers in charge of the measure-
ments it appears " that at the present time and for several 
years past the reading on the United States official gauge at 
Port Eads of the plane of mean high tide bas been about 1 
foot higher than it was in 1875." 
The Chief of Engineers states that " the plane of high 
tide as indicated by the gauge is unstable, the curve of changes 
haR not been regular, and, while uniformly higher, at times 
recedes, having at the present time a downward tendency. 
These changes must result from changes in the level of the 
Gulf tides, the tendency being higher, or from a general sub-
sidence of the delta of the Mississippi, together with the 
gauge and bench marks to which it is referred. The only 
fact which can now be particularly stated is that the eleva-
tion of the Gulf level as ref erred to the gauge and established 
bench marks has changed since 1875." 
3i2 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
P u b Ii c Works - Secretary of War. 
It is not clear, according to the statement of the Ohief of 
Engineers, whether the change is a real or only an apparent 
· one, the increased reading on the gauge being due, as claimed 
by some, to a genera.I subsidence of the delta together with 
the gauge and bench marks. 
The only question is, whether in either case, viz, that of 
an actual change in the height of average :flood tide, or that 
of a disturbance of the bench marks by which its height in • 
1875 was indicated, you have authority, for the purpose of 
present and future measurements, to ascertain the actual 
average height of flood tide for the time being. · 
In the latter case your authority is undoubted. It cer-
tainly was not intended that an artificial mark should be 
substituted for a natural level and adhered to at all events. 
In the former case your authority is the same. I find 
nothing in the law which fairly justifies the construction that 
when once the height of average flood tide was ascertained, 
for the purpose of determining whether the channel provided 
for had been produced, that level should be adhered to dur-
ing the subsequent period of maintenauce, whatever might 
happen. ·whether Congress did or did not contemplate the 
possibility of changes which might cause the average height 
of flood tide to vary does not appear, but it is plain that the 
object which it intended to secure was a certain depth of 
water in the channel at the average height of :flood tide. And 
this object would not be certainly secured unless the obliga-
tions which Congress intended to impose and Eads to assume 
were to adapt his work to the actual situation, fixed if the 
situation remained the same, varying as the situation might 
change. In other words, it was a condition which was to be 
produced and maintained, not a specific work; a volume of 
water, not an artificial waterway. 
uch being my view of the true construction of the acts in 
que tion, my opinion is that you have the right whenever, in 
your judgment, ju tice either to the Government or to the 
con ractor o requires, to determine the actual height of 
av rag flood tide a a datum for mea urement. 
Thi view seem to be confirmed by the fact stated by the 
ngin r thu~ vhile the height of average flood tide at the 
m uth of tb pa i affected on1y 1... y the natural ebb and 
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flow of the waters of the Gulf, its height at the head of the 
pass is affected also by the state of the river and possibly 
other causes which introduce greater possibilities both of 
original inaccuracy and of subsequent changes. 
The period to be covered by observations for the purpos~ 
of fixing the proper average depends on science, not on law; 
but it should be sufficiently long to include every phase of 
the situation as it is affected by the various causes which 
operate upon it. 
As the surveys, measurements, and observations doubtless 
involve expense, I deem it proper to add that in my opinion 
you are authorized to 1·equire such expense to be provided 
for by the representatives of Eads when it is to be incurred 
on their application. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR. 
UNMAILABLE MATTER-LOTTERY. 
The business of a certain company considered and determined to be in 
the nature of a lottery within the meaning of the United States 
statutes. 
The name "lottery " covers any determination of gain or loss by the 
issue of an event which is merely contrived for the occasion. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 24, 1896. 
Sm: I have carefully examined the papers which accom-
pany your letter of December 9, requesting my opinion with 
respect to your action in refusing use of the mails to various 
''bond and investment companies." Those papers included 
briefs of counsel for the companies and of the Assistant 
Attorney-General for your Department. I have also heard 
counsel and had briefs from them. I have the honor now to 
give my opinion as requested. 
The statute (sec. 3929, as amended September 19, 1890, 26 
Stat., 466) provides that "The Postmaster-General may, upon 
evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is 
engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme 
for the distribution of money or of any real or personal prop-
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erty, by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind," direct that 
registered letters directed to ~mch person or company be 
withheld and returned to the senders, and that payment of 
money orders payable. to such person or company be refused. 
By the act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 964), these powers 
are "extended and made applicable to all letters or other 
matter sent by mail." 
These acts were within the constitutional authority of 
Congress, and empower you to deny all mail facilities to those 
whom you ma.y find to be engaged in any of the classes of 
business described. (Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S., 727; In re 
Rapier, 143 U. S., 110.) 
Your remaining question is whether the business conducted 
by the companies you name, as it is disclosed by the evidence 
before you, comes within the description given by the statute. 
I have chiefly considered the case of "The Pettis County 
Bond and Investment Company," of Sedalia, Mo., that being 
t.he :first one you name, the one which has been most heard, 
and the one which presents what is claimed and appears to 
be the strongest case. I shall therefore give my opinion upon 
that case only, believing that it covers all the others. If you 
think it does not, I shall be glad to consider any to which 
you may call my attention. 
The question presented has twice been the subject of opin-
ions by my immediate predecessor (20 Opin., 748, and 21 
Opin., 4), who in each case concurred in the conclusions which 
the .Assistant .Attorney-General for your Department bad 
reached after careful study and exhaustive research. I can 
see no difference in principle between the case now presented 
and those covered by the opinions just cited. In fact, all 
companies of this class are alike in their general design and 
differ only in details and methods. The design is to induce 
sub criptions for bonds by holding out the chance of receiv-
ing large sum for mall payments, the chance depending 
on the numbering of the bonds. The schemes for determin-
ing the fortunate number vary, and so do the terms in which 
th bond an l coupon expr s the undertaking of the com-
p ni ; but it an not be fairly denied that, without the ever 
pre nt chance of p edily getting much for little, not one of 
th mpanie uld attem1 t to do busine s or succeed in 
th ttempt if made. 
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While the forms of legitimate investment are carefully pre-
sented, they alone would not tempt the most unwary. I do not 
mean that they are necessarily intended to deceive, because 
they must be known by the public generally, as well as by the 
promoters, to be designed merely as a legal pretext or back-
ground for the schemes of chance in which it is the immediate 
and primary objecttoengage. That the intention is generally 
to carry out fairly those schemes as proposed and understood 
need not be denied; but this does not relieve them from legal 
condemnation. 
The Pettis County Company issues a bond for $1,000 upon 
payment of $10 and an agreement to pay $3 monthly until 
the four coupons which accompany the bond are all paid. 
The solicitor receives $9 commission out of the first pay-
ment. The remaining $1 and the monthly payments are 
divided among expense, redemption, and reserve funds. The 
bond has four coupons, numbered 1 to 4, each calling for $250, 
and bonds are numbered serially as issued. 
These coupons are payable in the order determined by the 
application to the numbers of the bonds of a rule partly 
serial and partly multiple, thus: 1, then 4; 2, then 8; 3, then 
12, etc. .A table showing, as an example, the operation of 
the rule up to 400, provided bonds bearing all the numbers 
are outstanding, is printed on the back of each bond. 
Except in the rule adopted to determine the order of pay-
ment, this plan does not materially differ from those of the 
myriad of such companies which were springing up all over 
the country until they were checked by your action in refus-
ing them the use of the mails. .As no subscriber could know 
what number his bond would bear when issued, he would 
simply take the chance, in paying bis $10, of receiving a 
bond which would soon yield him $250 at the expense, neces-
sarily, of the unlucky bondholders. This is so clearly a 
mere scheme of chance in the nature of a lottery, and has 
been so often held to be such by the courts, that it would be 
a waste of time to discuss it. 
In order to avoid this ruling, made in its own case, as I am 
advised, this company changed the form of its printed appli-
cation, so that instead of paying the $10 at the time of sign-
ing, the subscriber merely agrees to pay it if the bond is sat-
isfactory when delivered and examined. It is now claimed 
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that the subscriber takes no chance whatever because he does 
not embark in the scheme, unless he sees from his bond when 
presented that it bears one of the numbers which entitle its 
coupons to payment early enough to suit his views of expected 
gain. 
This is ingenious and specious enough, no doubt, to induce 
subscriptions by the unthinking. .At any rate, the company 
is eager to make the attempt, though it is not willing to elim-
inate the preferred coupon fea,ture. · But it is manifest that 
if every subscriber, by merely comparing the number on his 
bond with the order of :q.umbers printed on the back of it, 
could tell with any approach to certainty the. order in which 
his coupons would be reached for payment, nobody would 
take the bonds which are to be passed by; and unless these 
are taken there is an end of the business. One might as 
w_ell try to run an ordinary lottery without blanks as such 
a preference investment scheme without any unpreferred. 
Some must lose what others gain. It is manifest upon the 
slightest reflection that, as all the subscribers have the same 
right_ of rejection upon the presentation of the bonds, and the 
numbers are given upon issuance for presentation, no sub-
scriber can possibly tell how many of the bonds bearing lower 
numbers than his own are really outstanding when his bond 
is presented. So that it may justly be said that the change 
has made the chance feature of the scheme worse rather than 
better, because if the elements of uncertainty are not in fact 
increased they are given a fictitious appearance of certainty. 
It appears that although this company bas a capital of 
only 2,000, $100,000 in bonds have been deposited for it as 
required by a law of Missouri from insurance and other 
companies. This wa", of course, done by its promoters and 
shows their faith in the profitableness of the cheme. But if 
it be conceded that thi depo it is available to subscribers, 
whether to tho e who realize the profit which all hope for, 
or tho e, if uch there hould ever be, who keep up their 
pa m nt to the end and thereby escape the forfeiture which 
follo any default, tbi doe not affect the inqury as to the 
r al nature f the ompany husine, . A lottery is none 
the le a lo t ry b u it i fairly conducted or because 
u h ondu t i amply ~ cur d. 
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lt is claimed that actuarial computation shows that the 
"reserYe fuud" will be sufficient to pay off the unpreferred 
bonds at their maturity. Investment at a high rate of com-
pound interest, without any allowance whatever for loss of 
time or other loss, is assumed in the calculation. But assum-
ing its correctness, the lottery nature of the scheme does not 
disappear, because it is incredible that without the chance 
thereby afforded anyone could be found to pay money into 
such a company for twenty years without return. The coup-
ling of a sale or other ordinary transaction with a scheme of 
chance does not save it from legal condemnation. This is a 
very common device. 
It has been urged that the "investments" offered by these 
companies do not differ in principle from insurance, and are 
in fact '' fairer and better because the bondholder does not 
have to die or lose his property to realize them." The fallacy 
consists in confusing mere chance with uncertainty. One's 
property may not burn at all, and the time he will die is not 
k11own; but neither event depends upon mere chance, and the 
law therefore recognizes contracts contingent upon them while 
it doesnotcountenancelotteries. Yettheargumentad vanced 
applies as well to lotteries as to the preference feature of the 
business of this company. If the prizes in lotteries had been 
made to depend upon the happening of some serious event 
to which all persons are liable, it is quite likely that the law 
respecting lotteries would not be as it is. But the name 
''lottery," which originally implied casting lots, now covers 
any determination of gain or loss by the issue of an event 
which is merely contrived for the occasion. 
It is said, also, that as one of the features of these "invest-
ments" is that the bondholders who persist gain advantage 
from the forfeiture of the bonds of those who fail in their 
payments, the case presented is the same as that of insurance 
on the "tontine" plan. If one of these companies should 
eliminate the preference in payment of coupons -to be deter-
mined by the mere holding of a lucky number, this question 
might arise. But the chance of preference lies among bond-
holders of equal standing in all respects. The fact that the 
prospects of all who continue to pay are impr:oved by the 
dropping out of holders of bonds bearing lower numbers 
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does not eliminate the element of mere chance, and therefore 
does not alter the case. 
The principle of survivorship involved in tontine insur-
ance has been the subject of doubt and discussion because, 
in its simple form, it has been claimed to be mere wagering 
among tbe members on the length of their lives. Bat it 
involves no lottery element. If, however, to a series of ton-
.tine endowment policies a scheme should be added for pay-
ing some of them before maturity, according to the determi-
nation of any form of hazard, we should have ~ partial 
analogy to the present case. But the argument would fail 
because no such system has ever been held or admitted to 
be lawful. 
In my opinion the Pettis County Company comes within 
the terms of the statutes, and all other companies which 
promise payments to part only of a class, who all stand on · 
an equal footing, leaving the selection to depend on any rule 
of hazard, whether such payments constitute the entire 
scheme of their business or are connected with other features 





It is not necessary for the Secretary of Agrieulture to give a notice of 
furlough without pay of assistant microscopists over his official sig-
nature in each indf vidual case when their services are not required. 
A general order, signed by him, directing inspectors in charge of assist-
ant microscopists to furlough them without pay when their services 
are not required will be sufficient. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 24, 1896. 
SrR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
le ter of February 18, 1896, in which, reforring to assistant 
micro' opi t being furloughed by you without pay, you say: 
I would req ae tan opinion from your office as to whether 
it i ne e ary for me to give a noti e of furlough over my 
offi ial ignatur in each individual ase, or will a general 
ord r i n db me dire tin er in pe ·tor in charge of a i t -
pi t to furlough them without pay when their 
re no r uired be ufficient 
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"In view of the fact that the active employment of the . 
assistant microscopists depends upon the orders received by 
the packing houses, it was impossible to tell more than a few 
days ahead when their services would be required, and it is 
much more convenient to direct the inspector in charge to 
furlough without pay when necessary. It would be almost 
impossible for me to give individual furloughs in each case 
unless I sent to inspectors blank furloughs, signed, for them . 
to fill in with the name and time." 
In United States v. Murray (100 U. S., 537), it was held, 
where a clerk in the Treasury Department was furloughed 
against his remonstrance, that" there is nothing to prevent 
the Secretary from putting him on furlough without pay at 
any time, if the exigencies of the service require it. He 
may be dismissed absolutely, and it is difficult to see why, if 
this can be done, he may not be furloughed without pay, 
which is in effect a partial dismissal. If he desires to be 
free from all obligations to serve in the future he may resign; 
but if he permits his 1iarne to continue on the rolls it must 
be on sueh terms as are imposed by the Department." 
Your right to furlough can not be questioned. 
Inasmuch as the contingencies upon which it is desirable 
to furlough microscopists arise from time to time and upon 
conditions which you can not foresee nor control, the advan-
tages to the Government of this system would be largely 
sacrificed if you are compelled to act personally in each indi-
vidual case, and after the occasion bas arisen. I am of the 
opinion that you can make general regulations, under which 
your subordinates in charge of particular localities can, as 
circumstances call for such action, furlough microscopists, to 
take effect at once, reporting their action to you. 
I suggest that you employ microscopists who may have 
intermittent work, with the understanding that the employ-
ment is only from time to time as their services may be . 
needed, and that the furlough system is for their benefit and 
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DUTIES. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to refund penal duties 
which have been paid into the Treasury on the ground that they were 
incurred without willful negligence or an intention of fraud on the 
part of the importer. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'.I.'ICE, 
llfarch 13, 1896. 
SIR: Answering your communication of February 4, ask-
ing my official opinion as to your power to refund penal 
duties which have been paid into the Treasury under the 
provisions of section 7 of the customs administrative act of 
June 10, 1890, chapter 407, I have the honor to saythat sec-
tion 20 of the antimoiety act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391, 
to which you refer me, confers, in my opinion, no power to 
refund any duties, pena.l or otherwise. The cases in which 
you are authorized to refund duties were described in the 
opinions of this Department rendered September 21 and 
November 8, 1895. I can find no statutory authority to 
refund penal duties on the ground that they were incurred 
without willful negligence or an intention of fraud on the 
part of the importer. 
I return herewith the opinions of the Solicitor of the 
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An opinion given by the Attorney-General, which under the uniform 
practice of the Attorneys-General of withholding any expression of 
opinion on a mere moot question until a case has actually arisen, he 
mio-ht with entire propriety have declined to give. 
Any publication in an official circular of the ground upon which an 
employee of the Governmen1; has been suspended or discharged from 
th public service will not support a cause of action for libel against 
the officers making such publication, provided it was made in good 
faith, witbou t malice, in the performance of official duty, and with the 
design only f promoting the public interests. 
DEP .ARTME '.I.' OF JUSTICE, 
March 14, 1896. 
IR: I have the honor to a knowledge receipt of your let-
r f h 6 h in t nt, in lo ing a " pecimen of a, monthly 
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· circular issued by the Weather Bureau of the Department of 
Agriculture and distributed among its employees for the pur-
poses of information and discipline." You invite my atten-
tion particularly to such portions of the circular as are marked 
111 blue and ask my opinion whether "the printing anrl dis-
tribution of this circular might give cause for civil action 
against the Chief of the Weather Bureau for libel on the 
part of any person who13e name appears on such circular." 
Inasmuch as the circular has been already issued and dis-
tributed-and a cause of action, if any, has already accrued-
I am unable to perceive precb,ely the object of your inquiry 
for my opinion; and, indeed, uuder the uniform course of 
practice observed by my predecessors in office, I might with 
entire propriety withhold any expression of opinion at all on 
a mere moot question until a case has actually.arisen. But I 
may say for your information that any publication in an official 
circular of the ground upon which an officer or employee of 
the Government has been suspended or discharged from the 
public service will not support a cause of action for libel 
against the officer making such publication, provided it was 
made in good faith, without malice, in the performance of an 
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APPROPRIATION-SEEDS. 
The appropriation which was made for the purchase of seed .for the 
Agricultural Department, in accordance with the provisions of section 
527 of the Revised Statutes, for the year 1896 is available for pur-
chases made under joint resolution S. R. 43. 
Said joint resolution authorizes and directs the purchase and distribu-
tion of seeds for the year 1896 according to the practice which had 
been followed by the Departme:.::.: ~" Agriculture up to the year 1895, 
and the Secretary of Agriculture is to inquire how the distribution 
has been made in previous years, and follow the same course. If it 
has varied from year to year, he has a discretion, which he is free to 
exercise, but it will be a discretion of choice and not to do or leave 
undone. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 16, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested, 
upon the question submitted by your letter of 14th instant, 
whether, under joint resolution (S. R. 43) "authori_zing and 
directing the Secretary of ..Agriculture to purchase and dis-
tribute seeds, bulbs, and so forth, as has been done in pre-
ceding years," you are '' compelled to use any part of an 
appropriation which was made for the purchase of seed in 
accordance with the provisions of section 527 of the Revised 
Statutes." 
You ·were advised, ..August 15, 1894 (21 Opin., 55), that the 
act. making appropriations for your Department for the :fiscal 
year 1895 did not authorize the purchase of any other seeds 
than those described in Revised Statutes, section 527; that 
is to say, seeds "rare and uncommon to the country or such 
as can be made more profitable by frequent changes from 
one part of our own country to another." You were further 
advised upon the same subject ..April 20, 1895 (id., 162). ..Act-
ing under those opinions, you refrained from purchasiug and 
distributing seeds, as had theretofore been done by your 
Department, on the ground that the seeds which had been 
distributed and those which you would be able to procure 
for di tribution did not come within the description of seeds 
to which you are limited by section 527. 
The manifest object of the joint resolution was to author-
ize and direct the purclJa 'e and distribution of seeds for the 
year 1896 aceording to the practice which had been followed 
by your Department before your action above mentioned. 
The word "rare," which i found in section 527, is omitted in 
the re olution and the word" valuable" only used. While it 
i an unu ua] manner of lP.gislating to refer to previous prac-
ti e only as he tandard aud mea ure fot the official action 
dir cted I ee no r a on for ho]diug that the resolution i 
invalid or ineffective for that rea'on. You are thereby 
dire t d t "di tribute vah.w:.,:8 seeds for the year 1896, a 
ha b n one in preceding y ars." ou ar imply put to 
h inquiry how the di ri utio~ has been made in previou 
r .·, a11d r quired t foll , h ame •our e, o far a 
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practicable, for the year named. The resolution assumes that 
the course has been uniform in previous years. If it has 
varied from year to year you have a discretion which you 
are free to exercise, having in mind the general object of 
legislation on the subject, but it will be a discretion of choice 
and not a discretion to do or leave undone. fo other words; 
the plain intent and effect of the resolution are to remove all 
question of the construction of previous legislation on t~e 
subject and direct you to distribute seeds for the present 
year as has, in fact, been done heretofore, whether strictly 
in conformity with law or not. This Congress unquestion-
ably had the authority to do. If an amendment or suspen-
sion of existing legislation be involved, such amendment_ or 
suspension is accomplished by the resolution. · The direction 
is mandatory and should be followed. 
The object of the last part of the resolution was to remove 
all doubt as to your authority to purchase seeds for distribu-
tion without resorting to advertisement for bids, a question 
of such authority having been raised by you in the commu-
nication upon which the second opinion above cited was 
given. You are authorized and directed to make purchases 
for the current year in the open market at your own discre-
tion, provided you do not pay more than a reasonable and 
fair price. The appropriation for the purchase of seed for 
the year 1896 is available for purchases which you make 
under the resolution. 
RespectfuUy submitted. 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE. 
ACCOUNTS--MISTAKE OF LAW. 
A soldier should not be held accountable for money paid him in excess 
of the amount he was entitled to where such payment was made 
through a mistake of law on the part of the executive officers of the 
Government. · 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
jlpril 1, 1896. 
SIR: I beg to acknowlPdge tte receipt of the communica-
tion of Capt. Owen J. Sweet, Twen-ty-fifth Infantry, U.S. A., 
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of February 23, 1896, to the Adjutant-General of the Army, 
"referring to a communication from the .Adjutant-General's 
Office of date February 17, 1896, stating that the records on 
file in that office show Private Edward Langford, Company D, 
Twenty-fifth Infantry, to have been erroneously mustered for 
arlditional pay on account of continuous service in explanation 
of his action in mustering the soldier for $4 per month addi-
tional pay since March 28, 1894, was by virtue of remarks on 
descriptive and assignment roll of the soldier to that effect 
and that the overpayment of $231.13 will be entered as a 
stoppage on muster and pay roll of the company against 
the soldier and that the soldier will be mustered for $2 per 
month for five years' continuous service as directed, etc.," 
which communication, by the in<lorsements thereon, appears 
to have been forwarded through regular channels to the 
Adjutant-General's Office of the War Department and by the 
Secretary of War referred to the Judge-Advocate-General of 
the Army, with the request that he return the paper, with 
an expression of his opinion as to whether or not, in view of 
all the circumstances of the case, the Secretary of War has 
the power to remove the stoppage on account of overpayment 
to the soldier of the amount of $229.13 (to December 31, 
18!l5); and by a further indorsement thereon presents the 
clear and well-reasoned opinion of the Judge-.Advocate-
General of the Army, supporting the conclusion expressed 
by him that the money so paid to Private Ed ward Langford 
in excess of the amount which that soldier was entitled to 
was made through a mistake of law on the part of the 
executive officer of the Government, for which the soldier 
hould not be held accountable. 
I fully concur in the reasoniug and conclusion here ex-
pre ed. 
In Colon 1 wayne' ase (17 Opin., 448), Colonel Swayne 
a cepted a commi ' ion a colonel of the Forty-fifth United 
ate Infantry on the 10th eptem ber 1866. From the time 
f hi appointment a colonel to 1 t .Augu t, 1867, when he 
wa int rm mu tered out of the rvice as major-general of 
ol nteer , olonel wayue ontinued to draw the pay of 
n ral. Th que tion pre ented for opinion was, 
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whether the Government was entitled to set off against his 
allowance for percentage increase so much of the pay re-
ceived by him · as :µiajor-general from the 10th September, 
1866, the date of his acceptance of the appointment of colo-
nel, to 31st August, 1867, when he was mustered out of the 
service as major-general of volunteers, as represents the 
excess of a major-general's pay over that of a colonel. 
Mr. Brewster, Attorney-General, was "of opinion that 
upon principles of administrative policy which ought to be 
considered firmly established the settlements between Colo-
nel Swayne and the accounting officers in the matter of his 
pay as major-general of volunteers are conclusive ·upon the 
executive department of the Government and can not be 
reopened in the way indicated." 
John W. Pulliam, captain~ assistant quartermaster, United 
States Army, filed a claim for service .Pay "under any and 
all laws allowing credit for cadet service at United States 
MiJitary Academy." Re was allowed $583.09 on that claim. 
After that allowance was made the Supreme Court of the 
United States held all such allowances to be without the 
authority of law. Captain Pulliam afterwards filed a claim 
for longevity rations a_nd increased pay. It was proposecl to 
set off against the .amount to which be was justly entitled 
the sum which had been improperly paid to him. Mr. Miller, 
Attorney-General (19 Opin., 439), held, following the rule 
in Lamborn v. County Commissioners (97 U. S., 185), that "a 
voluntary payment made with a full knowledge of all the 
facts and circumstances of the case, though made under a 
mistaken view of the law, can 110t be revoked, and the money 
so paid can not be recovered back;" that" the settlement in 
Captain Pulliam's case can not be reopened upon the ground 
that it proceeded on a mistaken view of the legislation 
governing the subject involved." 
I am clearly of opinion that the rule of law thus invoked 
and applied for the relief of educated and experienced offi-
cers of the Army should apply ct multo fortiori for the relief 
of an ignorant and unlettered private soldier who bad no 
part whatever in the statement of the accounts which resulted 
in the balance paid to him and who appears to have been paid 
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The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
DUTIES. 
The operation of section23 of the customs administrative act is not con-
fined to damaged goods. 
It is not the intent of Congress that the United States should in any 
case exact ·as duties an amount greater than the value of the property 
imported. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 10, 18.96. 
SrR: I have the honor to acknowlerlge your communica-
tion of March 31, 1896, asking my official opinion as to the 
constructio1i of section 23 of the customs administrative act 
of June 10, 1890, chapter 407, which is as follows: 
"That no allowance for damage to goods, wares, and mer-
chandise imported into the U11ited States sha1I hereafter be 
made in the estimati011 and liquidation of duties thereon; 
but the importer thereof may, within ten days after entry, 
abandon to the United States all or auy portion of goods, 
wares, a11d merchandi e included in any invoice, aud be 
r lieved from the payment- of the duties on the portion o 
abandoned : Provided, That tlrn portion so abandoned shall 
amount to ten per centu1I,1 or over of the total value or 
quantity of the invoice; and the property so abaudoned 
baII be 'old by public auction or otherwh;e disposed of for 
tb a c unt and ·r dit of t.b United State' under such reg-
ulation , a, th cretary of th~ Tr asury may pre ·cril>e." 
n a 1 me wheth r an import r of good , no part of 
wl1i ·h i.· <lama0·ed ma be r lie ed from the payment of the 
duti n c ny por i n (not I , . than 10 per ~entum iu value 
r nanti ·) f hi inv i by ah, 11doni11g it to tlie United 
t·1t . Ju my pinion h l eratiou of thi ection i not 
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eonfined to damaged goods, and it is not the intent of Con-
gress that the United States should in any case exact as 
duties an amount greater than the value of the property 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
N A VY-CONTRACTS OF MINORS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
A minor who at, the age of 19, with the consent of his father, enlisted 
in the Navy, has not the right on coming of age to demand his dis-
charge under the rule which applies to his ordinary civil contrac.ts. 
The United States have the right to prescribe the rules and conditions 
under which voluntary or compulsory services are to be rendered by 
citizens. 
The period at which persons reach their majority and become sui jur-is 
with respect to the ordinary affairs of life can not abridge this power 
of the General Government. 
If a statute authorizes a minor by enlistment to bind himself during _ 
his minority, he can bind himself for a further period. 
The phrase "other persons" in the act of Ma.rch 2, 1837, included mi-
nors above 18 as well as men of full age. 
DEPAR'.l.'MEN'r OF JUSTICE, 
April 16, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion on the question 
submitted in your letter of the 9th instant, whether or not 
one who at the age of 19, with the consent of his father, 
enlisted in the Navy, has the right on coming of age to 
demand his discharge under the rule which applies to his 
ordinary civil contracts. 
The question is controlled by the following sections of the 
Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of May 12, 1879 (21 
Stat., 3), and by section 2 of the act of "February 23, 1881 
(21 Stat., 338): 
"SEC. 1418. Boys between the ages of fourteen and eight-
een years may be enlisted to serve in the Navy until they 
shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years; other persons 
may be enlisted to serve for a period not exceeding .five years, 
unless sooner discharg~d by direction of the President. 
328 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
Navy -- Cont r :L ct s of Minors - St a.tutor y (;on st r n c ti on . 
"SEC. 1419. Minors bet.ween the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen years shall not be enlisted for the naval ervice 
without the consent of their parents or guardians. 
"SE·c. 1420. No minor under the age of sixteen years, uo 
insane or intoxicated person, and no deserter from the naval 
or military service of the United States shall be enlisted in 
the naval service. 
"SEC. 1G24, ART. 19. Any officer who knowingly enlists 
into the naval service any deserter from the naval or mili-
tary service of the United States, or any insane or intoxi-
cated person~ or any minor between the ages of fifteen and 
eighteen years, without the consent of bis parents or guar-
"diau, or any minor under the age of fifteen years, shall be 
dishonorably dismissed from the service of the United 
States." 
It will be noted that section 1418 provides that all persons 
other than boys between 14 and 18 years may be enlisted to 
erve for a period not exceeding five years. Section 1419 
requires the consent of parents and gua,rdians for the enlist-
ment of such minors; but no such condition is required by 
this or any other law for the enlistment of minors over 18. 
Section 1420 prohibits the enlistment of any minor under 
14, but there is no prohibition against enlisting minors over 18. 
Section 1624, article 19, requires the dishonorable dismissal 
of any officer who knowingly enlists into the naval service a 
minor under 18 without the consent of his parents or guardian; 
but there is no penalty for enlisting minors over 18 with or 
without such consent. 
It js clear from these provisions that Congres has author-
ized the enlistment in the Navy of minors who are over 18, 
and that the consent of parents and guardian i not nece -
ary to make the enli tment valid. 
The United States are empowered to raise and maintain a 
navy, and have a right to prescribe the rules and condition 
nnd r which voluntary or compulsory services are to be ren-
dered by itizen . 
The p riod at which per ons reach their majority and 
be ome ,"ui juri · with re pect to the ordinary affair of life 
an not a ridg tbi pow r of the Creneral Government. If 
th ral tate hould, a the may, extend the period of 
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minority to the age of 25, it is manifest that the power of the 
Federal Government to provide for the common defense would 
be greatly abridged if its relations with its citizens, in respect 
of service in the Army or Navy,arelimited by the status which. 
such citizens have under State laws. Our armies and navies 
would lack stability if terms of enlistment could be abridged 
at the will of those who reach their majority according to the 
laws of their States of domicile. 
As a minor over 18 can by enlistment bind himself during 
bis minority, there is no reason why he can not bind himself 
for a further period. 
The conclusion I have reached is not in accord with that of 
my predecessor, the Hon. JolmNelson . . (4 Opin., 350.) He 
treated the question as if citizens of the United States sus-
tain the same relation to the Government with respect to 
service in the Army and Navy as they do to ordinary persons 
in matters of contract, and tests the question by the usual 
rules applicable to the contI;acts of minors. 
In re McNulty, 2 Lowell, 270 (Federal Cases, 8917), minors 
over 18, who enlisted without the consent of their parents, 
were discharged on habeas corpus. The reasoning of that 
case is opposed to my conclusion, but carried to its logical 
result it would deny the right of the Government to enlist 
any minor over 18 with or without the consent of parent or 
guardian, for it holds that the act of March 2, 1837 ( 5 Stat., 
153), now carried into section 1416, which provided for enlist-
ing "boys" between the specified ages and "other persons," 
meant by the latter only men of full age by the law of the 
State where the contract of enlistment is made. This con-
struction would entirely deprive the Government of authority 
to enlist minors over 18, although it is well known that this 
class is peculiarly desirable and may be necessary for mili-
tary and naval service. I know of no reason for supposing 
that Congress did not consider minors above 18 to be "per-
sons." On the contrary, the use of the expression '' other 
persons," after the mention of minors under 18, shows that 
Congress had no such idea. 
It seems clear to me that minors between 14 and 18 are · 
treated as one class and their enlistment made lawful con-
ditionally, while all persons over 18, whether of age or not,. 
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were included in the phrase "other persons" who may be 
enlisted for five years. This view is supported by In re 
Doyle (18 Fed. Rep., 369), which sustained the enlistment of a 
minor over 18 made without consent of parent or guardian. 
If the statute authorizes the enlistment of a minor, then 
his contract is binding. (Tyler on Infancy and Coverture, 
sec. 96.) If it is bindin_g, it affects him just as it would affect 
any other person. It is not strange that the Government, 
which bas the undoubted right to require the involuntary 
service of minors, should provide for obtaining it volun-
tarily. 
In reaching a conclusion I have been ·much influenced by 
Judge Story's discussion of the principles involved. (See 
United States v. BainlJridge, 1 Mason, 71.) 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.ARY OF THE NAVY. 
WORLD'S FAIR-MEDALS. 
The law authorizing tl.ie Secretary of tl.ie Treasury to furnish electro-
t,ypes and photographs ot tl.io medals of award to exhibitors at the 
·world's Fair to whom medals have been awarded, and to newspapers 
and periodicals for publication, carries with it the authority to those 
to whom snch electrotypes and photographs may be furnished. to have 
prints made therefrom without further or lllore specific authority. 
The exhibitors, printers, or publishers have not the right to insert the 
u·ame of the exhibitor in the blank space which will be used for that 
purpose on the medal. 
After the exhibitors shall have received the medals and diplomas 
awarded tl.iem, the Treasury Department has no further authority over 
th m, and is not authorized to say what use shall or shall not bo 
made of them, or to restrict the-making or using of facsimiles of them 
by exhibitors to whom they have been awarded, beyond what is pre-
scribed by the express provisions of the statutes referred to in this 
opinion . 
DEPARTMENT OF Ju TICE, 
April 18, 1896. 
r, · your ornm · · 15th in tant, r fer-
f ct of u (27 tat., 3 9), and 
t a t f 7 tat., 87), und r 
, n ury Department to 
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make certain medals and diplomas to be awarded to exhibit-
ors at the World's Columbian Exposition; also to the .section 
in the general appropriation act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 
928), by which the Secretary of the Treasury is "authorized 
to furnish electrotypes or photographs of the medal of award 
of the World's Columbian Exposition to exllibitors to whom 
medal has been awarded, at the expense and cost of such 
exhibitors, and also to furnish the same to newspapers and 
periodicals for publication, provided the publishers to whom 
the electrotypes or photographs are furnished pay the ex-
penses thereof, but that no electrotypes or photographs shall 
be furnished to any persons except those to whom medal bas 
been awarded and to newspapers aud periodicals paying for 
the same, and any other person printing facsimiles of said 
electrotypes or photographs of said medals shall be liable to 
the penalty prescribed by act of August 5, 1892." 
You request an expression of my opinion "whether the 
law authorizing the furnishing of electrotypes to exhibitors 
carries with it also the authority to have prints made there-
from, or must the printers and publishers receive authority 
from the Department before using the electrotypes in the 
advertisements of their customers." 
You further inquire whether "either the exhibitors or 
printers or publishers hnive the right to insert the name of 
the exhibitor in the blank space which will be utilized for 
that purpose on the medal." 
You further request to be advised whether, "after the 
exhibitors shall have received the medals and diplomas 
awarded them, this Department_ has any further authority 
oTer them, or any authority to say what use shall or shall 
not be macle of them, or to restrict the making or using of 
facsimiles of them by exhibitors to whom they have been 
awarded." 
The evident purpose and intent of Congress in its legisla-
tion on this subject was that the medals and diplomas 
awarded to exhibitors at the World's Columbian Exposition 
should receive and retain the character of credible and 
abiding testimon-ials of the truth of . what is inscribed on 
them, and to that end severe penalties were attached to 
counterfeiting and to fraudulently and unlawfully having in 
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possession or causing to be circulated any duplicate or 
counterfeits of such medals or diplomas. 
In an opinion heretofore given by me, in response to a 
request from you of November 4, 1895, I stated that section 
3 of tbe act of August 5, 1892 (27 Stat., 389), which author-
ized the Secretary of the Treasury to give the holder of a 
medal properly awarded to him permission to have dupli-
cates thereof made at any of the mints of the United States, 
from gold or silver or bronze, at the expense of the person 
desiring the same, was repealed by act of March 3, 1893. 
(27 Stat., 587.) 
The purpose there manifested of denying- to lawful hold-
ers of such medals the privilege of having tl1e same dupli-
cated at the mints of the United States is Rtill more clearly 
evinced by the expr~ss provision of section 3 -of the act of 
March 3, 1893, prohibiting every person within the United 
States or any Territory thereof, without lawful authority, 
from making- or aiding or assisting in making any dies, hub, 
plate, or mold, in steel, plaster, or any other Rubstance what-
soever, in the likeness or similitude as to the design or 
inscription ther~on, of any die, hub, plate, or mold, desig-
nated for the striking of the medals and diplomas of award 
for ·the World's Columbian Exposition, as provided in section 
3 of the act of August 5, 1892. 
It appears from your letter that the provision of the act 
of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 928), authorizing tile Secretary of 
the Treasury to furnish electrotypes or pllotographs of the 
medals of award, was induced by the unexpected delay in 
the completion and delivery of the medals awarded to the 
exhibitors, and to enable the successful exhibitors to enjoy 
the privilege of u ing cuts of their medal8 without incurring 
the penalties prescribed by the act of March 3, 1892. 
Th act of l\farch 2, 1895, is specific in the authority granted 
to th Bureau of Engraving and Printing, under the uper-
vi ion of the ecretary of the Treasury, "to print upon tl.t 
blank 1iploma au horiz d by ection 3 of the act of Augu t 
,> 1 :c, a amend d by the act of farch 3, 1 93, the name 
f b 1) r n to whom the diploma are to be awarded by 
th rld lumbian "ommi 
h n t r pl a foll w : 
h Tr a ury to 
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furnish electrotypes and photographs of the medals of award 
to exhibitors to whom medals have been awarded, and to 
newspapers and periodicals fo~ publication, carries with it 
the authority to those to whom such electrotypes and photo-. 
graphs may be furnished to have prints made therefrom 
without further or more specific authority. 
2. The exhibitors, printers, or publishers have not the 
right, in my opinion, to insert the name of the exhibitor in. 
the blank space which will be utilized for that purpose on 
the medal. 
3. After the exhibitors shall have received the medals and 
diplomas awarded them, the Treasury Department bas not 
any further authority over them, and has not any authority 
to say what use shall or shall not be made of them, or to 
restrict the making or using of facsimiles of them by exhib-
itors to whom they have been awarded, beyond what is pre-







The S'.ECRE'l'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
SPECIAL PRIVILEGES-REGULATIONS. 
A limitation by the Secretary of the Treasury of the right to kill sea 
otter within a certain area to a certain race or class of people would 
be granting a special privilege and would violate section 1956 of the 
Revised Statutes. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 21, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested by 
your letter of the 18th instant. The question presented is 
whether Article VI of your proposed regulations as to the 
killing of sea otter conflicts with the last sentence of section 
1956 of the Revised Statutes. By act of Congress approved 
Febmary 21, 1893 (27 Stat., 4 72), the provisions of that sec-
tion are made applicable to the waters of the North Pacific 
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Ocean and Bering Sea as defined in the award of the Paris 
Tribunal. Sectiori 1956 prohibits the killing of various fur-
bearing animals, but permits you, under such regulations as 
you may prescribe, to authorize the killing of any such animals 
except fur seals, but provides that you shall not "grant any 
special privileges." Your said .Article VI prescribes that 
only resident natives of Alaska (Inoians) and a certain class 
of white men shall have the privilege of killing sea otter 
within said area. 
A special privilege is one which is not open to all persons 
alike who comply with terms and conditions fairly within 
the power of all. The limitation of a right to people of a 
specified race or class, therefore, is necessarily a special 
privilege. In my opinion, your proposed regulation would 
be a violation of the last clause of section 1956. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DUTIES. 
Section 14 of the customs administrative act did not in any way limit 
the power of collectors of customs to reliquidate duties in the interest 
cf the Government within one year after entry. 
DEPARTMENT OF ,JUSTICE, 
April 29, 1896. 
SIR: Answering your communication of .April 27, I have 
the honor to say that, in my opinion, section 14 of the cus-
tom administrative act of June 10, 1890, did not limit in 
any way the power of the collector of customs to reliquidate 
dutie in the interest of the Government within one year 
after the time of entry, as recognized in section 21 of the 
antimoiety act of June 22, 1874. (See opinion of General 
pprai er omerville, G. . 1304.) 
ery r pectfully, 
Tb ET R 
HOLMES CO R D, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. 
The certificate of eligibles delivered to the appointing officer by the 
,mbordinates of the Civil Service Commission is a complete authority 
to such officer to make any selection he may desire therefrom., and is 
a complete protection to the appointee. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 1, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of April 23, accompanying a letter from the Civil Serv-
ice Commission, asking my opinion upon the case of James 
P. Baggott. It appears that on March 14, 1896, the post-
master at Racine, Wis., iu accordance 'with the civil-service 
rules, requested a certificate of eligibles for filling a vacancy 
in a clerical posit,iou in his office. Baggott's name was the 
fourth on the eligible list and should not have been certified 
(Postal Rule IV), although possibly had everything been 
done regularly it would eventuaUy have appeared. (Gen-
eral Rule IV, sec. 3.) The postmaster, assuming, as he 
lrnd a right to do, that the certification made to him was 
in accordance with the civil-service rules and regulations, 
selected Baggott, who was appointed. So far as appears 
from the facts stated by the Commission, Baggott's appoint-
ment was made before the appointing officer was aware of 
the irregularity in the certification. 
This case is similar to that of Frank C. Moore, discussed 
in my opinion of J auuary D, 1896, except that in Moore's case 
the irregularity was not discovered until be bad served over 
six months and received an absolute as well as probationary 
appointment. In my opinion, however, this distinction is not 
material. The appointing officer must necessarily place abso-
lute reliance upon the certificate received by him from the 
board of examiners. The appointment is usually made 
promptly, and the appointee often gives up other employ-
. ment, so that it would be a great injustice to him to be thrown 
out of his new place in the Government service on account 
of a mistake made by som~ subordinate of the Civil Service 
Commission. 
I think that the regularity of the steps taken by the Civil 
Service Commission is not jurisdict_ional; and that, while the 
subordinates of that Commission are subject to discipline for 
3513-YOL 21, PT 2--9 
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such misfeasances as occurred in the present case, neverthe-
less the certificate which they deliver to the appointing offi-
cer is a complete authority to the latter and a complete pro-
tection to the appointee. 
Answering the first question submitted, therefore, it is my 
opinion that Baggott's appointment was legal. This disposes 
also of the second question. 
Answering the third question, as to whether there is "any 
·1aw or rule which will be ~ffective in preventing a board 
from securing the appointment of a person who is ineligible 
or who has never been examined by simply entering his 
name on the certificate," I know of no method except the 
selection of competent and careful boards of examiners. 
Doubtless every effort to this end has been made by the 
Civil Service Commission; and this case, therefore, must be 
classed among the mistakes that occasiona1ly and unavoid-
ably occur in all business affairs. I do not think that I can 
properly advise as to whether the eligible whose right to 




TAX ON STATE BANK CIRCULATION. 
The tax on State banks, imposed by the act of February 8, 1875, chapter 
36, sections 19 and 20 does not apply to paper which can not be used 
in the community as money without danger of total loss to whoever 
may take it. 
DEP AR'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 5, 1896. 
IR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of April 30, reque ting my opinion as to whether the 
:fi llowing order ''i uch a note, on the irculation of which, 
in li u of the money or c~rrency of the nited tate a ta.· 
f 1 I er entum i impo eel by ction 19 and 20 of the 
a t f bruar 1875 (1 tat., 311)." 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 337 
Tax on St1ite Bank Circulation. 
The order is as follows: 
"OFFICE OF COLUMBUS S.A. VIN GS B.A.NK, [10. 
'·No. 1.] "Columbus, Ga., 1st day of .April, 18.96. 
"Pay to Louis F. Garrard, or bearer, ten dollars ($10.00) 
in merchandise silver bullion, at retail. 
"H. B. CROWELL, 
".Assistant Treasurer. 
"To G. GUNBY JORDAN, 
"President." 
In HolUster v. Mercantile Institution (111 CT. S., 65), Chief 
Justice Waite, speaking for the court, said: 
"From this review of the legislation on the general subject, 
and the apparently studied use by Oongresf; of words of 
appropriate signification, whenever it was intended to cover 
anything el~e than promissory notes, in the commercial sense 
of that term, we are led to the conclusion that only such 
notes as are in law negotiable so as to carry title in their 
circulation from hand to hand, are subjects of taxation under 
the statute." 
If the instrument be expressed to be payable "in cash or 
specific articles" in the alternative, or "in merchandise," or 
in any other article than money, as, for instance, "an ounce 
of gold" (Roberts v. Smith, 58 Vt., 494), it becomes a special 
contract and by the law merchant loses its character as com-
mercial paper. In order to possess the quality of negotia-
bility it should afford on its face every element necessary to 
fix its value. 
The order here is not payable in money; it is payable in 
silver bullion, which is an article of merchandise; its value 
is measured in dollars; but the order is expressly for mer-
chandise and not for money. 
It is not a contract on which an action of debt could be 
maintained by the holder of it. It is not negotiable, can not 
t e used as currency, will not pass from hand to hand by 
delivery merely, without indorsement, can not in short, be 
used in the community as money without danger of total 
1os8 to whoever may take it, Hence, it is not, in my opinion, 
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such a note as is embraced within sections 19 and 20 of the 





JUDSON HARMO_,__ . 
The SECRE'.l.'ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DEPARTMENT CLERKS-DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE. 
Employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing are entitled to 
leave of absence under the act of July 6, 1892, chapter 154, notwith-
standing the provisions of the act of March 3, 1893, chapter 211, sec-
tion 5. 
When an act of Congress has received for ten years a uniform depart-
mental construction, which was known to Congress, and a subsequent 
act in pari 1nate1·ia is enacted, without change of language, there is a 
presumption of considerable force that the new language is intended 
to receive the same construction as the old. 
A general act does not operate as a r epeal of a prior special act when 
there is no necessary inconsistency in their standing together. 
The provisions of the act of 1893 apply only to clerks and employees in 
the city of Washington. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 6, 1896. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of April 30, 
asking my official opinion as to the statute governing leave 
of absence in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 
The act of July 6, 1892, chapter 154, applicable only to 
employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printiug, pro-
vides that they " shall be allowed leave of absence with pay 
11ot exceeding thirty day in any one year." It contain 
p cial provi ion for the pieceworkers in that Bureau, regu-
lating their pay while on leave of ab ence "by the average 
amount of work doue by uch person and the pay therefor 
durin th ev ral m nth of they ar." 
b l o-i lativ , t ., appropriation act of March 3 1 03 
b pt r .:111 tion o, a provi ion applicabl to all cl rk 
and tli r mplo ill th v ral x cutiv Departm n 
pr id hat th b ad of a D partment "may gran thirty 
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days' annual and thirty days' sick leave in any one year to 
each clerk and empioyee" with the possible extension of sick 
leave to sixty days "in exceptional and meritorious cases, 
where to limit such sick leave would work peculiar hardship." 
The question now presented is whether the act of 1893 
operates as an implied repeal of the act of 1892 and is appli-
cable to employees of said Bureau. 
The Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in his 
letter of May 4 to yourself, which has been submitted to me, 
claims that his Bureau is not strictly a part of any Executive 
Department. and therefore is uot within the purview of the 
statute of 1893. Assuming, however, that this claim is not 
well founded, and that the Bureau is properly a part of the 
Treasury Department, nevertheless it is my opinion that its 
employees are still subject to the provisions of the statute of 
1892. 
The language of the statute of 1893 describing the clerks 
and employees who are entitled to leave of absence there-
under is copied from the provision in pari materia of the 
legislative, etc., appropriation act of March 3, 1883, chapter · 
128, section 4. The Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing states in his letter that by the uniform departmental 
construction of the statute of 1883 it was held inapplicable 
to bis Bureau. This was certainly also the understanding 
of subsequent Congresses, as is shown by their action in 
adopting ~pecial legislation for the benefit of the employees 
of the Bureau. (Acts of March 3, 1887, chap. 392, and July 
. 6, 1802, chap. 154; Cong. Rec., Feb. 28, 1887, p. 2429, and July 
1, 1802, p. 5723.) When an act of Congress has for a con-
siderable period of time received a uniform departmental 
construction, and this construction was known to Congress, 
and a subsequent act in pari materia is enacted without 
cbang·e of language, there is a presumption of considerable 
force that the new language is intended to receive the same 
construction as the old. (20 Opin., 719, 721.) Moreover, the 
statute of 1893 contains no express repeal of or reference 
to the statute of 1892. There is no necessary inconsistency 
in the two acts standing together. The maxim generalia, 
specialibus non d,Jrogant applies, and the later act does not 
operate as an implied repeal. (Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S., 
340 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
Revenue-Cutter Service. 
556, 570.) It should be added that the nature of the work 
done in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing is so differ-
ent from that done in the other Executive Departments as to 
confirm the view that the special act governing leaves of 
absence to its employees was not intended to be repealed. 
I therefore have the honor to advise you that the statute 
of 1892 is still in force and is the only law governing leaves 
of absence in that Bureau. 
Your further communication of May 4 asks my opinion 
whether the above-cited provisions of the statute of 1893 
relate to all employees of your Department, whether located 
at the seat of Government or elsewhere. This question is, 
in my opinion, to be answered 1n the negative. As already 
stated, the persons affected by the act of 1893 were intended 
to be the same as those affected by the act of 1883, and by 
the settled executive and legislative construction of the 
former act its operation is confined to clerks and employees 
in this city: (See acts of June 27, 1884, chap. ]26; August 
28, 1890, chap. 812; October 1, 1890, chap. 1260.) 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE1'.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE. 
Sick seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the benefit 
of the Marine-Hospital fund provided for sick and disabled seamen. 
DEP .A.RTMEN'l' OF JUS1'ICE, 
May 7, 1896. 
SIR: r have your letter of May 2, requesting my opinion 
upon the questjon whether the Treasury Department "i 
required under existing law to extend the benefits M the 
Ma,rine-Hospital fund to the sick and disabled officers and 
eamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service." You call my atten-
tion to tb a t of June 29, 1870, March 3, 1875, and June 
20, 1 4, and you tate that while it would appear from 
tb wording of tion 1 of the act of June 29, 1870 that 
all rnm nt v el were xempt from the ho pital tax, 
amen on re enue ut r were r quir d to pay 
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this tax and that the regulations of the Revenue-Marine 
Service, paragraph 69, expressly provide for this contribu-
tion to the Marine-Hospital fund. 
A. review of the legislation on this subject from 1798, when 
the tax of 20 cents a month on seamen employed on vessels 
of the United States engaged in foreign and coasting trade 
was :first laid for the purpose of establishing such hospital 
fund, down to the present time shows that little, if any, 
regard was bad to symmetry or consistency in the adapta-
tion and structure of the several statutes. 
The fund for the maintenance of what was known as the 
Marine Hospital was derived originally, and as late as 1875, 
from taxes laid upon seamen employed on vessels of the 
United States arriving from a·foreign port or registered ves-
sels employed in the coasting trade. 
A.n obvious propriety would seem to require that a fund 
thus derived from the wages of seamen should be devoted 
exclusively to the care, comfort, and maintenance of those 
who contributed to the fund. 
By section 15 of the act of June 26, 1884, all the acts and 
parts of acts providing for the assessment and collection of a 
hospital tax for seamen were repealed, and the expenso of 
maintaining the Marine-Hospital Service thereafter was 
to be home by the United States out of the receipts for 
duties on tonnage provided by that act. So the United 
States Government from that time on has provided the fund 
from which this service has been maintained. 
While in the earlier acts the fund appropriated for the 
Marine-Hospital Service was directed to be employed "for 
the care and relief of sick and disabled seamen employed 
in registered, enrolled, and licensed vesse]s of the United 
Sta,tes," yet by the act of March 3, 1875, section 3, it was 
provided: 
"That term 'seaman,' wherever employed in legislation 
relating to the Marine-Hospital Service, shall be held to 
include any person employed on board in the care, preserva-
tion, or navigation of any vessel, or in the service, on board, 
of those engaged in such care, preservation, or navigation." 
This clearly embraces seamen on board revenue cutters. 
In the chapter of the Revised Statutes on the Government 
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Hospital for the Insane, section 4843, insane persons belong-
ing to the Revenue-Cutter Service are provided for in express 
terms. I do not think, however, that the express provision 
for them in that chapter justifies their exclusion from the 
other provisions of the statute wherein they are not expressly 
named. On the contrary, I think it manifest that the later 
statutes plainly indicate a general policy on the part of the 
Government to extend benefits of the hospital service to all 
persons, whether in the navy, marine, or revenue ~ervice. 
4-nd I am of opinion, therefore, that the sick seamen of the 
Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the benefit of the 






The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
NAVAL ACADEMY-APPOINTMENT OF CADETS. 
A cadet, nominated to the Naval Academy upon the recommendation of 
a Member of the House of Representatives who, since the recommen-
dation and nomination, has been unseated by contest of election, can 
not be lawfully deprived of his place if he passes his examination. 
The Secretary of the Navy is not to revoke such a nomination and notify 
the newly seated member that a vacancy occurs. He has no right to 
call for a new recommendation, except under section 1516, Revised 
Statutes, when the candidate fails to pass his examination. 
The notice provided for by section 1514, Revised Statutes, as amended, 
was intended to be given to the Member of Congress actually sitting, 
and the recommendation provided by said section was intended to be 
made by such Mero ber and action duly taken thereon should not be 
affected by any subsequent event, except the failure of the nominee to 
pass his examination. 
Until a deci ion is made which unseats them, Members of Congress 
who ats ar contested are con idered to be in all respects endowed 
with the same rights, power , and privileges as other members. 
R: I bav 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 7, 1 96. 
my opini n, a reque ted in 
ou a k hat i "the tatu 
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of a naval cadet recently nominated to the Naval Academy 
at Annapolis" upon the recommendation of a Member of the 
House of Representatives, who, since the recommendation 
and nomination, has been unseated by contest of election. 
The practical question is whether or not you are to revoke 
the nomination and notify the newly seated Member that a 
vacancy exists. 
The answer depends on section 1514, Revised Statutes, as 
amended July 26, 1894 (2 Supp., 206), which provides that-
"The Secretary of the Navy shall, as soon after the fifth of 
March in each year as possible, notify in writing each Mem-
ber and Delegate of the House of Representatives of any 
vacancy that may exist in his district. 
"The nomination of a candidate to fill said vacancy shall 
be made upon the recommendation of the Member or Dele-
gate, if such recommendation is made by the first day of J_uly 
of that year; but if it is not made by that time the Secretary 
of the Navy shall fill the vacancy by appointment of an actual · 
resident of the district in which the vacancy exists," etc. 
The date named in the statute was undoubtedly chosen 
with reference to the meeting of Congress. The require-
ment of prompt notice was due to manifest reasons of public 
policy. The object was not so much to confer a privilege on 
the Members of Congress as to insure full classes of cadets. 
Congress of course knew that nominees require time for 
preparation and travel, and also knew that seats of Mem-
bers of Congress are often contested; yet no exception was 
made with respect to notice in cases of Members whose seats 
are contested, and none for the suspension or revocation of 
recommendations iu such cases, or of the nominations made 
thereon. It follows, therefore, that Congress intended the 
notice to be given to, and the recommendation to be m·ade 
by, the Member of Congress actually sitting, and that action 
. duly taken thereon should not be affected by any subsequent 
event except the failure of the nominee to pass the exami-
nation. 
This is quite consistent with the general rules which apply 
to Memuers of Congress whose seats are contested. They 
are considered, until a decision is made which unseats them, 
to be, in all respects, endowed with the same rights, powers, 
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and privileges, as other members. Laws passed by their 
votes are valid; all acts done by them are binding, and 
there is no reason why a mere recommendation to an execu-
tive department should be governed by any different rule. 
Even if you had not acted upon the recommendation until 
after the Member who made it was unseated, your nomina-
tion thereon would be perfectly legal and valid. This was 
held by Attorney-General Bates (10 Opin., 46), who said, a 
question having arisen as between recommendations made 
by a Member of Congress and his predecessor, "I am clearly 
of the opinion that yon have power to appoint anyone who 
stands recommended by a Member of Congress who was, at 
the time he recommended, representing the district in which 
the applicant resiqes." The opinion sets forth the "very 
injurious, not to say absurd, results" which would follow from 
the view that the Member of Congress referred to in the 
statute is the one who represents the district at the time of 
final appointment or entry into the Academy. As the deci-
sion in a contested election case is not retroactive, new 
Members who succeed to seats made vacant by death or 
resignation must be held to occupy the same position with 
respect to recommendations as successful contestants. The 
uncertainty and embarrassment which would follow if recom. 
mendations should be considered annulled in such cases are 
quite apparent. 
But, however it might be in case you had not acted on 
the recommendation, I do not think you have any right to 
call for a new recommendation except under section 1516, 
which provides that, when any candidate nominated upon 
the recommendation of a Member of Congress fails to pass 
the examination, "the Member or Delegate shall be notified 
to :recommend another candidate," etc. 
As it appears from your statement that you acted on the 
recommendation while the Member who made it then actu-
aliy represented his district in Congress, my opinion is that 
the matter has passed beyond your reach, and that, if the 
can lidate pa ses the examination, he can not lawfully be 
d priv d of hi pla e. 
il th . xa t questi n was n t there con idered, ome 
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of the reasons for my opinion are sustained in 10 Opinions, 
494, and 21 Opinions, 164. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 
DU'fIES. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to permit collectors of cus-
toms to receive special deposits of penal duties, to be returned by them 
to the importers in case the duties should be remitted. All duties 
paid to the collector must be placed to the credit of the Treasurer of 
the United States. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'IOE, 
May 16', 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of May 8, in which you ask my official opinion whether you 
have the power to make a customs regulation whereby col-
lectors of customs in cases where penal duties have been 
assessed may receive the amount of such duty personally as 
a special deposit, pending your . action upon the importers' 
application for a remission or mitigation of the penalty, the 
amount to be returned to the importer by the collector's 
check should you grant such application, and to be turned 
into the Treasury by the collector should your decision be 
adverse. 
Section 3010 of the Revised Statutes provides that all 
moneys paid to a collector for "unascertained duties" shall 
be "placed to the credit of the Treasurer of the United 
States, and shall not be held by the collector * * * to 
await any ascertainment of duties." This is a reenactment of 
the statute of 1839, which was intended to avert the danger of 
future defalcations by collectors, such as had occurred in the 
famous case of Samuel Swartwout. (Barney v. Rickard, 157 
U. S., 352, 356.) This section was not repealed by the cus-
toms administrative act of 1890, and it ~s my opinion that it 
is applicable to these penal duties, and therefore that it for-
bids the adoption of a regulation such as you propose. · 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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SEAL FISHERIES-REGULATIONS. 
Section 1956, Revised Statutes, as amended, applies to the Territory of 
Alaska and the waters thereof, and to all the t'.ominion of the United 
States in the waters of Bering Sea. It is lawful for the Secretary of 
the Treasury, under said section, to <Hrect captains of the fur-sealing 
fleet to seize all foreign vessels found hunting or to have hunted sea 
otter within said waters. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 20, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowled_ge the receipt of your 
letter of May 15, 1896, asking for an opinion as to whether 
or not a direction under section 1956 of the Revised Stat-
utes, as amended by section 3 of the act of March 2, 1889 
(25 Stat., 1009)1 to the captains of the fur-seal patrolling fleet 
to seize all foreign vessels found hunting or to have hunted 
sea otter within three miles of the coast of Alaska or other 
territory of the United _States would be in violation of law. 
Section 1956 is as follows: 
"No person shall kill any otter, mink, marten, sable, or 
fur seal, or other fur-bearing animal within the limits of 
Alaska Territory, or in the waters thereof; and every per-
son guilty thereof shall, for each offense, be :fined not less 
than two hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or 
imprisoned not more than six months, or both; and all ves-
sels, their ta·ckle, apparel, furniture, and cargo, found en-
gaged in violation of this section shall be forfeited; but the 
Secretary of the Treasury shall have power to authorize the 
killing of any such mink, marten, sable, or other fur-beadng 
animal, except fur seals, under such regulations as he may 
prescribe; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary to pre-
vent the killing of any fur seal and to provide for the exe-
cution of the provisions of this section until it is otherwise 
provided by law; nor shall he grant any special privileges 
under thi ection." 
ection 3 of the act of March 2, 1889, is as follows: 
"That ction nineteen huudredand iifty- ix of the Revised 
ta ute ftlie nit d tate i h rebydeclared to includ . and 
pply to all th dominion of the nited State in the waters 
f B bring a; and jt hall b the duty of the Pre i<lent, at 
·m ly on in e ch year to j ue hi proclamation and 
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cause the same to be pul>lished for one month in at least one 
newspaper, if any such there be published, at each United 
States port of entry on the Pacific Coast, warning all persons 
against entering said waters for the purpose of violatiug the 
provisions of said section; and he shall also cause one or 
more vessels of the United States to diligently cruise said 
waters and arrest all persons, and seize all vessels found to 
be, or to have been, engaged in any violation of the laws of 
the United States therein." 
Section 1956, as amended, applies to the Territory of 
Alaska and the waters thereof, and to all the dominion of 
the United States in the waters of Bering Sea. 
In respect of the waters thus embraced, I am of the opin-
ion that your instructions are authorized by law. (In re 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
TREATIES-CHINESE. 
A treaty, so far as its provisions are self-executing, repeals a prior stat-
ute with which it is in conflict. 
The convention of 1894 between the United States and China is a treaty. 
Under its provisions a Chinese subject resident in a British colony, 
and belonging to one of the privileged classes, may be admitted here 
upon a certificate from the colonial government. · 
DEP ARTMEN'.l.' OF JUSTiCE, 
May 20, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of May 13, asking an official opinion as to the construction 
and operation of Article III of the convention of 1894 between 
the United States and China. (28 Stat., 1211.) 
This article provides that'' Chinese subjects, being officials, 
teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity or 
pleasure, but not laborers," when seeking admission into 
the United States, "may produce a certificate from their 
Government or the Government where they last resided." The 
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question bas arisen whether Chinese subjects belonging to 
the privileged classes above mentioned and who are residents 
of the British colony of Hongkong, may obtain admission 
to the United States upon production of a certificate signed 
by the registrar-general in that colony. I assume, for the 
present purposes, that the registrar general is the proper 
representative of the colonial government. 
While called a convention, the document to which you 
refer is clearly a treaty within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. It is, therefore, so far as its pro-
visions are self.executing, a part of the supreme law of the 
land. It is my opinion that the provisions of the article 
under consideration are self-executing. Its language is clear. 
It requires a certificate from the government of the colony 
of Hongkong. It requires nothing more than that. Its 
requirements would not be satisfied by a certificate from the 
Government of China. 
The act of July 5, 1884, chapter 220, section 6, requires 
that certificates in similar cases should be issued by the 
Chinese Government, "or of such other foreign Government 
of which at the time such Chinese person shall be a subject." 
Prior, therefore, to the treaty of 1894 a certificate from the 
authorities at Hongkong would have been insufficient in 
the cases now under consideration, and a certificate from 
the Chinese Government would have been necessary. 
You ask my opinion whether the treaty "waives or modi-
fies the requirement of" the act of 1884. As the treaty is 
subsequent to the statute, and as its provisions are self-
executing, I am of the opinion that it does modify the 
requirement of the statute, so that tbe certificate must now 
come from Hongkong and not from China. ( The Oherolcee 
Toba,cco, 11 W all., 616, 621; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S., 
190, 194 ; 13 Opin., 354.) 
Very re pectfully, 
H OLMES CO RAD, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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INTERIOR DEPARTMENT-DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE. 
The Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb is not a part of the 
Interior Department. 
Advertisements for proposals under section 3709, R. S., are not required 
for supplies or services for this institution. 
Uniform departmental practice should receive great, if not,cont.rolling, 
weight in statutory construction, especially where the statutory lan-
guage was not modified when incorporated in the Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMEN'.I.' OF JUSTICE, 
May .20, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of May 12, asking my official opinion as to whether pur-
chases and contracts for supplies or services for the use of 
the Columbia Institution for the Instruction of the Deaf and 
Dumb must be made in conformity with the provisions of 
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the acts 
of January 27 and April 21, 1894. It appears from the 
papers which you furnish me that the institution mentioned 
was organized about 1856 as a volunteer association by Amos 
Kendall and others. The constitution of the association 
provided, among other things, that the institution should be 
1ocated in the District of Columbia; that it should "be sup-
ported by donations, legacies, subscriptions of members and 
others, and such aid as Congress may be pleased-to afford, aud 
such other means as the board of directors may prescribe;" 
and that the moneys of the association should be paid out 
by the treasurer ·" on such vouchers as may be prescribed by 
the board of directors." The association was subsequently 
incorporated by Congress. ( A.ct of February 16, 1857, chap. 
46.) The act of incorporation recognized the right of the 
institution to receive contributions and to take and bold real 
and personal property, so far as might be necessary to its 
maintenance and efficient managemeut (sec. 1); and that it 
should be "managed as provided for in its present constitu-
tion and such additional regulations as may from time to 
time be found necessary." (Sec. 2.) It provided for the 
maintenance and tuition of indigent deaf, dumb, or blind 
persons properly belonging to the District of Columbia; 
m:tking the Secretary of the Interior the judge of the quali-
fications of such applicants, and provi<ling for their mainte-
nance and tuition out of the Treasury of the United States. 
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(Sec. 4.) It gave the_ right to -receive and instruct other 
deaf, dumb, and blind persons not at tbe expense of the 
Treasury. (Sec. 5.) It provided that the president and 
directors should report annual1y to the Secretary of the 
Interior. (Sec. 6.) These provisions, with some which have 
been subsequently added, are incorporated in the Revised 
Statutes, sections 485V-48G8. 
It is thus clear that the institution was originally intended 
to be, on the one band, a corporation independent of the 
United States Government, while on the other hand it should 
be the means by which the Government should perform its 
charitable duty to the indigent deaf, dumb, and blind of tbe 
District of. Columbia and, as such, the recipient of contribu-
tions from the National Treasury. It was not a bureau of 
the Interior Department, but the Government contributions 
were to be made through the Secretary _of the Interior and 
accounted for to him. 
Largeappropriationshavesinceannuallybeen made by Con-
gress for the benefit of tllis institution, and they have always, 
so far as I am aware, been paid through the medium of the 
Secretary of the Interior. By the sundry civil appropriation 
act of March 2, 1895, chapter 189 (28 Stat., 941), appropri-
ations of $52,500 were made "for support of the institution, 
including salaries and incidental expenses, for books and 
illustrative apparatus, and for general repairs and improve-
ments," and "for special repairs to the buildings and for the 
improvement of the grounds," $1,000; also, $30,000 "for 
additional building complete." It is not expressly provided 
by the statute that these disbursements shall be in any way 
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of tl1e Interior, but 
this seems to have been always the practical coustruction of 
the annual appropriations in pari materict, and I understand 
that thee timates annually submitted by the Secretar,y of tlle 
Tr a ury, which are the ba i of Oongres ioual action in this 
regard, r pre ·e11t the e expen es as beiug uuder the juri die 
tiou f th Interior Department. It may be a sumed, ther -
fore that the ougre ional ap1 ropriation for the ammal ur-
f the in titution i properly 1 ayable tlJr u h 
f b Int rior. The upport of iu li ·en 
tb Di. tri t f olurnbfa ha alwa 
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since 1857, been contributed through the Interior Depart-
ment, as origfoally planned. To the appropriation for the 
current :fiscal year h; added the qualification that '' all dis-
bursemeuts for this object shall be accounted for through 
the Department of the Interior." (District of Columbia 
appropriation act of March 2·, 1895, chap.176, p. 761.) 
The so-called Dockery Act of July 31, 1894, chapter 174, 
section 7, provided that the Auditor for the State and other 
Departments should receive and examine all accounts relat-
ing to the District of Columbia, and also "accounts of all 
boardH, commissions, and establishments of the Government 
not within the jurisdiction of any of the Executive Depart-
ments." The same~ection provided that theAuditor for the 
Interior Department should receive and examine all accounts 
of all bureaus and offices under the direction of the Secre-
tary of the Interior, and also "all accounts relating to army 
and navy pensions, Geological Survey, public lands, Indians, 
Architect of the Capitol, patents, census, and to all other 
business within the jurisdiction of the Department of the 
Iuterior." Tl.le Comptroller of the Treasury has held that 
the appropriations relati11g to this institution constitute 
"business within the j uris<liction of the Department of the 
Interior"within the meaning of this s~ction. (1 Comp. Dec., 
19.) This decision appears to me to be clearly correct; and 
the Government contributions toward the support of this 
institution constitute '' business within the jurisdiction of 
the Department of the Interior." It so happens, as appeared 
by the last annual report of that institution, that about 
eight-ninths of its current expenses are paid by these appro-
priations. This condition might be changed at any moment, 
however, by_ a charitable bequest; ai1d I do not think that 
the corporation itself is in any sense a bureau, office, or other 
subdivision of your Department. 
The precise question now presented is whether this cor-
poration is in your Department within the meaning of 
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, relating 1io "purchases 
and contracts for supplies or servfoes in any of the Depart. 
ments of the Government." 1'his provision has been on the 
statute book for thirty-five years. (Act of March 2, 1861, 
chap. 84, sec.10.) It is claimed in the correspondence which 
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you submit, and it is nowhere denied, that this provision has 
al ways received a practical construction, whereby this insti-
tution has been excluded from its terms. If this be the case, 
that construction should receive great, if not controlling, 
weight ( Unitecl States v. HealeJJ, 160 U. S., 136, 141, 145), 
especially since the statutory language was not modified 
when it was incorporated in the Revised Statutes. (20 Opin., 
721.) I think that this practical construction was the correct 
one, and therefore that your question must be answered in 
the negative. I have examined with care the able opinion of 
Assistant Attorney-General Hall to the contrary, but am 
unable to accept his conclusions. 
Very respectfully, 
IIOLMES 0ONRAD7 
Acting Attorney-General. · 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR. 
PENITENTIARIES. 
The States of South Dakota and Montana having received grants for 
the erection of penitentiaries, the enabling act under which the two 
Dakotas, Montana, and w·ashington were admitted into the Union 
provided that North Dakota and Washington should have like grants 
for the same purpose. It appears that Washington already bas a 
penitentiary. Held, that further legislation is required. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 23, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of 9th 
iustant, and io say in reply that I think further legislation 
i , required ill the matter of the penitentiary at Walla Walla, 
Wash. For the reasons stated in my letter of 9th instant, I 
think the situation is anomalous. The appropriation (27 
Stat., 661) under which you purchased grounds and pro-
po, e to erect a penitentiary in the State of Washington is 
in t rm made " to carry into effect section 15" of the 
uabling act uuder whi h the two Dakota , Montana, and 
a ·hin t n wer ad mitt d into the nio11. The act of 
M r ·h 2 1 1 (-1 tat., 37 ) had appropriated 30,000 for 
th r t"tion f a p nit n iar in t11e T rritory of Dakota. 
·ti n 1:- f th n blin a t xrr ly granted to the tate 
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of South Dakota the lands acquired under the act of 1881 
and any unexpended balances of the moneys thereby appro-
priated, and, having also transferred to Montana the peni-
tentiary and all lands connected therewith at Deer Lodge 
City, provided: 
''And the States of North Dakota.and Washington shall, 
respectively, have like grants for the same purpose, and sub-
ject to like terms and conditions as provided in said act of 
March second, eighteen hundred and eighty-one, for the 
Territory of Dakota." 
This was merely a promise to make the four States equal 
by providing North Dakota and Washington with penitenti-
aries, as had been done with South Dakota and Montana,. 
The act of 1893 (27 Stat., 661) was merely in the line of per-
forming that promise. But as I am advised that Washing-
ton already has a penitentiary, it seems to me the attention 
of Congress should be called to the matter before any further 
expenditure of money is made. Certainly there is no author-
ity at present for the transfer of the land you have already 
bought with the money appropriated by the last-named act. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE IN·l'ERIOR. 
ABSENCE FROM DUTY. 
The act of March 1., 1889, section 49, was not repealed or modified by the 
act of March 3, 1893, section 5. The object of the former was to pro-
vide for the public defense and that of the latter to regulate leaves of 
absence for private reasons or purposes. There is, therefore, no incon-
sistency between the two acts. 
Leaves of absence of employees of the Government in the discharge of 
military duties are not to be charged to the thirty days allowed them 
annually for rest and recreation. 
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May f:3, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested in 
your letter of the J 2th instant, on the question whether sec-
tion 49 of ~he act of March 1, 1889 (25 Stat., 772), is repealed 
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or modified by section 5 of the act of March 3, 1893 (27 
Stat., 715). 
The former act provides-
,, That all officers and employees of the United States and 
of the District of Uolumbia who are members of the National 
Guard shall be entitled to leave of absence from their respec-
tive duties, without loss of pay or time, on all days of any 
parade or encampment ordered or authorized under the pro-
visions of this act." 
The latter, which was the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial appropriation act, makes it the duty of the heads of the 
several Executive Departments, "in the interest of the pub-
lic service, to require of all clerks and other employees of 
whatever grade or class, in their respective Department~, 
not less than seven hours of labor each day," except Sundays 
and holidays, providing for thirty days annual and thirty 
days sick leave with pay, discretion being given to extend 
sick leave in certain cases. 
This question had arisen in my own Department before 
your letter came, and I had decided it in the same way as 
the Solicitor of the Treasury, a copy of whose opinion yon 
inclose. I approve that opinion, which states some of the 
reasons which require the conclusion that the earlier law is 
not affected by the later. 
The objects of the two acts were different-that of the for-
mer being to provide for the public defense and that of the 
latter being to regulate and limit leaves of absence for pri-
vate reasons or purposes. There is, therefore, no inconsist-
ency or conflict between the two acts, so that the general 
repeali11g clause in section 6 of the act of 1893 doe not 
apply to the part of the act of 1889 above quoted, or to any 
other parts, as it must be held to do if it applies at all. 
It is not to be presumed that Congress intended by the 
later act to exclude from the militia of the District the large 
proportion of it citizens in the public civil service, yet tbi 
r ult would follow from any other con truction than that 
wlli h I ha e given it. The earlier act requires that all able-
b died mal re ident of the Di tri t b enrolled. (Sec. 1.) 
Th mption recit d ( e . 2) <lo not include civil employee 
f the D partm nt . ember of the militia are re uired 
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not only to engage in active service when called upon (sec. 5), 
but also to prepare themselves for such service by attending 
drills, etc. (Sec. 40 et seq.) The latter duty is quite as impor-
tant as the former, and there is no more reason for holding 
that section 49 is repealed, which _ exempts members from 
civil duty without loss of pay or time, than for holding that 
the sections are repealed which require obedience to calls for 
active duty. 
What I have already said applies to the direction to heads 
of Departments in the act of 1893 (sec. 5) to require "not 
less than seven hours labor" of all clerks and employees. 
This is merely correlative to the limitation of ordinary leave 
and does not apply when such persons are engaged in any 
form of militia duty. 
It is absurd to suppose that Congress intended by this 
provision to empower or direct heads of Departments to neu-
tralize the order of the President as Commander in Chief of 
the Militia (sec. 6), or that of ·the other commanding officers, 
or to compel employees to put in the leave allowed them for 
rest and recreation in the discharge of military duties. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
DEPARTMENTAL CLERKS-DELEGATION OF POWER. 
Departmental clerks, messengers, and laborers are to be appointed and 
removed by the head of the Department, when not otherwise pro-
vided by statute. This power can not be delegated, but must be 
exercised by the Secretary or Acting Secretary. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 26, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of May 14 asking my official opinion as to your power 
to delegate authority to make" appointments, promotions, 
reductions, and discharges of messengers and laborers" in 
your Department. 
Your powers in this regard are similar to those of the 
heads of the other Executive Departments. (Act of Feb. 9, 
1889, chap. 122, sec. 1.) 
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The employment of messengers and laborers in the Execu-
tive Departments is based upon section 169 of the Revised 
Statutes, which is as follows: 
"Each head of a Department is authorized to employ in 
his Department such number of clerks of the several classes 
recognized by law, and such messengers, assistant messen-
gers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other employes, and 
at such rates of compensation, respectively, as may be 
appropriated for by Congress from year to year." 
I think that the word "employ" in this section is used as 
the equivalent of" appoint" (see Rev.Stat., secs. 60,194); and 
therefore that the sole responsibility of every appointment 
in an Executive Department rests upon the head of that 
Department, except where otherwise specially provided by 
statute, as in Revised Statutes, section 476. This view is 
confirmed by an examination of our early statutory law. 
When the Executive Departments were originally estab-
lished it was expressly provided that the appointment of 
the clerks therein should be made by the beads of Depart-
ments. (Acts of July 27, 1789, chap. 4, sec. 2; Aug. 7, 1789, 
chap. 7, sec. 2; Sept. 11, 1789, chap. 13, sec. 2; Sept. 22, 1789 
chap. 16, sec. l; April 30, 1798, chap. 36, sec. 2; March 3, 
1849, chap. 108, sec. 11.) Subsequent legislation indicated 
that Congress regarded employment and appointment as 
synomymous. (Acts of April 21, 1806, chap. 41, secs. 2, 4; 
Aug. 26, 1842, chap. 202, secs. 1, 11.) 
Since the power of appointment is confided to the head of 
a Department, the· power of removal belongs also to him. 
(Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet., 230; Blake v. United States, 103 
U. S., 227; United States v. Allred, 155 U. S., 591, 594.) The 
powers to promote and'' reduce" are merely species of the 
power to appoint. 
The power to appoint and remove being discretionary in 
character, it is my opinion that they can not be delegated. 
o far a I am aware, this bas always been the practical con-
truction of our legislation in this particular. It is true that 
ou may inquire, inve tigate, and determine by the aid of 
our ubordinate ; but the final determination must be your 
a t and not their . (See 7 Opin., 594, 597.) I am of the 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 357 
Treaties-Chinese. 
opm10n, therefore, that all appointments and removals of 
messengers and laborers in your Department must be made 
by the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Department; 
and that the power can be delegated neither to the Chief of 




The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
TREATIES-CHINESE. 
The phrase "Chinese consul at the port of departure" used in Article 
II of the convention between the United States and China, proclaimed 
March 17, 1894, means the consul who represents the Chinese Govern-
ment at the place where the laborer leaves the United States. 
The words "port" and "land," used in said treaty, do not limit the 
right to return to such Chinese ai; travel by sea. 
It is necessary for Chinese laborers to leave this country at a place 
which is a port and is within the jurisdiction of a Chinese consul, 
and that t,hey should return to it at a port of entry where there is a 
collector, but as they have the right to go and return by land, these 
places need not be seaports. 
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUS'.I.'ICE, 
May 26, 1896. 
SIR: I nave the honor to give my opinion, as requested in 
your letter of the 22d instant, upon the proper construction 
of Article II of the convention between the United States 
and China, concerning the subject of emigration, proclaimed 
March 17, 1894. 
By Article I the coming of Chinese laborers to this country 
is absolutely prohibited for a period of ten years. Article 
II provides that such prohibition shall not apply to the 
return to this country of registered Chinese laborers having 
certain specified relatives here, or property, or debts of a 
certain value, but requires, as a condition of the right of 
such laborer to return, the deposit by him with the collector 
of customs of the district from which he departs of a written 
description of his family, propert1, or debts. The collector 
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is required to furnish him with a c~rtificate of his right t.-0 
return. Article II then proceeds as follows: 
"And such right of return to the United States shall be 
exercised within one year from the date of leaving the United 
States; but such right of return to the United States may 
be extended for an additional period, not to exceed one year, 
in cases where, by reason of sickness or other cause of disa-
bility beyond his control, such Chinese laborer shall be ren-
dered unable · sooner to return-which facts shall be fully 
reported to the Chinese consul at the port of departure, and 
by him certified to the satisfaction of the collector of the port 
at which such Chinese subject sha11 landin the United States. 
And no such Chinese laborer, shall be permitted to enter the 
United States by land or sea without producing to the proper 
officer of the customs the return certificate herein required." 
Your letter with its inclosure presents the case of three 
Chinese laborers, duly registered at Boston according to law 
and Treasury regulations, and furnished with proper certifi-
cates in accordance with the treaty, who left the country 
from the district of "Vermont, and, after visiting China, pre-
sented themselves for readmission at the same place in the 
district of Vermont after an absence of almost thirteen 
months. They were refused admission because the facts jus-
tifying the extension of the period ofreturn were not reported 
"to the Chinese consul at the port of departure and by him 
certified," etc., the collector holding such port of departure 
to be Canton, China, at which place they left that country, 
or Hongkong, a British port, at which they took ship. It 
appears that there is, of course, no Chinese consul at Canton, 
and that, for local and political reasons, the.British Govern-
ment permits none at Hongkong. 
Your inquiry is whether the" port of departure," at which 
the facts of sickne s or disability are to be so reported, is 
the port from which the laborer goes from this country or 
that from which he tatts on his return. 
It i a well-known fact that Chinese laborers who leave 
thi country almost invariably return to their own. Thi 
fact wa , of cour e w II known to the framers of the treaty. 
The knew, al o, that no country has consuls at it own 
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ports. It seems clear, therefore, that they could not have 
meant the port of departure from China. 
If this be true, it appears to follow that the framers of the 
treaty must have meant the port from which the laborer 
departs from this country. He is required to deposit a writ-
ten description of his family, property, or debts '' with the 
collector of customs of the district from which he departs." 
While, at first glance, the phrase "port of departure" may 
appear, from its use in connection with the phrase "port at 
which such Chinese subject shall land in the United States," 
to indicate the point of beginning of the voyage of return, 
this appearance must give way before the manifest necessity 
of so construing the treaty, if possible, as to give it the 
operation which the parties plainly intended it to have. 
Besides, the two phrases may both fairly be construed as 
referring to the United States, requiring the fact of unavoid-
able detention to be reported to the Chinese consul at the 
port where the person desiring to return left this country, 
and the certificate thereof to be sent to the collector of the 
port at which he desires to reenter it. 
As Chinese consuls in this country are _received by our 
Government and subject to recall on their request, it was 
naturally willing to trust to their good faith, and the Chinese 
Government, one of the parties to the treaty, had the right 
to require of them the service it imposes. The only other 
possible construction is that the phrase "Chinese consul at 
the port of departure" was intended to designate our con-
suls at Chinese ports, but such construction would require 
an entire change of the language used. When that mean-
ing was intended, .Article III shows that the makers of the 
treaty knew how to express it. That article, in providing 
for the rights of Chinese officials, students, merchants, etc., 
to come to and reside in the United States, authorizes '' a 
certificate from their Government, or the Government where 
they last resided, vised by the diplomatic or consular repre-
sentative of the United States in the country or port whence 
they depart." 
While the language of the section you submit is not 
explicit, and the question presented can riot, therefore, be 
360 HON. JUDSON RARMON. 
T re a tie s-Cllin es e. 
answered with entire freedom from doubt, my opinion is that 
the officer to whom the facts of sickness or disability are 1io 
be reported is the consul who represents the Chinese Gov-
ernment at the place whence the laborer left the United 
States. "While the words used, "port" and "land," usually 
relate to a sea voyage, they were used because the Chinese 
generaJly go .. and come by sea, and not because it was the 
intention to limit the right to return to such as travel in that 
way. This is apparent from the last sentence of the section: 
"And no such laborer shall be permitted to enter the.United 
States by land or sea without producing to the proper officer 
of the customs the return certificate herein required." 
Instances where expressions suggested by the commonest 
form of the subject dealt with have been held to apply to all 
its forms, are not uncommon in judicial decisions. 
Moreover, the word "port" does not always mean a sea-
port when it is used in connection with our customs officers, 
and the word" land" is not necessarily limited to disembar-
kation from a ship. 
It appears to be necessary for the laborer to leave this coun-
try at a place which is a port and is within the jurisdiction 
of a Chinese consul, and that he should return to it at a port 
of entry where there is a collector; but as his right to depart 
and return by land as well as by sea is recognized by the 
treaty, these places need not be seaports. 
As the manifest object of this clause of the treaty was to 
reliev_e returning Chinese laborers from the consequences of 
sickness or casualty, the argument from inconvenience is not 
without weight. Detentions from these causes are quite 
likely to occur after the commencement of a long voyage 
which, in their absence, would accomplish the return before 
the expiration of the year. Sickness, storms, or the many 
mi haps of ocean travel, may require the statement mentioned 
in the treaty on arrival in the United States, although it 
eemed unueces ary before starting. These facts must have 
b en in the minds of the framers of the treaty; yet if any 
o b r con truction be adopted than that which I have indi· 
ted th unfortunate traveler would have to return to the 
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place from which he started or undergo the long delay which 
would be required to communicate the facts to the officer at 
that point and receive his certificate thereof. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
AGENTS-COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY. 
The ''agent" referred to in section 3469, Revised Statutes, is one who 
has special charge of a claim for purposes of collection or enforcement 
in the same way that a district or special attorney has, though he need 
not possess their professional character. 
While the Comptroller of the Treasury is an agent of the Government, 
in the broad sense of the term, he is more properly called an officer, 
and was not intended to be included within the word "agent" in the 
statute. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 27, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion, as requested in 
your letter of the 14th instant, upon the question whether 
the Comptroller of the Treasury is an " agent" within the 
meaning of section 3469 of the Revised Statutes, which is as 
follows: 
."Upon a report by a district attorney or any special attor-
ney or agent having charge of any claim in favor of the 
United States, showing in detail the condition of such claim, 
and the terms upon which the same may be compromised, 
a,nd recommending that it be compromised upon the terms so 
offered, and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to 
compromise such claim accordingly." 
I am inclined to think that '' special" qualifies both attor-
ney and agent; but whether this be so or not, the agent 
referred to in the statute is one who has special charge of a 
claim for purposes of collection or enforcement in the same 
way that the district or a special attorney has, though he 
need not possess their professional character. While the 
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Comptroller and Auditors of the Treasury are agents of the 
Government in the broad sense of the term, they are more 
·properly called officers, and the fact that they were not 
intended to be included within the word "agent" in the 
statute is apparent from the mention of district and special 
attorneys, who are also agents in the general sense. It is 
fair to assume that the Comptroller would have been men-
tioned as well as the district attorney if it had been the inten-
tion of Congress to make the statute applicable to him. 
While the Comptroller and Auditors may also be said to 
have general charge of claims in favor of the Government, 
they do not have charge of them in the same sense that a 
district or special attorney or agent has, viz, for the express 
purpose of directly enforcing them. 
It is suggested that as the Comptroller and Auditors are 
the only persons who can be said ever to !Jave charge of 
some claims and who have charge of _all claims for a time, the 
result of the construction I have given the statute is to pre-
vent compromises until the claims have been pl[tced in the 
hands of an attorney or collecting agent and a report is 
received from him, no matter how advantageous to the 
Government an immediate compromise might be. But the 
manifest purpose of the statute was to require for your 
information, before acting upon a proposed compromise, the 
opinion and advice of a person who bas given special atten-
tion to the nature, proof, and collectibility of the claim-in 
the locality where it arose or is to be enforced. You are pre-
sumed to have all the knowledge of fact and law which your 
immediate subordinates possess, and the recommendation of 
the Solicitor, which is also required, is intended to furnish 
you with legal advice upon the general aspects of the claim, 
but none of these officers can furnish you the direct and 
r liable information and ad vice which come from special 
attention to the claim or ontact with the debtor. 
For th e rea on my opinion i that the Comptroller of 
the Tr a ury is not au ' agent ' within t he meaning of the 
·tatu . 
ry r pe tfn11 
J DO H RMON. 
Th IIE E .A.S RY. 
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DEPARTMENT CLERKS-DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE. 
The chief clerk, chiefs of bureaus, and translator in the State Depart-
ment are to be appointed by the Secretary of State. 
These officers are all "clerks" within the meaning of the Revised 
Statutes, section 169. 
When departmental practice is not uniform it affords no guide to the 
construction of the law. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 4, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of June 2, asking my opinion whether the chief clerk, 
chiefs of bureaus, and translator in your Department are to 
be appointed by you, or to be nominated by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate. The question is raised by the 
new civil-service rules promulgated by the President on 
May 6, 1896, which rules apply to the appointment of these 
officials in case their appointment is vested in you by law. 
The Constitution provides that all officers of the United 
States shall be appointed by the President by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, except where, in case of 
inferior officers, Congress shall otherwise provide by law. 
If, therefore, you are vested with the appointing power in 
these cases, it must be by virtue of some statutory provision. 
(6 Opin., 1; 15 Opin., 3, 5.) If there be any such provision 
it must be found in section 169 of the Revised Statutes, 
which is as follows: 
"Each head of a Department is authorized to employ in 
his Department such number of clerks of the several classes 
recognized by law * * * and at such rates of compensa-
tion respectively as may be appropriated for by Congress 
from year to year." 
The word "employ" in this section has always been 
regarded as the equivalent of "appoint;" and I have ap-
proved this construction in an opiuion rendered to the Sec-
retary of Agriculture on May 26 last. The question now to be 
decided, therefore, is this: Are the officials mentioned in your 
letter among the "clerks of the several classes recognized by 
law" within the meaning of the section quoted f The effect 
of this clause is not to be confined to the four main classes 
of clerks mentioned in sections 163 and 167 of the revision. 
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These sections are reenactments of provisions of the civil 
and diplomatic appropriation act of March 3, 1853, chapter 
97, section 3, which statute also provides separately for chief 
clerks and disbursing clerks . of the various Departments, 
who, by the uniform practice of the Departments, have always 
been treated as clerks within the meaning of section 169. 
They were expressly held to be such by .Attorney-General 
Pierrepont. (15 Opin., 3, 6.) 
I think that the chief clerk of each Department is clearly 
a clerk within the meaning of section 169, and that the same 
conclusion must also be reached as to the translator, an offi-
cial whose existence is recognized only in the annual appro-
priation act, and whose duties are purely clerical. 
It remains to consider the case of the so-called chiefs of 
bureaus. While these officials have been recognized by 
statute for over twenty years, the practice of your Depart-
ment has not been uniform as to the manner of their appoint-
ment. It therefore affords no guide to the construction of 
the law. (Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U.S., 542; United States 
v. Healey, 160 U. S., 136, 141-145.) You call my attention, 
however, to an interesting and exhaustive discussion of this 
subject by Mr. E. I. Renick, chief clerk of your Department, 
who states that while there are no officials in your Depart-
ment styled chiefs of division, nevertheless your so-called 
chiefs of bureaus "receive the compensatfon and exercise 
the functions of chiefs of divisions> The chiefs of division 
in various Departments have, I believe, always been regarded 
as clerks, and this construction bas received the approval of 
the Attorney-General. (15 Opin., 3, 6; 20 Opin., 728.) 
I am unable to perceive any distinction between what are 
called divisions of the Treasury Department and what are 
called bureaus in your Department. Each were originally 
establi bed by departmental regulations and presided over 
by I er on who were nominally, as well as actually, Depart-
ment clerk . Their being mentioned l>y Congress in appro-
priation a t , or otherwi e, as chiefs of bureaus or chief: of 
di i ion do s not take them out of the operation of ection 
1 . Tb chi fr in our Department are clearly ranked a 
cl rk in tb Re i ed tatut , coming between the chief 
1 rk nd be di bur ing 1 rk. ( ec. 201.) I do not think 
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they are chiefs of bureaus within the meaning of section 178. 
The word "bureau," like many others, is loosely used in the 
revision, the terminology of the codified statutes not having 
been made entirely definite and uniform. (See 21 Opin., 94.) 
My conclusion, therefore, is that all of the officials men-
tioned in your communication are to be appointed by your-
self, and come, therefore, within the new civil-service rules. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF STATE. 
REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE. 
The Treasury Department is obliged, under existing laws, to extend the 
benefits of the Marine-Hospital fund to the sick and disabled officers 
and seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service . . 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 11, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of May 
2, requesting my opinion "whether this Department is 
obliged, under existing laws, to extend the benefits of the 
Marine-Hospital fund to the sick and disabled officers and 
seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service." 
In my opinion of May 7, in response to a similar inquiry 
from you, I reviewed the legislation on the subject of Marjne-
Hospital Service at some length and reached the conclusion 
expressed in that opinion, "that the sick seamen of the 
Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the benefit of the 
Marine Hospital provided for sick and disabled seamen." 
I have carefully reexamined the ground on which that 
opinion rested, in the light of the additional doeuments 
which accompany your present request. 
The legislation on this subject is meager, fragmentary, and 
disconnected. But as early as July 16, 1798, provision was 
made by Congress (1 Stat., 605) for the relief of sick and dis-
abled seamen. By that statute 20 cents per month was 
deducted from the wages of seamen of every ship or vessel 
of the United States arriving from a foreign port, and from 
the seamen of vessels engaged in_ the coasting trade. By 
the fourth section of this statute it was provided that any 
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surplus remaining of the moneys so collected should be in-
vested in the stock of the United States, under the direction 
of the President, until in his opinion a sufficient fund should 
be accumulated for the purchase of ground and for buildings 
"to be erected as hospitals for the accommodation of sick and 
disabled seamen." 
Section 5 provides for the appointment, by the President, 
of'' directors of the marine hospital of the United States," 
whose duty it shall be "to provide for the accommodation of 
sick and disabled seamen under such general instructions as 
shall be given by the President of the United States for that 
purpose." 
By act of June 29, 1870 (16 Stat., 169), it was provided that 
40 cents per month should be retained from the wages of 
seamen of every vessel of the United States arriving from a 
foreign port, or of registered vessels employed in the coast-
ing trade. 
By section 5: "That the fund thus obtained shall be 
employed, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, for the care and relief of sick and disabled seamen 
employed in registered; enrolled, and licensed vessels of the 
United States." , 
By section 7: "That for the purposes of this act, the term 
'vessel,' herein used, shall be held to include every descrip-
tion of water craft, raft, vehicle, and contrivance used or 
capable of being used as a means or auxiliary of transporta-
tion on or by water." 
By act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 485), it was provided 
that "every vessel subject to hospital tax, except vessels 
required by law to carry crew lists, shall have and keep on 
board, subject to inspection and verification at all times by 
any officer of the customs, a seaman's time book." 
By section 3: "That term 'seaman,' wherever employed 
in legislation relating to the Marine-Hospital Service, shall 
be held to include any person employed on board in the care, 
preservation, or navigation of any vessel, or in the service, 
on board, of those eno-ao-ed in uch care preservation, or 
navigation. ' 
By ction 6: ' That sick and di abled eamen of foreign 
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ve~sels and of vessels not subject to hospital dues may be 
cared for by the Marine-Hospital Service at such rates and 
under such regulations as the Secretary of the TrP-asury 
may prescribe." 
By act of J uue 26, 1884 (23 Stat., 57): 
"SEc.15. Sections forty-five hundred and eighty-five, forty-
five hundred and eighty-six, and forty-five hundred and eighty-
seven of the Revised Statutes, and all other acts and parts of 
acts providing for the assessment and collection of a hospital 
tax for seamen, are hereby repealed, and the expense of main-
taining the Marine-Hospital Service shall hereafter be borne 
by the United States out of the receipts for duties on ton-
nage provided for by this act; and so much thereof as may be 
necessary is hereby appropriated for that purpose." 
By act of August 4, 1894 (28 Stat., 229), the privileges of 
the marine hospitals were extended to keepers and crews of _ 
the Life-Saving Service, who "shall be received in said hos-
pitals and treated therein, and at the dispensaries thereof, as 
are seamen of American registered vessels." 
It will be observed from this course of legislation that in 
the earliest act the marine hospitals were "for the accom-
modation of sick and disabled seamen, under such general 
instructions as should be given by the President of the United 
States." 
That not until 1870 was the class of seamen to be accom-
modated limited to "seamen employed in registered, enrolled, 
and licensed vessels of the United States." 
That by the act of 1875 provision was made for the accom-
modation of seamen of vessels other than the "registered, 
enrolled, and licensed vessels of the United States, under 
such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may pre-
scribe." 
It is true that revenue cutters of the United States do not 
fall within the class of "registered, enrolled, and licensed 
vessels." It does appear, however, from an official letter of 
Mr. Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, dated 
June 1, 1812, addressed .to the collector of the port of New 
Orleans, that an account presented for the payment of serv-
ices rendered by a private physician to the officers or crew 
of a revenue cutter was disallowed, '' inasmuch as the crew 
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of the revenue cutter are to be assisted from the hoRpital 
fund as other sailors." 
It further appears from the records of the Treasury 
Department "that the tax for the maintenance of a marine-
hospital fund was exacted and collected monthly from the 
seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service from January 1, 1833, 
to 1884, when the tax was abolished by Congress." 
It further appears from the Regulations for the Govern-
ment of the United States Marine-Hospital Service, 
approved May 20, 1889, by the Secretary of the Treasury 
and by the President of the United States (p. 54), that the 
following regulation was prescribed and yet remains in 
force: 
" Officers and seamen of the Revenne-Cutter Service will 
be admitted to care and treatment at all stations of the first 
class without reference to length of service and without 
charge." 
It thus appears that from a very early period in the his-
tory of the Government the right of the officers and crew of 
the Revenue-Cutter Service to the privileges of the Marine-
Hospital Service was recognized by the executive officers of 
the Government; and that for more than fifty years imme-
diately preceding the abolition by Congress of the tax on 
eamen for the maintenance of the hospital fund, the seamen 
of the Revenue-Cutter Service were regularly assessed and 
taxed for this purpose. 
Thus we have not only a regulation of the Department 
acquiesced in for a long time, but also a contemporaneous 
construction of the statute by those executive officers of the 
Government on whom has devolved the duty and responsi-
bility of carrying the statute into effect. And we have more 
t.han thi in the enforced contributions from their wages by 
eamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service for more than half a 
en ury to the fund by which the hospital buildings were 
r cted and from which the hospital ervice was maintained. 
The regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury already 
r ferred to, pr viding for the admission of officers and sea-
m n f the e nue-Cutt r Service to the marine ho pital , 
mad in pur uan e of tion 6 of the act of 
1 75, whi h authorize th admi i n of the ick 
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seamen of foreign vessels and of vessels not . subject to hos-
pital duty to marine hospitals upon such terms as the Secre-
tary of the Treasury may prescribe. 
These considerations compel me to the conclusion that the 
Treasury Department is obliged, under existing laws, to 
extend the benefits of the Marine-Hospital fund to the sick 







The. . SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION ACT. 
Under the immediate transportation act, the Secretary of the Treasury 
may require common carriers desiring to avail themselves of its privi-
leges to file bonds to accept and transport within a definite fixed period 
of time all merchandise offered under the act. 
The Attorney-General can not give an opinion upon a judicial question. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 17, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of June 6, asking an opinion in relation to certain common 
carriers who have been authorized by you to transport mer-
chandise in bond under the provisions of the immediate trans-
portation act of June 10, 1880, chapter 190. This act contem-
plates that merchandise imported at an exterior port shall be 
"shipped immediately" to the port of destination (sec. 1); 
that the collection of duties by the United States shall be 
postponed until the arrival at the port of destination, the 
goods meanwhile being regarded as in warehouse (sec. 2; 
Seeberger v. Schweyer, 153 U. S., 609); and that to effectuate 
the purpose of the act the carriers are required to give bond 
to the United States, with such conditions, not inconsistent 
with law, as you may require. (Sec. 3.) One of the condi-
tions thus imposed by you is that the carrier "sh~ll without 
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delay transport a nd make prompt report and safe delivery of 
a ll mei·chandise described in each _and every entry." (Cus-
toms Regulations, 1892, art. 400.) It appears, however, that 
bonded carr iers sometimes refuse altogether to transport 
imported merchandise, for the reason that it is inconvenient 
or unprofitable to them. You ask mew hether they are bound 
to do so. 
I do not find that you are authorized by law to grant an 
irrevocable license to any common carrier for any period of 
time, or that you have attempted to do so. It is, tlierefore, 
in your . power to require of every c_arrier, as a condition to 
the continuance of his privileges under the statute, the filing 
of a new bond containing, in unmistakable language, an 
agreement to accept and transport, within a definite fixed 
period of time, all merchandise offored under the act. 
Whether or not you have any remedy against carriers who 
have refused transportation in the past is a judicial ques-
tion. You have no power to collect damages except through 
the courts. The question, therefore, is not one arising in 
the administration of your Department within the meaning 
of section 356 of the Revised Statutes, and not one upon 
which it would be proper for me to give an official opinion. 
(20 Opin., 702, 714; 21 Opin., 6.) , 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASUR Y. 
P UBLICATIONS FOR OFFICIAL USE-PUBLIC PRINTE R. 
'.rhe h ead of a Department h as no right under section 90 of the p rint ing 
biJl of January 12, 1895, t o make a requisition upon the Public P rinter 
for a greater number of copies of p ublications other than "bills and 
resolutions " t han the number of bureaus in the Department and c1ivi-
sions in the office of the J1ead thereof. 
If he makes the requisition under t h e gener al authority vested in his 
epartment, and with the understanding that th e cost is to be charged 
ao-ainst the printing appropriation for hi Department, he Jrns t he 
right to make uch requi ition and the Public Printer ba no author-
i t to pa upon th e ·haract r of publications which be may deem 
, n ial tr carr io out the work f his epartment. 
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS1'ICE, 
June 22, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of June 18, 1896, in which you ask whether or not you 
have the right under section 90 of the printing bill of Janu-
ary 12, 1895, to make a requisition upon the Public Printer 
for 1,000 copies of Report No. 1049 on Senate bill No. 1552. 
Section 90 is as follows: 
'' The heads of Executive Departments, and such executive 
officers as are not connected with the Departments, respec-
tively, shall cause daily examination of the Congressional 
Record for the purpose of noting documents, reports, and 
other publications of interest to their Departments, and shall 
cause an immediate order to be sent to the Public Printer 
for t.he number of copies of such publications required for 
official use, not to exceed, however, the number of bureaus 
in the Department and divisions in the office of the head 
thereof. The Public Printer shall send to each Executive 
Department and to each executive office not connected with 
the Department, as soon as printed, five copies of all bills 
and resolutions, except the State Department, to which shall 
be sent ten copies. of bills and resolutions. When the head 
of a Department desires a greater number of any class of 
bills or resolutions for official use, they shall be furnished 
by the Public Printer on requisition promptly made." 
This section provides for furnishing to the heads of Execu-
tive Departments "documents, reports, and other publica-
tions of interest to their Departments," in a number of 
copies required for official use not exceeding" the number of 
bureaus in the Department and divisions in the office of the 
head thereof." It also provides for furnishing to the head 
of a Department '' a greater number of any class of bills or 
resolutions for official use." 
The document requested by you is not a bill or resolution, 
and does not come in this latter class. Under the other pro-
vision the number is limited, as above stated. It is contem-
plated that the documents furnished under this section are 
not to be charged to the printing appropriation made for 
the respective Departments. If you contemplate having the 
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reports furnished under section 90, and on this ba~is, then, in 
my opinion, you have no right to make the requisition for 
1,000 copies. 
If, on the other hand, you make the requisition under the 
general authority vested in your Department, and with the 
understanding that the cost is to be charged against the 
printing appropriation for your Department, then I am of 
the opinion that you have a right to ma~e such requisition, 
and that the Public Printer has no authority to pass upon 
the character of publications which you may deem essential 
for carrying out the work of your Department. 
Respectfully, 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
A. cting A. ttorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF .AGRICULTURE. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-SEEDS-STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION. 
The act making appropriations {or the Department of Agriculture for 
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, authorizes the Department to pay 
$130,000 for seed already put up in packages and labeled, ready for 
distribution. 
An act of Congress should not be treated as a nullity if it can by any 
reasonable construction be made operative. In construing the act it 
is proper to consider facts which have been known to Congress and 
to assume that it legislated having them in view. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 30, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of June 18, 1896, in which you ask for an opinion as to 
whether the act making appropriations for the Department 
of .Agriculture for the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, can 
be carried out in spirit and in letter. 
The provi ion in question i as follows: 
' Divi ion of seeds, purcha e and distribution of valuable 
eed : F r the purcha e, propagation, and distribution of 
v luable ed , bulbs, tree , shrubs, vines, cuttings, and 
pl nt and expen e of labor, tran portation, paper, twine, 
m printing po tal card , and all necessary material and 
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repairs for putting up and distributing the same, and to be 
distributed in localities adapted to their culture, one hun-
dred and :fifty thousand dollars. And the Secretary of 
Agriculture is hereby authorized, empowered, directed, and 
required to expend the said sum in the purchase, propaga-
tion, and distribution of such valuable seeds, bulbs, trees, 
shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants, and is authorized, em-
powered, directed, and required to expend not less than tbe 
sum of one hundred and thirty thousand dollars in the pur-
chase at public or private sale of valuable seeds the best he 
can obtain and such as shall be suitable for the respective 
localities to which the same are to be apportioned and in 
which the same are to be distributed, as hereinafter stated, · 
and such seeds so purchased shall include a variety of vege-
table and flower seeds suitable for planting and culture in 
the various sections of the United States. 
"That section :five hundred and twenty-seven of the 
Revised Statutes be amended so that it will read as follows: 
'' 'SEC. 527. That purchase and· distribution of vegetable, 
:field, and flower seeds, plants, shrubs, vines~ bulbs, and cut-
tings shall be of the freshest and best obtainable varieties 
and adapted to general cultivation.' 
"An equal proportion of two-thirds of all seeds, bulbs, 
trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants shall, upon their 
request, after due notification by the Secretary of Agriculture 
that the allotment to their respective districts is ready for 
distribution, be supplied to Senators, Representatives, and 
Delegates in Congress for distribution among their constitu-
ents, or be directed and mailed by the Department upon 
their request; and the person receiving such seeds shall 
be requested to inform the Department of results of the 
experiments therewith: Provided, That all seeds, bulbs, 
plants, and cuttings herein allotted to Senators, Representa-
tives, and Delegates in Congress for distribution remaining 
uncalled for on the :first of May shall be distributed by the 
Secretary of Agriculture, giving preference to those persons 
whose names and addresses have been furnished by Senators 
and Representatives in Congress, and who have not before, 
during the same season, been supplied by tbe Department: 
And provided also, That the Secretary shall report, as 
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provided in this act, the place, quantity, and price of seeds 
purchased, and the date of purchase; but nothing in this 
paragraph shall be construed to prevent the Secretary of 
.Agriculture from sending seeds to those who apply for the 
same. .And the amount herein appropriated shall not be 
diverted or used for any other purpose but for the purchase, 
propagation, and distribution of valuable seeds, bulbs, trees, 
shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants: Provided, however, That 
the Secretary shall not distribute to any Senator, Repre-
sentative, or Delegate seeds entirely unfit for the climate and 
locality he represents, but shall distribute the same so that 
each Member may have seeds of equal value, as near as may 
·be, and the best adapted to the locality he represents: Pro-
vided also, That the seeds allotted to the Senators and Repre-
sentatives for distribution, in the districts embraced within 
the twenty-fifth and thirty-second parallels of latitude, shall 
be ready for delivery on the tenth day of January or at the 
earliest practicable time thereafter." 
You say in your letter that: 
"The act provides $150,000 for the purchase, propagation, 
and distribution of valuable seeds, etc., including labor, 
transportation, paper, twine, gum,printing, postal cards, etc., 
but at the same-time requires the Secretary to expend not less 
than the sum of $130,000 in the purchase of valuable seeds 
alone. 
''Now, as a matter of fact, it is impossible to pay the nec-
essary expenses of preparing and distributing $130,000 worth 
of seed, paper bags, printing, transportation, labor, etc., 
with the $20,000 allowed by this act for the purpose, not to 
speak of the' trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants' named 
in the act. In support of this opinion I submit herewith a 
statement from the disbursing officer of this Department, 
ho wing the relative amounts expended by us during several 
years for the purcha e of seed and for all other expense of 
their preparation and distribution. It will be seen that an 
amount oTeater than the amount paid for the eedis required 
to prepar them for di tribution by Congre men. 
" h r tary of oTicultur declined to purcha e eed 
thi ar, in accordance with the advice of the Attorney-
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General in letter dated April 20, 1895, a copy of which is 
attached hereto, until Congress had, by resolution in effect 
March 14, 1896, instructed him to do so. In view of the 
lateness of the season, the Secretary then entered into con-
tracts with two seed houses to prepare, pack, label, and 
deliver the seeds to the mails on orders of Congressmen. 
A lump sum was paid for the seed put up in papers and mail 
packages, with the franks pasted upon them. This could be 
done under the appropriation bill for 1896, but apparently 
can not be done under that for 1897~ now under discussion. 
In the bill for 1896 there was no limit upon the amount that 
could be expended for other things than seed, such as paper 
packages, or for any expense of preparing the seed for 
distribution. 
'' ' For this reason, it appears to be doubtful whether this 
Department has the authority to pay $130,000 for seed 
already put up in packages and labeled, ready for distribu-
tion, as was done this year. The act under consideration is 
very positive in declaring that $130,000 shall be paid for 
seed, to the exclusion of '' trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and -
plants," and the expenses of labor, transportation, paper, 
twine, gum, printing, postal cards, and all necessary mate-
rial and repairs for putting up and distributing the same." 
It is certain that if $130,000 were paid for" valuable seeds" 
alone, the remaining $20,000 of the appropriation would be 
entirely inadequate to pay for putting up and distributing 
them, so that nothing would be left for the purchase of 
"trees, shrubs, vines, cuttings, and plants.'" 
" This act is made still more difficult of execution by the 
further requirement that the Secretary of Agriculture shall 
direct and mail the seed upon requests from Congressmen, 
and incur various other expenses, all of which must come 
out of the $20,000 allowed for every other purpose except 
the purchase of valuable seeds. And this is all made more 
difficult still by the abolition of the statutory roll of the seed 
division, hitherto provided in all the appropriation bills." 
The question is not free from doubt. An act of Congress 
should not be treated as a nullity if it can by any reasonable 
construction be made operative. In construing the act it is 
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proper to consider facts which must have been known to 
Congress and to assume that it legislated having them in 
view. 
It must be supposed that Congress knew from the expendi-
tures in former years that it would be entirely impossible to 
pack and distribute $130,000 worth of seeds with the remain-
ing $20,000 of the $150,000 appropriation, to say nothing of 
other expenses which were to be met out of this balance, 
and that for the year 1896 seeds had been purchased by 
your Department, put up in packages, and labeled ready for 
distribution. Congress had abolished the statutory roll of 
the seed division, and knew that you had no regular facili-
ties for packing such a large quantity of seeds. 
A conclusion that Congress intended that $130,000 of the 
appropriation should be expended for seeds in bulk and un-
prepared for distribution would carry with it the corollary 
that Congress deliberately enacted a law with the purpose 
that it should be a dead letter, intending either that the 
seeds should not be purchased at all, or that after purchase 
they should not be distributed. Such a purpose can not be 
imputed to Congress. 
The action of Congress in passing a joint resolution direct-
ing the purchase of seeds for 1896, and the mandatory 
language of the act in question, entirely negative any such 
idea. 
It is clear beyond doubt that Congress intended the seeds to 
be purchased and to be distributed out of this appropriation. 
I am of the opinion that the designation of such a large 
proportion of the entire appropriation for the purchase of 
seeds, made with the knowledge that the remainder would 
not be sufficient for packing seeds for distribution and for 
carrying out the other purposes expressed, was made in con-
templation of the manner in which the purchase was made 
for 1 96, and with the expect.eition that the $130,000 would be 
expended for ed prepared for distribution in the same way. 
e pectfully, 
J UDSON HARMON. 
The E '&ET.A.RY 0 GR ICUL'.I'URE. 
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL-FOREIGN LAW. 
The existence of a foreign law is a question of fact. 
The Attorney-General can not give an opinion upon the law of a foreign 
nation. 
As to whether a discriminating duty should be imposed under the act of 
1894 upon salt imported from Germany, which country imposes a duty 
in the nature of an internal excise tax on salt exported from the United 
States. Quawe. 
DEPAR'.l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 2, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of June 20, asking a further opinion in the matter of the . 
duties upon German salt. 
Paragraph 608 of the tariff act of 1894 puts salt in general 
on the free list, but contains the following proviso: 
"Provided, That if salt is imported from any country, 
whether independent or a dependency, which imposes a duty 
upon salt exported from the United States, then there shall 
be levied, paid, and collected upon such salt the rate of duty 
existing prior to the passage of this act." · 
The Empire of Germany imposes a duty upon salt exported 
from the United States, and duties have up to this time 
continued to be levied upon German salt. Germany, how-
ever, has always claimed that its salt is entitled to free entry, 
for the reason that its own import duty merely countervails 
an excise which it levies upon all salt produced in its own 
territory; claiming that the exaction upon American salt, 
while in form a duty, is really but an excise; that there is no 
discrimination against American salt, and that paragraph 
608, therefore, has no application. This question was sub-
mitted by you to Attorney-General Olney, who declined to 
give an opinion upon it, because he was not supplied with 
sufficient information, since the laws of Germany, "like other 
foreign laws, are facts to be proved by competent evidence." 
(21 Opin., 80.) 
Your present communication contains no statement of the 
facts as to the German salt excise, but states that "the data 
necessary to a conclusion appear to be included in the papers 
sent herewith." 
You inclose a translation made at the State Department 
of a communication recently received from the German 
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ambassador upon this subject. This communication incloses 
extracts from a law of the North German Confederation 
(which no longer exists) bearing date October 12, 1867, relat-
ing to the excise on salt; an extract from an agreement of 
May 8, 1867, between certain States, since included in the 
German Empire, with relation to the same matter; some 
comments upon the constitution of the German Empire; a 
general statement as to laws of the Kingdoms of Bavaria 
and Wiirtemberg and the Grand Duchies of Baden and 
Hesse, copies of which laws are not inclosed, and a state-
ment as to the budget of the German Empire for the fiscal 
year 1895-96. This communication discloses great complica-
tion in the constitutional system of that Empire, and shows 
that some degree of expertness is required for a correct 
understanding of its fiscal system. 
This communication is accompanied by a letter from the 
Secretary of State addressed to you. This letter, however, 
expresses no opinion upon the questions of German law and 
practice which are argued by the ambassador. The Secre-
tary of State merely says: ''You will observe that the 
ambassador states that proof is presented by his note that 
.American salt in Germany is placed on the same footing 
with German salt in respect to duties and taxes." 
It is apparent, therefore, that I can not advise upon the 
point submitted hy you without first examining the consti-
tution of the German Empire and the legislation .to which 
the ambassador refers, and deducing therefrom a conclusion 
of German law. This, however, I am not authorized to do, 
nor is the Department of Justice equipped for such investi-
gation. Nothing is better settled than that the opinion of 
the .Attorney-General can not be asked upon a question of 
fact; and it is equa11y well settled that the existence of a 
foreign law is a question of fact. (21 Opin., 80; Church v. 
Hubbart, 2 Or., 187, 236; IJainese v. Hale, 91 U.S., 13, 20.) 
I do not think tbat ongress, in providing for official opin-
ion by the .Attorney-General, intended that he should be 
all d upon to advi e concerning question of foreign law. 
He i not pe ted to be conver ant with the variou lan-
guag in which for ign legislation must be read; nor i 
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he, like the Secretary of State, provided with an official 
translator for his assistance. Whether the statements of a 
foreign ambassador as to the true construction of the legis-
lation of his own Government and the practice thereunder 
should be accepted as true, is, I think, a question to be 
decided by the Secretary of State and not by the Attorney-
General. I do not think that you would be authorized to act 
upon any statement of German law coming from me. If by 
other means you ascertain positively that the duty upon Amer-
ican salt exacted by the Empire of Germany is in fact but a 
method of subjecting it to an excise to which it contributes 
equally with domestic salt, and if, upon such definite informa-
tion, you are in doubt as to whether German salt is entitled 
to be admitted into our ports free of duty, the question pre-
sented will be one which I shall be authorized to answer. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
PUBLIC WORKS-CONTRACTS. 
Under section 5 of the river and harbor act a contractor on a continuing 
contract work can be permitted to earn in one :fiscal year more than 
$400,000, but he may not demand or receive from the Government in 
any one year more than $400,000, and must be content to remain a 
creditor of the Government until his money is paid as provided for in 
his contract, of which this act is a part. 
Said section 5 is not limited in its application to cases in which the total 
amount authorized to be expended is more than $400,000. 
Where the total amount authorized to be expended is less than$400,000, 
contractors may be allowed to earn the amounts authorized to be 
expended in advance of the appropriation by Congress for such work. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'.l'ICE, 
July 21, 1896. 
SIR: I have your letter of July 9, in which you direct 
attention to certain sections and provisions of the river and 
harbor act, in which authority is given the Secretary of War 
for making '' continuiug contracts" for the construction and 
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improvement of certain public works; and restrictions are 
imposed as to the amount to be expended annually under 
such contracts. You recite in your letter section 5 of the act, 
and submit to me the questions: 
'' 1. Whether, under the terms of the law which limits the 
amount that the Secretary of War can obligate the Govern-
ment for in any one :fiscal year to $400,000, and forbids him to 
make any obligation to pay more, a contractor on one of these 
continuing contract works can be permitted to earn more than 
the specified amount in any one :fiscal year 1 · In other words, 
can the amount of work done in any one fiscal year exceed in 
value the amount of money which Congress has authorized to 
be paid¥" 
Under the generallaw (sec. 3679, Rev. Stat.) it is provided: 
"No Department of the Government shall expend, in any 
one :fiscal year, any sum in excess of the appropriations 
made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the Gov-
ernment in any contract for the future payment of money in 
excess of such appropriation." 
Under the present statute, authority is expressly given to 
the head of the War Department to contract for the construc-
tion of public works in certain cases which may require many 
years to complete, and under the contracts so made the Gov-
ernment will be involved for the future payment of money 
largely in excess of the amount already appropriated. 
The contracts will doubtless prescribe the limits of time 
within which the entire work, or certain specified stages 
thereof, shall be completed; and penalties will doubtless be 
prescribed for the failure on the part of the contractor to 
complete the whole or such portions of said work within the 
period prescribed. 
The expenditures of money provided for in tbe appropria-
tion acts of Congress are based upon the estimated annual 
rev nues of the Government available for the o~ject of uch 
appropriations. 
It wa doubtle con idered in this particular appropria-
tion act that how ver u ful the works therein provided for 
mi h b , or h w r d irable their early completion, yet a 
due r (Yard to he annual revenue of the ernment would 
no c dmi f, Jar r annual exp nditure in any ca e than i 
th r in pro id d for. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 381 
Public Works-Contracts. 
A. contractor, allowed under a contract, say, three years for 
the completion of a certain work, can in no case receive in 
any one year more than $400,000 on his contract. But, sup-
pose that by the application of newly discovered instruments 
or devices he is able to accomplish in one year the work 
which, at the date of his contract, it was reasonably supposed 
would require three years for its completion, shall this con-
tractor be permitted to economize the time to avail himself of 
the newly discovered appliances, and earn in one year what 
otherwise would have required three, I see nothing in the 
spirit, the object, or the letter of the law to forbid it. He 
may not demand or receive from the Government more than 
$400,000 in any one year, and must be content to remain a 
creditor of the Government until his money is paid as pro-
vided for in his contract, of which this act is a part. 
I therefore say, in answer to this question, that the con-
tractor may perform, under his contract, in one year the 
work which the contract allows him three years to perform, 
although he may not receive full payment therefor under 
three years. 
"2. Whether, in the case of restricted annual obligation, 
or in cases of continuous contracts not subject to the pro-
visions of section 5, because the total amount authorized to 
be expended is less than $400,000 (as in the case of Dunkirk 
Harbor, New York, on page 4 of the act), it is permissible to 
allow the contractor to earn the amounts authorized to be 
expended in advance of the appropriation by Congress for 
such work'" 
I do not understand section 5 as being limited in its appli-
cation to cases in which "the total amount authorized to be 
expended is more than $400,000." I understand the provisos 
in that section to be applicable to any contract made under 
the authority of this act. 
I see no reason whatever why contractors under contracts 
where the total amount authorized to be expended is less 
than $400,000 should not be allowed to earn the amounts 
authorized to be expended in advance of the appropriation 
by Congress for such work. Certainly the language of the 
act does not exclude such a construction. 
In the case suggested in your letter as an illustration of 
the appropriation for the improvement of the harbor at 
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Dunkirk, N. Y., this is a "continuing improvement"; the 
Secretary of War is authorized to make contracts for "such 
materials and work as may be necessary to complete the 
modified project for its improvement, to be paid for as appro-
priations may from time to time be made, not to exceed in 
the· aggregate $398,258, exclusive of the amount herein and 
heretofore appropriated." 
Now, there it is not even stipulated that the appropriation 
shall be annual. . The Secretary is empowered to contract 
for the completion of the entire work; the contract will 
doubtless prescribe a period within which, in "the opinion of 
the engineer officers, such a work should be completed; but 
the contractor may complete it in half the time allowed. Can 
any reason be suggested why he should not be permitted to 
do so, and thereby earn the full amount contracted for and 
save the time that would be otherwise wasted, .A. contrary 
view would require that he should hold himself in readiness 
to prosecute such work only in those years and for such a 
length of time as Congress may see proper to provide for by 
appropriation. 
I am of opinion that it is permissible to allow the con-
tractor to earn the amounts authorized to be expended in 
advance of the appropriation by Congress for such work. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
WORKS IN CONNECTION WITH FORT TAYLOR-RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION OF REAL ESTATE. 
17 Opinions, 7, concurred in, except in so far as that opinion held that 
proceedings to oui;t the United States from possession of the premi es 
were not maintainable. Such proceedings, while not maintainable 
directly against the nited tates, may yet be maintained against 
the individual in pos ·e ion of the premises. 
The nited tate had authority to take possession of and use real 
e tate during the period of the war for war purposes, but had not the 
authority to dive t the title of the owner. They had not the power 
to retain po. ion of real e ta.te originally taken for war purpo ~ 
beyond th period during which the occasion for the taking con-
tinued. 
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The United States having taken possession and still retaining same, 
such possession can not be surrendered by the officers of the Govern-
ment without authority from the Secretary of War. 
If the United States, being in possession of such real estate, have been 
forcibly ejected-even by the lawful owner-such possession is unlaw-
ful and should be r estored to the United States by a possessory action 
in the courts. 
If the United States ham abandoned such real estate and the lawful 
owner has entered and taken possession, his possession is lawful and 
should not be disturbed. 
DEP .A.R'.l.'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 21, 1896. 
SIR: I have your letter of the 16th of July, in which you 
state that in the summer of 1861 the Government desired to 
construct works in connection with Fort Taylor, for the defense 
of the harbor of Key West, Fla.; that the. sites needed for the 
proposed works were owned by private individuals; that 
negotiations were commenced for the purchase of these sites 
by the Government, but the exigencies of the times and cer-
tain difficulties in procuring titles prevented the purchase 
"and possession was taken of the two tracts by order of the 
Secretary of War of September 21, 1861, reiterated Decem-
ber 18, 1861, and the construction of the works was com-
menced soon afterwards;" that the land has never been 
purchased by the United States, but the works were con-
structed thereon by the United States at great cost and still 
remain upon the land. 
It appears that in January, 1881, the opinion of the .Attor-
ney-General was asked by the Secretary of War "'if under 
the circumstances the United States can hold possession of 
tbe sites, exclude intruders, whether they claim to be owners 
or not, and force the owners to enter claims for the land 
either in Congress or before the Court of Claims, by which 
means they can obtain proper compensation for their lands..'' 
The Attorney-General expressed the opinion at that time that 
the United States could hold possession of the sites and 
exclude intruders therefrom, whether they claimed to be 
owners or not; and further, that no proceedings to oust the 
United States from the premises were maintainable. He 
advised that application be made to Congress for authority 
to acquire the title, either by purchase or condemnation, 
instead of forcing the owners to go to Congress for relief. 
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I concur in the views expressed by my predecessor in that 
opinion, except in so far as he held that proceedings to oust 
the United States from possession of the premises were not 
maintainable. Such proceedings, while not · maintainable 
directly against the United States, may yet be maintained 
against the individuals in possession of the premises. 
The United States had authority to take possession ofand 
use real estate during the period of the war for war purposes. 
They had not the authority, or the power, by any summary 
proceeding, to divest the title of the owner of such real 
estate; nor had they the power to retain possession of real 
estate originally taken for war purposes beyond the period 
during which the occasion for the taking continued. 
The United States having taken possessjon and sti11 retain-
ing the same, such possession can not be surrendered by the 
officers of the Government without authority from the Sec-
retary of War. 
If the United States, being in possession of these sites, or 
either of them, have been forcibly ejected and ousted-even 
by the lawful owner-such possession is unlawful and should 
be restored to the United States by a possessory action in 
the courts. 
The course recommended by Attorney-General Devens 
(17 Opin., 7)1 that application be made to Congress for the 
purchase or condemnation of this land, is, manifestly, the 
wisest and most just course to be pursued. 
If the United States have abandoned these sites, or either 
of them, and the lawful owner has entered and taken posses-
sion, his possession is lawful and can not and should not be 
disturbed. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRE TARY OF WAR. 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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ARMY OFFICERS-SECRETARY O_F WAR. 
An examination by an examining board of a lieutenant of the Army to 
determine his :fitness for promotion, by which it was found that he 
was incapacitated for active service on account of certain physical 
tlisabilities, which findings were approved by the Surgeon-General, 
by the Major-General Commanding the Army, apd by the Acting 
Secretary of War, but not by the President, was not such an exami-
nation as is required by law for the retirement of an officer from 
active service. · 
He could not be retired without the approval of the President. 
If he recovers from such disabilities, the Secretary of War may allow 
him a reexamination for promotion. 
Tho phrase "he shall ue retired with the rank to which his seniority 
entitle(l him to be promoted," in the proviso to the act of October 1, 
1890, is not a mandatory provision for the retirement of the disabled 
officer, but is fur the purpose of :fixing the rank with which he should 
be retired. · 
DEP .AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 31, 1896. 
SIR: I have your communication of the 20th of July, 
inclosing a request in writing, from the Hon. John H. Mitch-
ell, United States Senator, with a number of other papers, 
presenting the case upon which you request my opinion . 
.Among these papers is a communication of October 24, 1895, 
from Medorem Crawford, first lieutenant Second .Artillery, 
Fort Schuyler, N. Y., to the .Adjutant-General, United States 
.Army (through military channels). This communication sub-
mits a protest-
,, For the personal consideration of the honorable Secre-
tary of War, against a reexamination as to his fitness for 
promotion of First Lieut. Edwin S. Curtis, Second United 
States .Artillery, who has been directed by Special Orders, 
No. 247, paragraph 9, .Adjutant-General's Office, October 22, 
1895, to appear before a board of officers 'for such reexami-
nation; he having already been examined by an examining 
board appointed by Special Orders, No. 251, Headquarters of 
the .Army, .Adjutant-General's Office, October 28, 1891, by 
which board he was found to be incapacitated for service by 
reason of physical disability contracted in the line of duty, 
and the proceedings of the board in his case having been 
duly approved by the honorable Secretary of War, and his 
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action promulgated by Special Orders, No. 102, Headquarters 
of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, May 6, 1893, and the 
officer ordered to proceed to bis home. 
"I respectfully enter the above protest on the ground of 
the illegality of ·a reopening of bis case by a second exam-
ination into his .fitness for p'romotion." 
It further appears, from the papers accompanying your 
letter, that on December 8, 1891, Lieut. Edwin~- Curtis was 
examined by an examining board to determine his fitness for 
promotion and was found (incapacitated for active service on 
account of certain physical disabilities; · that this finding 
was approved by the Surgeon-General and by the Major-
General Commanding the Army and, on December 18, 1891, 
by the then Acting Secretary of War; that on the last-
named date Lieutenant Curtis was notified that he would be 
retired at the proper time. 
On May 6, 1893, he was ordered to his home, and on June 
23, 1893, be was granted sick leave of absence until further 
orders. 
On May 16, 1895, he applied for reexamination and sub-
mitted a surgeon's certificate showing that he had recovered 
his kealth and was then physically sound. On this applica-
tion he was, with the approval of the Secretary of War, 
assigned to duty at Fort Trumbull, Conn. 
On October 21, 1895, the action of the Acting Secretary of 
War, of December 18, 1891, approving the .finding of the 
examining board, was cancelled ·by the Secretary of War. 
The ground of the protest of Lieutenant Crawford against 
the reexamination for promotion of Lieutenant Curtis appears 
to be that the examination of December 8, 1891, when 
approved by the Secretary of War, December 18, 1891, 
became final and conclusive, and that no power or authority 
existed in the Secretary of War to direct or permit a reex-
amination of Lieuteuant Curtis. He relies upon the proviso 
to the act of October 1, 1890-
That hould he officer fail in his physical examination 
and be found incapacitated for ervice by reason of physical 
di bility contracted in line of duty he shall be retired 
wi h b rank to wbi h hi eni rity entit1 d him to be pro-
m 1. 
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The correctness of this view must depend upon· the law as 
it then stood, whether expressed by act of Oongress or by 
authorized executive orders. 
By act of October 1, 1890 (26 _ Stat., 562), entitled "An 
act to provide for the examination of certain officers of the 
Army and to regulate promotions therein," it is provided in 
section 3-
" That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to 
prescribe a system of examination of all officers of the Army 
below the rank of major to determine their fitness for pro-
motion, such an examination to be conducted at such times 
anterior to the accruing of the right to promotion as may be 
best for the interests of the service: * * * And pro-
vided, That should the officer fail in his physical examina-
tion and be found incapacitated for service by reason of 
physical disability contracted in line of duty he shall be 
retired with the rank to which his seniority entitled him to 
be promoted." * * * 
This act was published in General Orders, No. 116, Head-
quarters of the Army, October 7, 1890. 
On October 29, 1890, there was published in General 
Orders, No. 128, Headquarters of the Army, certain rules 
'' prescribed by the President in accordance with section 3 
of the act of Congress approved October 1, 1890. Of these 
Rule III is as follows: 
"When the board finds an officer physically incapacitated 
for service it shall conclude the examination by finding and 
reporting the cause which, in its judgment, has produced his 
disability, and whether such disability was contracted in the 
line of duty. For the purpose of this inquiry the proceed-
ings of the board shall conform to those of a retiring 
board." 
By a" Circular" of December, 18, 1890, issued by order of 
the Secretary of War, from the Surgeon-General's Office-
,,' Physical incapacity' is defined as a condition, bodily or 
mental, which unfits at present, or is likely to unfit in the 
near future, the officer for the performance of his duties." 
In General Orders, No. 80, October 5, 1891, Headquarters 
of the Army, aud in General Orders, No. 6, January 26, 
1893, Headquarters of the Army, certain rules, prescribed by 
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the President in accordance with section 3 of the act of Con-
gress approved October 1, 1890, were published for the 
information of those concerned. 
On January 31, 1893, thore were issued from the Head-
quarters of the .Army a certa.in "General instructions for 
examining boards" for the guidance of examining boards in 
the examination of commissioned officers for promotion . 
.Among these instructions is the following: 
".All questions relating to the physical condition of a can-
didate shall be determined by the full board; and if the 
board finds an officer physically incapacitated the proceed-
ings will be authenticated by the signature of the president 
and the recorder only." 
On September 15, 1893, certain other '' General instruc-
tions for examining boards" were issued from the Headquar-
ters of the Army as follows: 
"When the board finds it necessary ... to act in the capacity 
of a retiring board under paragraph 3 of General Orders, 
No. 12_8, October 29, 1890, it will, before concluding the exam-
ination for retirement, apply to the .Adjutant-General for a 
statement of tlrn officer's military service and any evidence 
· which may be on file relating to the question of bis disability, 
the same as furnished to a retiring board, and upon the 
receipt of such statement and evidence will proceed to thor-
oughly examine into the merits of the case in accordance 
with the requirements of sections 1248 and 1249, Revised 
Statutes." 
Construing together the statutes and regulations provid-
iug for the promotion of officers of the Army, we find that 
under the act of October 1, 1890, a physical, as well as a 
professional, examination was provided for as a condition for 
promotion; and that act expressly provides that-
" Should the officer fail in his physical examination and be 
found incapacitated for service by reason of physical disa-
bility he hall be retired with the rank to which his senior-
ity entitl d him to be promoted." 
It houJ l be borne in mind that the title of this act is 
" n a t to provide for the e 'amination of certain officers of 
he m and t regulate promoti n therein. ' That title 
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correctly describes the object, purpose, and intent of the act 
as appears from all of its provisions. 
It was not an act to provide for the retirement of officers 
from the Army, but merely to _fix the rank of officers and 
"regulate promotions" in the Army. 
The phrase to which Lieutenant Crawford directs atten-
tion in the third proviso to section 3 of the act," he shall be 
retired with the rank to wh1ch his seniority entitled him to be 
promoted," plainly is not a mandatory provision for the retire-
ment of the disabled officer, but for the purpose of fixing the 
rank with which he should be retired. _No authority was 
given by law to the board of · examiners for promotion to 
retire any officer from the Army; no such authority is any-
where given to the Secretary of War. 
The law providing for the retirement of officers from the 
Army will be found in sections 1243-1260 of the Revised 
Statutes. . 
Section 1249 provides for the report to be made by the 
Army retiring board. 
Section 1250 provides: 
"The proceedings and decision of the board shall be trans-
mitted to the Secretary of War, and shall be laid by him 
before the President for his approval or disapproval and 
orders in the case." 
Section 1251 provides: 
"When a retiring board finds that an officer is incapaci-
tated for active service, and that his incapacity is the result 
of an incident of service, and such decision is approved by 
the President, said officer shall be retired from active service 
and placed on the list of retired officers." 
So that no officer can be retired from the Army upon the 
report of any board, evep. if such report be approved by the 
Secretary of War, except it "is approved by the President." 
It is true that the physical examination of an officer who 
is under examination for promotion may be the same in its 
character and extent as the physical examination of an officer 
who is under examination for retirement. Indeed, section 
3, General Orders, No. 128, of October 9, 1890, of the rules 
prescribed ·by the President for the examination of officers 
for promotion requires that "for the purpose of this inquiry 
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the proceedings of · the board shall conform to those of a 
retiring board." And this circular from the Surgeon-General 
of Decern ber 18, 1890, and the " General instructions for 
examining boards" of January 31, 1893, prescribe, with 
minuteness and detail, the character of such examinations. 
The "General instructions" of September 13, 1893, pro-
vide that-
" When the board finds it necessary to act in the capacity 
of a retiring board, under paragraph 3 of General Orders, 
N o.128, October 29, 1890, it will, before concluding the exam-
ination for retirement,' apply to the Adjutant-General for a 
statement of the officer's military service and any evidence 
which may be on file relating to the question of his disability, 
the same as furnished to a retiring board, and upon the 
receipt of such statement and evidence will proceed to thor-
oughly examine into the merits of the case, in accordance 
with the requirements of sections 1248 and 1249, Revised 
Statutes." 
'11his order indicates the manner in which the examination 
is to be conducted, and substantially directs that it sha11 be 
the same in all respects as that provided for a retiring board. 
It must be apparen~ then, that no such proceedings were 
had in the case of Lieutenant Curtis as to effect his retire-
ment from the Army. 
The findings of the examining board of December 8, 1891, 
were approved by the Surgeon-General, the Major-General 
Commanding the Army, and by the Secretary of War; and 
Lieutenant Curtis "was notified that he would be retired at 
the proper time." But he could not be retired without the 
approval of the President; and even if the action of the 
examining board for promotion were to be regarded and 
treated as that of a retiring 'board, still it would be inopera-
tive to effect hi retirement until approved by the President. 
ection 1246, Revi eel Statutes, provide that the Secretary 
ar, und r the direction of the Pre ident, may a semble 
c retiring board, to con i t of not mor than nine, nor le ' 
than :five fficer two-fifth of whom hall be 'elected from 
h 1 dicaJ or . Th board f xaminati n for the pro-
id d for in the rule pr cribed b the 
r1 r o. 2 , 0 t b r 29, 1890, ball 
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consist" of five members, two of whom shall be selected from 
the Medical Corps, and a recorder." 
' So that it would seem that a board constituted as a board 
of examination for promotion, as required to be, can not be 
invested with the· power of a retiring board, which the law 
requires to be differently constituted. 
On the whole, I am of opinion that tbe physical examiI1a-
tion to which Lieutenant Curtis was subjected on December 
8,189.1, was not such an examination as was required by law 
for the retirement of an officer from active service; and that 
no reason appears from the facts submitted to me, or from 
the law as it then was, or as it ,now is, why-upon the facts 
stated-the Secretary of War may not allow him a reexam-
ination for promotion. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 




STATUTORY CONSTRUCTlON-SECRETARY OF WAR. 
The river and harbor act of June 3, 1893, making an appropriation 
for the protection of the east bank of the Mississippi River opposite 
the mouth of the Missouri River, leaves it to the discretion of the Sec-
retary of War whether he s_hall make such expenditure or not. 
Language whose ordinary meaning is permissive only is sometimes 
held to be mandatory when other parts of the law make it plain that 
it was intended to require and not merely authorize. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
A. ugust 1, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of July 28, calling my attention to the folio wing clause 
in the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896: '' That of the 
money herein :appropriated for the improvement of the 
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Mississippi River between Cairo and the mouth of the Mis-
souri River there may be expended, under the direction of 
the Secretary of War, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, 
or so much thereof as may be necessary, in order to improve 
the channel of the river, and to protect the east bank of the 
Mississippi river from caving in and being washed away at 
or near a point opposite the mouth of the Missouri River 
and extending south along said east bank, and thirty thou-
sand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall 
be expended in removing the bar in front of Chester, Illinois, 
and protecting the west bank of the Mississippi opposite 
Chester," and asking my opinion whether the expenditure 
of the $50,000, provided in the item quoted, for protecting 
the east bank of the Mississippi River at a point opposite 
the mouth of the Missouri, is virtuaJly ordered by Congress, 
or is the expenditure of the amount left to ·the discretion of 
the Secretary of War. 
While language whose ordinary meaning is permissive 
only, like that in the clause in question, has sometimes been 
held to be mandatory when other parts of the law made it 
plain that it was intended to require, and not merely author-
ize, my opinion is that the permissive form was here used 
with the deliberate intention of leaving to your judgment 
the question whether any of the sum named should be 
expended; and if so, how much. Your attention is called 
by Uongress to the condition of the channel and the east 
bank of the Mississippi at the point named, and it is made 
your duty, if that condition be found to be as reported to 
Congress, to proceed with the expenditure authorized if, 
in your judgment, an improvement of that condition may 
fairly be expected to result. Otherwise you are left at lib-
erty to leave the appropriation unexpended. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The ECRE'.l'A.RY OF WAR. 
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CIVIL SERVICE. 
Section 4-415, Revised Statutes, so far as it prescribes the method by 
which vacancies on the board of inspectors of hulls of steam vessels 
shall be filled, was repealed by the civil-service act and the board pro-
vided by said section can not act as a board of examiners under the 
civil-service act, unless the members of such board ar.e selected and 
appointed as such board of e~aminers under section 5, Rule IV. 
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 10, 1896. 
SIR: I have yours of the 6th instant, stating that a vacancy 
exists in the Steamboat Inspection Service of inspector of 
hulls of steam vessels at San Francisco, and submitting for 
my opinion the question ''whether the ·Civil Service Com-
missfon can use the board provided by law, section 4415, 
Revised Statutes, and make them a civil-service examini11g 
board under its provisions, or whether the civil-service 'law 
and rules abrogate that statute as far as these places are 
concerned." 
By act of January 16, 1883, entitled ''An act to regulate 
and improve the civil service of the United States" (22 Stat., 
403): 
"SEO. 7. That after the expiration of six months from tbe 
passage of this act no officer or clerk shall be appointed., 
and no person shall be employed to enter or be promoted in 
either of the said classes now existing or that may be arranged 
hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has passed au 
examination, or is Hhowri to be specially exempted from such 
examination in conformity herewith. But nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to take from those honorably 
discharged from the military or naval service any preference 
conferred by the seventeen hundred and fifty-fourth section 
of the Revised Statutes, nor to take from the President any 
authority not inconsistent with this act conferred by the sev-
enteen hundred and fifty-third section of said statutes; nor 
shall any officer not in the executive branch of the Govern-
ment or any person merely employed as a laborer or work-
man be required to be classified hereunder; nor, unless Ly 
direction of the Senate, shall any person who has been nomi-
nated for confirmation by the Senate be required to be classi-
fied or to pass an examination." 
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The rules here referred to are those provided for in section 
2 of said act. 
Pursuant to the authority and requirement of said act and 
of section 1753, Revised Statutes, the President did, on May 
G, 1896, approve certain rules which have been duly promul-
gated and all other rules revoked. 
By Rule III the departmental service was made one of 
the branches of the classified executive civil service of the 
United States and includes therein the officers and employees 
of the Steamboat Inspection Service. 
By Rule IV, section 2~ it was provided: 
"No person shall be appointed to, or be employed in, any 
position which has been, or may hereafter be classified under 
the civil-service act, until he shall have passed the examina-
tion provided therefor, or unless he is especially exempt 
from examination by the provisions of said act or the rules 
made in pursuance thereof." 
Section 5 authorizes the Civil Service Commissioners to 
"appoint from persons in the Government service such 
boards of examiners as it may deem necessary." 
I am of opinion, then, that section 4415, Revised Statutes, 
so far as it prescribes the method by which vacancies on the 
board of inspectors of hulls of steam vessP-ls shall be :filled, 
is repealed by the civil-service act, and the board provided 
by section 4415, Revised Statutes, can not act as a board of 
examiners under the civil-service act unless the members 
of such board are selected and appointed as such board of 
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ection 39 - and 39 3, Revised ' tatutes, are not in derogation of com-
m n right. They are r venne laws and are not to be strictly con trued, 
thou rh they impo penalti . 
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Railroad companies can not set up any" common right" against the 
conditions which the law incorporates in their contracts with the 
Government. 
The public interest requires that the Government should have a monop-
oly of the business of carrying letters, etc. 
Letters aud packets relating to the business of the railroad on which 
they are carried may be carried by such railroad outside of the mails, 
not in Government stamped envelopes. The right is to carry letters 
written and sent by the officers and agents of the railroad company 
which carries and delivers them, about its business, and these only. 
They may be letters to others of its officers and agents, to those of con-
necting lines, or to anyone else, so long as no other carrier intervenes. 
It has no right to transport letters for a third person. 
Letters of a company addressed to officers or agents of a connecting 
line on company business and delivered to an agent of the latter at 
the point of connection may be carried by the latter to any point on 
its line, because such letters become its own on receipt by any one of 
its agents. 
Any company, or any officer or employee thereof, carrying letters w,hich 
are neither written by that company nor addressed to it, is liable to 
the penalties imposecl by law. 
Tbe officer or agent of the person or company sending letters to be 
carried contrary to law is it seems also liable. 
A company may not carry letters from _one of its connecting lines to 
another when they relate to through business over the lines of all. 
Such letters do not ,., relate to its business:, within the meaning of 
the postal regulations. 
The expression "private hands," in section 3992, Revised Statutes, was 
intended to cover all except common carriers on post routes. Neither 
the latter nor their employees can be considered as "private hands" 
under this section, and if they could be, the express or implied obli-
gation of railroads to carry letters for each other to remotely con-
necting lines would amount to "compensation" within the meaning 
of the statute. 
The denial of the right of railroad companies to carry letters between 
other companies with whose lines their own connect applies also to 
the carrying of letters by railroad companies for companies, corpora-
tions, or pdvate individuals, operating car lines, transportation lines, 
hotels, restaurants, or any class of business that may either be con-
nected with or not connected with the railroad proper. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 12, 1896. 
Sm: Your letter of the 3d instant supplies the defects in 
that of July 29, to which I called your attention, by submit-
ting the specific questions on which you ask my opinion. 
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I have the honor, therefore, now to comply with your request. 
The delay has been chiefly due to the desire of counsel at a 
distance to present their views, which I was glad to gratify 
for my own benefit as well as in fairness to those whose 
interests are involved. 
You submit your order No. 422, dated July 2, 1896, rela-
tive to the sending and carrying by railway companies of 
'' letters outside the mails and not inclosed in Government 
stamped envelopes, and which do not relate to the cargo 
being carried on the train." The order quotes sections 3985 
and 3993 of the Revised Statutes, declares that "the carry-
ing of such letters outside the mails is in direct violation" of 
those sections, and threatens prosecution of all persons con-
cerned therein. The sections cited are as follows: 
"SEC. 3985. No stage coach, railway car, steamboat, or 
other vehicle or vessel which regularly performs trips at 
stated periods on any post route, or from any city, town, or 
place to any other city, town, or place, between which the 
mail is regularly carried, shall carry, otherwise than in the 
mail, any letters or packets, except such as relate to some 
part of the cargo of such steamboat or. other vessel, or to 
some article carried at the same time by the same stage 
coach, railway car, or other vehicle, except as provided in 
section three tl10usand nine hundred and ninety-three; and 
for every such offense the owner of the stage coach, rail-
way car, steamboat, or other vehicle or vessel shall be lia-
ble to a penalty of one hundred dollars; and the driver, 
conductor, master, or other person having charge thereof, 
and not at the time owner of the whole or any part thereof, 
shall for every such offense be liable to a penalty of :fifty 
dollars. 
"SE . 3993. All letters enclosed in stamped envelopes, if 
the po tage stamp i of a denomination sufficient to cover 
he po tage that would be chargeable thereon if the ame 
were ent by mail, may be ent, conveyed, and delivered 
otherwi e than by mail, provided such envelope shall be 
duly dire t d aud properly ealed, o that the letter can not 
b taJ~ n therefrom wi bout d facing the nvelope, and the 
d t of h 1 r of the tran mi ion or re eipt thereof 
am1>ed upon the n el pe. But the 
TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL. 397 
Letters Outside of the Mails Carried by Railroad Comp:mies-Statutory (;onstruction. 
Postmaster-General may suspend the operation of this sec-
tion upon any mail route where the public interest may 
require such suspension." 
You refer me to section 3992 also, which is as follows: 
"Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the con-
veyance or trausruission of letters or packets by private 
hands without compensation, or by special messenger 
employed for the particular occasion only." 
You ask: (1) "Can the railroad companies carry, outside 
of the mails, not in Government stamped envelopes, any first-
class mail matter except such as concerns the cargo carried 
by the road?" 
(2) "Is it proper for a railroad company to carry, outside 
of the mails, not in Government stamped envelopes, first-
class mail matter intended for a connecting line?" 
(3) "Is it proper for a railroad company to carry, outside 
of the mails, first-class mail matter not in Government 
stamped envelopes, for companies, corporations, or private 
individuals operating car lines, transportation lines ( either 
passenger or freight), operating hotels, restaurants, or any 
other class of business that may either be connected or not 
connected with the railroad proper 1" 
( 4) ''Can such companies as mentioned in the third ques-
tion carry their own mail; and if so, under what circum-
stances?" 
Section 1022 of the Postal Laws and Regulations of 1893, 
after prohibiting the carriage of letters and packets accord-
ing to sections 3985 and 3993, excepts such as relate " ·to the 
business of the railroad on which they are carried." You 
state that this clause bas been found in all the postal regu-
lations for many years, until it has become the settled con-
struction by your Department of the laws now embodied in 
these sections; and that you are therefore not disposed to 
iusist on the strict construction of your order, which would 
reverse that construction, unless the law requires you to 
do so. 
You say, however~ that the railroad companies of the 
country have given so broad a construction to the clause 
just quoted that a system of railway l~tter service has grown 
up of such proportions that it carries substantially all the 
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correspondence of railway officers and employees~ and those 
of kindred organizations, on all subjects connected with rail-
road business, and that n~gular offices for the distribution 
and routing of this railway mail are established at all large 
terminal points. 
I do not think these statutes are in derogation of common 
right, and therefore to be strictly construed as stated in 
United States v. United States Express Oo. (5 Biss., 91). They 
are revenue laws ( United States v. Bromley, 12 How., 96), 
and are not to be strictly construed, though they impose 
penalties. (4 Opin., 159; United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall., 
406; United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S., 12.) Certainly rail-
road companies can set up no "common right," if such they 
have, against the conditions which the law incorporates in 
.their contracts with the Government. The intention of the 
law was to secure to the Government a monopoly of the 
business of carrying letters, etc., which the public interest 
requires it to do in some regions at a loss, which might 
become too great a burden if it should be deprived of any 
portion of the business elsewhere. (See 9 Opin., 161, and 14 
Opin., 152.) 
But, whatever rule of construction be applied, I think the 
long-settled rule of your Department, taken as meant, car-
ries out the intention of the law. Read literally, section 3985 
would forbid the carrying of any letters or · packets outside 
the mails besides those covered by the express exceptions. 
But your predecessors who adopted and have maintained the 
rule above mentioned, looking to the object which Congress 
manifestly had in view, construed the law as applying ouly 
to carriage for other persons. This coustruction seems to be 
sustained by the glimpse into the minds of the framers of the 
law which the expressed exceptions afford, as well as by 
other sections of the law relating to the same general sub-
ject. (See ec . 3982-3984 and 4 Opin., 159.) Section 3992 
al o confirm thi view, both the exceptious it makes plainly 
relating to carriage for third person , as appears from the 
refer n e to · mpen ation in one ca e and employment in 
h oh r. 
idently had n thoucrht of int rfi ring with the 
f rri r on po tr ute for communicating 
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dirf>ctly with their own employees or with other persons. It 
was dealing only with their public business of carrying for 
others. Therefore no exception was required in this respect · 
and no argument is to be drawn from its omission from the 
expression of exceptions. 
In view of the language of the law and the plain right of 
Congress to require all letters carried on post routes by pul;>-
lic carriers to go in the mails, the right of railroads to carry 
their own letters must rest alone on the reason above given, 
which also furnishes the limitation of the right by its very 
definition. Even if the enjoyment of the right were deduced 
from lack of authority in Congress to interfere with it, rather 
than from absence of intention to do so, the same result 
would follow. The right is to carry .letters written and sent 
by the officers and agents of the railroad company which 
carries and delivers them, about its business, and these only. 
They may be letters to ot~ers of its officers and agents, to 
those of connecting lines, or to anyone else, so long as no 
other carrier intervenes. The moment this occurs, such other 
carrier is transporting letters for a third person. It bas no 
natural right to do this, as it is asserted to have with respect 
to its own letters; and as to letters other than its own, no 
exception is permissible beyond those expressed in the 
statute. 
The clause above quoted from the postal regulations was 
manifestly not intended to do more than carry out the law. 
Otherwise it would, of course, be invalid. But taken not to 
refer to letters of others than the carrying company, it is con-
sistent and proper. Such, I am confident, was the meaning 
intended. 
Of course, letters of a company addressed to officers or 
agents of a connecting line on company business, and deliv-
ered to an agent of the latter at the point of connection may 
be carried by the latter to any point on its line, because such 
letters become its own on receipt by any one of its agents, 
and transfer to another agent, without the intervention of 
another carrier, comes within the principle already expressed. 
But any company, or any officer or employee thereof, carry-
ing letters which are neither written by that company nor 
addressed to it, is liable to the penalties imposed by the law. 
3513-VOL 21, PT 2--13 
400 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
Letters Outside of tile lllails Carried by Railroad Companies-Statutory Construction. 
The officer or agent of the person or company sending lettiers 
to be carried contrary to the law is, it seems, also liable. 
· (See United States v. Hall, 9 .Am. Law Reg., 232, and R. S., 
sec. 5440.) 
I am unable to reconcile with this view of the law the 
claim that a company may carry letters from one of its con-
ll:ecting lines to another when they relate to through busi-
ness over the lines of all. This claim proceeds on the theory 
that the carrying company's interest, actual or possible, in 
the subject of the correspondence makes the letter" relate 
to its business," in the language of the postal regulations. 
But, as I have said, this la.nguage was used with reference 
to letters sent by or addressed to the carrying company, or 
on its behalf, and the form of expression adopted was 
doubtless merely intended to exclude private correspond-
ence between persons in the employ of carriers. Otherwise 
the regulation, like the claim based on it~ would be contrary 
to the law. In United States v. Bromley (supra) an order for 
goods to be brought by a steamboat on its return trip was 
held to have been wrongfully carried, although the carrier 
had a direct interest therein. 
Congress certainly expected that the _postal authorities 
would inspect letters, etc., transported by carriers not in 
the mails nor in stamped envelopes, in order to prevent and 
punish violations of law. (See secs. 3990 and 4026, and 
Blackham v. Gresham, 16 Fed. Rep., 609.) It is difficult to 
attribute to Congress an intention to •make the conduct of 
these officers depend on so difficult an inquiry as that 
involved in determining whether the carrier has an interest 
in the subject of correspondence to which it is not a party. 
While a somewhat similar inquiry may be required for the 
detection of private correspondence between railway em-
ployees,. it can be readily conducted by mere inspection of 
the letters, unlike investigation as to the carrier's interest 
in subjects of correspondence between other companies. 
Besides, such inquiry as to private correspongence is una-
voidable; while mere inspection of the envelopes will gener-
ally enable in pector to decide whether letters are by or to 
be arrier it If or it agents acting for H. It would be 
e uall imp ible for a carrier to determine, a8 it must do 
in rd r to a oid vi lation of the law, whether letters sent 
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by one of its connecting lines to another relate wholly to 
business in which it has a specific interest. The view 
contended for seems to require the assumption that each 
connecting carrier has such interest in all correspondence 
between other companies about through business done or 
expected. This assumption is unwarrantable in view of 
United States v. Bromley (supra). 
I do not think section 3992 has any bearing on this point. 
'(The conveyance or transmission of letters or packets by 
private hands without compensation" must, ofcourse, be held 
to refer to something different from conveyance or trans-
mission "by special messenger employed for the particular 
occasion;" but "private hands" was evidently intended to 
cover all except common carriers on post routes. Neither 
the latter nor their employees, while engaged in their busi-
ness, can be considered as "private hands" under this sec-
tion, and, if they could be, my opinion is that the express or 
implied obligation of railroads to carry letters for each other 
to remotely connecting lines would amount to "compensa-
tion" within the meaning of the statute. I <l.o not under-
stand it to be contended that the clause relating to special 
messengers is relevant here. 
The suggestion you make that the right of railroad com-
panies to carry their own letters to connecting lines is liable 
to abuses which are difficult to detect can not be considered. 
It is not to be assumed that anyone will violate the law, when 
it is clearly understood, and communications from one con-
necting line to another and communications from it to the 
next, though on . the same subject, come clearly within the 
right of carriage outside of the mails and without stamps. 
Nor can I give weight to the inconvenience which, it is 
alleged by some of the counsel who have been heard, will 
result to the railways and their patrons from the abolition 
of what may be termed "through railway mail," which this 
opinion requires. Assuming the superior promptness and 
efficiency of this service, which is asserted, it may be that 
its abolition will result in the improvement of the public 
mail service. At any rate, such considerations can not affect 
wha,t I consider the evident meaning of the Jaw, 
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It is manifest that what I have said in denying the right of 
railroad companies to carry letters between other companies 
with whose lines their own connect applies also to the car-
riage of letters by railroad companies for the class of persons, 
associations, and companies . mentioned in your third ques-
tion, and that the right of such persons, associations, and 
companies to carry their own mail is defined and limited like 
that of railroad companies. 
Having answered all your questions generally, I deem it 





A question which was referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury, and 
at his request referred to the Attorney-General, answered by the 
Attorney-General, because it is an important one. 
On an• application for an abandonment to the United States of dutiable 
goods, in accordance with the provisions of section 23 <;>f the customs 
administrative act of June 10, 1890, the decisions of the collector and 
Board of General Appraisers, if it was i;be importers' duty to protest, 
are conclusive, if the importers took no appeal, .and a refund, asked 
by the importers on the ground that the rulings of the collector and 
Board of General Appraisers were erroneous under a subsequent ruling 
of the Treasury Department in another case and a still later opinion 
of the Attorney-General, will not be allowed. 
An application for an abandonment under section 23 of said customs 
administrative act does not present an "administrative question" as 
to which the decision of the collector is final. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF · JUSTICE, 
A11,gust 18, 1896. 
IR: I have tbe honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of A.ugu t 3, asking- an official opinion concerning the 
application of tbe E. L. Goodsell Company for a refund of 
duti . . 
It appear that thi company imported.fifty boxes of lemons 
pril 5 1 95, at tbe port of New York. On .April 11 an 
, ppli ·a ion wa :filed with the collector of the port for an 
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abandonment to the United States of these lemons in accord-
ance with the provisions of section 23 of the customs admin-
istrative act of June 10, 1890. At that time this section was 
construed by your Department as permitting abandonment 
only in the case of damaged . goods. The application was 
therefore referred to an appraiser for the purpose of ascer-
taining w bether the goods were damaged. This official, upon 
- taking up the case, found that the goods, which bad been 
lying on a wharf in Jersey City, had been dumped by direc-
tions of the board of health of that city. The collector 
declined to grant any relief to the importers in the premises. 
The latter thereupon filed a protest under the provisions of 
section 14 of the customs administrative act. The case thus 
came before the General Appraisers, who sustained the col-
lector's decision "in view of the fact that the importers bad 
presented no evidence in support of their claim other than a 
certificate of the board of health to the effect that the goods 
had been condemned and sent to the dump." The importers 
took no appeal. 
It was subsequently ruled by your Department in another 
case that such a certificate of the board of health would be 
accepted as sufficient evidence; and still later, by an opinion 
rendered April 10, 1896, the present Attorney-General has 
held that the question of damage is altogether immaterial, 
and that importers have a right to abandon goods, whether 
damaged or not, if amounting to 10 per cent or over of the 
total value or quantity of an invoice. It must, therefore, 
now be assumed that the decisions of the collector and of 
the Board of General Appraisers in the present case were 
erroneous, and I assume, also, that the lemons were still in 
existence on April 11, so that no question arises as to whether 
an abandonment within the meaning of section 23 can be 
made after the goods are already destroyed. 
The importers having asked a refund, the question was 
referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury; but as it is an 
important one, it is now referred to this Department at his 
request. (See opinion of September 21, 1895.) 
The rulings of the collector and of the Board of General 
Appraisers were plainly not due to any mutual mistake of 
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fact. They must be assumed to have been due to "an erro-
neous view of the facts in the case" within the meaning of 
the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 136, section 1; and hence, 
if it was the importers' duty to protest, are conclusive; because 
the protest taken by them at the time was not followed up 
by an appeal. (Opinions of September 21 and November 8, 
1895.) 
It is suggested, however, that an application for abandon-
ment under section 23 presents an '' administrative question," 
as to which the decision of the collector is final and not sub-
ject to review by the Board of General .Appraisers, and that 
therefore there could be no protest in such a case. The col-
lector's decision, however, clearly relates to the rate and 
amount of duties chargeable. It is hence subject to review 
by the General .Appraisers under sections 13 and 14 of the 
customs administrative act as construed by .Attorney-General 
Olney in 21 Opinion, 92, 95. 
I do not think that United States v. Klingenberg (153 U.S., 
93), properly understood, is in conflict with this construction. 
Notwithstanding some language in the opinion in that case, 
I do not think that the court intended to hold the question 
then presented to be a jurisdictional one in the strict sense 
of that term. The court held a certain proclamation by the 
Secretary of the Treasury to be conclusive as to the value 
of the .Austrian florin; but had the collector's construction of 
that proclamation been erroneous instead of correct, and bad 
the collector thus disobeyed the proclamation instead of 
obeying it, I do not understand it to be settled that the 
Board of General .Appraisers would have been without juris-
diction to correct the error. ( Wood v. United States, 72 Fed. 
Rep., 254,257; compare opinion of November 26, 1895.) 
I therefore have the honor to advise you that the Board of 
General Appraisers had jurisdiction to review the collector's 
deci ion in the present case, and that the action of the Board 
wa final for all purpo e , since the importers did not appeal. 
Thi i ufficient to dispos~ of the case. 
V ry re pectfully, 
EDW .A.RD B. WHITNEY, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
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TROLLER OF THE TREASURY-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that in cases of apparent 
conflict the more specific provisions should govern, and this is espe-
cially the case when the specific proyisions follow the general one. 
Under section 56 of the public printing and binding act of January 12, 
1895, chapter 23, the Public Printer should print in slip form and dis-
tribute 760 copies of private laws, postal conventions, and treaties. 
To what appropriation the expense of these copies is to be charged is a 
question which may be asked of the Comptroller of the Treasury, and 
should not be answered by the Attorney-General. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 31, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of July 18 relating to the questions in controversy between 
your Department and the Public Printer respecting the 
• proper construction of the public printing and binding act of 
January 12, 1895, chapter 23. This act is long and compli-
cated; but I am informed by the Public Printer that he does 
not ·desire to submit an argument upon these questions, 
so that I am obliged to pass upon them without knowing 
the ground upon which he made the rulings of which you 
complain. 
Sectio'n 56 of the -act provides that there shall be printed 
in slip form 460 copies of Private Laws, Postal Conventions, 
and Treaties, which shall be distributed as follows: To the 
House document room, 100 copies; to the Senate document 
room, 100 copies; to the Department of State, 500 copies; to 
the Treasury Department, 60 copies. Adding up these speci-
fications gives a total of 760 copies, or 300 more than the total 
as given in the statute. The Public Printer refuses to sup-
ply more than 460 copies all told; and he deducts the whole 
shortage of 300 from the quota of your Department. I am 
unable to perceive any justification for charging the whole 
deficit to your Department and deducting nothing from the 
quotas of the House and Senate document rooms or of the 
1'reasury Department. This action seems to me purely arbi-
trary. I am further of the opinion that the Public Printer 
should print and distribute ·760 copies. It is a general rule 
of statutory interpretation that in cases of apparent conflict 
406 HON. JUDSON . HARMON. 
Statutory Construction-Public Printer-Comptroller of the Treasury-Attorney-
General. 
the more specific provision should govern; and this is espe-
cially the case when the specific provisions follow the general 
one. ·(Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 183.) No 
case can be clearer than the present for the application of 
these rules. 
Section 90 of the act gives you the right to call upon the 
Public Printer for such copies as_ you may require for official 
use of Government publications, ''not to exceed, however, 
the number of bureaus in the Department and divisions in 
the office of the head thereof." The question arising upon 
this section is, whether the expense of these copies is to be 
charged_ to the appropriation for your Department or to the 
general fund for public printing. 
This is a question which may be asked of the Comptroller 
· of the Treasury. ( Act of July 31, 1894, chap. 17 4, sec. 8.) It 
belongs to a class of questions which require for their deci- • 
sion a special knowledge of our appropriation acts and the 
course of decisions thereunder. "They are questions which 
the Comptroller, by his great experience, is better qualified 
to pass upon, and it is desirable to avoid any possible con-
flict of precedents. Therefore it seems to me inadvisable for 
me to attempt to pass upon these inquiries." (21 Opin., 179.) 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE'l'.A.RY OF ST.A.TE. 
OPINIONS 
OF 
HoN. JUDSON HARMON, OF Omo, 
AND 
HoN. JOSEPH McKENNA, OF CALIFORNIA. 
CIVIL SERVICE-SECRET AGEN'l'S. 
The confidential agents formerly employed in the free-delivery divi-
sion of the Post-Office Department, and designated secret agents, did 
not become classified employees of the departmental service within 
Rule III of the civil-service rules promulgated May 6, 1896. 
This rule covers only those employees who are to be regarded as appointed 
for service in the departments at the seat of Government (whether 
for the time being actually employed there or detailed for service else-
where), as distinquished from those appointed for service in the States 
or Territories, or, as in the case of the Railway Mail Service, in the 
cou'ntry at large. 
DEPARTMEN'.l' OF JUSTIOE, 
September 10, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of August 29, asking my opinion as to whether the con-
fidential agents formerly employed in the free-delivery 
division of your Department, and designated secret agents, 
became classified employees of the departmental service 
within Rule III of the civil-service rules promulgated May 
6, 1896. These agents were employed at the rate of $5 per 
diem and expenses under the general appropriation "for free-
delivery service" for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1896. 
(Post-Office appropriation act of February 28, 1895, ch. 140; 
28 Stat., 691.) 
This rule includes in the departmental service all employees 
of whatever designation, "however or for whatever purpose 
employed, whether compensated by a fixed salary or other-
wise, who are serving in or on detail from the several execu-
tive departments, commissions, and offices in the District of 
Columbia." 
407 
10892-VOL 21, PT 3--1 
408 RON. JUDSON HARMON. 
A r r e a r s o f P e n s i o n-S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n. 
This clause does not cover all of the employees of your 
Department, as is shown, among other things, by the fact 
that the Railway Mail Service is separately mentioned. I 
think that it covers only those who are to be regarded as 
appointed for servic~ in the departments at the seat of Gov-
e_rnment (whether for the time being actually employed there 
or detailed for service elsewhere), as distinguished from those 
appointed for service in the States or Territories, or, as in 
the case of the Railway Mail Service, in the country at large, 
I think that these secret agents, like the employees of the 
Railway Mail Service, must be regarded as appointed for 
the country at large; as I understand their occupation to 
have been a roving one, inspecting the letter-carrier service 
in different parts of the country, and not having any special 
relation to the service in the District of Columbia. Other-
wise the question might be raised whether their appointment 
did not conflict with the act of August 5, 1882, chapter 389, 
section 4. 
I am therefore of the opinion that these agents were not 




ARREARS OF PENSION-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The provision of section 4724 of the Revised Statutes "that no person 
in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, shall be allowed to draw both a 
pension as an invalid and the pay of his rank or station in the serv-
ice" is not applicable to an officer upon the retired list. 
If a statute is ambiguous, a long-established construction thereof by 
the department charged with its execution, if continuous and con-
sistent, will be regarded as conclusive. 
Under the pension appropriation acts of 1890 and 1891 no pension mon-
eys can be drawn by retired officers of the Army, Navy, or Marine 
orps after August 29, 1890, but these two statutes are not to be given 
a, retrosp<•ctive ffect so as to cut off arrears already due. 
DEP ARTMEN'.r OF JUSTICE, 
September 11, 1896. 
IR: I h e the honor to acknowledge your communica-
u f ept m r 4, r lating to the opinion previously asked 
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with rel~tion to the claim of Col. John Pulford, formerly o_f 
the Fifth Michigan Volunfoer Infantry, for certain arrears 
of pension. 
It appears that Colonel Pulford, whiie in the volunteer . 
service during the rebellion, received two severe gunshot 
wounds, on July 1, 1862, and May 5, 1864, respec~ively; that · 
on account of the~e wounds he was placed upon the pension 
list June 15, 1866, his pension dating from July 17, 1865; 
that on February 23, 1866, he was appointed second lieuten-
ant in the Regular .Army; that he has received his pension 
from July 17, 1865, to February 23, 1866; that he did not 
thereafter claim further pension payments until very recently, 
apparently believing that he was disqualified from receiving 
them by reason of section 4 724 of the Revised Statutes; that 
he was retired from active service on December 15, 1870, 
and that this retirement was based upon a medical examina-
tion which proved that he was incapacitated for active serv-
ice through the result of the wounds for which he had there-
tofore been pensioned. 
It is not questioned by anybody that during his service in 
the Regular .Army from 1866 to 1870 Colonel Pulford was 
disqualified from drawing any invalid pension by reason of 
the final proviso to the pension appropriation act of April 
30, 1844, chapter 15, which is as follows: 
"That no person in the .Army, Navy, or Marine Corps 
shall be allowed to draw both a pension as an invalid and 
the pay of his rank or station in the service, unless the 
alleged disability for which the pension was granted be such 
as to have occasioned his employment in a lower grade or in 
some civil branch of the service." 
This section . was thereafter reenacted as section 4 724 of 
the Revised Statutes. The first question presented by Colo-
nel Pulford's application is whether this statutory provision 
was applicable to an officer upon the retired list, as he seems 
then to have supposed. The .Assistant Secretary of the · 
Interior decided this question in the affirmative, and for this 
reason, among others, has held that the present claim has 
properly been rejected; but upon a motion for a reconsidera-
tion, you have asked me to review his decision, UJ•on the 
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face of the statute I agree entirely with the Assistant Secre-
tary; aiid if the question were res nova1 would be clearly of 
the opinion that Colonel Pulford was a'' person in the army" 
within the statutory meaning. ( United States v. Tyler, 105 
U. S., 244; Badeau v. United States, 130 U. S., 439, 451. ) 
The construction of this provision, however, I think is gov-
erned by an element which seems not to have been brought 
to the attention of the Assistant Secretary, namely, that of 
long-established departmental practice. It appears that the 
Pension Bureau always construed these provisions as not 
applicable to retired officers; that in 1890, 300 of such officers 
were thus actually upon the roll drawing invalid pensions, as 
well as their retired pay, and that the practice continued 
until stopped in that year by an act of Congress, hereinafter 
mentioned. 
If there be any ambiguity in a statute, a uniform practice 
of this kind, continuing for a quarter of a century, ought to 
be conclusive. (Robertsonv. Downing, 127 U.S., 607,613, and 
cases cited; United States v. Healey, 160 U. S., 136, 145.) 
Departmental practice under an act of Congress has an 
effect similar in this respect to Congressional practice under 
an ambiguous statutory provision. ( The Laura, 114 U. S., 
411, 416, and cases cited; McPherson v. Blackie, 146 U.S., 1, 
27.) The weight to be given to departmental practice is 
greatly increased when Congress, in reenacting the law, fails 
to indicate in any way its disapproval of the settled con-
struction, to which it is thus regarded as giving an implied 
approval. (18 Opin., 532; 20 Opin., 721; 2 Comp. Dec., 100.) 
The opinions just cited are those of executive officers only, 
but the first of them has been referred to with apparent 
approval by the Supreme Court. (Earnshaw v. Oadwalader, 
145 u. s., 247, 258.) 
There is, indeed, an exception to this rule when the statute 
is not ambiguous and the departmental practice clearly 
defeats its obvious purpose. ( United States v. Tanner, 147 
. S., 661,663; United States v. Alger, 152 U.S., 384,397; Web-
ter v. Luther, 163 . S., 331, 342; 20 Opin., 593.) I think, 
however, that the tatute now under consideration is not 
ufficien ly clear to bring it within this exception to the 
rul , e pecially when the cause for which the pensioner was 
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retired from active military service and reduced in pay 
was the very same "disability for which the pension was 
granted." 
For the reasons above stated, I think that ColoLel Pulford 
is entitled to his pension, unless he has been deprived thereof 
by subsequent legislation. Two statutes have been referred 
to as having this effect. The pension appropriation act of 
August 29, 1890, chapter 820, section 2, provided as follows: 
"Hereafter no officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps 
on the ~etired list shall draw or receive any pension under 
any law." 
The pension appropriation act of March 3, 1891, chapter 
548, contains the following proviso: 
" That hereafter no pension shall be allowed or paid to any 
officer, noncommissioned officer, or private in the .Army, 
Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States, either on the 
active or retired list." 
It is incontestable that under this proviso no pension 
moneys can be drawn which would otherwise have become 
payable after August 29, 1890. These two statutes, how-
ever, are not necessarily to be construed as intended to cut 
off arrears already due to persons who were already on the 
pension roll. No principle of statutory construction is bet-
ter settled than that words should not have a retrospective 
operation'' unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative 
that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the 
intention of the legislature can not be otherwise satisfied." 
(United States v.Heth,3 Cr.,314; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall., 
596, 598; Twenty Per Gent Oases, 20 Wall., 179, 187.) It 
must be conceded that the language of these statutes of 
1890 and 1891 is strong. The question is difficult. Still, I 
do not think that I am required to give a retrospective effect 
to the statute in this particular. The object of Congress 
was to put a stop to the practice for the future. I do not 
think that it was intended to cut off the few pensioners who 
had not yet applied for the sums already due. The language 
of the proviso above quoted is much like that of the statute 
considered in Miles Planting Oo. v. Oar lisle ( 5 D. C. App., 
138); but that case related to sums not yet accrued at the 
passage of the act. 
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It is therefore my opinion that the applicant is entitled to 
bis arrears of pension up to and including the last quarterly 
payment falling due prior to August 29, 1890. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET A.RY OF THE INTERIOR. 
[NoTE.-For a reconsideration of the question involved in 
this opinion, see 21 Opin., 453. E. C. B.] 
ALIEN OFFICERS ON VESSELS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
If there be any ambiguity in a statute, a uniform departmental practice 
should be regarded as having settled the law. 
A tax on a vessel employing as mate an alien, imposed under section 4219 
of the Revised Statutes, which provides that a "vessel any officer of 
which shall not be a citizen of the United 8tates shall pay a tax of 50 
cents p er ton," should not be remitted because such alien had duly 
declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States and 
had for more than three years continuously served on board American 
merchant vessels, but has never actually been admitted to cit,izeusbip. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 15, 1896. 
· SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of August 25, requesting an opinion with relation to the 
case of one Joseph Sjo, an alien employed as mate upon 
the American schooner Lucy, of San Francisco. It appears 
that on February 26, 1892, this seaman duly declared his 
intention of becoming a citizen of the United States, and 
that from that date he has continually served on board 
American merchant vessels; but apparently, for some reason, 
he bas never actually been admitted to citizenship. On 
account of his employment as mate, you have imposed upon 
the schooner a tax of $147 under the final clause of section 
4219 of the Revised St.atutes, which is as follows: 
"And any vessel, any officer of which hall not be a citizen 
of the uited States, shall pay a tax of fifty cents per ton." 
The legality of this tax is contested under section 217 4, 
whicb, among other thing , provides as follows: 
''And ery eaman being a foreigner ball after his dec-
laration of intention to become a citizen of the United State , 
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and after he shall have served such three years, be deemed 
a citizen of the United States for the purpose of manning 
and serving on board any merchant vessel of the United 
States, anything to the contrary in any any act of Congress 
notwithstanding; but such seaman shall, for all purposes of 
protection as an .American citizen, be deemed such after the · 
filing of his declaration of intention to become such citizen." 
In considering the case I shaU assume, without deciding, 
that if section 2174 gave to Sjo the right to be an officer upon 
an .American merchant vessel that vessel would be freed from 
the tax above mentioned; but the words "manning aud serv-
ing on board any merchant vessel" do not necessarily give 
the right to act as an officer. To the contrary, we have the 
following express provision of section 4131: 
".And officers of vessels of the United. States shall in all 
cases be citizens of the United States." 
This provision has been construed in an opinion of .Attor-
ney-General Brewster (17 Opin., 534); and it is held not to 
be qualified by section 2174. That- opinion was rendered 
before 1883, and has, if I understand correctly, been the basis 
of a uniform departmental practice since that time. · If there 
be any ambiguity in the statute such a practice should at 
this late date be regarded as having settled the law. ( United 
States v. Jlfoore, 95 U. S., 763; United States v. Pugh, 99 U.S., 
265; United States v. Healey,160 U.S., 136,145; 20 Opin., 730.) 
Were the question a new one I should have great difficulty 
in reaching the same conclusion, because I can find no other 
provision in the Revised Statutes upon which the first clause 
quoted from section 2174 can operate. I do not feel justified, 
however, in overruling it after thirteen years' acquiescence 
in a c~tse arising within a month before Congress, in amend_ 
iug the act for the purpose of abolishing some exceptions 
that had been granted (act of .AprH 17, 1874, ch. 107), has 
expressed the rule even more emphatically than before. 
( .Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 255, sec. 1.) 
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APPROPRIATION-CONTRACTS. 
Where an appropriation is made by act of Congress for certain improve-
ments and authority is given to the Secretary of War to make addi-
tional contracts not to exceed a given amount to carry on continuously 
the work intended, and by a 1iroviso to the act certain portions of the 
sum appropriated and authorized to be expended are to be expended 
in a particular way, the latter sums are to be charged to the specific 
sum appropriated. 
If the appropriation should not be expended the work could at a sub-
sequent time be contracted for under the authority to make additional 
contracts. 
If the appropriations are not used for the particular work designated 
by Congress they can not be used for any other purpose. 
The direction to expend the sums mentioned in the proviso is not man-
datory to the extent that the full amount must be expended if the 
work can be done for less, or the work need not be proceeded with at 
all if contrary to the recommendations of the Mississippi River Com-
mission mentioned in the act, it being manifest that the recommenda-
tions of the Commission were to be looked to. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 29, 1896. 
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of September 18, 1896, in which you set out from the 
river and harbor act of June 3, 1896 (29 Stat., 230), the fol-
lowing proviso: · 
"Provided further, That of the sum hereby appropriated 
and authorized to be expended the sum of sixty-four thou-
sand dollars shall be expended in the rectification of the 
banks at Greenville, Mississippi, and sixty-four thousand 
dollars in the rectification of the banks at Helena, Arkansas, 
according to late plans submitted by Captain Graham D. 
Fitch, Corps of Engineers, and sixteen thousand dollars in 
the rectification of the banks at New Madrid, Missouri." 
You state that the Mississippi River Commission propose 
to limit operations at Greenville to an expenditure of $24,000 
and to defer all operations at New Madrid and Helena until 
fund authorized for expenditure in some later fiscal year are 
made available by future appropriation. · 
You a. k my offi ial opinion on the following point : 
"1. hether, in view of the phraseology of the proviso 
qu t d th ev ral sum mentioned therein are chargeable 
nly t he p ific appropriation of 625,000 made by the 
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act, or whether they are chargeable either to this appropria-
tion or to any of the further sums pledged by Congress and 
which may be subsequently appropriated. 
"2. Whether the ·expenditure of the several sums men-
tioned in the proviso, if chargeable only to said appropriation 
of $625,000, is mandatory; and, if so, whether the same must 
be expended within this :fiscal year." 
In my opinion the particular sums specified in the proviso 
are chargeable to the specific appropriation of $625,000. It 
is just as if $481,000 bad been appropriated in one sum for 
all of tbe other purposes contemplated and the several sums 
mentioned in the proviso had been separately appropriated 
for the several specific purposes mentioned. 
While this is true, I am further of the opinion that if for 
any reason the appropriations made by this act should not 
be expended the work could at a subsequent time be con-
tracted for under the :first proviso, which is as follows: 
'' That on and after the passage of this act additional con-
tracts may be entered into by the Secretary of War for such 
materials and work as may be necessary to carry on continu-
ously the plans of the Mississippi River Commission, as afore-
said, or said materials may be purchased and work done 
otherwise than by contract, to be paid for as appropriations 
may from time t.o time be ma,de by law, not exceeding in the 
aggregate eight million three hundred and seventy-five thou-
sand dollars, exclusive of the amount herein appropriated.'' 
I am further of the opinion that these specific appropria-
tions, if not used for the particular work designated by Con-
gress, can not be used for any other purpose. 
The direction to expend the sums mentioned in the proviso 
is, in my opinion, not mandatory to the extent that you are 
bound to expend the full amount if the work can be done 
for less or to proceed with it at all contrary to the recom-
mendation of the Mississippi River Commission. 
The section to which this proviso is added is as follows: 
"Continuing improvement, · six hundred and twenty-five 
thousand dollars, which sum shall be expended under the 
direction of the Secretary of War, in accordance with the 
plans, specifications, and recommendations of the Mississippi 
River Commission." 
416 HON. EDWARD B. WHITNEY. 
I m ll o r t a t i o n o f C 11 r o m o s-S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n • 
It is manifest that the recommendations of the commission 
were to be looked to. 
The whole question of plans for improving the Mississippi 
River has been largely intrusted to them. 
If, looking as they doubtless would to the enterprise as a 
whole, or, if conditions having altered, they should recom-
mend that special work should not be proceeded with, I do 
not think that you are compelled to 'do so even when an appro-
priation has been made in the emphatic language in the pro-
viso, for it is not necessarily in conflict with that portion 
of the act above quoted, and should be construed in harmony 
with it, if possible, looking to the purpose of Congress so long 
manifested to have the work executed according to the plans 
and recommendations of the commission. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE'.l.'.A.RY OF W .A.R. 
IMPORTATION OF CHROMOS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The importation of foreign-made chromos, which are copies of a for-
eign painting that has been copyrighted, bnt which are not them-
selves copyrighted, but are protected only by the copyright of the 
original painting, is not prohibited by an act of Congress providing 
the manner of obtaining a copyright for chromos, and forbidding, 
during the existence of such copyright, the importation into the 
United States of any chromos· so copyrighted. 
·where the language of an act of Congress is ambiguous, the probable 
intention of the individual Members of Congress would be sought as' 
a guide to construction, but a clear omission from the statute can 
not be supplied upon any consideration of supposed oversight, incon-
sistency, or hardship. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 3, 1896. 
SIR: 
1ertain foreign-made chromos, which are copies of a 
foreign painting, are being imported. The painting has been 
copyright d under sections 4952 and 4956 of the Revised 
ta ute , a amended by the act of March 3, 1891, chapter 
h65. ou do not inform me whether or not the importation 
i a violation of the copyright; nor is this material to the 
qu tion whi .h ha ari en in your Department. 
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These chromos are not made from drawings on stone made 
within the limits of the United States; and in your commu-
nication of September 15 you ask to be advised whether their 
importation is prohibited by the proviso to section 4956. 
Under the enactments above referred to, by observing the 
proper formalities, not only may a painting be copyrighted 
but also a book, photograph, chromo, or lithograph. It is 
not, however, profitable to copyright a chromo or other litho-
graph representing a · copyrighted painting; for the copy-
right of the painting protects all copies made by its owner 
or persons authorized by him, while copies made by any-
body else, whether by lithography or otherwise, are illegal. 
Hence, chromos may be imported which are not themselves 
copyrighted, but are protected only by the copyright of 
the original painiing; and I understand from you that these 
chromos are of such description. 
To obtain a copyright for a painting under section 4956, a 
photograph thereof must be delivered to the Librarian of 
Congress, or else deposited in the mail within the United 
States addressed to him. To obtain a copyright for the 
chromo or lithograph, two copies thereof must be so deliv-
ered or deposited; provided-and this is the proviso to which 
you refer-that "the two copies of the same required to be 
delivered or deposited as above shall be printed from 
* * * drawings on stone made within the limits of the 
United States or from transfers made therefrom." The pro-
viso relates also to books and photographs, but not to paint-
ings. It continues as follows: 
"During the existence of such copyright the importation 
into the United States of any book, chromo, lithograph, or 
photograph so copyrighted, or any edition or editions thereof, 
or any plates of the same not made from type set, negatives, 
or drawings on stone made within the limits of the United 
States, shall be, and it is hereby, prohibited." 
This proviso clearly applies only to books, chromos, litho-
graphs, orphotographs,copyrighted as thereinbeforedirected, 
namely, by delivering or depositing two copies with the 
Librarian of Congress. It can not, without violation of its 
language, be so read as to include in its application chromos 
or photographs protected merely by the copyright of the 
painting. 
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It is urged that the individual Members of the Congress 
which enacted the proviso intended to include all chromos 
protected by copyright, whether the copyright was granted 
for the chromo itself, or for the painting of which it is a 
copy. Had they so intended, it would have been easy to 
say so. Had their language been amb~guous, their probable 
intent would have been sought for as a guide to construc-
tion. But their language is unambiguous; and to torture 
the clear language of Congress, in order to fulfill a supposed 
intent of its individual members, would be to legislate, not 
to construe the law. '' A clear omission from a statute, like 
this, can not be supplied upon any considerations of supposed 
oversight, inconsistency, or hardship." (21 Opin., 292.) 
I have therefore the honor to advise y()u that the importa-
. tion of the chromos is not prohibited. ... 
Very respectfully, 
EDWARD B. WHITNEY, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
REMISSION OF PEN.AL DUTIES. 
A.s the Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to refund "addi-
tional" or penal duties imposed by the customs administrative act of 
1890, when once in the Treasury, merely because not incurred by willful 
negligence or fraud, and as the collectors of customs are obliged under 
the law to require payment of so-called penal duties as a condition 
precedent to delivery of the goods and must pay them at once into 
the Treasury when received, without waiting for the result of an 
application for remission, the power of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to remit such duties may be unavailing in many cases, but not in the 
case' of warehoused goods, nor where the penalties are first assessed 
upon final liquidation after the delivery of the goods to the importer. 
Wh n goods are entered or withdrawn for consumption, the Treasury 
Department has no authority to suspend the collection of these penal 
duti s pending an application for remission, "the goods in the mean-
while having been delivered from the custody of the Government." 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 3, 1 96. 
IR: It ha been held that the" additional" or penal duties 
im o ed under ection 7 of the customs administrative act of 
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June 10, 1890, chapter 407, may be remitted by you (20 Opin., 
660); but that you have no authority to refund them, when 
once in the Treasury, merely because not incurred by willful 
negligence or fraud (21 Opin., 320), and that the collectors of 
customs must pay them at once into the Treasury when 
received, without waiting for the result of an application for 
remission (2_1 Opin., 345). Of course, like other duties, they 
can be refunded in certain cases. (21 Opin., 224, 251.) 
In your communication of September 14 you ask whether 
your Department has authority to suspend the collection of 
these penal duties pending such application, '' the goods in 
the meanwhile having been delivered from the custody of the 
Government." You suggest "that if collectors are obliged 
under the law to require payment of so-called penal duties 
as a condition precedent to delivery of the goods the power 
of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit such penalties is 
in effect abrogated." The power may be unavailing in many 
cases, but not in the case of warehoused goods, nor where 
the penalties are first assessed upon final liquidation, after 
the delivery of the goods to the importer, as in Patton v. 
United States (159 U. S., 500). 
Prior to the Revised Statutes the estimated duties upon 
imported goods had to be paid at once, or a warehouse bond 
given. (Barneyv. Rickard,157U. S., 352, 357-359,andauthor-
. ities cited.) I am aware of no subsequent legislation relax-
ing these requirements. The warehouse bond is the security 
referred to in section 2869 of the Revised Statutes, as 
amended by the act of June 5, 1894, chapter 92. If the 
goods are warehoused, and subsequently withdrawn for con-
sumption before a decision upon the application for remis-
sion, the penal duties must be paid. (Customs administra-
tive act, 'sec. 20.) 
I therefore have the bonor to advise you that when goods 
are entered or withdrawn for consumption all duties then 
charged against them, including penal duties, must be paid 
before they are released from Government custody. 
Very respectfully, 
EDWARD B. WHITNEY, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
While the word "may" in a statute is sometimes construed as imposing 
a duty rather than conferring a discretion, yet this rule of construe-
. tion is by no means invariable, and its application depends on the 
context of the statute, and whether it is fairly to be presumed that it 
was the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power 
or to impose an imperative duty. 
The ordinary meaning of the language in the enactment must be pre-
sumed to be intended unless it would manifestly defeat the object of 
its provisions. 
The Secretary of War is not required by the river and harbor act of 
June 3, 1896, providing that contracts may be entered into by him for 
the completion of improvements named, to make such contracts, but 
he has a discret.ion to decline to make them in all cases where he is 
convinced that the public interest would not be subserved by making 
them. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 9, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of Octo-
ber 7, wherein, calling my attention to various provisos in 
the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, that contracts may 
be entered into by you for the completion of improvements 
named, to be paid for out of future appropriations, you 
inquire: 
"ls it mandatory that the Secretary of War shall make 
such contracts, estimate for and enter upon the improve-
ment of such rivers and harbors as are provided for in this 
act, or is it within bis discretion to decline to make such 
contracts in any case where he is convinced that the pro-
posed expenditure will not be for the public interest¥" 
I have given the subject the serious consideration which 
its importance requires, and beg to submit my opinion as 
follows: 
The enacting clause of the act named is : 
'' That the following sums of money be, and are hereby, 
appropriated, to be paid out of any money in the Treasury 
not otherwise appropriated, to be immediately available, and 
to bee pended under the direction of the Secretary of War 
and the upervi ion of the Chief of Engineers, for the con-
me ion, completion, repair, and preservation of the public 
w rk h reinafter named." 
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Then follow the recital of various improvements, with the 
sums appropriated for each, to many of which are appended 
the provisos to which your question relates. These appear 
to be in the same form throughout, and · the first will there-
fore serve as a sample. It is: 
"Improving harbor at Rockland, Maine: Continuing im-
provement, including project recommended by Chief of 
Engineers under· date of December fourteenth, eighteen 
hundred and ninety-five, twenty-five thousand five hundred 
dollars, of which one thousand five hundred dollars may be 
expended for the removal of an old hulk, sunk in the harbor: 
Provided, That contracts may be entered into by the Secre-
tary of War for such materials and work as may be neces-
sary for the completion of said projects for the improvement 
of said harbor, to be paid for as appropriations may from 
time to time be made by law, not to exceed in the aggregate 
seven hundred and sixty thousand five hundred dollars, 
exclusive of the amount herein and heretofore appropriated." 
The appropriation of specific funds "to be immediately 
available" ordinarily imposes the duty of expending them 
for the purposes named in the act. In the item quoted tb:ere 
is nothing indicating an intention to leave anything to your 
discretion with respect to the expenditure of the sum appro-
priated. 
But the authority given you to contract for work to be 
paid from future appropriations is not only in the form of a 
proviso, but is also expres8ed in the form usually adopted 
for the granting of authority with discretion. It could be 
held that you are required to enter into such contracts only 
by construing the word "may" as imposing a duty rather 
than conferring a discretion. While such construction is 
sometimes given this word, especially where the power con-
ferred is to be exercised for the benefit of the public or that 
of private persons, yet "this rule of construction is, how-
ever, by no means invariable. Its application depends on 
the context of the statute, and on whether it is fairly to be 
· presumed that it was the intention of the legislature to con-
fer a discretionary power or to impose an imperative duty." 
( U. S. v. Thornan, 156 U. S., 359.) 
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From the various authorities cited in the opinion in that 
case (see also 63 Md., 18; 121 N. Y., 569) it appears that the 
true rule always is that stated by.Mr. Justice Story in Minor 
v. Mechanics' Bank (1 Pet., 64), that "that exposition ought 
to be adopted in this, as in other cases, which carries into 
effect the true intent and object of the legislature in the 
enactment. The ordinary meaning of the language must be 
presumed to be intended unless it would manifestly defeat 
the object of the provisions," and by Mr. Justice Grier in 
Thompson v. Carroll's Lessee (22 Howard, 434), that "it is 
only where it is necessary to give effect to the clear policy 
and intention of the legislature that such a liberty can be 
taken with the plain words of the statute." The intention of 
Congress was, except in instances where a contrary intent is 
manifested (see 21 Opi~., 391, with reference to the same act 
now in question), that you should proceed with the projects 
specified to the extent of the appropriations without inquiry 
as to their wisdom. This, which is the main purpose of the 
act, would not be affected by construing the provisos accord-
ing to the ordinary meaning of their language, which is per-
missive and not mandatory. There is no necessity, therefore, 
of resorting to a rule of construction to make the language of 
the act conform to the intention of Congress. On the con-
trary, it is entirely reasonable, from the nature of the subject 
and the usual mode of dealing with it by Congress, to assume 
that the provisional and permissive forms were purposely 
used in order to leave to your sound discretion the deter-
mination whether it would be better for the public interests 
to make contracts covering the entire work, or, by confining 
the expenditures to the sums appropriated, leave Congress 
free to act upon new information, changes in the situation, 
or different views of public necessity or policy which experi-. 
ence may induce. 
My an w r to your question, therefore, is that you are not 
required to make such contracts, but have a discretion to 
d ·line to make them in all ca e where you are convinced 
th t tb public intere t would not be subservecl by making 
ry r p ctfnlly, 
,J{ ]) .,0 lIARMO . 
y It' .A.R. 
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PUBLIC PRINTER'S APPROPRIATION . . 
The allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the different 
Departments is not within the jurisdiction of the accounting officers 
of the Treasury. · 
Copies of Congressional documents ordered from the Public Printer 
under section 90 of the public printing and binding act of January 
12, 1895, by the Secretary of State to a number not exceeding the 
number of bureaus in his Department, should not be charged to the 
allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation for such Department. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 12, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication 
of October 8, referring to my opinion of August 31 (21 Opin., 
405) with relation to questions in controversy between your 
Department and the Public Printer. For an answer to one 
of these questions, which related to the construction of an 
appropriation act, I referred you to the Comptroller of the 
Treasury for an answer. I have since been furnished by 
the Comptroller with a copy of the opinion which he ren-
dered you on July 15, 1896 (3 Comp. Dec., 19), showing that 
the allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among 
the different Departments is not actually passed upon by the 
accounting officers of the Treasury, and holding that it is 
not within the jurisdiction of these officers. (See Rev. Stat., 
3802; sundry civil appropriation act of June 11, 1896, ch. 
420, 29 Stat., 452.) I am informed that this ruling of the 
Comptroller is in accordance with a uniform and well-estab-
lished practice in the accounting offices under similar appro-
priation acts, which is enough to settle its correctness (20 
Opin., 721; 21 Opin., 338, 349); and it appears to be well 
grounded. Consequently, the Comptroller's opinion can not 
be asked under the Dockery Act of July 31, 1894, chapter 
17 4, section 8, and it becomes necessary for me to answer 
your question. 
The question arises under the public printing and binding 
act of January 12, 1895, chapter 23, section 90, which section 
is set forth at 21 Opin., 371. You have ordered from the 
Public Printer eleven copies of certain Congressional docu-
ments of interest to your Department1 that number not ex-
ceeding the number of bureaus therein. The Public Printer 
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insists upon charging them to the allotment for your Depart-
ment. He has informed me that he does not desire to submit 
an argument upon the question. I am unable to perceive 
any reason for his ruling. It is my opinion that the eleven 
copies you desire should be furnished you without such 
charge. 
Very respectfully, JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE. 
CHINESE-TREATY. 
The Treasury Department has no authority to direct the admission of 
Chinese laborers who fail to obtain before departur e from this country 
the certificate required by the treaty with China, although t hey have 
complied with all the requirements affecting Chinese who leave the 
United States, except the procuring of this certificate. 
A Chinese laborer who proposes to leave the United St ates and return, 
complies with the conditions necessary to demand a cer t ificate if he 
file the required papers "with the collector of customs of the district 
from which he departs." Any rule directing him to file such papers 
with the collector of any other district imposes a condition not war-
ranted by the treaty. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 14, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
le_tter of October 10, 1896, in which you ask whether or not 
your Department can direct the admission of returning 
Chinese laborers who failed to obtain, before departure from 
this country, the certificate prescribed by Article II of the 
treaty between the United States and China of March 17, 
1894, it appearing that such persons, before leaving this 
country, complied with all of Fhe requirements affecting 
Chinese laborers who leave the United States with the pur-
pose of returning, except that of procuring from the collector 
of customs of the district from which they departed certifi-
cate of their right to return. 
The only provision for the return of Chinese laborers to 
the United States is under said article, which is as follows: 
"The preceding article shall not apply to the return to 
the nited tates of any regi tered Chine8e laborer who bas 
a lawful wi.£ , child, or parent in the United States or prop-
ert th r in of the value of one thou and dollars 'or debts 
f lik m un du him and pending ettlement. Neverthe-
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less every such Chinese laborer shall, before leaving the 
CT nited States, deposit, as a condition of his return, with the 
collector of customs of the district from which he departs, a 
full description in writing of his family, or property, or debts 
as aforesaid, and shall be furnished by said collector with 
such certificate of his right to return under this treaty as 
the laws of the United States may now or hereafter prescribe 
and not inco·nsistent with the provisions (?f this treaty; and 
should the written . description aforesaid be proved to be 
false the right of return thereunder, or of continued residence 
after return, shall in each case be forfeited. And such right 
of return to the United States shall be exercised within one 
year from thedateofleavingthe United States; but such right 
of return to the United States may be extended for an addi-
tional period, not to exceed one year, in cases where by rea-
son of sickness or other cause of disability beyond his con_-
trol such Chinese laborer shall be rendered unable sooner to 
return, which facts shall be fully reported to the Chinese 
consul at the port of departure, and by him certified, to the 
satisfaction of the collector of the port at which such Chinese 
subject shall land in the United States. And no such Chi-
nese laborer shall be permitted to enter the United States 
by land or sea without producing to the proper officer of the 
customs the return certificate herein required." 
It has for a long time been the policy of Congress to 
exclude Chinese laborers from the United States. 
Section 4 of the act approved July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 115), 
provided for the return of Chinese laborers under certain 
stringent conditions. 
By section 2 of the act approved October 1, 1888, the right 
of return given to Chinese laborers was entirely taken away. 
The policy of the Government being against the admission 
of Chinese laborers, treaty provisions making exMptions 
should not be extended by construction to cases not falling 
· within the plain scope of the language used. 
I am of the opinion that the words" before leaving the 
United States" qualify the words "shall be furnished by 
said coUectoi' with such certificate of his right to return," 
and that it was the intent that each.Chinaman should, before 
leaving, receive such certificate in order to entitle him to 
return. 
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If it be held that departing Chinese laborers can do what 
is affirmatively imposed upon them, and leave the country 
with the right to have certificates forwarded, it is manifest 
that great confusion' may arise, the certificates may not get 
to proper hands, and the burden of enforcing the exclusion 
acts may be thereby rendered much more onerous. 
The rule promulgated by your Department, and which was 
in force when the case now present arose, provides that the 
collector of customs, ''if he is satisfied that the person pre-
senting the same is the Chinese laborer therein described, he 
shall issue to him, on his departure from said port, a cer-
tificate in the following form." (Synopsis, Rulings and 
Decisions, 181:l6, p. :31.) 
This rule, which is consistent with the provisions of the 
treaty, would, in effect, be destroyed if personal delivery be 
dispensed with. 
I answer the question in the negative. 
You also call attention to a regulation of your Department 
which requires that Chinese laborers who propose to leave 
the U nitecl States and return shall file application, state-
ment, etc., with the collector for the district within which 
the laborer resides, which collector is to certify the papers 
and forward the same to the collector of customs at the port 
of exit; and you ask whether or not such papers may be filed 
properly in the office of the collector of customs at the port 
where the Chinese laborer resides, in view of the require-
ment of Article II of the treaty, that such papers shall be 
placed by tlle laborer in the possession of the collector of 
cu toms for the district from which he is to depart. 
I understand your question to be, in substance, whether 
or not your Department can require such papers to be filed 
by ~he laborer with the collector for the district within which 
he re id . 
I am of the opinion that the departing laborer complies 
with th conditions n cessary to demand a certificate if he 
fil the r equired paper "with the collector of customs of the 
di rict from whi h he departs," and that any rule directing 
him to file uch papers with the collector of any other dis-
trict im o e. a oudition not warranted by the tl'eaty. 
e p ctfully, J DSO HARMON. 
OF THE TREA UR Y. 
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LEA. VES OE' ABSENCE. 
The provisions of the legislative appropriation act. of March 3, 1893, con-
cerning annual and sick leaves of absence do not apply to employees 
of the Department of Agriculture employed outside of the city of 
Washington. (21 Opin., 338 followed.) 
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 17, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of October 14, ar:;king my opinion whether the provisions 
concerning annual leave and sick ]eave in the legislative 
appropriation act of March 3, 1893, chapter . 211, section 5, 
apply to employees of your Department employed outside of 
this city. This question has already been settled in the 
negative (21 Opin., 338), and I so advise yon. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
PUBLIC PRINTING. 
The word "order'' in section 80 of the public printing and binding act 
of January 12, 1895, providing that "no order for public printing shall 
be acted upon by the Public Printer after the expiration of one year 
unless the entire copy an.cl illustrations for the work shall have been 
furnished within that period," was not intended to include a joint 
resolution of Congress like the resolution of April 2, 1894, providing 
for printing '' a history of the international arbitrations to which the 
United States was a party, together with a digest of the decisions 
rendered in such arbitrations." · 
DEP A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
October 19, 1896. 
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion ·of October 16, asking an opinion upon a question of law 
raised by Mr. John B. Moore. 
It appears that Congress, by a joint resolution approved 
April 2, 1894, provided for printing "a history of the inter-
national arbitrations to which the United States was a party, 
together with a digest of the decisions rendered in such arbi-
trations," * * * "said history and digest to be printed 
under the editorial supervision of John Bassett Moore, and 
the editing to be paid for out of any moneys in the Treasury 
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not otherwise appropriated." You do not state the facts fur-
ther, but I assume that the history had not been prepared at 
the time of the passage of the resolution, so that the inten-
tion was for Mr. Moore to write the history and digest, and 
not simply to supervise their printing. The work was one 
which would naturally be expected to involve a considerable 
expenditure of time. 
By the public printing and binding act of January 12, 
1895, chapter 23, section 80, it was provided that'' no order 
for public printing shall be acted upon by the Public Printer 
after the expiration of one year unless the entire copy and 
illustrations for the work shall have been furnished within 
thflt period," with a proviso which does not seem to me to be 
applicable here. 
I think that the word "order" in the clause just quoted 
wa not intended to include a joint resolution of Congress 
like that now under consideration. · It is, therefore, my 
opinion that this provision is no bar to the completion of 
Mr. Moore's work. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The .SECRE'fARY OF STATE. 
EX'l'I ADITION PROCEEDINGS-TRANSLATION OF PAPERS. 
In an application by the Mexican Government to a United States com-
missioner for the extradition of a fugitive under the treaty with that 
country, tho commissioner should decline to proceed with the inquiry 
until a translation of the papers containing the charges are produced 
hcfore him, but in such a case he should so advise that Government 
:wcl make a liberal allowance of time for the production of such 
translation before returning tho papers. 
Whilr the treaty does not in terms provide for such translations, yet the 
proce dino-s thereunder must accord with the rules and forms of the 
tribunals of thatjnrisdiction to which i;econrse is had·; and inasmuch 
a. the ommissioner is the sole judge of the weight and sufficiency of 
the eviden e upon which extradition is sought, it follows that such 
viclenc mu t be pre ented in a language that is intelligible to him. 
DEPAR'.I'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 24, 1896. 
IR: have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
mmuni ·ation of the 20th in t.ant, inclosing the translation 
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of a note to you from the Mexican minister, stating that the 
United States commissioner at El Paso, Tex., from whom 
the Governor of the State of Chihuahua asked the extradi-
tion of Demetrio Cortes and his accomplices, returned the 
papers in the case on account of their not being translated. 
You ask my opinion as to ''whether the commissioner should 
formally reject and return the papers to the country seeking 
extradition because they, or some part of them, have not 
been translated." 
By article 1 of the treaty with Mexico of December 11, 
1861, it is provided: . 
"That this (the delivery of a person charged with crime) 
shall be done only when the fact of the commission of the 
crime shall be so established as that the laws of the country 
in which the fugitive or the person so accused shall be found 
would justify his or her apprehension and commitment for 
trial if the crime had been there committed." 
The act of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the com-
missioner or other examining officer says that if he deems 
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the pro-
visions of the treaty he shall certify the same, together with 
a copy of all the testimony, and issue his warrant for the 
commitment of the person so charged. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of In 
re Luis Oteiza y Cortes (136 U.S., 337), quotes with approval 
the language of Judge Wallace in 21 Blatch., 300. When 
referring to United States commissioners sitting in cases of 
extradition, he said: 
'' He is made the judge of the weight and effect of the evi-
dence, and this court can not review his action, when there 
was sufficient competent evidence before him to authorize 
him to decide the merits of the case." 
In order to the intelligent exercise of his judgment, the 
mind of the commissioner must be informed as to the facts 
of the case before him. He can be judicially informed only 
by the evidence which may be laid before him, in language 
and terms which are intelligible to him. If the evidence 
adduced is couched in signs, symbols, or language which the 
commissioner does not understand, it must be translated 
into terms which are intelligible. 
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It is objected on behalf of the Mexican Government that 
the treaty under which this extradition was asked makes no 
provision for the translation by that Government of such 
writings. But it should be remembered that while the treaty 
does secure to the parties to it the mutual right of extra-
dition, yet the proceedings for the exercise of such right 
must of necessity accord with the rules prescribed and the 
forms observed in the tribunals of that jurisdiction to which 
recourse may be had. In Mexico the proceedings would be 
governed by the laws and forms which are in force there, 
and so, when the application is made to the judicial tribunals 
of this country, a like rule should be applied. 
In every jurisdiction the person invoking its aid must 
present his case in accordance with its rules. He is the 
actor, the plaintiff, the petitioner, and must present his case 
both in its allegata and probata fully and intelligibly. If the 
testimony of an expert is needed to furnish the translation 
of the documents offered in evidence, the party offering the 
evidence must produce with it the translation. 
I am of opinion that the commissioner should have de-
clined to proceed with the inquiry upon which he was 
engaged until the proper translations were produced before 
· him, but be should have so advised the Mexican Government 
and made a liberal allowance of time to enable that Govern-
ment to produce such translations before returning the 
papers. 
Very respectfully, 
The SECRET.A.RY OF ST.A.TE. 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
Acting Attorney-Gener<!'l. 
A VI ABLE WATER -DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE 
FUNCTIONS. 
Under the provisions of an act providing that whenever tho Secretary 
of War d termines that a bridge over a navigable waterway of the 
Unit d tate is an unreasonable obstruction to the free navigation of 
such wat rway, it hall be his duty, after giving th parties an 
opportunity to be heard, to dir ct that the bridge be so altered as 
to r nder navigation rea onably unobstructed, and in giving such 
notice he shall specify th changes requir u and the time within which 
to b made. 
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It is not an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative function for 
Congress .to in trust to the Secretary of War the power to declare what 
is an unreasonable obstruction to navigation. 
Congress itself is not required to consider each.case of alleged obstruc-
tion to navigation and determine the facts ancl declare that an 
obstruction exists, but it may generally define the offense and leave 
the facts to be determined by a court or special tribunal. 
Where a bridge was erected by authority of a State before Congress 
assumed actual jurisdiction over the river for the purposes of navi-
gation, and it is declared to be an obstruction to navigation, such 
obstruction may be removed without compensation from the United 
States, and such removal can not be regarded as a "taking of private 
property," within the meaning of the Constitution. 
The power of Congress over navigable streams is supreme and grows 
out of the power to regulate commerce. -
The power of Congress to declare what is an obstruction and to remove 
it from a navigable stream is well settled. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
October 24, 1896. 
Srn: On January 28, 1896, the Department of Justice 
·received your letter of January 27, 1896, in which you state 
· the following: 
".A.bout 3 miles above the mouth of Rock River, Illinois, 
commence the Lower Rapids, at Milan, Ill., which extend 
upstream about 1½ miles. Prior to the improvements here-
inaner mentioned the depth of water at the head of these 
rapids was 2 feet at low water, but at high water in the 
MissisRippi River the rapids were entirely backed out, giving 
a navigable depth of 11 foet. From 1836 to 1850 a very 
considerable commerce was carried on this river by means of 
steamboats, flatboats, and barges, but with the construction 
of the Sterling dam in 1854, about 50 miles above the mouth 
of the river, and of low fixed bridges at Colona and Milan, 
near its mouth, all navigation of the river ceased. 
'' In 1888 it was determined to use the lower portion of 
this river as a part of the Illinois and Mississippi Canal 
route, and since then the Government has built dams at the 
head of these rapids and a canal around the rapids. A wagon 
bridge, owned and controlled by the city of Moline, Ill., · 
spans the river, about 4 miles above this canal, over the 
pool created by these dams. It is a fixed bridge with bot-
tom chord only about 3 feet above high water and 11 feet 
above the fixed level of the pool; and it is necessary that 
ed upon. 
• 1. 
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In a letter dated October 14, 1896, referring to former 
correspondence, you renew your request for an opinion. 
The que tion of whether or not Rock River is within the 
term "navigable waters of the United States" is one of 
mixed fact and law. 
The facts stated in your letter, and the fact that Rock 
River leads into the Mississippi River, bring it within the 
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term: ( The Daniel B(l;ll, 10 Wall., 557; The Montello, 20 
Wall., 430; Escanaba Go. v. Chicago, 107 U.S., 682.) 
The question of law arises as to whether or not the parties 
controlling the bridge can be _compelled to alter it withou-t 
the Gopernment bearing the expense. This question is one of 
very great gravity, and is not free from doubt. 
Section 4 of the act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 453), 
is as follows: 
'' That section nine of the river and harbor act of August 
eleventh, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, be amended 
and reelacted so as to read as follows: 
" 'lhat whenever the Secretary of War shall have good 
reason to believe that any railroad or other bridge now con-
structed, or which may hereafter be constructed, over any of 
the navigable ·waterways of the United States is an unrea-
sonable obstruction to the free navigation of such waters, on 
account of insufficient height, width of span, or otherwise, 
or where there is difficulty in passing the draw opening or 
the draw span of such bridge by rafts, steamboats, or other 
water craft, it shall be the duty of the said Secretary, first 
giving the parties reasonable opportunity to be heard, to 
give notice to the persons or corporations owning or con-
trolling such bridge so to alter the same as to render navi-
gation through or under it reasonably free, easy, and unob-
structed; and in giving such notice he shall specify the 
changes required to be made, and shall prescribe in each case 
a reasonable time in which to make them. If at the end of 
such time the alteration has not been made, the Secretary 
of War shall forthwith notify the United States district 
attorney for the district in which such bridge is situated, to 
the end that the criminal proceedings mentioned in the suc-
ceeding section may be taken.'" 
Section 5 is as follows·: 
'' That section ten of the river and harbor act of .August 
eleventh, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, be amended 
and reenacted so as to read as follows: 
" 'That if the persons; corporation, or association owning 
or controlling any railroad or other bridge shall, after: receiv-
ing notice to that effect as herein before required from the 
Secretary of War, and within the time prescribed by him, 
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willfully fail or refu ·e to remove the same, or to comply with 
the lawful order of the Se retary of War in the premises, 
such persons, corporation, or as ociation shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars; 
and every month such persons, corporation, or association 
shall remain in default in respect to the removal or alteration 
of such bridge shall be deemed a new offense, and subject 
the persons, corporation, or association so offending to the 
penalties above prescribed.'" 
The United States, as appears by your statement, bas 
assumed jurisdiction over Rock River. 
The power of Congress over navigable streams is supreme, 
aud grows out of the power to regulate commerce. (Monon-
gahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S., 335; Bridge 
Co. v. United States, 105 U. S., 475.) 
When Congress chooses to act, it is not concluded by any-
thing that the States or that individuals by its authority 
have done from assuming entire control of the matter and 
abating any erections that may have been made, and pre-
venting any others from being made except in conformity 
with such regulations as it may impose. ( Gilman v. Phila-
delphia, 3 Wall., 713; Bridge Go. v. United States, 105 U. S., 
479; Willamette Iron Bridge Go. v. Hatch, 125 U.S., 1, 12; 
Ei:;canaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S., 683; Monongahela Navi-
gation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S., 336.) 
The power of Congress to declare what is an obstruction 
and to remove it from a navigable stream is well settled. 
(Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 731; Bridge Go. v. United 
States, 105 U.S., 475; Escanaba Go. v. Chicago, 107 U.S., 683; 
Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U. S., 385; Monongahela 
avigation Go. v. United States, 148 U. S., 335.) 
The que tion ariE-es whether or not the power intrusted to 
the ecretary of War by sections 4 and 5 of the river and 
harbor act of September 19, 1890, is a delegation of the leg-· 
i lative function. 
In nited tate v. Keolcuk and H. Bridge Go. (45 Fed. Rep., 
178) Judge hira held that-
" bridg having b en built and maintained in accordance 
ith h r uirem nt of n act of Congress, the Secretary 
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of War can not declare it an obstruction to navigation and 
require it to be changed, remodeled, or rebuilt under the act 
of Oongress of August 11, 1888 (25 U. S. Stat. L., p. 424, 
secs. 9, 10), providing that when he shall have reason to 
· believe that any bridge is an obstruction to free navigation, 
or where there is difficulty in passing the draw opening or 
raft span, the Secretary of War shall give notice requiring 
the bridge to be altered so as to render navigation through 
or under it free, easy, and unobstructed, and that the owner 
of any such bridge shall be liable to a penalty for willfully 
failing to remove the bridge or to cause the necessary altera-
tions to be made." 
The ground proceeded upon was that-
"The section in question confe!s upon the Secretary the 
duty of determining whether a given bridge is an unreason-
able obstruction, which in turn involves the duty of deter-
mining how much of an obstruction the public interests 
require should be placed in the way of the free navigation 
of the river, w.hich is a question which belongs to Congress 
to determine and which can not be rightfully delegated to 
any subordinate authority or person" (p .. 183). 
Sections 9 and 10 of the act of 1888 were amended by sec-
tions 4 and 5 of the act of 1890. 
Among other. material changes made by the amendments, 
it is provided that the obstruction must be '' unreasonable," 
and that the parties shall have a "reasonable opportunity to 
be heard," and that the Secretary of War shall" specify the 
change required to be made." 
Section 5 expressly makes a failure to comply with the 
requirements of section 4 a misdemeanor. 
In the Rider Case, United States District Judge Sage 
followed Judge Shiras, extending the doctrine as laid down 
by him to the sections as amended, saying "the question 
to be here decided is whether Congress could delegate, as 
it has undertaken to do, its authority in the premises to the 
Secretary of War. My conclusion is that it could not." 
( United States v. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 410.) 
Congress bas passed a complete act, providing that it shall 
b~ a misdemeanor to maintain an unreasonable obstruction 
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to navigation after a notice and hearing and after the 
special tribunal charged with the investigation of and find-
ing of the fact has determined that there is an unreasonable 
obstruction and a reasonable time for removing the obstruc-
tion has expired. 
The party concerned has a hea~ing, and the offense is not 
complete until after the hearing and a determination against 
him, and an opportunity to abate the nuisance has been 
given. 
The whole inquiry seems to resolve itself into whether or 
not Congress must itself consider each case of alleged 
obstruction to navigation and determine the facts, and 
declare that an obstruction exists, or whether it can gener-
ally define the offense and_ leave the facts to be determined 
by a court or special tribunal. 
Because Congress is vested with the power, as incidental 
to the commerce clause, to protect navigation, and, there-
fore, can declare and remove an obstruction, it does not fol-
low that it must itself examine into the details and facts of 
each case. This would be impracticable and would almost 
nullify the use of the power. 
Between sessions obstructions to navigation, no matter how 
outrageous, could not be dealt with. If Congress should 
undertake, during the sessions, to investigate specific cases, 
it is manifest that it would simply amount to a practical 
abdication of the power; for in the nature of things it would 
be impossible, within any reasonable time, to determine such 
questions.· 
It would be equally out of the question for Congress to 
attempt to define ''unreasonable obstruction to navigation," 
so as to make the definition practically safe and useful. It 
might as well be attempted to define" fraud" by a statute 
and fix its limitations and characteristics. 
If the power is to be exercised at all, it must be under a 
general law declaring, as the law in question does, that the 
maintenance of an unreasonable obstruction shall be a mis-
demeanor, and the determination of the facts must be left to 
ome tribunal, either a regular court, or a commission, or an 
cu tive officer. The determination of such a question in 
th regular our e of judicial proceedings would be tedious. 
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expensive, and the results would be variable, inasmuch as 
separate juries could come to different conclusions upon 
practically the same state of facts. In the interest of econ-
omy, promptness, and uniformity of decisions, it is manifest 
that the best course to be adopted is the one that has been 
pursued. 
If the act, in general terms, made the maintenance of an 
obstruction a misdemeanor, and if there could then be a 
conviction upon the determination of the Secretary of War, 
or any other tribunal, of the question as to whether or not 
there had been an unreasonable obstruction, it could be 
objected that persons would be committing a misdemeanor 
without knowing at the time that there was a violation of 
the law. 
The act in question, however, is not open to this criticism. 
There is first a hearing and a determination of the facts, and 
then there is an opportunity to avoid committing the offense, 
and the offense is only complete after the party is fully 
apprised of all the conditions. · 
In this case the Secretary of War is made a special tri-
bunal to adjudicate facts. 
It is competent for the legislature to establish, independent 
of the courts, special tribunals whose judgment shall b.e 
final. 
The taxing interests of this country involve by far the 
largest question so far as value is concerned. The assess-
ment of property is necessarily in trusted to special tribunals, 
which operate constantly and upon a vast scale. They are 
composed of nonjudicial officers, and if they pursue the law 
their conclusions are final. 
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States (142 U. S., 651) and 
Fong You Ting v. United States (149 U. S., 698) and Lern 
Moon Sing v. United States (158 U. S., 538), it was held that 
Congress might intrust to executive officers the final deter-
mination of facts upon which foreigners might be sent out 
of or excluded from this country, and that their conclusions 
could not be reexamined by any court. 
Congress has repeatedly passed laws committing the exe-
cution of acts in regard to the admission of aliens into the 
United States to the Secretary of the Treasury, collectors of 
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customs, and to inspectors acting under their authority. 
(See acts of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat., 477; .Aug. 3, 1882, 
ch. 376, 22 Stat., 214; Feb. 23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat., 414; 
Oct. 19,- 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat., 566.) ' 
By section 3 (22 Stat., 214),· and in similar laws, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury was authorized to establish rules and 
regulations and to issue instructions to carry out these and 
other immigration laws of the United States. 
In Enterprise Saving Association v. Zumstein (67 Fed. Rep., 
1000), it was held by the circuit court of appeals of the sixth 
circuit, in an opinion delivered by Judge Lurton, and con-
curred in by Judges Taft and Severens, that in enforcing 
the postal laws against lotteries it was competent for Con-
gress to intrust to the head of the Post-Office Department · 
the determination of the question as to what was a lottery. 
Congress can only legislate in a general way, and large 
powers are necessarily intrusted to the different depart-
ments, such, for instance, as the supervising power given to 
the Secretary of the Interior over questions of patents and 
relations to Indians and the public lands. It has been held 
that he can set aside a survey and order another survey and 
issue a patent thereon, which is the exercise of judicial 
power. This right arises from the supervising power given 
him under the statute, and the courts have invariably sus-
tained it, and in speaking of this class of powers have said: 
"It is obvious, it is common knowledge, that in the admin-
istration of such large aud varied interests as are intrusted 
to the Land Department, matters not foreseen, equities not 
anticipated, and which are therefore not provided for by 
express statute, may sometimes arise, and therefore that the 
Secretary of the Interior is given that superintending and 
supervising power which will enable him, in the face of these 
unexpected contingencies, to do justice." ( Williams v. United 
States, 138 U. S., 524; Knight v. United States Land Assn., 
142 u. s., 181.) 
In McOull.och v. Maryland (4 Wheat., 316, 421), Chief 
Ju tice Mar hall said: 
"The ound con truction of the Constitution must allow to 
he ational Legi lature that discretion, with respect to the 
m n y which the powers it ·on£ r are to be carried into 
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execution, which_ will enable that body to perform the high 
duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the 
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope 
of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited but con~ist with the letter and spirit of the Consti-
tution, are constitutional." 
It has now been established beyond controversy that Con-
gress has the power to incorporate national banks and clothe 
them with large discretionary powers, and for the purpose of 
accomplishing what Congress itself might directly do. 
This power was maintained in McCulloch v. Maryland ( 4 
Wheat., 31.6) and in Osborn v. United States Bank (9 Wheat., 
738) mainly upon the ground .that it was an appropriate 
means for carrying on the money transactions of the Govern-
ment. (Legal Tender Gase, 110 U. S., 445.) 
In re The Lriura (114 U.S., 411), although the pardoning 
power is by the Constitution vested in the President, the 
court held that an act authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to remit fines and penalties incurred by a steam 
vessel was valid, and it held that to determine otherwise 
would be to overthrow the practice which had been observed 
and acquiesced in for nearly a century. 
In Dorsheimer v. United States (7 Wall., 166) it was held 
that such power intrusted to the Secretary of the Treasury 
is one for the exercise of his discretion in a matter in trusted 
to him alone, and that it admits of no appeal to any court. 
In all those cases in which it is held that executive officers 
of the Government will not be controlled by the court in 
matters in which they have to exercise judgment or discre-
tion, it is apparent that large powers are intrusted by Con-
gress under the acts investing them with authority, and that 
they really exercise in this way by delegation, and neces. 
sarily so, for the purpose of carrying on the vast affairs of 
the Government and its details, authority which in a strict 
sense pertains to Congress. (See Decatur v. Paulding, 14 
Pet., 497-514; United States v. Guthrie, 17 How., 284; United 
States v. The Commissioners, 5 Wall., 563; Litchfield v. Reg-
ister q,nd Receiver, 9 Wall., 575-577; Garrick v. Lamar, 116 
u. s., 426.) 
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In United States v. Breen (40 Fe<l. Rep., 402) it was h~ld that 
Congress can authorize the Secretary of War to make rules 
and regulations, and can make it a misdemeanor to violate 
these rules when so made. 
In United States v. Bailey (9 Pet., 238) it was held that the 
crime of perjury, which was defined by statute, could be· 
committed by taking an oath in conformity with a mere regu-
lation of the Treasury Department. 
In Oaha v. United States (152 U. S., 219), in commenting 
upon this decision. the court said: 
" It was held that the Secretary had power to establish 
the regulation, and that the effect of it was to make· the false 
affidavit before the justice of the peace pe:r:jury within the 
scope of the statute, and this notwithstanding the fact that 
such justice of the p~ace was not an officer of the United 
. States." 
In the Caha Case the court upheld an indictment for per-
jury, which grew out of proceedings instituted in accordance 
with regulations of the Interior Department. 
These cases and the case under consideration differ from 
that of United States v. Eaton (144 U. S., 677), in which the 
court held that a failure to comply with regulations made by 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue could not be punished. 
The reason was that the statute had not made such refusal 
an offense. 
The court said: 
" It is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should 
exist for declaring any act or omission a criminal offense; 
and we do not think that the statutory authority in the 
present case is sufficient. If Congress intended to make it 
an offense for wholesale dealers in oleomargarine to omit to 
keep books and render returns, as required by regulations to 
be made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it would 
have done so distinctly, in connection with an enactment such 
as that above recited, made in section 41 of the act of Octo-
ber 1, 1 90. 
" R gulations prescribed by the President and by the 
heads of D I artments, under authority granted by Congress, 
m y be regulation pre ribed by law, o a lawfully to sup-
r a t done und r them ancl in accordance with them, and 
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may thus have, in a proper sense, the force of law; but it 
does not follow that a thing required by them is a thing so 
required by law as to make the neglect to do the thing a 
criminal offense in a citizen where a statute does not dis-
tinctly make the neglect in question a criminal offense" (p. 
688). 
The case under discussion has the element which was 
lacking in the Eaton case, for a statute has distinctly made 
the neglect in question a misdemeanor. 
The act of July 5, 1884, section 3, makes the Commissioner 
of Navigation's finding conclusive on all questions of inter-
pretation growing out of the execution of the laws relating 
to the collection of tonnage tax . . (N. G. L. S.S. Go. v. Hedden, 
43 Fed. Rep., 17-25.) 
Among the powers conferred upon 9ongress by the eighth 
section of the first article of the Constitution are the follow-
ing: 
"To provide and maintain a navy. 
" To make rules for the government and regulation of the 
land and naval forces." 
It was held in Dynes v. Hoover (18 How., 20), and the 
decision has never been questioned, that under this provision 
of the Constitution Congress has authority to establish 
courts-martial. 
It was further held that the decision of the court-martial 
in a matter where it has jurisdiction is final and can not be 
reviewed by the courts. ( 20 How., 83; Johnson v. Sayre, 158 
u. s., 109.) 
Congress, in establishing courts-martial, provided that the 
Secretary of the Navy is authorized to establish "regulations 
of the Navy," with the approval of the President. ( 12 Stat. 
L., 565; Rev. Stat., sec.1547.) 
Pursuant to this authority, "regulations for the adminis-
tration of law and justice" were issued on the 15th o_f .April, 
1870. 
It has been held that such regulations have the force of 
law. ( Gratiot v. United States, 4 How., 80; Ex parte Reed, 
100 u. s., 22.) 
Thus the legislative power is not exercised in detail, but a 
court is established in pursuance of the power conferred 
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upon Congress, and the Secretary of the Navy is clothed 
with the power of making regulations to control the court. 
This is one of the many instances in which it is essential 
for the operations of a great government that matters of 
detail be intrusted by the legislative department to executive 
officers for the purpose of giving effect to legislative acts. 
By article 34, Revised Statutes, section 1624, the proceed-
ings of summary courts-martial are to be conducted under 
such forms and rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary 
of the Navy with the approval of the President. 
Here Congress has constituted a court and it has delegated 
to an executive officer authority to establish rules for its 
procedure. 
By section.1547, Revised Statutes, the regulations issued 
by the Secretary of the Navy, and as they might thereafter 
be altered by him, with the approval of the President, are 
recognized as the regulations of the Navy. 
In pursuance of these regulations, Sayre became "a person 
in the naval service of the United States." He was tried by 
a court-martial and the Supreme Court refused to review its 
findings. (Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S., 117.) 
By an act of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat. L., 237, 240), an 
appropriation was made to be expended under the direction 
of the Secretary of War for the repairs, preservation, and 
completion of certain public works and inter alia "for the 
improvement of the harbor of Savannah." 
A like appropriation was made by the act of March 3, 1875 
(18 Stat., 459), "for the improvement of the harbor of 
Savannah, Ga." 
Neither of these acts directed the manner in which these 
appropriations should be expended. The mode of improving 
the harbor was left to the discretion of the Secretary of War. 
The legislative department declared that the improvement 
should be made, and devolved the determination of what 
would or would not be an improvement upon the Secretary 
of ar. 
It wa contended that, while Congress had the power to 
authoriz the on tructiou of a specific work, it could not 
r tary of War with uch large discretion, anu 
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that for t,his reason the act was void. The Supreme Court 
sustained the act in South Carolina v. Georgia (93 U. S., 13). 
In that case, acting under the commerce clause, Congress 
authorized an improvement. It empowered the Secretary of 
War to determine what would or would not be an improve_ 
ment, and so the act could not be made effective without the 
action of the Secretary of War. If he determined the char-
acter of the improvement, that was final and the act operated 
upon it. 
In this case Congress makes the obstruction to navigation 
a misdemeanor. It devolves upon the Secretary of War to 
determine when there is an obstruction and to give the party 
a hearing upon the investigation. When this special tribunal 
has determined that there is an obstruction, then the act 
operates upon it as in the former case. 
In Miller v. Mayor of New York (109 U. S., 385,393,395) it 
appeared that Congress authorized the building of a bridge 
over a river, but the particular bridge authorized was such 
as should thereafter be approved by the Secretary of War. 
After the Secretary of War fixed by bis approval the char-
acter of the bridge which was not an obstruction to naviga-
tion, then the act, operated upon it and authorized the 
building of the bridge. Until then the legislative license did 
not go into effect. Here was a complete act in the abstract, 
but its operation in the concrete was dependent upon the 
determination of facts by the special tribunal. It was con-
tended that this was an unlawful delegation of the power 
vested in Congress. The court held to the contrary, saying: 
"By submitting the matter to the Secretary, Congress did 
not abdicate any of its authority to determine what should 
or should not be deemed an obstruction to the navigation of 
the river. It simply declared that, upon a certain fact being 
established, the bridge should be deemed a lawful structure 
' and employed the Secretary of War as an agent to ascertain 
that fact. Having power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations and among the several States, and navigation being 
a branch of that commerce, it bas the control of all navigable 
waters between the States, or connecting with the ocean, so 
as to preserve and protect their free navigation. Its power, 
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therefore, to determine what shall not be deemed, so far as that 
commerce is concerned, an obstruction, is necessarily para-
mount and conclusive. It may, in direct terms, declare abso-
lutely or on conditions, that a bridge of a particular height 
shall not be deemed such an obstruction; and, in the latter 
case, make its declaration take effect when those conditions 
are complied with . . The act in question, in requiring the 
approval of the Secretary before the construction of the 
bridge was permitted, was not essentially different from a 
great mass of legislation directing certain measures to be 
taken upon the happening of particular contingencies or the 
ascertainment of particular information. The execution of a 
vast number of measures authorized by Congress, and car-
ried out under the direction of heads of Departments, would 
be defeated if such were not the case. The efficjency of an 
act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come 
from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency 
upon which the act shall take effect may be left to such 
agencies- as it may designate." (South Carolina v. Georgia, 
93 u. s., 13.) 
By section 2380, Revised Statutes-
" The President is authorized to reserve from the public 
lands, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, town sites on the 
shores of harbors, at the junction of rivers, important por-
tages, or any natural or prospective center·s of population." 
Following strict construction, this would be a delegation 
by Congress of its legislative power. 
In Currier v. West Side Elevated Patent Ry. Company 
(6 Blatch., 487), it was held that authority conferred upon 
commissioners to approve an experimental elevated railroad 
and making such approval essential to the continuance in 
existence of the railroad was not a delegation of legislative 
power. 
The creation of a railroad commission to fix reasonable 
toll for fr ight and pa senger tran portation is not an un-
con titutional delegation of legislative powers. ( Georgia v. 
rnith, 70 Ga., 694.) 
ith r i giving power to the governor to make pilotage 
r gnl tion ·. (Martin v. Wither poon, 135 Mass., 175.) 
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The statute providing for the civil service authorizes the 
Commissioners and the President to make rules for carrying 
the act into effect, and the President is authorized to pre-
scribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the 
civil service of 'the United Sta.tes as may best promote the 
efficiency thereof. (22 Stat., 403; sec. 1753, Rev. Stat.) 
Under the act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), power is 
conferred upon the President, when he shall have determined 
certain facts, to allot land in severalty to Indians on reser-
vations. 
In Field v. Clark (143 U. S., 649) it was held that Congress 
might confer authority upon the President to suspend by 
proclamation the operation of the law affecting the importa-
tion of certain articles, upon his determination that any 
country producing such articles imposed duties upon the 
agricultural or other products of the United States which in 
bis opinion were reciprocally unequal or unreasonable. 
The court said : 
"Legislative power was exercised when Congress declared 
that the suspension should take effect upon a named contin-
gency. What the President was required to do was simply 
in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making 
of law. He was the mere agent of the law-making depart-
ment to ascertain and declare the event upon which its ex-
pressed will was to take effect" (p. 693)~ 
I am of the opinion that the sections in question are not 
an unconstitutional delegation of the.legislative function. 
Inasmuch as the bridge was erected by authority of the 
State before Congress assumed actual jurisdictioh over the 
river for the purposes of navigation, the question arises 
whether or not the obstruction can be abated without com-
pensation by the United States for the expenses incurred. 
The power of Congress to regulate commerce is subject to 
the limitations of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 
If property be taken for public use, compensation must be 
made. (Monongahela Navigation Go. v. United States 148 
' u. s., 335.) . 
Here there is no taking of property by the Government. 
The only requirement is that an obstruction be removed. 
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In Bridge Company v. nited States (105 U . S., 479) the 
court said: 
"Tho e who act ou tate authority alone necessarily assume 
all the risk of legitimate Congressional interference." 
In Jj]scanaba C01npany v. Chicago (107 U. S., 683) the court, 
speaking of the authority of the State, said: 
"When its power is exercised, so as t o unnecessarily 
obstruct the navigation of the river or its branches, Congress 
may interfere and remove the obstruction." 
. In Monongahela Navigation Company v. United States (148 
U.S., 338, 341) the court draws the distinction between the 
taking of property and the removal of an obstruction. 
If States can authorize constructions in or over navigable 
waters of the United States, and parties thereby can acquire 
a right against the United States to compensation for their 
destruction, or cost of change to meet the demands of navi. 
gation whenever Congress shall assume actual jurisdiction 
over such waters, then the power of Congress over the navL 
gable waters of the United States is not supreme. 
I am of the opinion that compensation can not be demanded 
and that you can lawfully _proceed as provided for in section 
4 of the act of September 19, 1890. 
Respectfully, · 
The SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR. 
J. M. DICKINSON, 
Acting Attorney-General. 
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS. 
A r egulation with respect to quarantining against yellow fever, which 
provides for an exception in the case of vessels bouD.cd for ports of the 
nited States north of the yellow fever danger line, does not consti-
tl~t~ a discrimination within the meaning of the quarantine law pro-
v1drng that '' all rules ancl r egulations made by the Secretary of the 
Treasury shall operate uniformly and in no manner discriminate 
again t any port or place." 
DEPARTMENT OF J STICE, 
November 7 , 1896. 
the honor to acknowledge your communication 
!" Oct b r _1 a l ing my opinion with r lation to a quaran-
in r gul t1 n re p ting yellow fever. The quarantine law 
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of February 15, 1893, chapter 114, section 3, provides that 
"all rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the . 
Treasury shall operate uniformly and in no manner discrimi-
nate against any port or place." Your regulations with 
respect to quarantining against yellow fever provide for an 
exception in the case of "vessels bound for ports in the 
United States north of the southern boundary of Mary-
land, with good sanitary condition and history, having had 
no sickness on board at ports of departure en route or on 
arrival, provided they have been five days from last infected 
or suspected port." The Supervising Surgeon-General of the 
Marine-Hospital Service, in his communication concerning 
this regulation, says: " It is as absurd to disinfect a ship 
from Havana at Portland, Me., as it is dangerous not to dis-
infect one from Havana at New Orleans." 
Since our country contains such great variety iu climate 
and sanitary conditions it is clear t_hat every regulation of 
your Department with relation to quarantine can not with 
wisdom be made applicable to the whole coast line. I do not 
think that Congress intended unwisdom in this respect. I 
do not think that this exception, which in effect covers that 
part of our coast which is north of the yellow fever danger 
line, constitutes a discrimination within the meaning of the 




The SECRETARY OF '.fHE TREASURY. 
ACTIONS-GOVERNMENT RETENTION OF FUNDS IN DISPUTE . . 
An appearance by parties to a suit in one jurisdiction does not operate 
as an abandonment of proceedings instituted by them in another juris-
diction, the parties and cause of action being the same. 
One may proceed on the same cause of action in as many jurisdictions 
as he can have service of process executed upon the defendants. 
One :final judgment on the merits rendered in one action can be pleaded 
in bar in all the others. 
Where funds in the hands of the Secretary of War are involved in a 
controversy between parties, pending under different forms of pro-
cedure in different jurisdictions, the funds should be retained by him 
until a final adjudication of the whole matter by the tribunal to which 
the parties may last resort. 
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF J USTICE, 
November 16, 1896. 
SIR: I have th~ honor to acknowledge the r eceipt of your 
communication of the 6th instant, reciting the facts of the 
transaction and of the subsequent litigation between Ham-
mond, Leonard, and Scofield on the one hand and Whaley and 
Taylor on the other, as . to which you request my opinion 
"whether the legal effect of the appearance by Leonar·d ap.d 
Scofield in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, 
as stated by Mr. Garland, is an abandonment of said pro-
ceedings in the supreme court of New York for Kings County 
and in the United States circuit court for the eastern district 
of New York." 
Having written the opinion of November 2, 1894 (21 Op., 
75), called for by your inquiry as to the propriety of deliver-
ing to· the receiver of the New York court the Treasury draft 
there referred to, and having had brought to my notice, 
officially, certain of the subsequent developments of this 
matter, I gave to your communication and the papers accom-
panying it careful consideration, and then called upon Mr. A. 
S. Worthington, a member of the bar of this city, with whom I · 
had occasion heretofore to confer as the legal counsel of 
Leonard and Scofield. In reply to my inquiries of him I have 
received from him a written communication of the 13th 
instant, inclosing a copy of a final judgment rendered on 
October 24, 1896, at a special term of the supreme court of 
New York for Kings County in favor of Leonard and Scofield 
and against Whaley and Taylor, which letter and copy I here-
with inclose. 
On full consideration of the whole matter, and especially 
of the briefs of Mr. Garland and the opinion of Judge Cox 
and the decree rendered thereon, I am of the opinion that 
the decree made by Judge Cox does not purport to be and 
wa not a final decree on the merits of the controversy 
b tween the partie , but was an interlocutory decree denying 
an application for a temporary injunction and dissolving a 
preliminary r training order theretofore awarded. 
he r on. given by Judge Cox in bis opinion would 
und bt dly bav upported a decree on the merit in favor 
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of the- defendants if the cause had been brought on to be 
finally heard on pleadings and proofs. 
The appearance of Leonard and Scofield in the ·supreme 
court of the District of Columbia did not, in my opinion, 
operate as an abandonment of the proceedings instituted by 
them in the supreme court of New York for Kings County. 
One may proceed on the same cause of action against the 
same defendants in as many different jurisdictions as he can 
have service of process executed upon the defendants. One 
final judgment on the merits rendered in one action can be 
pleaded in bar in all the others. 
It appears here that final judgment on the merits has been 
rendered in the New York court, which had obtained juris-
diction over the subject-matter and over all the part"ies. 
From that judgment an appeal may be taken by the defend-
ants. 
So, too, the proceeding pending in the supreme court of 
the District of Columbia may be pursued to final judgment or 
decree, from which an appeal may be taken. 
I venture to advise, therefore, on the whole case that the 
fund in your hands be retained by you until the controversy 
between these parties, now pendj_ng under different forms of 
procedure and in several jurisdictions, be determined by a 
final adjudication of the whole_ matter by the tribunal to 
which the parties may last resort. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 




RETIREMENT 01? JUDGES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The expression" any judge of any court of the United States," in the 
statute providing for the retirement of judges on full pay, applies to 
the chief justice of the Court of Claims as well as to the other 
judges of that court, and he may retire at the age·of 70 provided he 
shall then have been ten years a duly qualified judge of that court, 
although he may have held his commission as chief justice thereof 
less than ten years. 
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The expression "after having h eld his commission as such at least ten 
years," in the ame statute, does not mean that the commjssion under 
which the judge is serving at the time of bis retirement must have 
been in force ten years, but means being in commission. The refer-
ence to the · commission was not intended to make the paper title to 
the office held at the time of the retirement significant, but to make 
the legal right to act as a :Federal j ndge for ten years the test rather 
than the actual discharge of the duties of that office. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
November 18, 1896. 
· SIR: I have the honor to submit my opinion, as requested 
in your letter of the 17th instant. 
You state the question and the reason for submitting it as 
follows: 
"Judge Charles C. Nott having served as a judge of the 
Court of Claims for more than thirty years, I am contemplat-
ing his promotion to the chief justiceship of that court, made 
vacant by the death of Judge Richardson. I am impressed 
with the belief that the selection of Judge Nott for that 
place would subserve the public interest and be a just recog-
nition of long and valuable service. 
"I desire, however, before finally determining upon my 
course in the matter, to have your opinion in answer to the 
following question : 
"Would the retirement of Mr. Nott as chief justice of 
the Court of Claims upon his attaining the age of 70 and 
before he had served ten years as chief justice deprive him 
of the benefit of section 714 of the Revised Statutes, pro-
viding for the continuance of salary to a judge retiring at 
the age of 70, after having held his commission as such at 
least ten years~ " 
As you desire an answer to this question for your guid-
ance in filling an existing vacancy, the inquiry becomes a 
present and practical one, which it is my duty, according 
to the statute and the well-settled practice of the Depart-
ment, to answer. 
Th tatute involved is as follows: 
" EC. 714. hen any judge of any court of the United 
tate r ign hi office, after having held his commission as 
uch at lea t ten year , and having attained the age of 70 
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years, he shall, during the residue of his natural life, receive 
the same salary which was by law payable to him at the time 
of his resignation." 
The objects of this statute are not such as sometimes lead 
to a strictness of construction which makes the turn of 
every phrase a justification for reluctance to believe that a 
meaning was intended, which has not been clearly and un-
equivocally expressed. On the contrary, there is no reason 
why this statute should not be fairly construed, reading its 
terms in the light of the manifest object and purpose of Con-
gress. 
The object was to further the good of the public service 
by providing for the retirement, at full pay, of judges who 
have reached the age of 70 and been ten years on the bench. 
The expression "any judge of any court of the United 
States" was certainly intended to have the widest applica-
tion; although, if the meaning of this section is to turn ori 
forms of expression, it would not apply to the chief justice 
of the Court of Claims at all, because, by the act creating 
the court (Rev. Stat., sec. 1049), '' It shall consist of a chief 
justice and . four judges," etc. All five of these officers are 
appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, hold 
their offices during good behavior, take the same oath, have -
the same jurisdiction, and receive the same salary payable in 
the same way. It is not open to doubt that the retirement 
act was intended to apply to the chief justice as well as to 
the judges of that court. 
I understand that the doubt which led to your question 
has been suggested by the phrase "after having held his 
commission as such at least ten years." This, it bas been 
thought, may mean that the commission under which the 
judge is serving at the time of his retirement must have been 
in force at least ten years. Certainly no such intention is to 
be extracted from this language without resort to the same 
technicality which would deny to the chfof justice of the 
Court of Claims the right under this section which the other 
judges of that court have. The simplest form of expression, 
and therefore perhaps the most natural, would have been 
"resigns after having served at least ten years." But it is 
a matter of common knowledge that the object of this statute 
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was not only to ofter an additional inducement to enter the 
judicial service of the 'United States, but also to encourage 
the retirement therefrom of men whom age or infirmity make 
incapable of further service, some of whom, at the time of 
the passage of the act, had already b~en for a considerable 
time wholiy disabled. lf the form of expression I have 
above suggested had been used, it might have been claimed 
that actual service for ten years was required, so that the 
period of past incapacity would be excluded. It was, in my 
opinion, to avoid this result that the reference to holding 
the commission was made instead of reference to holding the 
office or discharging its duties. This intention seems to me 
clearly to account for the language used, and at the same 
time to exclude the idea that any significance was meant to 
be given to the formal written expression of authority which 
might, for the time being, be evidence of official character. 
I am wholly unable to conceive any r_eason which could have 
led Congress to a-consideration of this feature of the subject, 
especially with respect to judgeships which are exactly alike 
in every particular except in name. It was being in commis-
sion and not holding a particular commission that Congress 
meant to make a condition. 
Some of the conclusions to which any other construction 
would lead seem almost absurd. Thus a judge appointed 
during a recess of Congress receives at once a commission 
which is valid till the close of the next session. Under this 
commission, therefore, he may hold office a year. Being con-
firmed at the close of the next session of the Senate, be 
receives another commission during good behavior. I can 
not believe it open to doubt that at the end of ten years 
from his qualification under his original commission such 
judge, if seventy years of age, would be entitled to retire on 
full pay. He would not, however, have'-' beld his commis-
sion," i. e., that under which he was then entit.led to act as 
judge for ten years; he would have held it only nine. 
lu other words, the reference to the commission was not 
intended to make the paper title to the office held at the time 
of retirement . igriificant, but to make the lawful right to act 
as a deral judge for ten y ars the test rather than tbe 
actual di charge of the duties of that office. 
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What the result would be in case of the transfer of a judge 
from one Federal court to another with different jurisdiction 
and salary, I need not now consider. But I am entirely 
clear that, in the case submitted, Judge Nott, if appointed 
cllief justice of the Court of Claims, will have the right to 
avail himself of the privilege given by section 714 upon 
reaching the age of 70, provided he shall theii have been for 
ten years a duly qualified judge of that court, although he 
may have held his . commission as chief justice thereof less 
than ten years. So far as section 714 is concerned, the chief 
justice of the Court of Claims is, as I have before shown, 
one of the judges thereof, so that Judge Nott will, in case of 
his proposed appointment, be really holding the same office 
as before. He will simply have been designated to preside, 
but the fact that this is done by naming him chief justice 
and commissioning him as such makes no difference. In 
many courts . the judge is made chief justice whose term 
will first expire, but this does not change the nature of the 
office. When he retires he will have "held his commission" 
a8 a judge of the Court of Claims, no matter how often the 
paper expressing his authority may have been rewritten or 
renewed, from the time he was first entitled to act as a member 
of that court. 
I have the honor to be, with great respect, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The PRESIDENT. 
INVALID PENSION TO RETIRED OFFICER-STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION. 
A retired officer of the Army is not entitled to draw an invaliil. pension 
nor arrears of pension. 
The departmental construction of a statute followed. 
DEP .A.RTMEN'.l.' OF JUSTICE, 
November 20, 1896. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication asking reconsideration of my opinion of 
September 11, 1896, with relation to the claim of Col. John 
Pulford. That opinion, in holding that Colonel Pulford was 
entitled to draw an invalid pension prior to 1890, notwith-
standing his status as a retired officer of the Army, and 
454 HON. JUDSON HARMON. 
A ttorney•G en e ral-Refu n d of Duties. 
notwithstanding the statute of April 30, 1844, chapter 15, 
and section 4724 of the Revised Statutes was based upon 
the assumption that these statutes had received a. depart-
mental construction which makes them wholly inapplicable 
to the case of officer6\ upon the retired list. You now inform 
me that further investigation into the records of the Pension 
Bureau show that this assumption (which was based upon the 
correspondence between us with reference to this case) was 
incorrect. The Commissioner of Pensions, on October 13 
last, reports to you that section 4 724 was construed by the 
Pension Bureau as applicable to officers upon the retired list 
of the Army until September 3, 1888, when an exception was 
recognized in the case of survivors of the Mexican war who 
drew service pensions. On October 30 be further reports, 
from an examination of the records of his bureau, "that 
at no time since 1844_ has any pension claim been allowed in 
behalf of a retired officer or soldier as an invalid pension." 
The departmental construction thus appears to sustain the 
true construction of the statute in question, as held by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior and approved by me. 
The general rules of statutory construction set forth in my 
previous opinion thus require a reversal of its conclusion; 
and I advise you that the applicant is not entitleu to the 
arrears of pension claimed by him. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-REFUND OF DUTIES. 
A mistake on the part of the Treasury Department in estimating the 
equivalent of the Spanish pound, or libra, in the absence of due pro-
test by the importers, is not sufficient to warrant a refund of the 
ex ·ess of duties paid under such erroneous estimate. 
Th Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make a refirnd of duties 
where tb. re was an error due to a mutual mistake of fact. 
pon a que tion of fact tho Attorney-General will not give an opinion. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 3, 1896. 
the honor to acknowledge your communication 
0 a kin my opinion a to the claim of B. H. 
n ·~ 'o. of ew York. 
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It a,ppears that during the year 1895, and up to .April 9, 
1896, the collectors of customs, under instructions from 
your Department, estimated the Spanish pound, or libra, as 
equivalent to 1.0143 pounds avoirdupois; and that on the lat-
ter date, upon a report from the Superintendent of the Coast 
and Geodetic Survey, instructions were issued directing 
them to estimate it at 1.0161 pounds avoirdupois. The claim-
ants ask for refunds of duties exacted from them during this 
p.eriod by reason of the erroneous instructions, and you 
ask whether you have authority to reliquidate and refund 
accordingly. 
I think that your questions are answered, so far as they 
can be answered by this Department, in 21 Opin., 226, 252. 
Your power under the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 136, can . 
be exercised in case the error was due to a mutual mistake 
of fact. There was a mistake of fact on the Government's 
part, but this alone would not' be sufficient in the absence of 
due protest by the importers. Whether there was also a mis-
take of fact on the importers' part is a question of fact, and 




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 
ACQUISITION OF LAND BY THE UNITED STATES. 
The Secretary of the Treasury without further authority than the act of 
March 3, 1891, may accept a voluntary grant of land from the city of 
Saginaw, Mich., to be used for the purposes of a public building. 
No legislation of Congress is needed to enable the United States to take 
and hold land by voluntary gift, devise, or grant. 
The United States in their sovereign capacity have power to acquire 
and hold real property wherever and whenever such property is 
needed for the use of the Government in the execution of any of its 
powers. 
Such property may be acquired by any means by which natural or arti-
ficial persons may acquire property subject in certain cases to the 
local laws of the States. 
10892-VOL 21, PT 3--4 
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DEP .A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE, 
JJecember 11, 1896. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of November 25, requesting my opinion as 
to whether further legislation by Congress is needed to 
enable the United States to accept a voluntary grant of 
land from the city of Saginaw, in the State of Michigan, 
which has been tendered on the following state of facts, re-
cited in your letter: 
By act of Congress approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1094), 
you were authorized and directed to acquire, by purchase, con-
demnation, or otherwise, a site and cause to be erected thereon 
a suitable public building in the city of Saginaw, Mich. 
Subsequently the city of Saginaw donated to the United 
States the land needed for the purpose. 
Still later, and at the request of the city of Saginaw, Con-
gress by act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat., 590), directed you 
to reconvey to the city of Saginaw that portion of the land 
previously granted which it desired to repossess. 
It now appears that the city of Saginaw has discovered 
that it does not need the portion of land reconveyed to it 
and desires to restore it to the United States. 
It appears that the State of Michigan has by proper legis-
lation authorized the United States to acquire land within 
the limits of tbe State for public uses and has ceded to the 
United States exclusive jurisdiction over all lands already 
or thereafter to be acquired by them. 
It appears tbat the portion of land which the city of Sagi-
naw now proposes to reconvey to the United States can be 
beneficially used in connection with the land on which the 
Government building stands and will add to the comfort, 
convenience, and enjoyment of the public buildings and 
grounds. 
The United States in their sovereign capacity have power 
to acquire and hold real property wherever and whenever 
such property is needed for the use of the Government in 
the execution of any of its powers. Such property may be 
acquired by any of the means by which natural or artificial 
P r on may acquire property, ubject in certain cases to the 
l cal law of the tates. 
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No legislation by Congress is needed to enable the United 
States to take and hold by voluntary gift, devise, or grant, 
although such authority appears to have been expressly con-
ferred in this case by the act of March 3, 1891, which 
authorizes you to acquire land" by purchase, condemnation, 
or otherwise.'' 
I have therefore to say that you may "without further 
authority from Congress accept and use the additional land 
referred to," and that no " additional act or cession by the 






The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
AT'rORNEY-GENERAL-PREMIUMS. 
Where no occasion has arisen for the official action of the Secretary of 
War, the Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a question 
proposed by him. 
The contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company 
for the construction of a disappearing gun carriage, under the act of 
August 1, 1894, makes no provision for the payment of a premium and 
does not bind the Government beyond the amount appropriated. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
December 24, 1896. 
Sm: I have the -honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of November 7, 1896, in which you state the following: 
"In 1893 the United States entered into contract with the 
Morgan Engineering Oompany, of Alliance, Ohio, for one 
Gordon disappearing carriage for 10-inch B. L. rifle, the con-
tract containing the plan of the carriage which was agreed 
to be constructed, and also provisions and conditions rela-
tive to all matters pertaining to the construction, the price 
to be paid therefor, the manner and times of payments of the 
price, and many other matters. 
"On February 22, 1894, the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and 
Power Company wrote a letter submitting a plan of a gun 
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arriage which it d ired t construct for the United States, 
and containing al the provisions and conditions of the 
contract which it propo ed to enter into with the United 
States. 
'' The act making appropriations for fortifications, etc., 
approved August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., 214), authorized and 
directed the Secretary of War to contract with the Pneu-
matic Gun Carriage and Power Company for one 10-inch 
pneumatic disappearing gun carriage 'which shall be con-
structed on the general plan submitted by the company to 
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification in its letter dated 
February twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, 
and shall be capable of being traversed and the gun elevated 
and depressed by either pneumatic, electric, or hand power, 
and the details of said plan may be modified, changed, and 
improved in the discretion of the company.' 
"The act appropriated for the purchase of the saicl pneu-
matic carriage the sum of $50,000, or so much thereof as may 
be necessary, and further provided that ' the same conditions 
relative to the platform, ammuniUon, and payments, and s9 
forth, embodied in the contract for the Gordon ten-inch coun-
terpoise carriage shall apply to the pneumatic carriage, and 
the same facilities for carrying out the contract for the coun-
terpoise carriage shall be extended to the pneumatic carriage.' 
''UnderdateofNovember 5, 1894, the United States entered 
into a contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power 
Company for the carriage authorized by said act of August 
1, 1894, for the sum of $50,000, the full amount appropriated 
for the cq,rriage. In view of the provisions of' section 3732, 
Revised Statutes, and the doubt as to whether the said act 
of August 1, 1894, authorized the Secretary of War to enter 
into contract to pay premiums which would make the cost of 
the carriage exceed the amount appropriated therefor, no 
provi ion for the payment of premiums for rapidity of fire 
was inserted in the contract. In the contract for the Gordon 
carriage (in the advertisement and instructions attached 
thereto) it is provided that 'the carriage should be such as 
to P rmit of the firing of the ervice 10-inch rifle therefrom 
t u (10) time in ne hour, u ing hand power only, and there 
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shall be a deduction of $1,000 from the contract price agreed 
upon for each round less than this number in said time, and 
a bonus of $2,000 for each round greater than this number.' 
''Under this provision in the contract for the Gordon car-
riage and the provision in said act of August 1, 1894, that 
'the same conditions relative to the platform, ammunition, 
and payments, and so forth; embodied in the contract for the 
Gordon ten-inch counterpoise carriage shall apply to the 
pneumatic carriage,' the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power 
Company claims that it is entitled to a bonus of $2,000 for 
each shot fired in one hour in excess of twelve shots, the 
number required by the contract, although the contract price 
is $50,000, the full amount appropriated for the carriage." 
You ask for an opinion-
" As to whether under said act of Congress of August 1, 
1894, the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company is 
entitled to a premium of $2,000 for each shot that may be 
fired in an hour in excess of twelve shots," 
The act in quest,ion appropriated a specific sum, viz, $50,000, 
to "procure and test one 10-inch pneumatic disappearing 
gun carriage." The Secretary of War was "authorized and 
directed to contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and 
Power Company, of Washington, District of Columbia, with-
out advertising, for such carriage." 
The full amount of the appropriation is absorbed in the 
contract price for making and delivering the carriage. 
The contract which was made between the parties does 
not purport to bind the Government beyond the amount 
· appropriated. 
In view of these facts I do not see that any occasion has 
arisen for your official action in regard to the payment of 
premiums, and therefore, in accordance with the uniform 
practice of this Department, I must decline to express an 
opinion upon the question proposed by you. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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SLAUGllTER OF DI~EASED ANIMALS. 
By the act of August 30, 1890, providing that the Secretary of Agriculture 
may cau e to be slaughtered certain animals adjudged to be infected 
with di ea , or to havo be n exposed to infection, and providing the 
, manner in which the value of the animals so slaughtered as exposed, 
but not infected, shall be ascertained and paid, but that no payment 
shall be made for any animal imported in violation of the act, Con-
gress intended that the exposed animals imported in violation of the 
act are to be slaughtered, as well as the others. 
The authority of the Department of Agriculture to seize and slaughter 
the animals without compensation by the Government is doubtful. 
The Secretary is to adopt and enforce regulations for adjudging whether 
or not the animals are diseased or have been exposed to disease so as 
to be dangerous and without ha-ving reo·ard to possible claims, to ' ' "" . resort to slaughtering if, in his judgment, such a measure is reqmred 
to prevent the spread of the disease among animals in this country. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUS1.'ICE, 
Janua,ry 4, 1897. 
Sm: I have your letter of the 2d instant asking my opin-
ion as to the right of your Department to slaughter sheep 
imported by J. B. Manby, of Trinidad, Colo., quarantined at 
Santa Fe stock yards, at El P~so, rrex., and found to be 
affected with scab. 
Section 6 of the act of August 30, 1890, makes it a penal 
offense, with fine and imprisonment, to knowingly import 
sheep, etc., affected with disease, or sheep, etc., which have 
been exposed within sixty days to such disease. This pro-
vision is to be enforced, as any other criminal law, by court 
and jury. 
Section 7 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to quar-
antine all sheep, etc., imported. 
Section 8 prohibits their importation except at quarantine 
ports; and provides that the Secretary of Agriculture may 
cause to be slaughtered such of the animals named in this 
act as may be, under regulations prescribed by him, adjudged 
to be infected, or to have been exposed to infection so as to 
be dangerous to other animals; and that the value of ani-
mal o slaughtered as expo ed but not infected may be 
a certained by agreement or appraisal by persons appointed 
by th ecretary, ho deci ion to be final and paid out of 
. ' an mon Y rn th Trea ury not otberwi e appropriated; 
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'' but no payment shall be made for any animal imported in 
violation of the provisions of this act." This would seem to 
mean that no payment shall be made for any exposed animal, 
as well as none for any diseased animal, if imported in vio-
lation of the act; and to provide a summary method of 
appraisal and payment in the case of animals exposed, but 
not imported in violation of the act. Undoubtedly, however, 
the _exposed animals imported in violation of the act were 
intended to be slaughtered, as well as the others, and this 
slaughtering was to be of them and the others indiscrimi-
nately, without reg·ard to any question of illegal importation 
and with a view to preventing the spread of disease, etc. 
It is to be "adjudged" that the animals are diseased or 
exposed so as to be dangerous; not that they were i11egally 
imported. That question arises before the Secretary or at 
the Treasury only for the purpose of passing upon claims 
for payment under section 8 of the act. 
I am not prepared to say that a wrong decision of such a 
question by the ,Secretary of Agriculture, or at the Treasury, 
would have any greater effect than a decision by the Comp-
troller of the · Treasury in matters of accounts and claims 
generally; that no claims could be maintained in court for 
compensation for the slaughtering of sheep '' adjudged" to 
be diseased or to have been exposed to disease, and erro-
neously believed to have been imported in violation of the 
law, or that no other claims could be made. I therefore 
answer your question whether any doubt can be raised as to 
the authority of your Department to seize and slaughter the 
sheep in question without compensation by the Government, 
by saying that there is such doubt. 
As to what action it is necessary for you to take to guard 
against such claims, I am clearly of opinion that you are 
not expected to do more than adopt and enforce regulations 
for adjudging whether or not the sheep are diseased or have 
been exposed to disease so as to be dangerous, and, without 
~aving regard to possible claims, to resort to slaughtering if, 
m your judgment, such a measure is required by the purposes 
of the law, e. g., to prevent the spread of disease among 
animals in this country. 
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An appraisement should be had, in order that, if any of 
these sheep were not imported in violation of law, payment 
may be made for those exposed to disease, as directed by 
section 8 of the act referred to. 
_ Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE. 
GRANTS TO ST.A.TES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
The provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, granting certain sections of 
unappropriated public lands within the State of Colorado to the State 
for penitentiary 1rnrposes, to be selected and located by direction of 
the legislature with the approval of the President of the United 
States on or before a specified date, are not directory, as Congress 
had no right to give directions to the legislature of a State, but are 
in the nature of conditions precedent, and ctm only be given effect 
as conditions, and a failure by the designated authorities to select 
and locate the lands within the time named, renders the grant 
inoperative. After the expiration of said time the President is not 
authorized to approve a selection and location of said lands. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 4, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to submit my opinion as requested 
in your letter of September 1 last, with which you sent to 
me a letter to you from the Secretary of the Interior, dated 
August 20, 1896, asking your approval of a list of lands 
selected by the State of Colorado for penitentiary purposes 
under section 9 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 474). 
The Secretary refers to the decision by one of his predeces-
sors, of February 27, 1890 (10 L. D., 222), on the application 
by said State for certain salt lands granted it by section 11 
of that act, in which "it was held that the provisions of 
that section requiring the State to make its selection of salt 
lands within two years after the admission of the State is 
directory only, and failure to select within the period speci-
fi d doe not work a forfeiture of the grant." 
ou r que t that I advise you '' as to the correctness of 
th ruling f th Interior Department referred to * * * 
nd wh th r under ecti n 9 of the law pass d March 3, 
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1875 (18 Stat., 474), the President may approve selections of 
land for penitentiary purposes made by the State of Colo-
rado after the :first day of January, 1878." 
The act referred to was the enabling act under which Colo-
rado was admitted into the Union. Section 7 granted to the 
State sections Nos. J..6 and 36 in every township for the sup-
port of common schools. Section 8 likewise granted ":fifty 
entire sections of the unappropriated public lands within 
said State to be selected and located by direction of the legisla-
ture thereof, and with the approval of the President, on or 
before the first day of January, 1878, * * * in legal sub-
divisions of not less than one-quarter section, * * * for 
the purpose of erecting public buildings at the capital of 
said State for legislative and judicial purposes." Section 9 
is as follows: 
"That :fifty other entire sections of land as aforesaid, to be 
selected and located and with the appronal as aforesaid, shall 
be, and they are hereby, granted to said State for the pur-
pose of erecting a suitable building fo~ a penitentiary or 
State prison in the manner aforesaid." 
The language of section 8 with refer~nce to time and man-
ner of selection and location is plainly incorporated by ref-
erence in section 9, and the question is whether., the time 
named having passed without any action looking to the 
selection and locatfon of lands under section 9, the State 
still bas the right to select and locate them. 
Section 11, to which the decision of the Secretary of the 
Interior above cited referred, provided-
'~That all salt springs within said State, not exceeding 
twelve in number, with six sections of land adjoining, and 
as contiguous as may be to each, shall be granted to said 
State for its use, the said land to be selected by the governor 
of said State within two years after the admission of · the 
State," etc. 
I do not concur in the opinion of the Secretary. The 
authorities which he cites to support his conclusion relate 
to laws containing directions to public officers subject to 
the control of the legislature which passed them, specifying 
the time and manner in which public duties were to be per-
formed. These provisions as to time and manner were, in 
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the cases cited, held to be directory only, the intention hav-
ing been manifest to require the duty to be performed and 
nothing appearing to indicate that the action of the officer 
was to fail in case, for any reason, the directions as to time 
and manner should not be strictly followed. As stated in 
one of the passages quoted (p. 225 ), such provisions "seem 
to be generally understood to be merely instructions for the 
guidance and government of those on whom the duty is 
imposed, or directory only. The neglect of them may be 
punishable, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the 
act done in disregard of them." 
To the same effect are the quotations (p. 224) from French v. 
Edwards (13 Wall., 506) and those from other cases. 
As the terms "directory" and "mandatory" import, this 
rule of construction applies only to statutes giving directions 
or commands to officers or bodies whose action is under the 
control of the law-making power, and I think the error of the 
Secretary was in applying this rule to a law making a grant. 
Congress had no right to give directions to the legislature or 
to the governor of the State of Colorado, and can not, by the 
proper construction of the act, be held to have undertaken to 
do so. On the contrary, the act simply granted various quan-
tities of land for different State purposes. There was no con-
dition with respect to the school lands, the sections being 
designated by numbers; but the sections granted for the 
erection of public buildings and those granted for a peniten-
tiary building were to be selected and located by the legis-
lature on or before a date named, while the salt springs and 
adjoining sections were to be selected by the governor within 
a fixed period after the admission of the State. 
The propriety of treating the provisions of any statute as 
directory only has been questioned, and although the right of 
courts to do so in proper cases is established, they exercise it 
only with reluctance and in extraordinary cases. (Dreyfus 
v: J:$_rid~es, 45 Miss., 247; Best v. Gholson, 89 Ill., 465.) The 
d1stmct10n between the class of cases to which this rule 
applie and those to which it does not is well stated in 
Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, section 433 : 
"Where power or right are granted with a direction that 
c rtain regulation or formalities shall be complied with. it 
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seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous 
observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the 
right or authority conferred; and it is therefore probable 
that such was the intention of the legislature. But when a 
public duty is imposed, and the statute requires that it shall 
be performed in a certain manner or within a certain time, or 
under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well 
be regarded as intended 'to be directory only when injustice 
or inconvenience to others who have no control over those 
exercising the duty would result if such requirements were 
essential and imperative." 
Whether the usual rule of strict construction which usually 
applies to grants by the Government is to be adopted with 
respect to a grant to a State, and whether the grant in ques-
tion was one in presenti which, upon the selection and location 
of the lands, with the approval of the President, would take 
effect as of the date of the act, are questions which I think 
immaterial, because the intention of Congress was manifest 
to make the selection and location of the lands in the manner 
and within the time named conditions of the grant. It is not 
to be assumed that Congress had no purpose in designating 
separate agencies and different periods for the selection and 
location of the lands, nor is it necessary for officers intrusted 
with the execution of the law to inquire what that purpose 
was. It is sufficient that the statute plainly provides that 
the selection and location shall be made within a time spe-
cifically named. . 
As these provisions of the act can not be construed as direc-
tions to those whom Congress had no right to direct they 
can only be given effect as conditions which, if not complied 
with, prevent the grants from being effectual. They are 
not, strictly speaking, conditions subsequent, even if the 
grants be considered as in' presenti in the sense above men-
tioned, and therefore are not to be regarded with the disfavor 
commonly shown to such conditions. They are rather in the 
nature of conditions precedent. The various decisions by 
the Supreme Court of the United States (146 U. S., 593 and 
cases cited) holding, for the protection of the grantees, that 
grants of this nature, when the selection is made or the lands 
otherwise defined relate back to the date of the grant, do 
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not conflict with my view that failure by the designated 
authorities of the State to select and locate the lands within 
the times named renders the . grant inoperative. Properly 
speaking, the grant is not forfeited or defeated after it has 
taken effect. It merely failed to take effect because; being a 
mere floating grant, the necessary steps to cause it to attach 
to specific lands were not taken. 
It will be noticed that the President's approval was required 
with respect to the selection and location of the lands granted 
by sections 8, 9, and 10, but not with respect to those granted 
by section 11. 
My opinion is that you are not now authorized to give your 






The Makah Indians are prohibited, as other persons generally, by the 
· act of April 6, 1894, from killing seals at a time and in a certain part 
of the Pacific Ocean named in the act, and the only right they can 
claim is that of E>ealing in the particular manner and places permitted 
in explicit terms by section 6 of the act to coast Indians generally. 
While Indians are not commonly understood to be embraced by laws of 
Congress, yet they may be and often are, and whether they are or 
not is a question of intent. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 5, 1897. 
SIR: I have received from you the following request for an 
opinion: 
"Replying to your letter of the 11th instant, in reply to 
the letter of this Department, dated the 4th instant, con-
cerning the kUling of certain seals by Makah Indians, I have 
the honor to transmit a copy of a letter from the United 
State attorney for the District of Washington, stating, in 
reply to an inquiry of this Department, that the question 
whether the Makab Indians came within the exemption of 
ction G of the act of Congre s of April 6, 1894, was not 
Ir nted or c n idered or determined by the court. 
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"I have now the honor to ask your opinion whethAr the 
said Indians are included within the prohibition of section 6 
of the act of .A.pril 6, 18941" 
The section of law referred to does not directly prohibit, . 
but provides that the foregoing sections, which do contain 
prohibitions, shall not apply to "Indians dwelling on the 
coast of the United States and taking fur seals in canoes or 
undecked boats propelled wholly by paddles, oars, or sails, 
and not transported by or used in connection with other ves-
sels, or manned by more than five persons, in the manner 
practiced by said Indians." Sealing by these particular 
coast Indians in the manner thus particularly described is 
excepted from the prohibitions of the foregoing sections. 
Section 6 then proceeds to say that "the exception made in 
this section shall not apply to Indians in the employment of 
other persons, or who shall kill, capture, or pursue seals out-
side of territorial waters under contract to deliver the skins 
to other persons, nor to the waters of Bering Sea or of the 
passes of the Aleutian Islands." Which means that not 
even in the manner described in the section can Indians take 
seals who are not acting for themselves, but are employees 
of others, or are under contract to deliver the skins to 
others, etc. 
Section 6 is, therefore, permissive rather than prohibitory; 
but I understand the question to be whether the Makah 
Indians can take seals in a manner not the one particularly 
described in section 6; in other words, whether the general 
prohibitions of the act apply to the Makah Indians or do not 
apply to them because they are Indians or Makah Indians, 
and not white persons. 
The two Governments of Great Britain and the United 
States adopted a treaty of arbitration, which resulted in an 
award. This award is to set out in full in the act of April 
6, 1894, entitled "An act to give effect to the award," etc. 
The award provides that the Governments "shall forbid 
their citizens and subjects, respectively," to kill, etc., within 
a certain zone, and "shall forbid their citizens and subjects, 
respectively," to kill, etc., at a certain time, in a certain part 
of the Pacific Ocean, inclusive of Bering Sea. .A.mong other 
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articles of the award set forth in the law, article 8 contains 
almost the identical words of section 6 of the law. 
Now, whil~ the word "subjects" is used in treaties and 
international awards chiefly because the inhabitants of mon-
archies are called subjects instead of citizens, and that word 
alone would not indicate that Indians were in the minds of 
the arbitrators; yet article 8 clearly shows that Indians were 
intended to be included among subjects in this particular 
award. That article expressly excepts or exempts coast 
Indians sealing in the particular manner described in sec-
tion 6 of the law, and the conclusion is irresistible that other 
Indians or Indians sealing in other manners were intended 
to be embraced among the subjects who were to be forbidden 
to kill, etc. 
So also, while Indians are not commonly understood to be 
embraced by laws of Congress, yet they may be, and often 
H,re, and whether they are or not is a question of intent. It 
can not be doubted that the intent here was to carry out the 
award, which we must presume Congress to have rightly 
understood. When, therefore, Congress passes a law pur-
porting to be for that purpose, using instead of the words 
"citizens and subjects" the words "citizen of the United 
States, or person owing the duty of obedience to the laws or 
trea,ties of the United States," Congress, in my opinion, in-
tended the same persons whom the award intended, includ-
ing Indians. 
There is nothing in the recent history of our Indians and 
their treatment by the Government which makes it improb-
able that Congress would regard them as owing the duty of 
obedience to a treaty between this country and Great Britain 
concerning international affairs, or obedience to the laws of 
the United States when intended to apply to them. On the 
contrary, all recent dealings between the Government and 
our Indians have been in accordance with the theory that 
they owe obedience to our laws as subjects and many of them 
a citizen . 
therefor an wer your question whether the Makah In-
dian are included within the prohibition of ection 6 of the 
a ·t f April 6, 1894, by saying that they are prohibited as 
o her P r on by the act generally, and that the only right 
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they can claim is tµat of sealing in the particular manner 
and places permitted in explicit terms by section 6 of the law 
to coast Indians generally. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
UNDATED BONDS.-
A bond accompanying a bid to build certain public works, duly signed, 
sealed, and delivered, the separate proposals constituting the bid and 
the bond being on printed blanks bound together and consecutively 
paged in print, is not sufficiently defective to be regarded as invalid 
because the date of the bid and bond are not inserted in .the blanks 
left for that purpose in printing the instrument. 
The date is no part of the substance of a sealed instrument, and need 
not necessarily be inserted. The real date is the time of its delivery, 
which may always be proved. 
In specific cases the Secretary of War is authorized to ·waive formal 
defects in bids and bonds in order to secure the public advantage 
resulting from competitive bidding. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 9, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to give my opinion as requested in 
your indorsernent, dated December 30 last, on the letter 
of John M. Wilson, colonel of Engineers, U.S. A., to Brig. 
Gen. William P. Craighill, Chief Engineer, U.S. A., upon the 
question '' whether the bond accompanying the bid inclosed 
is, in view of the terms of the specifications, sufficiently 
defective to reqmre me to regard the same as invalid." 
The bid inclosed is that of Hughes Bros. & Bangs for 
building "extension of breakwater and sand-catch pier at 
Buffalo, N. Y." The bond is "guaranty to accompany pro-
posal," signed and sealed by two persons, whose signatures 
are duly witnessed and who have executed affidavits 
indorsed thereon as to their property qualifications. The 
plans and specifications on which proposals are invited, 
the separate proposals constituting the bid, and the bond 
are all on printed blanks bound together and consecutively 
paged in pr.int, the bond being upon part of the same sheet 
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with the signatures of Hughes Bros. and Bangs to the pro-
posals, so that it is clear that the bid and guaranty were, 
when executed and delivered, mechanically and inseparably 
connected. 
The objections suggested to the sufficiency of the bond, as 
appears from the letter above mentioned, and from that of 
Thomas W. Symons, major, Corps of Engineers, to General 
Craighill, which you also send, are that the date of the bid 
and that of the bond . are not inserted iu the blanks left for 
that purpose in printing the instrument. The bond or guar-
anty undertakes "that if the bid of Hughes Bros. & Bangs, 
herewith accompanying, dated ---, 1896, for furnishing 
material and labor for extension of breakwater and sand-
catch pier at Buffalo, N. Y., be accepted * * * wj.thin 
sixty days from the date of the opening of proposals therefor, 
the said bidder will, within ten days after notice of such 
acceptance, enter into a contract with the proper officer of 
the United States," etc. 
In my opinion this bond is not sufficiently defective to 
require you to regard the same as invalid. On the contrary, 
I think the 6bligation is valid and binding, notwithstanding 
the failure to insert the dates above mentioned. The naming 
of the bidders, the proper designation of the work to be done, 
and the reference to the bid as accompanying the bond are 
quite sufficient to connect the undertaking with its subject; 
so that certainly, unless the same bidders during the year 
1896 made more than one bid for this identical work, the 
date of the bid, if inserted, would add nothing essential to 
the instrument, and its omission deprives it of nothing. 
It is well settled that the date is no part of the substance 
of a sealed instrument and not necessary to be inserted. The 
real date is the time of its delivery, which may always be 
proved (2 Johnson, 234; 20 N'. Y., 333). The fact which the 
letters mention, that the affidavits indorsed on the bond, 
being dated November 24, 1896, show it was signed before 
the bid it elf, which is dated November 28 1896 is therefore 
. ' ' entuely immaterial. If November 24 appeared on the face of 
the in trument a the date of its execution it would be per-
feely valid. ti often impracticable to p;ocure signatures 
to such bond before or at the time the proposal is signed, 
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and the mere dates of the bid and the bond are of no legal 
consequence since both take effect only at the time of deliv-
ery, and there is no reason why such a bond may not be 
exAcuted before the signing of the bid and entrusted to the 
bidder with authority to deliver it together with the bid. 
The Secretary of War is authorized (20 Stat., 36) to pre-
scribe rules and regulations for the preparation, submission, 
and opening of bids relating to his Department. He is 
authorized (22 Stat., 487) to require a written guaranty with 
each bid of the tenor and effect of the one now submitted. 
But it is entirely within his authority to waive informalities, 
and this has been done generally by Army Regulation, 639. 
He i8 also authorized in specific cases to waive formal 
defects in bids and bonds in order to secure the public 
ad vantage resurting from competitive bidding which it was 
the intention of Congress to secure, and which would often 
be lost by exacting strict compliance with all the formalities 
required (10 Opin., 140; 15 Opin., 226). 
Therefore, notwithstanding section 17 of the general 
instructions which accompany the invitations for proposals, 
which requires that "all blank spaces in the proposal and 
bond must be filled in," etc., you might disregard the failure 
to do so, even without "the right to * * * · waive any 
informality in the bids," reserved by section 22 of said 
instructions. 
I return herewith th_e papers submitted by you. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
CONTRACTS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
An act of Congress authorizing the Secretary of War to contract for the 
improvement of the Chicago River" as far as may be permitted by 
existing docks and wharves," confines the improvements within exist-
ing docks and wharves. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 11, 1897. 
Sm: I have your communication of January the 7th in 
which you recite the provision in the river and harbor act of 
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June 3, 1896, for the improvement of the Chicago River, 
which is as follows: 
"For improving the Chicago River, in Illinois, from its 
mouth to the stock yards on the South Branch, and to Bel-
mont avenue on the North Branch, as far as may be per-
mitted by existing docks and wharves, to be dredged to 
admit passage by vessels drawing sixteen feet of water, 
according to the recommendation of Captain W. L. Marshall, 
of the corps of Engineers of the United States Army, in his 
_ report under date of August ninth, eighteen hundred and 
ninety-three: Continuing improvement, fifty thousand dol-
lars: Provided, That contracts may be entered into by the 
Secretary of War for such materials and work as may be 
necessary to complete the said project of improvement, to be 
paid for as appropriations may from time to time be made by 
law, not to exceed in the aggregate six hundred and :fifty 
thousand dollars, exclusive of the amount herein and hereto-
fore appropriated." 
And also certain extracts from the report of Maj. ( then 
Capt.) W. L. Marshall, Corps of Engineers, dated August 
9, 1893. 
You request my opinion "as to whether, under the above 
quoted extract from the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, 
the authority of the Secretary of War to make contracts is 
confined to improvements within existing docks and wharves, 
or whether it also extends to making contracts for (1) dredg-
ing, for removing wharves and docks, and widening channel, 
(2) rebuilding wharves and docks in widened places, and (3) 
acquiring right of way in widened places." 
The language of the act of June 3, 1896, appears to be free 
from obscurity or ambiguity. It provides for improving the 
Chicago River "as far as may be permitted by existing docks 
and wharves." 
This certainly does not contemplate the removal of wharves 
or docks, or for the rebuilding of wharves or docks, or for 
"acquiring the right of way." 
The object of the act appears to be the improvement of the 
Chicago Riv r by dredging the ame "to admit passage by 
e 1 drawing ixteen feet of water." 
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Whatever may be involved in dredging the river to admit 
passage by vessels drawing sixteen feet of water, is embraced 
within the authority granted by the act; but I do not under-
stand the dredging of the river" so far as.may be permitted 
by existing docks and wharves" involves the removal of 
such docks and wharves, or the rebuilding of any docks and 




Acting A. ttorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
REVOCABLE LICENSE-ELLIS ISLAND. 
The Secretary of the Treasury may grant a license, revocable at his 
will, to use a portion of Ellis Island, an immigrant station, for the · 
purpose of erecting and maintaining an exhibiting hall and conduct-
ing a land and labor bureau. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 11, 1897. 
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of the opinion of 
the Solicitor of the Treasury of June 4, 1896, which, by your 
indorsement thereon, is ''referred to the .Attorney-General 
for an expression of opinion as to the right of the Secretary 
of the . Treasury to lease or license for a term of years the 
use of a portion of Ellis Island, an immigrant station, for 
the purpose of erecting and maintaining an exhibition hall 
and conducting a land and labor bureau, as recommended in 
the report of the Immigration Investigation Commission 
(pp. 46, 47)." 
I have carefully considered the opinion of the Solicitor of 
the Treasury, together with the letter to you of May 4, 1896, 
from Mr. Charles .A... Hess, arid the letter of May 4, 1896, 
from Mr. Hess to the Bon. Herman Stump, Commissioner of 
Immigration, with the indorsements thereon. 
I concur entirely in the conclusion reached by the Solicitor 
of the Treasury. 
Very respectfully, 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
.A.ctin_q Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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[N0TE.-The conclusion of the Solicitor of the Treasury 
was as follows: 
"I am of the opinion that he (Secretary of the Treasury) 
may, without violating any law or statute of the United 
States, grant to the company when organized a license to 
erect and maintain a building for the purposes proposed on 
Ellis Island, the license to be made revocable at the will of 
the Secretary." (See 21 Opin., 476).-E. 0. B.] 
BONDED WAREHOUSES FOR IMPORTED RICE-DUTIES. 
The act of March 24, 1874, chapter 65, concerning bonded warehouses for 
storag~ of imported rice is still in force. 
Warehousemen of importers' bonded warehouses for the storage and 
cleansing of imported rice intendecl for exportation to foreign coun-
tries may withdraw for consumption, instead of ·exporting, certain 
by-products resulting from the manufacture, viz, rice meal and 
broken rice. 
The duty on these by-products should be assessed upori. the proportion 
of uncleaned rice represented by these by-products, rather than on 
the latter themselves, regarded as an independent importation. 
DEP A.R'l'MEN'.r OF JUSTICE, 
January 21, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of December 14, asking an opinion with relation to the 
act of March 24, 187 4, chapter 65, concerning bonded ware-
houses for the storage of imported rice. This statute is as 
follows: 
" That from and after the passage of this act importers' 
bonded warehouses, to be used for the storage and cleasing 
of imported rice intended for exportation to foreign coun-
tries, may be established at any port of entry in the United 
States, under s.uch rules and regulations as the Secretary of 
the Treasury may prescribe." 
It appears that up to the present time no application has 
been made for the establishment of such a warehouse. The 
fir t que tion naturally arising i whether the statute is still 
in fore . I find no statute directly repealing it, and I think 
that it i not superseded by the tariff act of ugust 28, 1894, 
ch pter 3 9, ection 9, providing for bonded warehouse for 
manufacture iu whole or in part of imported materials. For 
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the cleasing of rice does not seem to be a process of manu-
facture within the meaning of our laws. (Junge v. Hedden, 
146 U. S., 233, 239; Patton v. United States, 159 U. S., 500; 
509, and cases cited.) 
It appears, however, that, besides the cleaned rice which 
is to be exported, there are certain by-products resulting 
from the manufacture which are of some commercial value, 
namely, rice meal and broken rice. The applicant desires 
the privilege, in case he shall establish bis propm,ed ware-
house, to withdraw these by-products for co'nsumption 
instead of exporting them; and your first question is whether 
thi~ may lawfully be done. I answer this question in the 
affirmative. Your power to prescribe rules and regulations 
for these warehouses is a wide one. It is certainly a very 
reasonable regulation that the by-products, which appar-
ently are not sufficiently valuable to warrant their exporta-
tion, should be utilized, and not wasted. If it had been 
intended by Congress that the regulations should prohibit 
the withdrawal for consumption of any such by-products, I 
think that it would have said so, as in Revised Statutes, sec-
tion 3433. 
Your second question relates to the rate of duty which 
should be assessed upon. these by-products. You say: 
"Would the by-products, such as broken rice and rice 
meal, withdrawn for consumption, be dutiable as such, or 
should the duty be assessed on the quantity of imported 
uncleaned rice consumed in the product.ion of the by-
products'" 
I am supplied by the applicant with figures from which it 
would appear that there is very little waste in this cleansing 
process. From 1,000 pounds of uncleaned rice of average 
quality there is a waste of 25 pounds, while there results 
800 pounds of cleaned rice and 175 pounds of by-products. 
The duty on the uncleaned rice imported is eight-tenths of a 
cent a pound, while the duty on the by-products when 
imported is one-fourth of a cent a pound. 
Such analqgies as exist would indicate an intent in Con-
gress that the duty exacted upon the by-products when 
withdrawn for consumption u:~.der your proposed regulations 
should be assessed upon the proportion of uncleaned rice 
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represented by these by-products (rather than on the latter 
themselves regarded as an independent importation). This 
view is confirmed by an examination of the general pro-
visions of law relating to warehoused goods. Section 2983 
of the Revised Statutes provides that in no case shall there 
be any abatement of the duties made for any deterioration 
in the warehoused merchandise. From the Government's 
point of view a change in condition from that of uncleaned 
rice to that of one of these by-products is a deterioration. 
Answering your second question, therefore, it is my opin-
ion that the duties imposed should be at the rate of eight-
tenths of a cent per pound. 
Very respectfully, 
EDWARD B. WHITNEY, 
.Acting .Att(!rney-General. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
LEASE OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY-ELLIS ISLAND. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to lease for a term of years, 
or for any length of time, the property of the Government placed in 
his charge without express authority of'law, though he may license 
the use thereof. 
He has no authority to lease any part of Ellis Island. 
He has power under section 9 of the act of March 3, 1893, to grant 
exclusive privileges in connection with Ellis Island immigrant 
station, after public competition, subject to such limitations and con-
clitions as he may prescribe. 
There can not strictly be a lease of a use. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 25, 1897. 
SIR: In response to a request made through the Hon. 
Herman Stump, Commissioner-General of Immigration, of 
J auuary 20, 1897, I beg to supplement the opinion of Janu-
ary 11, 1897, heretofore forwarded to you in response to your 
indorsement of January 7 on the opinion of the Solicitor of 
the Treasury. Thi indorsement referred the opinion of the 
olicitor to me "for an expre sion of opinion as to the right 
of the er tary of the Treasury to lease or license, for a 
t rm of Y r , tll u e of a portion of Ellis Island, an immi-
gr nt tation, for the purpose of erecting and maintaining 
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an exhibition hall and conducting a'i land and labor bureau, as 
recommended in the report of the Immigration and InvestL 
gation Committee (pp. 46 and 4 7)." 
The Solicitor of the Treasury concludes his lengthy opinion 
with the statement: 
"I am of the opinion that he (Secretary of the Treasury) 
may, without violating any law or statute of the United 
States, grant to the company when organized a license to 
erect and maintain a building for the purposes proposed on 
Ellis Island, the license to be made revocable at the will of 
the Secretary." · 
I confined the expression of my former opinion to a con-
currence in the conclusions reached by the Solicitor of the 
Treasury, which meant no more than that the Secretary of 
the Treasury had the lawful authority to grant to any one a 
license to use the property for the purpose indicated. 
I purposely limited the expression of my opinion to the 
matter of license, because the opinion of the Solicitor of the 
~rreasu·ry went no further, and because the language of your 
indorsement seemed necessarily to contemplate a license, 
although the word "leased" was used. It speaks of the 
right "to lease or license for a term of years the use of a 
portion of Ellis Island." 
There can not strictly be the lease of a use. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has not the power to lease 
for a term of years, or for any length of time, the property 
of the Government placed in his charge without express 
authority of law therefor; and no such authority exists 
under which he can ]ease any part of Ellis Island. 
Section 3749, Revised Statutes, authorizes the Solicitor of 
the Treasury, with the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, to lease or sen a certain class of lands belonging to 
the United States. 
And section 3208, Revised Statutes, authorizes the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, to "sell and dispose of" another 
class oflands belonging to the United States. 
And paragraph 4 of the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 377, 
Sup. Rev. Stat., p. 251), authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to lease, at his discretion, for a period not exceed-
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ing five years, "such unoccupied and unproductive property 
of the United States under his · control for the leasing of 
which there is no authority under existing laws." 
But under none of these provisions of the statutes can 
authority be found for the Secretary of the Treasury to 
le~se any part of Ellis Island. which is both productive and 
occupied. 
Section 9 of the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stats., 569), con-
fers upon the Secretary of the Treasury the power to grant 
exclusive privileges in connection with Ellis Island immi-
grant station, after public competition, subject to such con-




The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-STATE BONDS. 
Under section 356 of the Revised Statutes the head of an executive 
department is authorized to require the opinion of the Attorney-
General only on questions arising in the administration of his 
department. 
As a recourse to law on the part of the Secretary of the Treasury for 
the settlement · and collection of certain bonds made and issued by 
certain States and owned by the United States would involve the 
very grave act of suing States, and as Congress has had this question 
repeatedly before it and has not directed such a course, the Secretary 
of the Treasury should not institute any suit. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
January 25, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of December 16, 1896, in which, after setting out that 
the United tates is the owner of certain bonds made and 
i ued by the States of Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North 
arolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, aggre-
gating 2,07 ,466.66~, you request an opinion "as to what 
legal pro e ding. may be taken, if any, by the Secretary of 
th Trea ury, or the Trea ury Department, under existing 
1 i 1 tion, for the ettlement or collection of these bond ; 
and if ny u h pow r hould exi t, how the ame may be 
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exercised; and if no such power or authority should be 
found to belong to the Secretary of the Treasury, or the 
Treasury Department, in whom, then, if in any, does such 
power or authority reside, and how may the same be exer-
cised'" ' 
I shall confine my answer to that portion of your inquiry 
which relate·s to the power of your Department and its exer-
cise, inasmuch as under section 356 of the Revised Statutes 
the head of an executive department is authorized to 
require the opinion of the Attorney-General only on ques-
tions arising in the administration of his department. 
There is no act authorizing you to compromise this _indebt-
edness. 
The first step toward enforcing the payment or these 
bonds would be a suit by the United States to recover judg-
ment against the several States. 
Assuming that such a suit . could be maintained in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, under the authority of 
United States v. Texas (143 U. S., 621), the inquiry arises 
whether or not you have the authority, or having it, should 
fastitute such a suit. · · 
As appears by your letter, all of these bonds were formerly 
in the Indian trust fund, except $538,000, bonds of the 
State of Arkansas, which were received from the Smith-
sonian Institution. 
The question of the collection of these bonds has been 
repeatedly before the Interior and Treasury Departments 
and Congress. 
Jn December, 1867,Attorney-General Stanbery, in a report 
made to Congress concerning certain of these bonds, said: 
'' I am at a loss to suggest any specific measure for further 
security in respect to these bondsA But it may happen that 
the indebted States and corporations may offer propositions 
for compromise favorable to the bondholders, and Congress 
may deem it expedient to give the Secretary of the Interior 
or the Secretary of the Treasury authority to entertain, and, 
in the exercise of a proper discretion, to agree to such 
propositions." (Ex. Doc. 59, H. R., 40th Cong., 2d sess.) 
On May 28, 1885, the Treasurer of the United States 
asked the Secretary of the Interior, the trustee of the 
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Indian fund, for in tructions in reference to the collection of 
the unpaid principal and interest of the bonds then belong-
ing to the Indian trust fund. On August 7, 1885, Secretary 
Lamar, reviewing the opinion of Attorney-General Stan-
bery, replied, saying that he did "not consider it necessary 
or proper that any further means should be attempted with 
reference to the collection of the unpaid principal and 
interest of the bonds under consideration until appropriate 
legislation therefor shall have been enacted by Congress." 
The report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1886, calls attention to the necessity 
for legislative action, as follows: 
"The bonds held by this office should receive the serious 
attention of the legislative power, the greater part of these 
bonds having been lying in the vaults of the Treasury, pay-
ing no interest save such as may have been sequestered from 
sums due the respective defaulting States, notwithstanding 
that these States have in great part compromised with their -
creditors, and are now paying interest on a part of the whole 
of their debt." 
House bill 6913, Fifty-third Congress, page 59, contained 
the following provision : 
" The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed 
to sell and dispose of said bonds, with the accumulated 
interest thereon, at the best price that can be realized for 
the same, and to that end he shall at once advertise for thirty 
days, inviting sealed proposals, and shall accept only such 
bids as may equal or exceed the face value of the principal 
of such bonds as the bidder proposes to buy." 
This was stricken from the bill as enacted. 
Congress bas annually appropriated for the payment of 
the interest on this trust fund. 
In 1870 Congress passed an act which, as section 3481 of 
the Revised Statutes, is as follows: 
"Whenever any State is in default in the payment of 
interest or principal on investments in stocks or bond 
i ued or guaranteed by such State and held by the United 
tate in tru t the Secretary of the Treasury shall retain the 
whol , or o mu h thereof a may be nece sary, of any 
mon Y du n any a ·count from the nited State to such 
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State, and apply the same to the payment of such principal 
and interest, or either, or to the reimbursement, with interest 
thereon, of moneys advanced by the United States on account 
of interest due on such stocks or bonds." 
This is the only legislation that I know of looking to the 
collection of these bonds. I :find no general statute making 
it your duty to sue on this class of claims. 
As a recourse to law on your part would involve the very 
grave act of suing States, and as Congress has had this 
question repeatedly before it and has not directed such a 
proceeding, I am of the opinion that you should not insti-
tute any suit. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CHINESE CERTIFICATES. 
Certificates presented by Chinese persons as evidence of their right to 
E:nter this country for the first time, conformably to the provisions of 
section 6 of the act of July 5, 1884, signed by a Chinese consul-gen-
eral within the United States, are not entitled to be treated as made 
by the Chinese Government within the meaning of the said act, not-
withstanding the fact that the Chinese minister had by letter com-
municated to the Secretary of State the information that his Govern-
ment had "authorized the consuls of China in foreign countries to 
issue" such certificates. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 2, 1897. 
SIR: I have your letter of the 16th~ultimo, asking my 
opinion upon the following facts stated : 
"On the 30th ultimo, the collector of customs at San Fran-
cisco transmitted to the Department certificates which had 
been transmitted to him by three Chinese persons as evidence 
of their right to enter this country for the first time, conform-
ably to the provisions of section 6 of the act approved July 
5, 1884. (Stat. L., vol. 23, p. 115.) The certificates were 
signed by the Chinese consul-general at San Francisco, and 
bore the seal and vise of the United States consul at Hong-
kong, as required by said act. The collector refused per-
mission to land to the holders of the certificates, it being held 
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by him that such papers, issued to residents of Ohina by a 
Chinese consular officer in this country, did not constitute a 
compliance with the requirements of the act cited above. 
Exception to his action having been taken by the attorney 
for the Chinese persons named in the certificates, the col-
lector requests instructions in the premises." 
It appears from the inclosures of your letter that the Chi-
nese in question started from Canton to come to the United 
States, going by way of the British island of Hongkong. 
No explanation is afforded of the absence of a certificate 
issued at Canton or Hongkong. 
Your letter is accompanied by an opinion by the solicitor 
of the Treasury to the effect that, the Chinese minister hav-
ing, by letter of June 2, 1891, communicated to the Secretary 
of State the information that his Government had "author-
ized the consuls of China in foreign countries to issue" such 
certificates, and this being a "foreign country" ( or '' other 
country," as it is put by the Secretary of the Treasury in 
acknowledging a copy of the minister's letter,) the consul-
general at San Francisco has been authorized to issue them. 
The communication from the minister is quoted, and makes 
the general statement that Chinese consuls in foreign coun-
tries have been authorized to grant such certificates ; but if 
the-authorization is so expressed, I can not attribute to the 
Chinese Government ignorance or disregard of the very rea-
sonable principle that what is within the letter is not within 
the law if not within the intent. It could not well have been 
intended by a decree of authorization so worded that the 
Chinese consul in Japan should certify to the characteris-
tics, etc., of a person about to depart from Siam for the United 
States; still less that the Chinese consuls in the United 
States should certify to the characteristics, etc., of persons 
about to depart from any other country than the United 
State to go to the United States. Neither is it necessary 
to presume that the Chinese consul-general at San Fran-
ci co ha been authorized to act because he has acted. As 
he i not a })lenipotentiary diplomatic representative of China, 
but merely a con ul, and a the general laws and custom 
r lating t con ul d not impo e upon him the duty of mak-
ing u h r ificat , no pre umption arises that he bas 
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authority to make them, and there is no evidence of such 
authority with respect to persons leaving Ohina for the 
United States. 
It is not my province to inquire into matters of fact. So 
far as you have presented the facts, they do not, in my opin-
ion, show the certificates in question to be entitled to be 
treated as made by the Chinese Government within the mean-
ing of section 6 of the act of Congress of July 5, 1884. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
DESERTING SEAMEN. 
Section 4598 of the Revised Statutes does not apply to a seaman, en-
gaged in the coastwise trade of the United States, shipped before a 
shipping commissioner, who may have signed a contract to perform a 
voyage and then absented himself from the vessel without leave from 
the proper officer, unless he contracted with a vessel of the burden of 
fifty tons or upward, required by section 4520 of the Revised Statutes 
to have formal contracts witµ their seamen. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 2, 1897. 
Srn: I have your letter of the 21st ultimo, aski~g my 
opinion upon the question whether section 4598 of the 
Revised Statutes "applies to a seaman engaged in the coast-
wise trade of the United States, shipped before a shipping 
commissioner, if he shall have signed a contract to perform 
a voyage and shall absent himself from the vessel without 
leave from the proper officer." 
The section mentioned occurs under the general title of' 
"merchant seamen," and is found to contain provisions con-
cerning the summary treatment of a deserting seaman "who 
shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage." He is to 
be brought before any justice of the peace upon complaint 
of the master, and ''if it then appears that he has signed a 
contract within the intent and meaning of this Title, and that 
the v9yage agreed for is not :finished or altered or the con-
tract otherwise dissolved," etc., the justice shall commit him 
to jail, to remain until the vessel shall be ready to proceed on 
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her voyage or the master shall require his discharge, and 
then to be delivered to the master. 
This approaches the enforcement of "involuntary servi-
tude," but has been held not to be unconstitutional. See 
Robertson et a,l. v. U. S., and Barry Baldwin, U. S. Sup. Ct.; 
not yet reported. 
I do not find in "this Title" a definition of contract, and 
therefore understand the words '' a contract within the intent 
and meaning of this Title" to refer to the particular contracts 
the forms and ceremonies of which are fully set forth in the 
Title. (Rev. Stat., 4511, 4512, 4520.) This interpretation 
seems to be the more reasonable because such a formal con-
tract, "in writing or in print," containing certain particulars 
about the nature and duration of ·the voyage, the time at 
which the seaman is to be on board, etc., etc., might well be 
used before the justice of the peace in a summary proceeding; 
but that magistrate might find much difficulty in dealing 
summarily with mere oral or informal agreements. 
By the act of June 19, 1886, section 2, it is provided that 
shipping commissioners may ship and discharge crews for 
any vessel engaged in the coastwise trade, trade with Canada, 
Newfoundland, Mexico, etc., at the request of the master or 
owner, the fees to be one-half those prescribed by Rev. Stat., 
4612. It will be observed that, unlike the contracts required 
by Rev. Stat., 4511, etc., these contracts are wholly optional. 
From this section 2, and from the terms of Rev. Stat., 
4511, itself, it is clear that the contracts covered by the lat-
ter are required only of masters of vessels bound from a 
port in the United States to any foreign port, except British 
American, Mexican, etc., and not of masters of vessels 
engaged in the coastwise trade. 
By act of ugust 19, 1890, it is provided that when a crew 
is shipped by a shipping commissioner for any vessel engaged 
in the coastwise, British American, etc., trades, as authorized 
by, ection 2 of the act of June 19, 1886, an agreement shall 
be made in the same manner and form as is provided by 
v. tat., 4511 and 4512, and the law makes the provisions 
f Rev. tat., 522, an<l numerou other sections of Title 
Iel' ·hant am n, including ection 4598, the one now in 
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question, extend to and embrace such vessels in the coast-
wise trade, etc., where their crews have been shipped by a 
shipping commissioner, '' to the same extent and with the 
same effect as if said vessels had been mentioned and 
embraced in the language and terms of said sections." 
On February 18, 1895, an act was passed entitled an act 
to amend the last-named act, providing that said act" is 
hereby amended so as to read as follows:" 
Then come the provisions that when a crew is shipped by 
a shipping commissioner for any vessel in the coastwise trade, 
etc., as authorized by the act of June 19, 1886, an agreement 
shall be made as provided by Rev. Stat., 4511 and 4512, 
except the sixth,- seventh, and eighth items of section 4511; 
that such seamen shall be discharged and receive their 
wages as provided in clause 1 of Rev·. Stat., 4529, and also -
by sections 4526, 4527, etc., etc., mentioning numerous sec-
tions of Title "Merchant seamen,'' but not mentioning sec-
tion 4598, now in question; and the law further requires 
that "in all other respects such shipment of seamen and 
such shipping agreement shall be regarded as if both ship-
ment .and agreement had been entered into between the mas-
ter of a vessel and a seaman without going· before a shipping 
commissioner." 
The last clause above quoted seems to refer to the unwrit-
ten or informal agreements customary with such vessels, and 
alluded to in Rev. Stat., 4513. 
The form and manner of amendment here used leave no 
doubt that the provision of the act extending section ·4593 to 
coastwise vessels is repealed; that is to say, that the new 
law is intended to be substituted for and wholly supplant 
the old. Without the express extension, thus repealed, sec-
tion 4598 seems not to have included coastwise vessels, 
because, as already said, the masters of those vessels did 
not enter into "a contract within the intent and meaning of 
this Title." 
Under the latest law contracts which may but are not 
required to be made as provided in cases under " this Title" 
of the Revised Statutes are not contracts of the same class, 
but a new class made in part only under the provisions of 
Rev. Stat., 4511. 
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I have already suggested that · the phrase "a contract 
within the intent and meaning of tbis Title" seems to refer to 
contracts the formalities of which are fully prescribed under 
the Title" Merchant seamen" in the Revised Statutes. There 
are two kinds of such contracts, one concerning foreign-
going· vessels, and the other concerning vessels " of tlle bur-
den of 50 tons or upward bound from a port in one State to a 
port in any other than an adjoining State, except vessels of 
the burden of 75 tons or upward bound from a port on the 
Atlantic to a port on the Pacific, or vice versa." (Rev. Stat., 
4520-4523.) Other shipping contracts are mentioned under 
"this rritle," so that the phrase "a contract within the intent 
and meaning of this Title" is not clear and might possibly 
mean any shipping contract; but I do not think it does, for 
this reason, in addition to those already given, viz: That 
section 4598, as originally enacted, July 20, 1790, did not 
have that meaning, but the one which I now attribute to it. 
An examination of the act of July 20, 1790, shows that what 
is now Rev. Stat., 4598, referred to formal contracts in writ-
ing or in print, required by section 1 to be entered into by 
every master of a ship bound "to any foreign port, or of 
any ship or vessel of the burden of 50 tons or upward bound 
from a port in one State to a port in any other than an 
adjoining State.'' Voyages to and from the Pacific were not 
considered at that date. The words" this Title" have been 
substituted in the revision for "thh; act" in the original law. 
I therefore answer yo~r question in the negative, with the 
explanation that section 4598 does apply to vessels of the 
burden of 50 tons or upward, required by Rev. Stat., 4520, 
to have formal contracts with their seamen. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRE'.rARY OF THE TREASURY . 
RTHER PACIFIC RAILROAD LA~D GRANT. 
The 1Torthnn Pacitic J ailroad 'ompany, having omplet d and put jn 
P ra.tiou th railroad :lnd telerrraph lines authoriz d by the a ·t of 
,July 2, 18 1 the condition of th grant to said ompany of · rtaiu 
l: 11<18 111 ntion d ju saicl act ha. be n fully perfoTmed, and the right 
t hav ' h la111l pt 11 t <l wits 11 rt •t i 11 sa,id ('Ompauy. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 48 7 
Nortliern Pacific Railroad Land Grant. 
By its consent to the issuing of bonds, secured by mortgage on the rail-
way and telegraph lines, Congress necessarily consented to their 
transfer to the purchaser in case of foreclosure, who, however, by 
operation of law, whether a natural or artificial person, and, if the 
latter, no matter how or by what authority created, would take the 
property subject to all the continuing rights of the Federal Govern-
ment, just as the original company held it. 
The mortg.ages issued by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company having 
been foreclosed, and all of the property, rights, and franchises of the 
company sold at judicial sale to the Northern Pacific Railway Com-
pany, a Wisconsin corporation, and the latter having asked for the 
patenting to it, or to purchasers from it, of certain lands granted by 
the act of 1864, the Secretary of the Interior is not justified in refusing 
to issue such patentti, but should act upon applications of the railway 
company for patents upon _the same considerations which would 
govern in case there· had been no foreclosure and the applications 
were made by the railroad company. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 6, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 
29th ultimo, with which you transmitted, for my considera-
tion, communications addressed to you, "with respect to the 
propriety of issuing patents to the Northern Pacific Rail way 
Oompany." 
Following the settled practice of the Attorneys-General, I 
might refuse the opinion requested, because you do not state 
the points you· wish to submit, but leave them to be gathered 
from the communications, which are somewhat voluminous. 
As, however, your letter shows that you require my opinion 
for your guidance in the discharge of official duties, and that 
both public and private interests require that it should be 
promptly given, I answer your question as it is put, which is 
as follows: 
"I, therefore, request that you will, at your earliest con-
venience, advise me whether or not I am justified in with-
holding patents from the Northern Pacific Railway Company 
on the grounds urged in the communication." 
The act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stats., 365), created the North-
ern Pacific Railroad Company, and authorized it to construct 
a railroad and telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget 
Sound. For the purpose of aiding the construction of such 
railroad and telegraph line, and ''to secure· the safe and 
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speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war, 
and public stores over the route of said line of railway," cer-
tain lands were _granted to said company, its successors and 
assigns (sec. 3). For these lands patents were to be issued as 
the lines should be completed, in sections of twenty-five 
miles each, "in a good, substantial, and workmanlike man-_ 
ner," as found and reported by commissioners (sec. 4). The 
road was to be a post route and military road, subject to the 
use of the United States, and also subject to such regula-
tions as Congress may impose concerning charges for Gov-
ernment transportation (sec.11). 
Section 10 forbade the issue of " mortgage or construction 
bonds," except by the consent of Congress; but on March 1, 
1869 (15 Stats., 346), such consent was given to the issue of 
bonds, secured by mortgage upon the railroad and telegraph 
lines, for the purpose of raising funds with which to construct 
the same. On May 31, 1870 (16 Stats., 378), consent was again 
given. Bonds were accordingly issued and secured by mort-
gage, with the proceeds of which the railroad and telegraph 
lines were finally completed and put in operation. 
The act of August 7, 1888 (25 Stats., 382), requiring all com-
panies which the Government had aided to construct railroad 
and telegraph lines thereafter to maintain and operate their 
telegraph lines "and exercise by themselves alone all the 
telegraph franchises conferred upon them and obligations 
assumed by them," applied to the Northern Pacific as well as 
to other companies, but it has no bearing on the present 
question. Its only object was to prevent the transfer of the 
telegraphic business of such companies to other companies. 
Congress has by none of the acts or resolutions above 
named in anywise waived or relinquished the rights reserved 
by the original act, save in so far as such waiver or relin-
qui hment results from the consent to the issue of bonds and 
the execution of mortgages. 
In 1896 the mortgage so issued were foreclosed and all the 
~ro~ . rty, right , and franchises of the company were sold at 
Judicial ale to th orthern Pacific Railway Company, a 
n in orpor tion, which purcha er ha entered into 
pm~se~;si n and ·1aim owner hip of the railroad and tele-
liu '· , land , anu prop rty of th orth rn Pacific 
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Railroad Company. It is ·stated that the real purchasers 
were bondholders and creditors of the old company, who 
have incorporated as the new company; but this, if true, 
appears to me to have no legal effect whatever. 
It is asserted that the new company, by taking possession 
of the property of the old one and operating its lines under 
the Wisconsin charter, has abandoned and repudiated the 
act of July 2, 1864, by which the Government's rights were 
reserved and secured and the grant of lands was made, and 
has thereby forfeited all right to such lands. 
A copy of Senate Resolution 124, Fifty-fourth Congress, 
first session, is attached to one of the comm"(\nications, which 
resolution, it is averred, was drawn and urged for passage 
by the parties interested in the purchase at foreclosure as 
aforesaid, but Congress refused to pass it. This merely 
serves to show that the desire of the purchasers was to have 
a Federal charter for the new company and that they resorted 
to the State charter only upon their failure to secure one 
from Congress. Although the joint resolution of 1870, supra, 
authorized a1 mortgage on all the property of the company. 
'' including its franchise as a corporation," the counsel in 
charge of the reorganization were certainly justified under 
the decisions in ad vising a new act of incorporation, instead 
of endeavoring to work out a transfer of the corporate exist-
ence of the old company to the new one through the fore-
closure proceedings. 
It is not suggested that the new company bas, iD: fact, in 
anywise dehied or repudiated, or threatened to deny or repu-
diate, its obligations to perform all the duties and fulfill all 
the obligations imposed by the original act. Such repudia-
tion is charged only as a legal consequence of the succession 
of the new corporation to the old. 
The new company ·having asked for the patenting to it, or 
to purchasers from it, of certain lands granted by the act of 
1864, objection is made by the communications aforesaid to 
your issuing such patents. The reasons are, in a word, that, 
as the Government has lost, as against the new company, the 
rights which it reserved against the old one in consideration 
of which the lands were granted, its obligation to patent the 
remainder of the lands covered by the grant has also ceased. 
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I deem it unnec sary t o follow in detail the numerous and 
highly technical arguments filed with you in support of the 
above objection , because they appear to me to have no bear-
ing on the que t.ion to be an swered. The consideration for 
the grant of lands was the construction and maintenance of 
a railroad anrl telegraph line across the continent, iD: which 
enterprise the Government had au interest on its own behalf 
as well as on that of its.citizens. These lines h ave long since 
been completed and in operation. The condition of the grant, 
therefore, has been fully performed and t he right to have 
the lands patented was perfect in the old company. (See 
section 4 of original act, above cited.) I find no further con-
dition in any of the laws that the right to the lands, when 
so perfected by the completion of the enterprise, would be 
lost by denial or attempted denial to the Government of any 
of its continuing rights in or to the property. Congress con-
tented itself with reserving such rights without making their 
unquestioned enjoyment a condition of forfeiture of the lands 
granted. 
By its consent to the issuing of bonds secured by mortgage 
on the railway and telegraph lines Congress necessarily con-
sented to their transfer to the purchaser in case of foreclosure, 
who, however, by operation of faw, whether a natural or 
artificial person, and, if tbe latter, no matter bow or by what 
authority created, would take the property subject to all the 
. continuing rights of the Federal Government just as the 
· original company held it. · I know of no reason why the Gov-
ernment may not enforce all the rights reserved to it by the 
particular laws in question, or those which it bas generally 
with respect to post routes and interstate commerce, quite 
as well against the State corporation which now owns and 
operates the property as it could have done against the old 
company. Certainly in its assent to the· mortgages Congress 
made no conditions as to the corporate character of the pur-
chaser in ca e of foreclosure. 
In hort, the argument pre ented to you is that tlte com-
pany which now applie for the patents has no right to them, 
b ·au: th ' overnment h , s lo t, a against it the right in 
~011. id r, tion of whi ·hit ranted th lands. The argument 
1 uu, und f r t, o r a u. · : ir,'t th premi i not true, 
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and second, if it wer tm , tu re nlt 
the reasons gi en ab v . The ri ht of th ol m1 t n 
the lands granted, which wa p rfe ted b th compl ti n 
its lines, pa ed to the pur ha er under:£ r lo ur o , 11 it 
property and right . The e land were alr ady full, 
They were subject to no condition ub · q_uent. 
My opinion is that you are not ju tified in refu inO' to 
issue patents to the orthern Pacific Railway Company for 
tlle reasons stated in the communications submitted to me, 
but that you should act upon applications for patents by the 
new company upon exactly the same considerations which 
would govern you in case there had been no foreclosure and 
tbe applications were made by the old company. 
Respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ARMY OFFICERS. 
The President has authority to assign enlisted men of the Army, who 
have. passed the examination as candidates for commissions, to vacan-
cies that may exist in any corps or arm of the service in which they 
have been commissioned, notwithstanding the fact that additional 
lieutenants remain in other corps u·nassigned. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
February 9, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 
5th instant, in which you request my opinion as to the 
"authority of the President to assign enlisted men who 
have passed tbe examination as candidates for commissions 
to vacancies that may exist in any corps of the line of the 
Army while additional second lieutenants· remain in other 
corps unassigned." 
You refer me to the opinion of Acting Attorney-General 
Maury (20 Opin., 149), in which somewhat the same question 
was considered. 
Under existing statutes commissions as second lieutenants 
are conferred upon graduates of the United States Military 
Academy and upon such enlisted men as may satisfactorily 
pass tbe examinations provided for in the act of July BO, 
1892 (27 Stat., 336), which provides: . 
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' E . ' . That h a an ie in the grade of second lieu-
t nant, h r t fi r fill d by the promotion of meritorious 
non mmi ion d ffi r of the Army, under the provisio~s 
of ection f the a t approved June 18, 1878, shall be filled 
by th appointm nt of competitors favorably recommended 
under tbi a t, in the order of merit established by the final 
e, amination." · 
By act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 562), it was provided: 
"And hereafter all appointments in t.he line of the Army 
shall be by commission in an arm of the service and not by 
commis ion in any particular regiment." 
A commission is not conferred upon one as a second lieuten-
ant in the line of the Army generally, but only as a second 
lieutenant in the infantry, cavalry, or artillery arm, or in the 
engineer or ordnance, or other corps of the Army. 
By act of May 17, 1886 (24 Stat., 50), a graduate of the 
United States Military Academy" may be promoted and com-
missioned as a second lieutenant in any arm or corps of the 
Army in which there may be a vacancy and the duties of 
which he may have been judged competent to_ perforrn." 
This act further provides that-
" In case there shall not, at the time, be a vacancy in such 
arm or corps, he may, at the discretion of the President, be 
promoted and commissioned in it as an additional second 
lieutenant, with the usual pay and allowances of a second 
lieutenant until a vacancy shall happen." 
So that not only is the graduate commissioned in some 
specific arm or corps of the Army, "tlle duties of which he 
may have been judged competent to perform," but if at the 
time of his graduation no vacancy exists in the arm or corps 
for which he may have been judged competent, then the 
President is authorized to commission him in such arm or 
corp · as an additional second lieutenant. 
No authority is given the President to assign an officer 
wh~ ha been commissioned in one arm or corps of the_ Army 
t fi_ll a vacancy in any other arm or corps of the Army the 
duti ,· of ':hich he has not been judged competent to perform. 
The nh, t d men who, und r the provi ions of the act of 
,July 30 1 92, have be n '' favorably recommend d" to fill 
h ' . . • 
' au 1 • 111 tb Ta 1 of ond 1i ut nant heretofore 
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filled by the promotion of meritorious noncommissioned offi-
cers of the Army" are commissioned under the act of Octo-
ber 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 561), "in an arm of the service." 
Non commissioned officers, under section 1214, Revised Stat~ 
utes, were "eligible for appointment as second lieutenants in 
any corps of the line for which they may be found so quali-
fied. If there be no vacancy in such corps, any noncommis-
sioned officer so found qualified for a commission therein 
may be attached to i_t by the President as a supernumerary 
officer by brevet of second lieutenant, subject to the pro-
visions of section 1215." 
So that, as to both graduates of the United States Military 
1 Academy and enlisted men favorably recommended for pro-
motion, the like provision applied, i.e., they were each com-
missioned in the arm or corps of the Army for which they 
were found to be severally qualified. And the President was 
not authorized to assign them to any other arm or corps, but 
was required to attach them to the arm or corps in which they 
were commissioned as "additional" or "supernumerary" 
lieutenants. 
The law governing promotions in the Army (Rev. Stats., 
sec. 1204) provides: 
"Promotions in the line shall be made through the whole 
Army in its several lines of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, 
respectively." 
So, too, as to transfers. The act of October 1, 1890, provides: 
"SEC. 2. That officers of grades in each arm of the service 
shall be assigned to regiments and transferred from one regi-
ment to another as the interests of the service may require 
by order from the War Department." 
It appears, then, that throughout the whole structure of 
the Army and the scheme of its organization the principle 
prevails of keeping separate and distinct the several arms 
and corps of which the Army is constituted, of confining 
promotions and transfers of officers to the arm or corps in 
which such officer is commissioned. And while authority is 
expressly given to the President to assign or attach candi-
dates for commissions in the Army whether graduates of 
the United States Military Academ; or enlisted men favor-
ably recommended for commission, such authority is in every 
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ca e limited to the assignment of t hese persons to the arm or 
corps of the Army in which they have been found qualified 
to serve. 
Keeping in view, then, the language of the statutes, their 
spirit, purpose, and intent, as manifested by past legislation 
and by the course of policy pursued since the foundation of 
the Military Academy at West Point, I am of opinion that 
the President has authority to assign enlisted men who have 
passed the examination as candidates for commissions to 
vacancies that may exist in any corps or arm of the service 
in which they have been commissioned, notwithstanding the 







The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R. 
REMITTANCE OF FORFEITURE OF RECOGNIZANCE. 
Outsicle of the District of Columbia the President h as no power to remit 
the forfeiture of a juugment on a recognizance. 
The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States, which 
includes judgments on recognizances, is vested by la win the Secretary 
of the Treasury with respect to all claims save those arising under the 
postal laws. 
DEP .A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
February 11, 1897. 
SrR: Pursuant to the reference, dated the 8th instant, 
indorsed on the application made to you for remittance of 
forfeiture of judgment on recognizance iu United States v. 
Neilcirlc et al., I have the honor to give my opinion on the 
que tion whether you have the power in the premises. 
In United Statesv. Ooolcendorfer (5 Cranch C. 0.,113), which 
ha been ited to you, it was held that" after the term in 
whi ha r cognizance has been forfeited in a criminal case 
the court an 11ot remit the forfeiture but the President of 
th nit d t t ·anund ra t f Co~gre sof June 17, 1812.' 
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But that case arose in the District of Columbia, to which the 
operation of the act cited was expressly limited (2 Stats., p. 
752). There is no statute giving the President power to 
remit forfeitures elsewhere; and his power to pardon offenses 
does not include the right to remit forfeitures (10 Opin., 
452; 11 Opin., 124). 
The power to compromise claims in favor of the United 
States, which include judgments on recognizance, is vested 
by law in the Secretary of the Treasury, who may act upon 
the report of the district attorney, special agent, or the 
Solicitor of the Treasury with respect to all claims save those 
arising under the postal laws (Rev. Stat., 3469). He may, of 
course1 compromise claims for a nominal consideration when 
the circumstances justify such a course, but neither he nor 
any other officer, save the President with respect to forfeited 
recognizance in the District of Columbia only, bas power to 
remit or waive judgments on forfeited bonds. 
As the application before you relates to a judgment in the 
district of Kentucky, my opinion is that you have no power 





Where, by act of Congress, the Secretary of War was authorized and 
directed to contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power 
Company for the purchase of a certain gun carriage, without adver-
tising, and in the same act a specific sum of money was appropriated 
for the purpose of procuring such gun, and no express or implied 
authority was given by the act to bind the Government beyond the 
amount appropriated, the Secretary of War, by making the contract 
for the full amount appropriated, exhausted his authority and could 
not make a supplemental contract binding the Government for fur-
ther expenditures. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
_ February 20, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of February 18, 1897, in which you state the following: 
"On February 22, 1894, the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and 
Power Company wrote a letter, submitting a plan of a gun 
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carriage which it desired to construct for the United States 
and containing al o the provisions and conditions of the 
contract which it proposed to enter into with the United 
States. 
"The act making appropriations for fortifications, etc., 
approved August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., 214), authorized and 
directed the Secretary of War to contract with the Pneu-
matic Gun Carriage and Power Company for one 10-inch 
pneumatic disappearing gun carriage, 'which shall be con-
structed on the general plan submitted by the company to 
the Board of Ordnance and Fortification in its letter, dated 
February twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, 
and shall be capable of being traversed and the gun elevated 
and depressed by either pneumatic, electric, or hand power, 
and the details of said plan may be modified, changed, and 
improved in the discretion of the company.' 
"The act appropriated for the purchase of the said pneu-
matic carriage the sum of $50,000, or so much thereof as 
may be necessary, and further provided that 'the same condi-
t-ions relative to the plat/ orm, ammunition, and payments, and 
so forth, embodied in the contract for the Gordon ten-inch 
counterpoise carriage shall apply to the pneumatic carriage, 
and the same facilities for carrying out the contract for the 
counterpoise carriage shall be extended to the pneumatic 
carriage.' 
"Under · date of November 5, 1894, the United States 
entered into a contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage 
and Power Company for the carriage authorized by said act 
of August 1, 1894, for the sum of $50,000, the full amount 
appropriated for the carriage. In view of the provisions of 
section 3732, Revised Statutes, and the doubt as to whether 
the said act of August 1; 1894, authorized the Secretary of 
War to enter into contract to pay premiums which would 
make the cost of the carriage exceed the amount appropri-
ated therefor, uo provision for the payment of premiums for 
rapidity of fire was inserted in the contract. In the contract 
for the Gordon carriage (in the advertisement and instruc-
ti u attached thereto) it i provided that 'the carriage 
h uld be u h a to permit of the firing of the service 
10-in h rifle ther from ten (10) time in one hour, using 
.. 
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hand-power only, and there shall be a deduction of $1,000 
from the contract price agreed upon for each round less than 
this number in said time, and a bonus of $2,000 for each 
round greater than this number.' 
" In view of this provision iu the Gordon contract the 
Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company claimed, at 
the time of entering into its said contract on November 5, 
1894, that it was entitled to a bonus of $2,000 for each shot 
fired in one hour in excess of twelve shots, the number 
required by its contract, and to have a contract therefor to 
bind the Government to pay the same out of future appro-
priations made by Congress, although the price fixed for the 
purchase of the carriage by the contract entered into at that 
time is $50,000, the full amount appropriated for the carriage. 
And, as it is said, for the purpose of expediting matters the 
contract was entered into at that time without the stipula-
tion in regard to premiums, with the understanding between 
the then Acting Secretary of War and the company that the 
question of the authority of the Secretary of War under the 
said act of August 1, 1894, to contract for premiums, as 
requested, would be submitted to the law officers of the Gov-
ernment, and that if they held that the act gave the Secretary 
of War such authority a supplemental contract would be 
entered into to pay such premiums. 
"The application for the Secretary of War to enter into 
such a supplemental contract is now pending in this Depart-
ment, and you are respectfully requested to render an opinion 
as to whether he has authority to do so." 
Section 3732 of the Revised Statutes provides that: 
"No contract or purchase on behalf the United States 
shall be made, unless the same is authorized by law or is 
under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment, except 
in the War and Navy Departments for clothing, subsistence, 
forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, 
shall not exceed the necessities of the current year." · 
The act approved August 1, 1894 (28 Stat., 214), appropri-
ated a specific sum, viz., $50,000, to "procure and test one 
10-inch pneumatic disappearing gun carriage." 
The Secretary of War was "authorized and directed to 
contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Com-
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pany, of Washington, District of Columbia, without adver-
tising for such carriage." 
The full amount of the appropriation was absorbed in the 
contract price for making and delivering the carriage. 
No express authority was given you by this act to bind 
the Government beyond the amount appropriated. There is 
no such implied authority from the provision that-
" The same conditions relative to the platform, ammuni-
tion, and payments, and so forth, embodied in the contract 
for the Gordon 10-inch counterpoise carriage shall apply to 
the pneumatic carriage, and the same facilities for carrying 
out the contract for the counterpoise carriage s~all be 
extended to the pneumatic. carriage." 
The word "payments" refers to the time and manner of 
payment, and was not intended to have the effect of increas-
ing the appropriation or conferring power to contract for an 
indefinite amount. 
My opinion is that in making· the contract for the full 
amount of the appropriation you exhausted your authority 
under the act, and that you are not authorized to make any 




The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
DEPOSIT OF SAVINGS BY SEAMEN. 
Paymasters of the Navy may receive from enlisted men or petty officers, 
for deposit, under the act of February 9, 1889, accumulated savings 
of any amount, provided they represent the earnings of such a person 
as an enlisted man or petty officer in the United States Navy. 
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
• February 24, 1897. 
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 11th instant, inclosing copies of a let-
t r, dated the 4th ultimo, from the commanding officer of the 
U. an Franci co, and the indorsements thereon rela-
he autbority of the paymaster of aid vessel to 
a d po. it, und r the provi ions of the act entitled 
t pr vid for th depo it of the aving of eamen 
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of the United States Navy," approved February 9, 1889 (25 
Stat., 657), the sum of $900 from the chief boatswain's mate 
of the vessel. 
You say-
"ln view of the practice in the Army and Navy, as stated 
in the indorsement on said letter of the Chief of the Bureau 
of Supplies and Accounts, I have the honor to request an 
expression of your opinion as to whether the money offered 
by the chief boatswain's mate may be received by the pay-
master, subject to the provisions of the act of Congress above 
mentioned." 
The act referred to provides: 
" That any enlisted man or appointed petty officer of the 
Navy, may deposit bis savings in sums not less than :five 
dollars with the paymaster, upon whose books bis account 
is borne, and be shall be furnished with a deposit book in 
which said paymaster shall note over bis signature the 
amount, date, and place of such deposit." 
The act further provides that the money so deposited 
" shall be accounted for in the same manner as other public 
funds"; and-
" SEC. 3. That the system of deposits herein established 
shall be carried into execution under such regulations as 
may be established by the Secretary of the Navy." 
Article 1488 of the United States Navy Regulations, 1893, 
provides: 
'' Enlisted men of the Navy, and petty officers, may 
deposit with the pay officer upon whose books their accounts 
are borne, any portion of the savings accruing from their 
pay, and with the approval of the commanding officer sav-
ings from other sources on board ship, in· sums not less than 
:five dollars, the same to remain so deposited until :final pay-
ment on discharge: Provided, That the sum of at least 
twenty-five dollars shall remain to the credit of such depos-
itors on the rolls of the pay officers." 
The statute authorizes the petty officer. or seaman to 
deposit his savings. ' 
The Navy Regulations provide for the deposit "of the 
savings accruing from their pay" and also "savings from 
other sources on board ship." 
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The statute provides that the amount so deposited "shall 
uot be permitted to be paid until :final payment on dis-
charge," and the Navy Regulations make similar provision. 
Enlistments for duty on board cruising vessels for the 
Navy are for a term of three years general service; and 
enlisted men in the naval service are only entitled to their 
discharge upon the expiration of their term of service. 
The doubt suggested in the letters accompanying your 
communication is as to whether an enlisted man, or petty 
officer, in the United States Navy may be permitted under 
this statute to· deposit with the paymaster accumulated 
savings frQm previous terms of enlistment, or only such sav-
ings as have accrued during the term of enlistment within 
which the deposit is made. 
The Paymaster-General of the Navy states in an indorse-
ment on the letter accompanying your communication that-
" The practice of the service is to permit enlisted men to 
make deposit in any amount desired. There are numerous 
cases of large deposits, an instance being the deposit by one 
man of $3,000 monthly for three consecutive months." 
Manifestly, such a deposit could not be of savings of pay 
earned during any one period of enlistment. 
The statute provides that the deposit may be made "with 
the paymaster upon whose books his account is borne." 
But it does not in terms or by necessary implication limit 
the amounts which may be deposited to savings earned dur-
ing any single period of timP-. 
The statute was evidently enacted in the interest of a 
class of men whose improvidence and helplessness has long 
been recognized and the consequences of which have been 
guarded against by previous beneficent legislation. 
It was intended to provide for this class a secure deposi-
tary, of which they might voluntarily avail themselves, but 
subject always to the restrictions and ~onditions which the 
tatute and the avy Regulations imposed. 
I am of opinion then, that in the case stated by you the 
payma ter of the . . S. San Francisco may receive from 
the •l1i f boat wain' mate the sum of 000 as a deposit 
und r th provi ion of the act referred to, provided the 
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$900 represents the" savings" earned by the petty officer as 






The SECRET.A.RY OF THE N.A.VY. 
DR.A. WBACKS-IMPORTED MATERIALS. 
The exportation of alcohol with the intention of its reimportation, in 
order to take advantage of the drawback privilege, is to be regarded 
as colorable only, the alcohol is forfeitable, the persons engaged in 
the transaction are punishable, and there is no right to drawback. -
If, however, the exportation was genuine, and with intent to dispose of 
the alcohol abroad, so that upon its arrival there it is to be regarded 
as absorbed in the general mass of foreign commodities, the subse-
quent importation of the goods in such cases is proper. 
Imported articles of domestic origin are . to be regarded as " imported 
materials" within the meaning of section 22 of the act of August 28, 
1894, chapter 349, when their prior i~portation was not merely col-
orable. 
DEPARTMEN'.I.' OF JUSTICE, 
February 24, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of February 19, asking my opinion whether certain alco-
hol is entitled to a drawback under section 22 of the tariff 
act of August 28, 1894, chapter 394, which provides-
" That where imported materials on which duties have been 
paid are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured 
or produced in the United States there shall be allowed on 
the exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount 
to the duties paid on the materials used, less one per centum 
of such duties." 
I assume, from the fact that this question is asked me, 
that the case under consideration by you can be brought 
within the first proviso to this section: 
"That when the articles exported are made in part from 
domestic materials the imported materials, or the parts of 
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the articles made from such materials, shall so appear in the 
completed articles that the quantity or measure thereof may 
be ascertained." 
You inform me that the alcohol was exported partly under 
section 3329 and partly under section 3330 of the Revised 
Statutes. In the former case it had paid internal taxes, but 
had received a drawback upon exportation. In the latter 
case it had paid no internal taxes. In either case certain 
duties are paid upon reimportation, according to somewhat 
awkward provisions of paragraph 387 and section 19 of the 
tariff law, which it is not necessary for present purposes to 
analyze. 
Your question, in substance, is whether the alcohol is an 
imported material within the meaning of section 22. 
Before discussing this it is necessary to consider whether 
the exportation was bona fide or merely colorable, w!th intent, 
by reimportation, to evade some restriction or obtain some 
advantage under our customs legislation. By section 3330 
it is unlawful intentionally to reland, within the jurisdiction 
of the United States, spirits which have been shipped for 
exportation under the provisions above cited. This prohibi-
tion has very recently been construed by the circuit court of 
appeals for the second circuit to prohibit the exportation of 
spirits for the purpose of immediately reimporting the same 
and thereby evading some provision of the law. (lflagler v. 
Kidd, not yet reported.) This construction is in accordance 
with previous opinions of this Department (17 Opin., 579; 
18 Opin., 331; see also 21 Opin., 23). If, therefore, this alco-
hol was exported with the intention to reimport the same 
for the purpose of taking advantage of the drawback priv-
ilege, the exportation is to be regarded as colorable only. 
The alcohol is forfeitable and the persons engaged in the 
tran_ action are punishable. In that case, of course, there is 
no right to drawback. 
If, however, the exportation was genuine and with intent 
to di pose of the alcohol abroad, o that upon its arrival there 
it i to be regarded a ab orbed in the general mass of for-
i ommoditie , tbe opinions and decision cited are not 
ppli abl . Th ubs quent importation of the good in 
i · pr per. beth r the provi ions of ection 22 
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are applicable to such goods is not entirely clear. The pro-
viso to that section contrasts "imported materials" with 
"domestic materials," which would tend to exclude all 
materials of domestic origin from the former of the two 
classes. Moreover, section 9 of the same act contains a 
series of provisions with a view to the exportation, free of 
duties, of'' all articles manufactured in whole or in part of 
imported materials or of materials subject to internal reve-
nue tax." It may be argued with force that, as this section 
expressly applies to materials subject to internal revenue 
tax, it must have been the intent of Congress that all articles 
made for export out of such materials must be made in 
bonded warehouses according to its provisions. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to understand why articles made of 
imported materials should be given greater privileges than 
those made of domestic materials; nor is it apparent why 
any discrimination should be made among imported goods to 
the disadvantage of those which are of American origin. 
On the whole, it is my opinion that imported articles of 
domestic origin are to be regarded as "imported materials," 
within the meaning· of section 22 of the act of 1894, when 
their prior importation was not merely colorable within the 
principle of Flager v. Kidd and the opinions above cited. 
Very respectfully, 
JUDSON HARMON. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
CIVIL SERVICE-TRANSFER OF CLERKS. 
The Civil Service Commission is not authorized to transfer a naval 
paymaster's clerk assigned to sea duty to a similar position in the 
Navy Department, as paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty were 
not classified by the President's order of May · 6, 1896, while such 
clerks performing similar se1·vices in offices on shore were classified 
by that order. 
DEP .A.RTMEN'.l' OF JUSTICE, 
February 27, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of the 25th instant, with inclosures, in which you 
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the power 
of the Civil Service Commission to authorize the transfer of 
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Mason A. Posey, paymasters' clerk on the U.S. S. Marble-
head, to a similar position in the Navy Department. It 
appears that paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty were 
not classified by the President's order of May 6, 1896, while 
paymaster's clerks performing similar service in offices on 
shore were classified by that order. 
Rule IV, section 2, of the civil-service rules promulgated 
by the President November 2, 1896, provides: 
"No person shall be appointed to, or be employed in, any 
position which has been, or may hereafter be, classified 
under the civil-service act until he shall haye passed the 
examination provided therefor, or unless he is especially 
exempt from examination by the provisions of said act or 
the rules made in pursuance thereof." 
Rule X, section 5, provides: 
''Transfer shall not be made from a position not classified 
under the civil-service act to a classified position." * * * 
The facts that paymasters' clerks on sea duty are not 
classified, while paymasters' clerks on shore duty are classi-
fied; that it is desired to transfer Mr. Posey from the one 
duty to the other, and not from the position he holds to 
another involving a different character of employment, and 
that if the transfer can not be made a hardship will be 
imposed on such clerks assigned to sea duty, do not, in my 
opinion, justify a different conclusion. The only way by 
which such . transfer can be made is by the classification of 
·paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty, or, if this is deemed 
impracticable or inexpedient, by an amendment of the rules 
so as to remove the hardship of such cases. 
Respectfully, 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
· Acting Attorney- General. 
The SECRETARY OF THE NA.VY. 
AV AL OFFICER-ARREST. 
As adequate power is possessed by the Secretary of the Navy to cause 
th arr st of an of'fi · r for malappropriation of public funds, notwith-
standing the f ct that he has b n arrested by the civil authorities 
f~r tb ame off •nse and discharged on bail, it is improper to cause 
lus arr t lly th • dvil office:i:s in ord r t his trial before a naval 
c· 11rt-martial. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 9, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of March 8, in which you recite a tele-
gram from the commandant of the naval station, Newport, 
R. 1., to the effect that Paymaster John Corwine, U.S. N., 
had been arrested and discharged on bail; and you request 
that "the United States attorney at Providence, R. I., be 
instructed to take such steps as may be necessary to secure, 
on behalf of this Department, the custody of Paymaster 
Corwine, in order that he may be brought to trial before a 
general court-martial for the offenses which be is alleged 
to have committed." 
And you request my opinion as to " the propriety of plac-
ing Paymaster Corwine in arrest and confinement at the 
naval station, Newport, R. I., notwithstanding the fact that 
he is under bond." 
On the case presented by you it is clear that Mr. Corwine 
is liable to indictment and prosecution in the courts of the 
United States for malappropriation of the public funds in 
his charge, and that he is liable to be proceeded against 
before a general naval court-martial for violation of the 
Na val Regulations. 
But the methods of procedure in these two tribunals are 
wholly distinct from the initiation of the prosecution to final 
sentence, and the law does not contemplate or make pro-
vision for their being commingled at any stage. 
The arrest of Mr. Corwine, at the instance of the United 
States attorney, could be made only upon a warrant setting 
forth the ground of complaint against him, issued by a civil 
officer and executed by a United States marshal. Such an 
arrest could be followed only by information, or indictment, 
and the proceedings consequent thereon, in a United States 
court. 
Section 1624, Revised Statutes, prescribe8 the articles by 
which the Wavy of the United States shall be governed. 
Article 14 prescribes the punishment which may be im-
posed by a naval court-martial upon any person in the naval 
service who willfully misappropriates money of the United 
States. 
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Article 8, section 20, authorizes punishment for the officer 
violating the Na val Regulations; and 
Articles 1040, 1041, and 1042 of the United States Naval 
Regulations provide for the arrest and confinement, under 
certain conditions, of officers charged with the commission 
of offenses. 
Full power is given to the Secretary of the Navy to cause 
the arrest of any officer of the Navy charged with the com-
mission of crime and have him brought before a naval court-
martial for trial. 
It would then, in my opinion, be unnecessary, and indeed 
improper, to cause the arrest of this naval officer by the 
civil officers of the Government in order to his trial before a 
naval court-martial while adequate power resides in the 
Secretary of the Navy to arrest and confine him and bring 






The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
The Attorney-General is not permitted by statute to respond to a 
request for an opinion by the head of a Department which does not 
show what the facts are or that a case has presently arisen in the 
administration of the Department. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 13, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of February 17, in which, after reciting 
section 1223, Revised Statutes, and section 2 of the act of 
Congress approved July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 205), you request 
my opinion as to '' whether or not the provision quoted from 
the latter act supersedes or modifies in any way the pro-
vision of ection 1223, Revi ed. Statutes, as to retired officers 
of the rmy holding or accepting appointment in the 
diplomatic or con ular rvice of the overnment." 
It d e not app ar from y ur letter what the fact are or, 
incl l th t , n a all h presently ari en upon which 
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my opinion is requested; but the inquiry submitted by you 
appears to present but a moot case, to which I am not per-
mitted by statute or precedent to respond. 
Section 356, Revised Statutes, provides: 
"The head of any executive department may require the 
opinion of the Attorney-General on any question of law 
arising in the administration of his Department." 
"The Attorney-General will not give an opinion on an 
important legal question when it is not practically presented 
by an existing case before a Department." (9 Opin., 421; 
10 Opin., 50; 13 Opin., 531; 19 Opin., 332.) 
'' It must, I conceive, be _deemed settled that the Attorney-
General can only act upon a determinate statement of facts 
furnished by the officer asking his opinion." (10 Opin., 267; 
11 Opin., 189.) _ 
Where an official opinion from.the head of this Department 
is desired on questions of law arising on any case, the request 
should be accompanied with a statement of the material 
facts of the case, and also the precise questions on which 
advice is wanted. (14 Opin., 367-368; 20 Opin., 220; 20 
Opin., 383.) 
Approved. 





The Secretary of the Navy is not precluded by section 2 of the act of 
July 31, 1894-, from employing one N., retired, under the act of Febru-
ary 19, 1897, to supervise the completion of certain tables of planets . 
.An act of Congr~ss authorizing the expenditure of money for the 
employment of a competent mathematician to supervise the comple-
tion of certain tables of planets, providing'.no permanency to the term, 
no requirement that the person employed shall either take an official 
oath or receive a commission, and no formalities in the selection of 
such an employee, does not create an office. 
The person to be employed may be designated either by order of the 
Secretary of the Navy or the head of the bureau having charge of the 
work to be done, which order need only designate the person selected 
as a competent mathematician and the compensation he is to receive. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 23, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your 
favor of March 13, 1897, asking for an opinion as to whether 
you are prohibited by virtue of section 2 of the act of July 
31, 1894, '' making appropriations for the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial expenses of the Government," from employ-
ing Prof. Simon Newcomb, retired, under the provisions of 
the act of February 19, 1897, ''making appropriations for the 
legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Govern-
ment for the fiscal year 1898," which provides: 
"For services of a competent mathematician to supervise 
the completion of the tables of the planets, two thousand five 
hundr0d dollars, to be immediately available." 
It is my opinion that you are not so precluded. The statute 
authorizing the expenditure of the money clearly does not 
create an office or contemplate any of the formalities in the 
selection of such an employee as to distinguish his employ-
ment as an office. There is no permanency to the term, there 
is no requirement that the person employed shall either take 
an official oath or receive a commission. 
Section 2 of the act of July 31, 1894, has received construc-
tion twice at the hands of the Comptroller of the Treasury, 
namely, in the cases of J;{,eynolds (reported in 2 Decisions of 
theComptroller,271),and Fleming(Id.,467), where the author-
ities bearing upon the essential elements distinguishing an 
office within the language of that statute from a mere employ-
ment are coll_ated and dwelt upon. Certainly, the person to 
be employed under the provisions of the a~t of February 19, 
1897, is more remote from the essential characteristics of an 
officer than were either of the employees mentioned by the 
Comptroller. 
In my opinion, the manner of designating the person to be 
employed is immaterial, and may be either by an order of the 
Secretary of the Navy or of the head of the bureau having 
charge of the work to be done, which order need only desig-
nate the per on elected as a competent mathematician and 
th ompen ation he j to receiv . 
V ry r p ctfully, 
JOSEPil MoKE A. 
' ETA.RY OF TUE .A.VY. 
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General must not relate to a 
mere moot question, but to one which requires immediate action, the 
answer to which is necessary for the protection of the o~cer making 
the inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the action which be is 
about to take. 
The question whether or not to commence a civil action or criminal 
prosecution must ordinarily be decided by some officer of the Depart-
ment of Justice. 
The Attorney-General is not authorized to give the head of another 
Department a legal opinion upon such a question. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
llfarch 25, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of March 15, relating to proposed judicial proceedings in 
relation to lands found to have been erroneously patented 
under the Western Pacific Railroad grant in California. 
The proceedings in contemplation are to be taken in con-
formity with the act of March 2, 1896, chapter 39. 
You ask me whether any right of action remains in t~ 
United States, and, if so, upon what company demand should 
be made for the value of the land. 
fhe opinion of the Attorney-General may be asked by the 
head of any other Executive Department "on any questions 
of" law arising in the administration of his Department." 
(Rev. Stat., 356.) The inquiry must relate, not to a mere 
moot question, but to one which requires immediate action. 
The answer must be necessary for the protection of the offi-
cer making the inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the 
action which be is about to take. The question whether or 
not to commence a civil action or criminal prosecution is one 
which must, ordinarily at least, be decided by some officer of 
the Department of Justice. If any other Department of the 
Government is informed of facts which seem to require such 
action to be taken, its duty is to communicate them, together 
with any suggestions which it desires to make, to the Depart-
ment of Justice. The Attorney-General, therefore, is not 
authorized to give a legal opinion under these circumstances, 
but his duty is to consider the question (not always one of 
pure law) whether it is advisable to commence litigation. 
(See 20 Opin., 702, 714; 21 Opin., 6, ma, 369.) 
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These reasons are sufficient to show that I am not per-
mitted to give a legal opinion upon the first question asked 
by you. I would suggest that you communicate to me fully 
the facts as to each tract of land with relation to which no 
claim of bona fide ownership under the act of 1896 is pending 
and undecided. It will then be my duty to decide whether 
proceedings shall be instituted, and, if so, against whom 
demand should be made for the land. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENN.A.. 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-RETIRED ARMY OFFICER. 
The Attorney-General is not permitted to give an opinion as to the con-
struction or interpretation of a statute except in an actual case which 
has arisen before one of the Executive Departments calling for its 
action in the regular course of its affairs. 
The solution of the question whether an officer on the retired list of the 
Army can accept a diplomatic or consular appointment and still hold 
his position on the retired list with rank and pay is a matter of his 
private concern only, and not a subject with which the United States 
can be concerned until some action h as been taken by such officer. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 26, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 22d instant, in closing a copy of a letter 
to the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated February 9, 
1897, Lexington Union Club, Lexington, Ky., from T. J. Olay, 
first lieutenant, United States Army, retired, and a copy of 
General Orders, No. 3, Headquarters of the Army, of January 
11, 1895. 
You acknowledge the receipt of my communication to you 
of the 13th in tant, in reply to an inquiry submitted by you 
to the ttorney-General '' as to the construction of a provision 
of the act f July 31, 1894, re pectingthe eligibility of retired 
ffi er of the Army to hold certain offices," as to which 
inquiry I r pli d that it app ared to present but a moot case, 
whi ·h I wa not permitted by statute or precedent to 
r :p nd. 
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You now renew your request for my opinion, and state that-
"A construction of the law of July 31, 1894, referred to, is 
necessary to dispose of questions arising in the administra-
tion of the War Department;" 
And conclude: 
'' The question as to whether or not the prohibition 
contained in section 1223, Revised Statutes, is set aside or 
repealed by section 2 of the act of July 31, 1894, is now 
submitted to the Department by Lieutenant Clay, a retired 
officer, a copy of whose letter is inclosed." 
I have to regret that a sense of official duty, enlightened 
by an unbroken line of decisions of my predecessors in office, 
founded upon a course of reasoning which I am unable to 
resist, but to which I heartily assent, forbids my compliance 
with your request. 
My duty is clearly defined in section 356, Revised Statutes, 
which provides: 
"The head of any executive department may request the 
opinion of the Attorney-General on any questions of law 
arising in the administration of his department," 
And section 357, which provides: 
'' Whenever a question of law arises in the administration 
of the Department of War, or the Department of the Navy, 
the cognizance of which is not given by statute to some other 
officer from whom the head of the Department may require 
advice, it shall be sent to the Attorney-General," etc. 
These sections have time and again received the construc-
tion of my predecessors, by which I am now guided. 
They do not permit the Attorney-General to give an 
opinion as to the construction or interpretation of a statute 
except in an actual case which has arisen and is before one 
of the Executive Departments calling for its action in the 
regular course of ~dministration of its affairs. 
Attorney-General Black in 1857, when a like request was 
made to him by one of your predecessors, said (9 Opin., 82): 
"It has always been the rule of this office to give advice 
only in actual cases where the special facts are set forth by 
the Department. It is impossible to reply to mere specula. 
tive points or supposed cases. The Attorney-General is not 
required to write abstract essays on any subject. 
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"If there be a claim pending before you on which you 
desire to have my advice, and you will be 12leased to say how 
it arises, what are the facts, and wherein the law seems 
doubtful, I shall with great pleasure give you my opinion." · 
In 1891 Attorney-General Miller said (20 Opin., 250): 
'' My predecessors have frequently held that the opinion 
of the Attorney-General can not be given upon a general 
subject, but only on one or more specific questions of law 
based on a case stated." 
It may be, and doubtless is, a subject of reasonable inter-
est, and perhaps of great anxiety, to officers of the United 
States Army on the retired list to ascertain "if an officer on 
the retired list of the Army can accept a diplomatic or consu-
lar appointment and still hold his position on the retired list 
with rank and pay." 
But, manifestly, the solution of that question by any 
retired officer of the Army, and the course of conduct which 
he may adopt in pursuance of such solution, is a matter of 
his private concern only, and not a subject with which the 
United States can be concerned until some action has been 
taken by such officer. 
I am unable to perceive how the mere abstract question 
can arise in the administration of the War Department; aud 
the opinion of the Attorney-General, if given in response to 
your inquiry, would be given when no case had actually 
arisen and when no case might ever arise. 
If Lieutenant Clay, or any other retired officer, should be 
called upon to determine such question in his own case, the 
obvious course for him to pursue is that which is open to 
every person inclined to pursue a course as to the legal conse-
quences of which he is in ignorance or doubt. H e should seek 
the advice of private counsel, learned in the law, and obtain 
their opinion, for which, if given without due care, such coun-
el can be held to a personal accountability. 
The whole matter, as it seems to me, is one strictly of pri-
vate concern and in no sense of public interest. 
ery r e pectfully, 
ppr d. 
RET W AR. 
HOLMES CONRAD, 
Solicitor-General. 
JOSEPH McKE A. 
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COLLISIONS AT SEA-NAVIGATION LAWS. 
The amendments to section 4233 of the Revised Statutes are special · 
rules duly made by local anthority according to the provisions of arti-
cle 30 of the act of August 19, 1890, chapter 802. 
Those portions of the act of 1890 which do not,,, interfere" with the oper-
ation of special rules duly made by local authority according to the 
provisions of article 30, as construed by the act of February 19, 1895, 
chapter 102, are rules for the guidance of American vessels, not only on 
the high seas, but also on "all waters connected therewith navigable 
by seagoing vessels." 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
March 31, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tions of March 29 and March 30, asking my opinion with rela-
tion to the rules of navigation. 
The internationa\ regulations for preventing collisions at 
sea, prescribed by the act of August 19, 1890, chapter 802, 
will go into effect by Executive proclamation on July 1, 189i. 
These regulations, by tbe terms of the statute, '' shall be fol-
lowed by all public and private vessels of the United States 
upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith 
navigable by seagoing vessels." Article 30, however, reads: 
"Nothing in these rules shall interfere with the operation of 
a special rule duly made by local authority relative to the 
navigation of any harbor, river, or inland waters." All laws 
inconsistent with the act of 1890 are repealed by sectfon 2. 
Acting probably upon suggestions of Attorney-General 
Olney (21 Opin., 106), Congress passed the act of February 
19, 1895, chapter 102, which provided, among other things, 
that the provisions of section 4233 of the Revised Statutes 
"are hereby declared special rules duly made by local 
authority" within article 30 aforesaid. By the act of March 
3, 1897, chapter 389, entitled "An act to amend the laws 
relating to navigation," Congress has in sections 12 and 13 
amended section 4233. 
You first ask whether the amendments to section 4233 are 
special rules duly made by local authority according to the 
provisions of article 30 of the act of 1890. This question I 
answer in the affirmative. You further ask whether those 
portions of the act of 1890, which do not "interfere" with 
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the operation of special rules duly made by local authority, 
according to the provisions of article 30, as construed by the 
act of 1895, are rules for the guidance of American vessels, 
not only on the high .seas, but also on '' all waters connected 
therewith navigable by seagoing vessels," instancing the 
provisions of article 31 of the act of 1890. This question I 
also answer in the affirmative. 
Very respectfully, 
J"OSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
BUREAU OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS-PENALTY ENVELOPES. 
The monthly bulletin published by the Bureau of American Republics, 
although it contains advertisements of private firms or corporations, 
is entitled to transmission though the mails free of postage under the 
act of February 20, 1897. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 8, 1897. 
Sm: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your commu-
nication of the 2d instant, with the accompanying "corre-
spondence" in reference to the use of the penalty envelope 
by the Bureau of American Republics for inclosing circulars 
soliciting advertisements to be inserted in the Bulletin issued 
by that Bureau and the mailing of the Bulletin containing 
private advertisements. 
You ask me to advise you "if it (the_ Bulletin) should be 
transmitted in the mails when it contains advertisements of 
private firms or corporations, free of postage, under cover of 
the penalty envelope." 
Secretary Olney in his communication of December 11, 
1896, addressed to your predecesRor, said : 
"The Commercial Bureau of American Republics is the 
agent or repre entat,ive of an association called 'The Inter-
national Union of American Republics for the Prompt Col-
le tion and Di tribution of Commercial Information.' The 
nit d tat i a member of this international union-a 
union n t ff cted by treaty, but by informal agreement 
n ti n d by th 1 gi lative nd executive branches of the 
nt. 
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"Under the agreement the United States advances annu-
ally the amount of money necessary for the maintenallce of 
the commercial bureau, which, by agreement is placed under 
the supervision of the Secretary of State of the United 
States, and by act of Congress (28 Stat., 419) is put under 
his direction and control." 
The act referred to provides: 
''The Bureau of American Republics shall be placed under 
the control and direction of the Secretary of State, who shall 
report to Congress at its next regular session the propriety 
of continuing said Bureau, or, if any obligation exists upon 
the part of the United States requiring the continuance 
thereof." 
By act of February 26, 1896, it was provided: 
"That any moneys received from sale of the Bureau pub-
lications, from rents, or other sources, shall be paid into the 
Treasury as a credit in addition to the appropriation, and 
may be drawn therefrom upon requisition of the Secretary 
of State for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the 
Bureau." 
It appears, then, that the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau 
of American Republics is a publication authorized by the 
Government of the United States as a feature of the Bureau 
of American Republics, which is "under the control and 
direction of the Secretary of State; " that the expense of 
this publication is primarily borne by the United States 
alone; that the reimbursement of such expenses depends 
on the voluntary contributions from the other members of 
the International Union of American Republics, "from the 
sales of the Bureau publications, from rents, or other sources." 
By act of March 3, 1877, section 5 (19 Stat., 335), it was 
provided-
,, That it shall be lawful to transmit through the mail, free 
of postage, any letters, packages, or other matters, relating 
exclusively to the business of the Government of the United 
States.'' 
The appropriation act for the diplomatic and consular 
service, approved February 20, 1897, provides: 
'' Commercial Bureau of American Republics, $28,000. 
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"Provided, That any money received from sale of the 
Bureau publications, from rents, or other sources, shall be 
paid into the Treasury as a credit in addition to the appro-
priation, and may be drawn therefrom upon requisitions of 
the Secretary of State for the purpose of meeting the 
expenses of the Bureau. 
"Provided, That the provisions of the fifth and sixth sec-
tions of the act entitled 'An act establishing post routes and 
for other purposes,' approved March 3, 1877, for the trans-
mission of official mail matter, be, and they are hereby ex-
tended and made applicable to all official mail matter of the 
Bureau of the American Republics established in Washing-
ton, by recommendation of the International American Con-
ference representing the International Union of American 
Republics." 
It can hardly be doubted that among the "official mail 
matter" referred to in the act must be embraced the 
Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of American Republics. 
This was the official organ, by means of which whatever 
beneficial results the Bureau produced were distributed 
among the members of the International Union. This was 
its sole organ of utterance. Without it, its labors would 
be as unprofitable as a watch without hands. 
It appears from the" correspondence" which accompanies 
your letter that at the time of and long prior to the passage 
of the act approved February 20, 1897, this Monthly Bulletin 
contained advertisements of persons and corporations trading 
and doing business on private account; that these adver-
tisements were solicited by the Director of the Bureau of 
American Republics, and were paid for by the persons for 
whom they were published. 
It is not unreasonable to impute to Cougress a reasonable 
degree of knowledge of the subject-matter upon which it was 
legi lating. In extending the provisions of sections 5 and u 
of the act approved March 3, 1877, and making them appli-
cable to all official matter of the Bureau of American Repub-
lic , it may be a sumed that the mind of Congre s was 
clir cted to the Monthly Bullletin a it then appeared. It 
wa.· the uly publi ation of the Bureau of American Repub-
li · ·, publi h d, a. eh ve e n, at the expen e of the United 
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States, by a Bureau which was subject to the direction.and 
control of the Secretary of State, the proceeds of the sale of 
which were to be paid into the Treasury of the United States, 
· to be drawn therefrom only upon requ1sitions of tbe Secre-
tary of State. It was recognized as "matter relating exclu-
sively to the business of the Government of the United 
States" and for that reason was authorized to be transmitted 
through the mail free of postage, just as it was, covers, adver-
tisemen·ts, contents, and all. · 
As an original question, it can hardly be doubted that the 
United States should not enter into competition with the 
private publications of the country for the advertisements of 
private enterprises; and as the Bureau of American Repub-
lics has been placed .by Congress under the control and 
dire'ction of the Secretary of State, it is entirely competent 
for the Secretary of State to prohibit the publication, in the 
Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of .American Republics, of 
such advertisements. 
I am of opinion, therefore, that the fact that this Monthly 
Bulletin contains advertisements of private firms or corpora-
tions does not deprive the Bureau of American Republics of 
the privilege extended to it by the act approved February 
20, 1897, of free postage for its official matter. 
The'' correspondence" accompanying your communication 








The number of Chinese to be admitted to this country as participants 
in the Tennessee Centennial Exposition may be limited by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 19, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the .17th instant, inclosing a telegram of 
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April 13, 1897, from A. M. Connor, collector, and an opinion · 
given to you by the Solicitor of the Treasury. You state 
that-
" In view of statements which have been made to the 
Department of the probable arrival at Seattle, Wash., of 150 
Chinese persons, and at San Francisco of from 200 to 300 
Chinese persons, claiming to be participants in the Ten-
nessee Centennial Exposition, and of the information con-
tained in the telegrams hereinbefore referred to from the 
director-general of the said exposition"-
And you request an opinion from me-
"As to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
limit the number of Chinese to be admitted to this country 
as participants in the exposition mentioned," 
1 have examined the joint resolution of May 18, 1896, and 
the inclosures submitted by you, and, upon full consideration 
of the whole matter, I beg to say that I concur in the conclu-
sion reached by the Solicitor of the Treasury that the Sec-
retary of the Treasury has complete authority to limit the 
number of Chinese to be admitted to this country as partici-






The SECRETARY OF 'fHE TREASURY. 
DAMS ACROSS THE RIO GRANDE. 
The Secretary of the Interior had no power, under the act of March 3, 
1891, providing for the location and selection of reservoir sites on the 
public lands of the United States and rights of way for irrigating 
ditches and canals, to grant a right to construct dams across the Rio 
Grande for the purpoRe of ch ecking the flow of water and distribut-
ing it for irrigation purpo. es. 
Tb ·ontrol and sup r vision of th navigable waters of the United 
tat 'B is vest cl in the r tary of \.Var. 
Th r medy of the nit d tates in case of the erection of a dam across 
na.vig. bl wat rs i hy injunction, nnder e tion 10 of the act of ep-
t m h ·r 10 1 , nd if the clam ha b en onstru ted, also by criminal 
pr . ·ution. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 24, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of April 8 referring to a previous correspondence 
between the Mexican Minister at this capital and the De-
partment of State with reference to the attempted construc-
t.ion by the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company of 
dams across the Rio Grande River and to a request made by 
you February- for an opinion from this Department on the 
question submitted, and you" renew the request for an opin-
ion on the question presented and invite attention to the 
pressing need of early action by your Department." 
I regret that compliance with your request for an opinion 
has been delayed by the resignation of officers of this Depart-
ment since the request was received. 
Your letter of February - was as follows: 
"Under what purports to be authority for it to do so, 
granted in 1895 by the Secretary of the Interior under sec-
tions 18 to 21, pages 1101 and 1102, volume 26, Statutes at 
Large, The Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company claims 
the right to construct a dam across the Rio Grande River at 
Elephant Butte, in New Mexico, 125 miles above El Paso, and 
are about to do it. 
'' The Secretary of State has requested the Secretary of 
War to 'adopt such measures as are most effective to open 
the river and to keep it open to such navigation as it is nat-
urally capable of affording for commercial traffic between 
the States or between any portion of the United States and 
Mexico.' 
"Permission to construct the dam has not been given by 
the Secretary of War, nor has he approved or authorized 
the same. The mouth of the Concho River (which empties 
into the Rio Grande) is 325 miles below the site of the pro. 
posed dam, and this river is the first material addition to 
the Rio Grande's volume of water below that point. From 
the mouth of the Concho up to El Paso, a distance of 200 
miles, the Rio Grande has been demonstrated to be a nav-
igable water, and used as such in interstate commerce, and 
it has been recognized by Congress to be a navigable water 
10892-VOL 21~PT 3--8 
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at El Paso. Above El Paso it does not appear to be used 
now for the purpose of navigation. But from El Paso to 
and including the site of the proposed dam, and a good many 
miles beyond that point, it has been used to float logs for 
commercial and business purposes, and in this part of the 
river i.t carries a slightly greater quantity of water than it 
does at El Paso and for 200 miles below El Paso, the volume 
of water being decreased on this part of the river by evap-
oration and agricultural uses. And also in this part of the 
river above El Paso, and including the site of the proposed 
dam, the conformation of the bed and banks of the river is 
such -as to make navigation, by reason of the deepe~ and 
more confined channel, more feasible than at El Paso. 
". The proposed dam is to be such a one as will check the 
flow of water in the river at Elephant Butte entirely for a 
great portion, if not all, of the year, and impound it, and also 
distribute it from that point for purposes of irrigation, so 
that the Rio Grande will be practically destroyed as a stream 
for many miles below Elephant Butte, and its volume of 
water so diminished as to materially affect its navigability 
throughout its entire course to the Gulf of Mexico. 
"Your opinion is, therefore, req nested as to whether, 
under the existing state of the law, there is any way for the 
United States authorities to prevent the construction of 
the said dam, and if so, what the remedy is." 
As I understand, the only authority which the Secretary 
of the Interior possessed is claimed to have been conferred 
by sections 18 to 21 of the act of March 3, 1891, entitled " An 
act to repeal timber culture laws and for other purposes." 
The sections referred to-and section 17-provide only for 
the location and selection of reservoir sites on the public 
lands of the Unjted States and rights of way for irrigating 
ditches and canals. There is nothing in the act or its pur-
po es which was intended to affect the control or supervision 
of the navigable rivers of the country. That, by other and 
ind ed later legislation, is put in the Secretary of War. 
ction 10 of the river and harbor act approved Septem-
ber 1 , 1 90 (26 tat., 454), i as follows: 
'That the er a ion of any ob truction not affirmatively 
authoriz d by law to th navigable capacity of any waters 
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in respect to which the United States has jurisdiction is 
is hereby prohibited. The continuance of any such obstruc-
tion, except bridges, piers, docks, and wharves, and similar 
structures erected for business purposes, whether heretofore 
or hereafter created, shall constitute an offense, and each 
week's continuance of any such obstruction shall be deemed 
a separate offense. Every person and every corporation 
which shall be guilty of creating or continuing any such 
unlawful obstruction in this act mentioned, or who shall vio-
late the provisions of the last four preceding sections of this 
act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on convic-
tion thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five 
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment (in the case of a nat-
ural person) not exceeding one year, or by both such pun-
ishments, in the discretion of the court. The creating or 
continuing of any unlawful obstruction in this act men-
tioned may be prevented and such obstruction may be 
caused to be removed by the injunction of any circuit court 
exercising jurisdiction i~ any district in which such obstruc-
tion may be threatened or may exist; and proper proceed-
ings in equity to . this end may be instituted under the 
direction of the Attorney-General oi the United States." 
Section 7 of that approved July 13, 1892, is as follows: 
"That section seven of the river and harbor act of Sep-
tember nineteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety, be amended 
and reenacted so as to read as follows: 
''' SEC. 7. That it shall not be lawful to build any wharf, 
pier, dolphin, boom, dam, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, 
or structure of any kind outside established lines, or in any 
navigable waters of the United States where no harbor lines 
are or may be established, without the permission of the Sec-
retary of War, in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, navi-
gable river, or other waters of the United States, in such 
manner as shall obstruct or impair navigation, commerce, 
or anchorage of said waters; and it shall not be lawful here-
after to commence the construction of any bridge, bridge draw, 
bridge piers and abutments, causeway, or other works over or 
in any port, road, roadstead, haven, harbor, navigable river, 
or navigable waters of the United States, under any act of the 
legislative assembly of a11y State, until the location and plap. 
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of such bridge or other works have been submitted to and 
approved by the Secretary of War or to excavate or fill, or 
in any manner to alter or modify the course, location, con-
dition, or capacity of any port, roadstead, haven , harbor, 
harbor of refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any break-
water, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United 
States, unless approved and authorized by the Secretary of 
Vvar: 
"'Provided, That . this section shall not apply to any 
bridge, bridge draw, bridge piers and abutments the con-
struction of which has been heretofore duly authorized by 
law, or be so construed as to authorize the construction of any 
bridge, drawbridge, bridge piers and abutments, or other 
works under an act of the legislature of any State · over or 
in a.ny stream, port, roadstead, haven, or l1arbor, or other 
navigable water not wholly within the limits of such State.'" 
These provisions are very definifa~, and the answer to your 
inquiry is obvious if the stream be a navigable one. This 
you assert, and I assume it. 
You say: 
"The proposed dam is to be such a one as will check the 
flow of water in the river at Elephant Butte entirely for a 
great portion, if not all, of the year and empound. it; and also 
distribute it from that point for purposes of irrigation, so 
that the Rio Grande will be practically destroyed as a stream 
for many miles below Elephant Butte, and its volume of 
water so diminished as to materially affect its navigability 
tllroughout its entire course to the Gulf of Mexico." 
The purposes of the company do not seem to be ambigu-
ous. In its prospectus (and, by the way, it is a foreign com-
pany, chartered by England) it proclaims its purposes to be-
" 1. To create the largest artificial lake in the world. 
"2. To obtain control of the entire fl.ow of the Rio Grande 
in southern New Mexico, the only practical means of irriga-
ting what i now considered the finest fruit and vine country 
in the nited State , and, by controlling the water, to con-
trol to a great extent the irrigable lands. 
"3. To compel the owners of irrigable lands in the valley 
f th i rande to convey one-half of their lands to the 
mp ny iu r turn fi r water right to the other ha,lf, and to 
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pay in addition a perpetual water rent of one dollar and 
:fifty cents per acre for every acre irrigated, or else to pur-
chase water rights, at the ruling rate, from the company. 
~, 4. To supply water to cities and towns for domestic and 
municipal purposes, and for milling and mechanical power, 
for which (they say) there is a large and constantly increas-
ing demand." 
The answer to your inquiry therefore is-
(1) That the Secretary of the Interior had no power, 
under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1891 (supra), to 
grant the rights claimed. 
(2) That the remedy of the United States is by injunction 
under section 10 of the act of September 19, 1890 (supra); 
and if the dam has been constructed, also by criminal 
prosecution. 
Upon being advised that the obstruction has been or is 
about to be erected, I shall at once order proper proceedings 
to be instituted by the United States district attorney 
under section 10 of the act approved September 19, 1890. 
( 26 Stat., 454.) 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 




BRIG GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 
The claim of Samuel C. Reid, junior, against the Unitec:i. States, growing 
out of the destruction of the brig Geneml Arrnstrong, fully considered 
ancl the conclusion expressed in the opinion of April 9, 1895 (21 Opin., 
154 ), that said Reid was not entitled to the amount demanded. Held 
to be erroneous. 
Under the act of March 2, 1895, the unexpended balance of the appropria-
tion made to satisfy the claims growing out of the destruction of the 
brig General Armstrong should be used to reimburse S. C. Reid, junior, 
to the extent that the vouchers on file in the State Department show 
that he has made expenditures or disbursements on this account. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
April 28, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of_ the 17th instant, in response to my letter 
of the 7th, in which I expressed my willingness, for reasons 
stated therein, to review · the opinion given by me April 9, 
1895, as to the authority of the Secretary of State "to apply 
any part of the unexpended b.alance to the payment of the 
expenses and charges or to the reimbursement of Mr. Samuel 
0. Reid, junior, or anyone else who may have paid them," etc. 
The reports of the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
Senate and House, respectively, on a bill introduced in the 
Fifty-fourth Congress for the relief of Samuel C. Reid, junior, 
induced me to make a thorough examination of all the papers 
on file in this Department, as well as of the report of the 
. Court of Claims to the Thirty-fifth Congress, relating to this 
matter, and in the light of these to reexamine the grounds 
upon which the conclusions expressed in the opinion of April 
9, 1895, to the Secretary of State rested, the result of which 
was a decided conviction that the conclusions there expressed 
were not responsive to the case submitted by the Secretary. 
of State and did injustice to the rights of the parties con-
cerned. 
In that opinion I stated: 
"It appears, however, that Samuel C. Reid, junfor, now 
insists that the unexpended balance shall be applied t~ 
reimbursing him the amounts which have been paid to bis 
assignees on the ground that such amounts were so expended 
by him in the expenses necessarily incurred in securing the 
appropriation. 
"But the objection to this is obvious and twofold. 
"First. The as ignment of 12th of September, 1835, from 
the owners of the vessel to Captain Reid is subject to the 
xpre s condition that he shall ''bear all the expenses and 
charges and perform all necessary services for the collection 
of the demand hereafter mentioned. 
" e ond. That the act of Congre s approved, March 2, 
1 5 un er , hich alone the ecretary of State has authority 
t di.1 ur h un xp nded balance, expre sly provides tbat 
• h 111 ppli d £ r th liquidati n and ettlemeut of tlle 
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claims of Samuel 0. Reid according to the vouchers now on 
file in said Department.'" 
The view there expressed fails to recognize and to discrimi-
nate between two distinct and wholly dissimilar claims, grow-
ing out of the destruction of the brig General Armstrong, 
which have been asserted and prosecuted since ;1815. 
One was the claim prosecuted by Capt. Samuel C. Reid as 
the assignee and the attorney in fact for the owners and the 
officers and crew of the brig_ General Armstrong against the 
Kingdom of Portugal. 
The other was the claim prosecuted by Samuel C. Reid, 
junior, on behalf of the owners and the officers and crew of 
said brig against the United States. 
The assignment of September 12, 1835, referred to in said 
opinion _related altogether to the claim which Captain Reid 
was prosecuting against the Kingdom of Portugal. 
The act of Congress approved March 2, 1895, directing 
that the unexpended balance "shall be applied to the liqui-
dation and settlement of the claims of Samuel C. Reid 
according to the vouchers now on file in said Department," 
relates altogether to the claim which Samuel C. Reid, junior, 
had prosecuted agaiust the United States. 
A brief and succinct review of the principal features of 
the history of this matter as disclosed in the public records 
and in the files of this Department will serve to clearly 
demonstrate the difference between the two claims and to 
show that their confusion has resulted from a partial exami-
nation of the records and files, and has led to the error 
which should be repaired. 
THE CLAIM AG.A.INST PORTUGAL. 
The brig General Armstrong was destroyed by English men-
of-war in the harbor of Fayal, within the dominions of the 
King of Portugal, with whom the United States were at 
peace; and a claim was believed to have accrued to the 
owners of the property destroyed against the Kingdom of 
Portugal. 
From 1814 to 1840 the claims of the owners and of the offi-
cers and crew of the brig were prosecuted against Portugal 
through Captain Reid, as their attorney in fact and on hi~ 
own account. 
526 HON. JOSEPH MCKENNA. 
Brig General Armstrong. 
In 1835 the owners of the vessel assigned to Captain Reid 
all their right, title, and interest in the vessel and in the 
claim in consideration of his prosecuting the claim against 
Portugal at his own expense and charges. 
In 1837 Mr. Kavanagh, our charge at Lisbon, under 
instructions from this Government, demanded from Portu-
gal satisfaction for said injury. From 1837 to 1844 it was a 
subject of correspondence between the two Governments. 
In April, 1850, on demand being again made by the United 
States, Portugal offered to refer . the matter to arbitration, 
and in July, 1850, renewed the proposition to that effect. 
Under a treaty•of 26th of February, 1851, between the two 
Governments, the matter was referred to the arbitramen, 
and award of Louis Napoleon, who, on 11th of December, 
1852, publiBhed his award in favor of Portugal and against 
the United States. 
This :finally determined the claim which Capt. Samuel C. 
Reid was prosecuting, and with it fell all the assignments, 
powers of attorney, contracts, and conditions growing out 
of it. 
THE CL.A.IM .A.GA.INST THE UNITED ST.A.TES. 
In January, 1854, the memorial of Samuel C. Reid, junior, 
"in behalf of the claimants in the case of the brig General 
Armstrong, praying indemnity," was presented to Congress 
and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate. It asked that $131,600 be appropriated for the 
indemnity of the claimants. 
This claim appears to have been referred by a resolution 
of the House of Representatives to the Court of Claims 
(Reports of Court of Claims, 1st sess. 35th Cong.). 
In February, 1858, the Court of Claims reported adversely 
to the claimant . 
In 1859 a bill for the relief of the claimants passed the 
enate, but was lost in the ITouse for want of a quorum. 
Here the matter appears to have been suspended for nearly 
t, nty years, when . . Reid, junior, renewed his efforts 
£ r ongr , which r sulted in the pas age of the act of 
1 Y , 1 .r.J ( 2 t t., 697), by which the Secretary of State 
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was authorized and directed "to examine and adjust the 
claims of the captain, owners, officers, and crew of the late 
private armed brig General Armstrong, growing out of the 
destruction of said brig by a British force in the neutral port 
of Fayal in September, 1814, upon the evidence established 
before the Court of Claims, and to settle the same upon princi-
ples of justice and equity, etc." 
On June 15, 1883,. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of' State, 
in a lett~r to Attorney-General Brewster, recited the act of 
Congress of May 1, 1882, the assignment of September 12, 1835, 
by the owners of the vessel to Samuel C. Reid, his heirs and 
assigns, the assignment of 31st of October, 1851, by Samuel 
C. Reid to Samuel C. Reid, junior; and he showed that, under 
the authority vested in him by the act of Congress, he had 
ascertained the losses and apportioned the fund among the 
owners and officers and crew of the vessel. He decided that 
the assignment of the owners to Reid, senior, was, in effect, 
a power of attorney to collect the total sum upon a contin-
gent fee of 50 per cent of the amount collected, he to pay all 
expenses, the balance to be paid over to the owners, their 
heirs or representatives, and that Samuel C. Reid, junior, 
stood in the shoes of his father in relation to this fund. He 
further decided that S. C. Reid, junior, under the assign-
ments from his father, was entitled to receive, as attorney 
for the owners, one-half the amount awarded, and also the 
value of his father's share, less the 50 per cent received by 
him as attorney. He states -that Mr. S. C. Reid, junior, 
claims "to be indemnified for the time, labor, and disburse-
ments made as said attorney, agent, and assignee for the 
benefit of the claimants in the case," and he submitted to 
the Attorney-General, for his opinion, the question whether 
S. C. Reid, junior, was entitled to be so indemnified and 
reimbursed. 
On July 7, 1883, Mr. Brewster, Attorney-General, gave his 
opinion, in which he denied the right of S. C. Reid, junior, 
but said: "The utmost that Reid, junior, can claim as to 
them is to be compensated out of their part of the fund on 
the principle that no man shall enrich himself at the co;t of 
another-the principle on which courts of equity proceed in 
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charging a fund in which a number are interested, with a 
reasonable allowance to the counsel, for the energetic few 
who have produced the fund." (17 Opins., 590.) 
On July 31, 1883, Mr. Brewster, on reconsideration, held 
that Captain Reid had no assignab]e interest in the fund, 
and that S. C. Reid, junior's, claim for reimbursement was 
covered by his former opinion. 
On June 6, 1887, Mr. Bayard, Secretar:y of State, requested 
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the claim of S. C. 
Reid, junior, to be reimbursed the amount of the expenses 
incurred by him in the prosecution of this claim. 
Attorney-General Garland, in an opinion of June 9, 1887 
(19 Opins., 32), held that this claim of Mr. Reid's "could 
not, for obvious reasons, be seriously entertained, much less 
adopted," but added, "if any good ground exists for reopen-
ing Mr. Frelinghuysen's adjudication of this question-and 
I express no opinion upon this subject--a claim by Mr. Reid, 
junior, for pro rata payment out of the bala.nce in your 
hands, or any increase in the allowance to him, might be 
considered." 
It is apparent that Mr. Frelinghuysen, in ascertaining the 
losses and in making distribution of the amount appropri-
ated by Congress, did not advert to the fact that the claim 
for which Congress by that act made provision was not the 
claim which Capt. S. C. Reid had prosecuted under the 
assignments and contracts with the owners and officers and 
crew .of the vessel. It was doubtless to this that Attorney-
General Garland referred in declining to express any opinion 
as to whether good ground existed for reopening Mr. Fre-
linghuysen's adjudication. 
It was after these persistent and oft-repeated demands by 
S. C. Reid, junior, for reimbursement of the amount expended 
by him in the prosecution of the claim against the United 
States, which had resulted after thirty years of labor in the 
appropriation by qongress in the act of May 1, 1882, after 
many opinion, by Attorneys-General in response to inquiries 
fr m ecretarie of State, that Congress finally, on March 
2 1 95, provided-
, That th unexp nded balance of the appropriation made 
Y h a t f th 1 ·t of a , 1 82, * * • now under the 
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control of the Department of State, shall be applied for the 
liquidation and settlement of the claim of Samuel C. Reid, 
according to the vouchers now on file in said Department." 
"The claim of Samuel C. Reid" was the claim which, since 
1883, he had with undaunted pertinacity been urging upon 
the Secretary of State, to wit, his reimbursement for the 
amounts expended by him in procuring the appropriation for 
the benefit of the owners, the officers, and crew of the lost 
vessel. 
"The vouchers now on file in said Department" were the 
receipts which evidenced the amounts expended by S. C. 
Reid, junior, in obtaining such appropriation. 
It is impossible, in the light afforded by the records and 
papers on file, to conceive that any other claim was referred 
to or provided for by the act of March 2, 1895. It was not the 
claim against Portugal that had been disposed of by the final 
award of Louis Napoleon; it was not the ~laim against the 
United States that had been provided for by the act of May 
1, 1882. The only claim remaining was the claim recited by 
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Mr. Brewster, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Gresham, 
and Mr. Garland; that was the claim for reimbursement. 
On April 3, 1895, Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, in a 
letter to the Attorney-General, reciting the act of Congress 
of March 2, 1895, and referring to the ruling of Mr. Freling-
huysen, inclosed copies of c9rrespondence between Mr. Reid, 
junior, and the State Department, and also copies of assign-
ments by Mr. Reid and of receipts from the assignees to 
the State Department, and asked: '' What amount, if any, I 
am required by the above-quoted extract from the act of 
March 2, 1895, to pay Mr. Reid out of the balance above 
referred to." 
On April 9, 1895, an opinion was given by me, in response 
to this request, in which the history of this matter is to some 
extent reviewed, but in which the claim of S. C. Reid, junior, 
is treated throughout as but a continuation of the claim 
originally prosecuted by his father, Capt. S. C. Reid, and the 
conclusions reached in that opinion were in accordance with 
the conclusions stated in the opinions of former Attorneys-
General prior to the act of March 2, 1895, that S. C. Reid 
junior, was not entitled to the amount demanded. ' 
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I am satisfied that the conclusion then stated by me was 
erroneous, in failing to discern what was the real claim 
asserted by S. C. Reid, junior. This was not the fault of the 
letter in which the request of the Secretary of State was con-
veyed. It was the result, perhaps, of giving too partial atten-
tion to the case as stated in the former opinions. 
I am of the opinion that the act of March 2, 1895, was an 
absolute appropriation of so much of "the unexpended bal-
. ance in tbe hands of the Secretary of State" as might be 
required toreimburseS.C.Reid,junior, the amounts expended 
by him as far as such amounts were evidenced and could be 
ascertained from the vouchers on file in the State Depart-
ment; and by such vouchers were meant the assignments 
and receipts, copies of which were exhibited in the letter of 
April 3, 1895, from Secretary Gresham. · 
The effect of the act of March 2, 1895, was to put an end to 
all questions as to the moral or legal rights of S. C. Reid, 
junior, to be reimbursed out of this fund. Congress, in the 
exercise of its unquestioned power, bas by this act disposed 
of all such questions by directing that the fund shall be paid 
over to S. C. Reid, junior, to the extent that the vouchers on 
file in the State Department show be has made expenditures 
or disbursements on this account. 
I am of opinion that the course of the Secretary of State 
is plain, and that the fund should be by him applied to the 
reimbursement of Mr. Reid as herein indicated. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 




OMPTROLLER OF 1'HE TREASURY-ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
If a claim for pay is presented to the Treasury Department, the question 
of th 1 ality of it. paym nt is one ex ·lusively for the Comptroller, 
who e ded ion thereon i final as to all executive officers. 
n questi n of di bur ments of money and payment of claims which 
bav(' b n r 1 gat cl by law to the 'omptroll r, the Attorney-General 
110111<1 not r nd r opinions. 
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DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
JJfay 6, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt oi -your 
communication of May 4, requesting an opinion whethe:r or 
not Samuel G. Fairchild is entitled to receive, in addition to 
the salary be bas received as local inspector of hulls, pay as 
special inspector of foreign steam vessels, notwithstanding 
bis waiver of claim therefor by accepting the additional 
appointment which, on its face, contained the statement 
"without additional compensation." 
It seems to me that the question .Presented by your com-
munication and the inclosed correspondence is not a proper 
one for an opinion. 
First, the correspondence is quite ambiguous as to whether 
a claim is or is not presented. If no claim is presented, then 
no matter is pending in your Department as to which your 
action is called for. -
If a claim is presented the question of the legality of pay-
ment is one exclusively for the Comptroller, whose decision 
thereon is, by statute, made final as to all executive officers. 
It has been repeatedly held by Attorneys-General that on 
questions of disbursement of money or payment of claims, 
so by law relegated to the Comptroller, the Attorney-Gen-
eral should not render opinions, especially in view of the 
fact that, if the matter is doubtful, it can be referred to the 
Court of Claims for authoritative decision. (Opinion of May 
22, 1895, 21 Opin., 178; opinion of June 8, 1895, 21 Opin., 188.) 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES. 
If a canal is one of the works provided for in section 7 of the act of 
July 13, 1892, making it unlawful, without the authority and permis-
sion of the Secretary of War, for anyone to build or construct any of 
the works therein mentioned in or over any of the navigabl~ waters 
of_ the United States that would obstruct or impair the navigation of 
said waters, the Secretary of War has the authority to authorize and 
permit its construction. 
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DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTIOE, 
May 11, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of April 24, in which you state that-
,, Application is made to the War Department by a private 
company known as the Port Arthur Channel and Dock Com-
pany to excavate a ship canal or channel from Sabine Pass 
to Port Arthur, in the State of Texas, a distance of about 
8 miles. Sabine Pass has been improved at the expense of 
the Government to · the extent of about $3,000,000, and a 
very fine harbor, with 25 feet of water between the Jetties, 
has thus been created. This harbor is made up by the dis-
tance between the jetties and a channel of perhaps six or 
seven miles long, upon the west bank of which is situated 
the town of Sabine Pass. The Port Arthur Company, how-
ever, controlling the Kansas City, Pittsburg and Gulf Rail-
way, extending from Kansas City, Mo., to the town of Port 
Arthur, desires to construct a canal from Sabine Pass below 
the town across a neck of land on the southwesterly side of 
Sabine Lake for a distance, and thence along the shore of 
the lake, and in that way up to or near the town of Port 
Arthur." 
You request that I will, at the earliest possible date, give 
you my "opinion as to whether the Secretary of War bas 
authority to permit the construction of this canal-of course 
under the direction of the Engineer of the Department." 
In complying with your request I will confine myself to an 
expression of opinion as to your legal power only. I express 
no opinion as to the expediency of its exercise in the case 
submitted, or as to its present or future consequenc.es, or, in 
view of them, how it should be guarded. 
Your authority to permit the construction of the proposed 
work is asserted under section 7 of the act of July 13, 1892 
(27 Stats., 88), which is as follows: 
" EC. 7. That it shall not be lawful to build any wharf, 
pier, dolphin, boom, dam, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, 
or true ure of any kind out ide established harbor lines or . . ' m ny navigable water of the nited States where no bar-
or line are or may be e tabli hed, without the permission 
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of the Secretary of War, in any port, roadstead, haven, har-
bor, navigable river, or other waters of the United States, in 
such manner as shall obstruct or impair navigation, com-
merce, or anchorage of said waters. * * * 
"And it shall not be lawful hereafter to commence the 
construction of any bridge, bridge draw, bridge piers and 
abutments, causeway, or other works, over or in any port, 
road, roadstead, haven, harbor, navigable river, or navigable 
waters of the United States, under any act of the legislative 
assembly of any State, until the location and plan of such 
bridge and other work have been submitted to and approved 
by the Secretary of War. lE< * * 
'' Or to excavate, or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify 
the course, location, condition, or capacity of the channel of 
said navigable water of the United States, unless approved 
and authorized by the Secretary of War. 
"Provided, That this section shall not apply to any bridge, 
bridge draw, bridge piers and abutments, the construction of 
which has been heretofore duly authorized by law, or be so 
construed as to authorize the construction of any bridge, 
drawbridge, bridge piers and abutments, or other works, 
under any act of the legislature of any State, over or in any 
stream, port, roadstead, haven or harbor, or other navigable 
water not wholly within the limits of such State." 
I have distributed this section so as to malrn it apparent 
that it embraces three distinct classes of subjects, into one 
or more of which the present case must be brought. 
The first clause refers to structures, such as wharves, piers, 
dams, breakwaters, jetties, etc. 
The third clause refers to excavations or fills in the channel 
of any navigable waters of the United States. 
The second clause refers to a distinct class of works con-
structed under the "act of the legislative assembly of any 
State." As to this class, it had been held in a long line of 
decisions of the Supreme Court, beginning with Willson v. 
Blaclcbird Oreelc Marsh Company (2 Pet., 245), that until Con-
gress, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce, had 
actually entered upon the improvement of the navigable 
waters within the territorial limits of a State it was compe-
tent for the State to adopt and execute such plan of improve-
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ment as to those navigable waters as it might see proper. The 
effect of this clause being to provide that notwithstanding 
the adoption by a State of any plan of improvement as to its 
navigable waters, such plan should not be executed until it 
had been submitted to and approved by the Secretary of War. 
The first and third clauses of the section were plainly 
intended to embrace all kinds of the work therein indicated 
that might be constructed in the navigable waters, whether 
structures of wood, stone, or iron, having their foundations 
in the soil beneath with superstructures above the surface 
of the water, or excavations or fills in the channel of such 
navigable water, which might alter or modify its course, 
location, condition, or capacity. 
As to all such works, section 7 provides that they shall 
not be constructed-as to the one class, without the permis-
sion, and as to the other, without the approval and author-
ity, of the Secretary of War. 
The only question submitted to me, and which it is at all 
proper that I should answer, is "whether the Secretary of 
War has authority to permit the construction of this canal." 
Without assuming to decide whether or not a "canal" is 
one of the works provided for fo section 7, I am of the opin-
ion that if it is the Secretary of War has the authority under 









A person appointed to a position not in the classified service at the time 
of hi. appointm nt, but which was sub equently classified by tho 
xecutiv order of fay 6, 1 96, wa r tained in the service absolutely 
and no sul j ct t a probati n of six months, is ntitled to all the 
right and b n fit of per. onH of the sam •lass or grade und r the 
civil- rvic a· , nd ma,y b tran f rr d. 
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DEPAR'J'MENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 19, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt by reference 
from you of the communication of Messrs. Procter and Har-
low, Civil Service Commissioners, and your request for my 
opinion on certain questions propounded by them. 
The fact.s essential to the question are as follows: 
Mr. William H. Michaels was appointed to a clerkship in 
the office of the Interstate Commerce Commission on .April 
28, 1896; took the oath of office on that day, and from thence 
was in actual service to the 15th of May, at which time he 
was furloughed without pay, but continued on the rolls. 
The position was not a classified one at the time of his 
appointment, but was subsequently classified by the Execu-
tive order of May 6, 1896. 
The Secretary of State requested the issuance of the nec-
essary certificate by the Civil Service Commission for his 
transfer to the Department of State. 
The commission raises a doubt of its legal ability to 
give the certificate, and attempts to sustain it by certain pro-
visions of the Civil Service Rules and the fourth paragraph 
of section 2 of the civil-service act of January 16, 1883. 
This paragraph is as follows: 
"Fourth. That there shall be a period of probation before 
any absolute appointment or employment aforesaid." 
Rule 2, section 7, of the rules provides that-
".A person holding a position on the date said position is 
classified under the civil-service act shall be entitled to all 
the rights and benefits possessed by persons of the same 
class or grade appointed upon examination under the pro-
visions of said act." 
Rule 8, section 3, provides that-
"A person selected for appointment shall be notified of his 
selection by the appointing or nominating officer, and upon 
his acceptance shall receive from the appointing officer a 
certificate of appointment for a probationary period of six 
months, at the end of which period, if the conduct and 
capacity o~ the probationer are satisfactory to the appoint-
ing officer, his retention in tile service shall be equivalent to 
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his absolute appointment; but if his conduct or capacity be 
not satisfactory, he shall be notified by the appointing officer 
that he will not receive absolute appointment because of such 
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity; and such notifi-
cation shall discharge him from the service: Provided, That 
the probation of an employee in the Indian school service 
shall terminate at the end of the school year in which he is 
appointed: And provided further, That the time which an 
employee has actually served as substitute in parts of the 
service where substitutes are authorized shall be counted as 
part of the probationary period of his regular appointment; 
but that time served under a temporary appointment shall 
not be so counted." 
Section 2 of rule 10 provides that-
'' A person who has received absolute appointment may be 
transferred." 
It is inferred from these provisions that a person holding 
a position on the date it is classified is subject to a probation 
of six months, or, in other words, has not an absolute 
appointment until the expiration of six mouths of actual 
employment, and until then can not be transferred. The 
inference is not justified, and proceeds from an incorrect 
interpretation of section 7 of rule 2. That section gives to 
"a person holding a position on the date said position is 
classified under the civil-service act" all the rights and bene-
fits of persons of the same class or grade appointed under 
the civil-service act. The language is, the" rights and bene-
fits." That is, " rights and benefits" after appointment-not 
burdens or conditions before appointment and limitations of 
it. Those in the service were retained in it, not probationally, 
but as approved; not conditionally, but absolutely. The rule 
accepted them, and if it had not intended it fully there 
would have been a careful discrimination as to service, and 
not an indistinguishable comprehension and putting on trial 
of tho e who may have been in the service for years with 
tho e of, maybe, a few months. A careful discrimination of 
P r on by ervice might or might not have been wise, but, 
if intended it would have been explicitly made and not left 
di utabl interpr tation. But the ection is so plain 
f it · lf th t onfu i n come from inquiry to make it more 
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so, and I will conclude by saying that the Secretary of State's 
request for the transfer of Mr. Michaels is entirely legal. 
Respectfully, 
· JOSEPH McKENNA. 
· The PRESIDENT. 
ERECTION _OF CATHOLIC CHAPEL AT WEST POINT. 
Sections 161 and 217 of the Revised Statutes do not authorize the grant-
ing of licenses for the occupation of parts of military reservations for 
the erection of hotels, church edifices, etc. 
Section 1331 has a special and partial purpose and gives no authority to 
dispose of the use of property. 
From the act of July 5, 1884, it may be regarded as certain that it was 
the view of Congress that an explicit authority was necessary for even 
a transient occupation of a military reservation for other than its 
special purpose. 
The act of July 28, 1892, authorizing the Secretary of War to lease such 
property of the United States under his control as may not for the 
time be required for the public use, forbids an occupation which 
contemplates permanency or duration longer than five years. 
The Secretary of War has no power to accept a donation of property for 
the Government for use in perpetuity of Roman Catholics. 
A revocable license, without limitation as to time, by the Secretary of 
War to a Roman Catholic archbishop, to erect and maintain a chapel 
on the military reservation at West Point, transcends the statute. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
May 19, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of May 17, 1897. 
You state that the Rev. C. G. O'Keefe petitioned Col. O. H. 
Ernst, Superintendent of the United States Military Acad-
emy at West Point for permission to erect a Roman Catholic 
chapel there for the use of the Roman Catholic cadets, etc. 
The petition you inclose. 
You further state that on the 3d of March of this year 
Secretary of War Lamont issued to the Right Rev. M. A. 
Corrigan, Roman Catholic archbishop of the archdiocese of 
New York, a revocable license to erect and maintain a chapel 
on the military reservation at West Point and that said 
license was on the 2d of April revoked by you and a new 
license granted in its place. The licenses you inclose. 
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A question being raised as to the legality of this action, 
you ask "whether granting licenses of this character is or 
is not legal." 
I reply as follows: 
West Point is Government property, and hence convey-
ances of it or uses of it can only be authorized by Congress. 
Has Congress so authorized 1 The only direct provision as 
to it is section 1331, w bich reads as follows : 
"The supervision and charge of the Academy shall be in 
the War Department, under such offi~er or officers as the 
Secretary of War may assign to that duty." 
This section has a special and partial purpose and gives 
no authority to dispose of the use of property. 
There are other provisions more general, and in a report 
made to Congress by the Secretary of War there is an 
enumeration of cases in which there were granted licenses 
for the occupation (of more or less duration) of parts of other 
military reservations. Some of these cases were of trifling 
moment, but others were important. Hotels were author-
ized and the erection of church edifices for particular denom-
inations. Of the latter one was to the Episcopalians at 
Governors Island, New York; one to the Catholics at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kans., and one also at Fortress Monroe to 
the same denomination. 
The privileges were denominated revocable licenses and 
came to be based on sections 161 and 217 of the Revised 
Statutes. 
The sections are as follows : 
" SEC. 161. The head of each Department is authorized to 
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the gov-
ernment of bis Department, the conduct of its officers and 
clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and 
the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, 
and property appertaining to it." 
"SEC. 217. The Secretary of War shall have the custody 
and charge of all the books, records, papers, furniture, fix-
ture , and other property appertaining to the Department." 
It is manife t that they do not authorize the practice 
exercised. 
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 539 
Erection of Catl1olic Chapel at West Point. 
Ou July 5, 1884, Congress passed an act of which section 6 
is as follows: 
'·The Secretary of War shall have the authority, in his 
discretion, to permit the extension of State, county, and 
Territorial roads across military reservations. to permit the 
landing of ferries, the erection of bridges thereon, and per-
mit cattle, sheep, or other stock animals to be driven across 
such reservation whenever in his judgment the same can be 
done without injury to the reservation or inconvenience to 
the military forces stationed thereon." 
This section is special and needs no comment except that 
at least part of it was unnecessary if the practice of the 
War Department was legal. To permit the temporary tres-
pass of passing cattle was surely within a power which could 
grant a license to build a church or a h9tel. It therefore 
may be regarded as certain that it was the view of Congress 
that an explicit authority was necessary for even a transient 
occupation or a military reservation for other than its special 
purpose, and it was natural when more durable interests 
were authorized by the act of July 28, 1892, they were pre-
cisely guarded and limited. 
The act of July 28 is as follows: 
"That authority be, and is hereby, given to the Secretary 
of War, when in his discretion it will be for the public good, 
to lease, for a period not exceeding five years and revocable 
at any time, such property of the United States under his 
control as may not for the time be required for public use 
and for the leasing of which there is no authority under 
existing law, and such leases shall be reported annually to 
Congress: Provided, That nothing in this act contained 
shall be held to apply to mineral or phosphate lands." 
It is not necessary to determine the character of estate 
which can be created under this section, whether one strictly 
at will and revocable by both parties or whether in the 
nature of an estate upon condition. It seems certain that 
permanence of right is forbidden by it, and hence it would 
seem that· an occupation which contemplates permanency 
or contemplates duration longer than five years is forbidden 
by it. A church edifice would seem to contemplate such 
occupation. In the instance case the character of structure 
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which is desired to be erected certainly does. As a struc-
ture-with integrity preserved-it can not be removed upon 
revocation or at the end of the term. 
It is proposed that the church shall be the property of the 
Government. The reverend gentleman who makes the offer 
says: 
"If this permission be granted, I propose to build a neat 
stone chapel to cost about $20,000; the money to be provided 
by me and the plans of the building to be submitted to the 
superintendent of the Military Academy for his approval or 
modification. On its completion, the chapel will be handed 
over to the United States Government for use in perpetuity 
of the Roman Catholics who may reside at West Point." 
This condition can not be complied with. It is very clear 
that the Secretary of War has no power to accept a donation 
of property for the Government, certainly not to accept it 
with the limitation proposed-its use in perpetuity to Roman 
Catholics. 
The action of Mr. Secretary Lamont did not respond to the 
offer-maybe excludes it. Nevertheless, there are serious 
objections to it. It gives, not a lease having a specified dura-
tion, but a license without limitation of time. 
It is provided by the license that ''the chapel will be 
erected and maintained at the cost of the licensee and his 
successors, and used for the religious worship of the Roman 
Catholics at West Point. During construction and there-
after the chapel shall be in the local custody of Rev. C. G. 
O'Keefe, rector, and his successors, under the general mili-
tary control and supervision of . the superintendent of the 
United States Military Academy. The site for the chapel 
and its dimensions will be designated by the superintendent, 
and before any work of building construction is commenced 
the plans and specifications of the structure will be submitted 
to and rece,ive his approval, and he will also assure himself 
that funds adequate to the completion of the chapel are 
available. In case of revocation of this license, the building 
will be removed within sixty days, and any sum which may 
have to be expended in putting any premises or property 
hereby authorized to be occupied or used in as good condi-
tion for use by the United States as it is at this date shall 
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be repaid by said the Right Rev. M. A. Corrigan or his 
successors, archbishops of the archdiocese of New York, on 
demand." 
By order of April 2, 1897, the license was revoked and 
another granted by you which has the same general provi-
sions, but specifically requires the chapel to be of stone and of 
dimensions indicated upon a blue-print plau attached to the 
license and made a part of it. By this the dimensions of the 
chapel will be 37 feet wide in its narrowest part ; 58 feet at 
its widest part, with a length of over 75 feet. It is to be 
removed within six months after notice of revocation. 
That these licenses transcend the statute is plain. The 
statute provides for a definite term, with a power of even 
revoking that. ·The licenses provide for no term, and really 
commit the Government to a practical perpetuity. It would 
be idle to deny this-idle to deny that you do not expect to 
exercise, nor is it expected that you will exercise, the power 
of revocation except in emergency. Indeed a contention, not 
without some authority, could be raised that you could not. 
( Veghte v. Rantan, 19 N. J., 142; Willia,mson, etc., R.R. v. Bat-
tle, 68 N. C., 546.) At ·any rate the Government would find 
itself embarrassed either to endure a perpetuity of right in 
the license or exercise an invidious power. 
The license should therefore be revoked and the petitioner 
remitted to Congress. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
'rhe SECRETARY OF' WAR. 
DUTIES-FEATHERS. · 
An importation of bird of paradise feathers, being composed of natural 
feathers which are neither dressed, colored, nor manufactured, is not 
within paragraph 328 of the tariff act of August 28, 1894. 
ff a special meaning has been attached to certain words in a prior tariff 
act, it is presumed that Congress intended that they should have the 
same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the 
same subject-matter. 
A sure method of interpreting a provision in a tariff law is bv its past 
history. • 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 7, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communica-
tion of June 4, asking my opinion as to the dutiable classifi-
cation of certain bird of paradise feathers, which have been 
classified by the collector as ornamental feathers suitable for 
millinery use under paragraph 328 of the tariff a.ct of August 
28, 1894, which is as follows: 
"Feathers and downs of all kinds, when dressed, colored, 
or manufactured, including quilts of down and other manu-
factures of down, and also including dressed and :finished 
birds suitable for millinery ornaments, and artificial and 
ornamental feathers, fruits, grains, leaves, :flowers, and stems, 
or parts thereof, of whatever material composed, suitable for 
millinery use, not specially provided for in this act, thirty-
five per centum ad valorem." 
You do not submit to me any statement of the precise 
condition of these feathers, or any specific question of law, 
but ask in general my opinion as to the proper construction 
of the paragraph. Under these circumstances a long line 
of precedents would justify my returning the papers for 
revision. 
If, however, I am to understand from your letter that these 
feathers, taken from the bird of paradise, have been neither 
dressed, colored, nor manufactured, enough information is 
given me to dispose of the present case. The language of 
the paragraph in question and of the corresponding para-
graphs in immediately prior tariff acts is somewhat obscure; 
but a satisfactory interpretation may be reached by tracing 
the language back to the act of June 30, 1864, chapter 171. 
By section 11 of that act a rate of duty was provided for 
'' ostrich, vulture, cock, and other ornamental feathers, 
crude or not dressed, colored or manufactured," and a higher 
rate for such feathers "when dressed, colored, or manu-
factured." Section 12 provided separately for "artificial 
and ornamental feather and fi<?wers, or parts thereof, of 
whatever material composed, not otherwise provided for." 
Clearly section 11 covered all natural ornamental feathers, 
while ection 12 was intended only for artificial feathers; the 
phra e "artificial and ornamental" in the latter section being 
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construed as if the conjunction " and" had been omitted. 
But "if a special meaning were attached to certain words in 
a pri_or tariff act," there is a presumption of some force " that 
Congress intended that they should have the same significa-
tion when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same 
subject-matter.'' (Mq,ddock v. Magone, 152 U. S., 368, 371-
372.) I find no sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption 
in the present instance. 
I think, therefore, that paragraph 328 of the present act 
(which really contains two independent categories, the former 
ending with the words "millinery ornaments") should be read 
as if the word" and" were omitted after the word" artificial." . . 
Hence the importation under consideration, being com-
posed of natural feathers which are neither dressed, colored, 
nor manufactured, is not within it. 
In construin_g the phrase "artificial and ornamental" I do 
not base my ruling upon any analogy drawn from the pro-
vision concerning "embroidered and hemstitched handker-
chiefs.'' It is sufficient to dispose of the present paragraph 
by its past history, which is one of the surest methods of inter-
pretation in dealing with our complicated tariff laws. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
TAX ON PASSENGERS. 
The passengers on whom the tax provided by the acts of August 3, 1882,. 
and August 18, 18!:l4, is imposed, are those who make the United States 
their place of destination, and not those who touch at our ports en 
route to some other country. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 15, 1897. 
Sm: I have the h~:mor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of June 8, transmitting a copy of a letter of 
19th of May, from the collector of customs at San Francisco 
' "relative to an application by the Occidental and Oriental
Steamship Company for a refund of certain per capita tax 
paid by said company on 35 Japanese passengers who arrived 
at .. San Francisco per steamer Gaelic, April 10, 1897." 
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It appears from your lett r and the letter accompanying 
it that these Japane e pa s ng rs bought their tickets at 
Yokohama, in Japan, for transportation from t.hat point to 
San Benito, Mexico. That they arrived in San Francisco 
en route and were there tran ferred, under the supervision 
and direction of the officers of the United Stat es Customs 
Service, to the steamship City of Para, to be transported to 
San Benito. 
You ask for my opinion "whether the tax accrued on the 
35 Japanese passengers arriving per Gaelic, as mentioned 
above." 
The act of August 3, 1882, entitled "An act to regulate 
immigration," provides: 
'' That there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of 
fifty cents for each and every passenger, not a citizen of the 
United States, who shall come by steam or sail vessel from 
a foreign port to any port within the United States." 
It further provides that this duty shall be paid "within 
twenty-four hours after the entry thereof into such port;" 
and still further; that the money thus collected "shall be 
paid into the United States Treasury and shall constitute a 
fund to be called the immigrant fund." 
By act of August 18, 1894: (28 Stat., 372), this head money 
duty was increased from 50 cents to $1. 
From the whole course of legislation on this subject, as 
well as from the expressions of opinion of the judges in the 
ca~es which have come before the Supreme Court, it is quite 
plain that the passengers on whom the capitation tax is laid 
are those who make the United States their place of destina-
tion and not those who merely touch at our ports en route to 
some other country. 
In Henderson et al. v. The Mayor of New York (92 U.S., 
274:) the main question was as to the right of the State of 
New York to impose such a duty. But Mr. Justice Miller, 
in delivering the opinion of the court, has defined the nature 
of this tax: 
"It is, as we have already said, in effect a tax on the pas-
senger which he pays for the right to make the voyage-a 
voyage only completed when he lands on the American 
shore." 
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The. landing is not a casual, transient halt-a mere coming 
ashore while the vessel is in port delivering or receiving pas-
sengers and freight-but a final and permanent landing, so 
far as that voyage is concerned,- at a port within the United 
States which was the "desired haven" which the passenger 
set out to reach. 
I have no doubt that the 35 Japanese passengers were not 
such as within the meaning and intent of the statute the 







The SECRET.A.RY OF TiIE TREASURY. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-PARKS .A.ND RESERVATIONS. 
Under the act of March 3, 1897, making appropriations for the District 
of Columbia, the laying of conduits or erection of overhead wires for 
electric lighting in any park or reservation for the purpose of light-
ing the park or reservation is prohibited. 
DEP ..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 16, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the 
letter of Colonel Bingham, of June 2, 1897, to Gen. John M. 
Wilson, Chief of Engineers, U.S. A., with the indorsements 
thereon of the Acting Chief of Engineers and of the .Acting 
Secretary of War, in which my opinion is requested "as to 
whether either the Commissioners of the District of Colum-
bia or the officer in charge of public buildings and grounds, 
under the terms of the act approved March 3, 1897, making 
appropriations for the government of the District of Colum-
bia, can authorize the laying of conduits or erection of over- . 
head wires, for electric lighting purposes, in any park or 
reservation for the purpose of lighting the park or reserva-
tion." 
By act approved March 3, 1897 (29 Stat., 673), it was pro-
vided: 
''Until Congress shall provide for a conduit system, it shall 
be unlawful to lay conduits, or erect overhead wires for elec-
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tric lighting purpo es, in any road, str et, avenue, highway, 
park or reservation, exc pt as hereafter pecifically author-
ized by law. Provided, however, that the Commissioners of 
the District of Columbia are her by authorized to issue per-
mits for house connections with conduit and overhead wires 
now existing adjacent to the premises with which such con-
nection is to be made, and also permits for public lighting 
connections with conduits already in the portions of the 
street proposed to be lighted; * * * nor t.o prevent the 
United States Electric Lighting Company from extending 
its conduits into Columbia Heights and Mount Pleasant 
within the fire limits, as specifically provided in the act of 
June 11, 1896, making appropriations for the expenses of the 
government of the District of Columbia." 
I am of opinion that under this act, the laying of conduits, 
or erection of overhead wires, for electric lighting purposes, 
in any park or reservation for the purpose of lighting the 
park or reservation is prohibited. 
Very respectfully, 
.Approved. 




OPENING OF BIDS. 
There is nothing in the acts of Ja~uary 27 and April 21, 1894, amending 
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, inconsistent with the legal right 
of the board of award of the Department of Agriculture to consider 
any bid received by them through the mail after the hour of 2 o'clock 
p.m. 
The designation of 2 o'clock p. m. '' for the opening of all such proposals 
in each Department" means only that such proposals shall not be 
opened before 2 o'clock p. m. 
A proposal received after that hour, under circumstances which war-
raute(l the belief that it had been prepared and submitted in the light 
of the proposals submitted by other bidders, which had been already 
opened and made known, should not be received or entertained; but 
a proposal received under conditions which precluded the possibility 
of such unfairness should not be rejected because it happens to be 
received by the board of award a few minutes after 2 o'clock p. m. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 16, i897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letters of May 17 and May 21, 1897, inclosing a letter of 
W. B. Dodson, postmaster at Akron, Ohio. 
Referring to the act approved January 27, 1894, amending 
section 3709, Revised Statutes, you ask-
" In view of the above, if the board of award of this Depart-
ment, appointed for the purpose of opening and considering 
bids under section 3709, has the legal right to consider any 
bid received by them through the mail after the hour of 2 
o'clock p. m." 
The act of January 27, 1894 (28 Stat., 33), providing for 
advertisements for proposals for supplies for the Executive 
Departments of the Government, provides that they-
" Shall continue to bffadvertised for and purchased as now 
provided by law, on the same days and shall each designate 
~ o'clock postmeridian of such days for the opening of all 
such proposals in each department and other Government 
establishment in the city of Washing ton. 
"And the Secretary of the Treasury shall designate the 
day or days in each year for the opening of such proposals 
and give due notice thereof to the other departments and 
Government establishments." 
Your letters do not disclose the kind of supplies for which 
bids were invited, and I venture to call your attention to the 
subsequent act of April 21, 1894 (28 Stat., 58),in which the act 
of January 27, 1894, is amended in very important particulars. 
I :find nothing in the legislation referred to which is incon-
sistent with the legal right of the board of award of the 
Department of Agriculture to consider any bid received by 
them through the mail after the hour of 2 o'clock p. m. 
The designation of 2 o'clock p. m. ·' for the opening of all 
such proposals in each department" means only that such 
proposals shall not be opened before 2 o'clock p. m. Cer-
tainly cases may and doubtless frequently do occur where 
the number of bids or proposals is so great as to occupy many 
minutes and perhaps hours in opening and considering them. 
All can not be opened _exactly at 2 o'clock. 
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The fact that one bid may arrive by mail after 2 o'clock p. m. 
and reach the hands of the board of award before they have 
opened all the bids which were received before 2 o'clock p. 
m. can hardly be accepted as sufficient ground for discard-
ing altogether the belated bid; and especially, as in the 
present case, where it appears from the letter of the post-
master that "the special delivery package mailed by' Wer-
ner Company' at .A.kron, Ohio, should by due course of mail 
have reached Washington at 1.25 p. m." 
The object .of the statute is to secure fairness and impar-
tiality in awarding Government contracts; and where proper 
notice has been given by advertisement and the time and 
the place for opening such proposals designated and pub· 
lished, one submitting his bid or proposal and forwarding 
the same by due course of mail, by which it should have 
been delivered before 2 o'clock p. m., should not be deprived 
of his right to participate in the competitive bidding because 
his letter containing his bid did not reach the board of award 
until a few minutes after 2 p. m. 
The statute should receive a reasonable construction and 
one in consonance with its manifest object and intent. 
The interests of the Government are best secured by the 
larger number of competitive bids from which selection may 
be made. 
By designating a certain hour on a fixed day "for the 
opening of all such proposals," both the Government and 
the bidders have secured to them the advantage of a pre-
scribed moment prior to whfoh no bids can be opened. 
The statute does not say that all proposals must be received 
prior to 2 o'clock p. m., but it designates that hour for the 
opening of the proposals. 
To be sure, a proposal received after that hour, under cir-
cumstance~ which warranted the belief that it had been pre-
pared and submitted in the light of the proposals submitted 
by other bidders, which had been already opened and made 
known, should not be received or entertained; but a pro-
posal received under conditions which precluded the possi-
bility of such unfairness should not be rejected because it 
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The SECRET.A.RY OF AGRICULTURE. 
REMISSION OF PENALTIES. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has not the right, in case of an applica-
tion for a remisson of penalty under section 17 of the act of June 22, 
1874, to prosecute a further inquiry into the facts after the United 
States commissioner has reported his :findings in the case under sec-
tion 18 of said act. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
June 22, 1897. 
SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communica-
tion of May 17, inclosing a copy of a letter from you to the 
Solicitor of the Treasury, and his reply thereto, conveying 
his opinion upon the question submitted to him in your let-
ter and a written brief from Messrs. Curie, Smith & Mackie, 
attorneys for petitioners. 
You submit for my opinion the question whether the Sec-
retary of tlie Treasury, in case of an application for remission 
of penalty under section 17 of the act of June 22, 1874, has 
the right, after the United States commissioner has reported 
his findings in the case under section 18 of said act, "to pros-
ecute a further inquiry into the facts." 
Section 17 provides that thP. person seeking remission of 
the penalty-
* * * "Shall present his petition to the judge of the 
district in which the alleged violation occurred, or in which 
the property is situated, setting- forth truly and particularly 
the facts and circumstances of the case and praying for relief, 
such judge shall, if the case in his judgment requires, proceed 
to inquire in a summary manner into the circumstances of the 
case at such reasonable time as may be fixed by him for that 
purpose, of which the district attorney and the collector 
shall be notified by the petitioner in order that they may 
attend and show cause why the petition should be refused. 
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" EC. 1 . in i ation hereby pro-
vided for ma b h h jud to whom the petition 
is pre ented, or, if he h, 11 lir t, b fore any United States 
commi ion r for u h di tri , aud the facts appearing 
thereon hall b t, t d ml ann d to the petition, and, 
together with a certifi d 1\ of h vidence, transmitted to 
the ecretar oftbeTrea ury,, ho hall thereupon have power 
to mitigate or remit uch :flu , penalty, or forfeiture, or remove 
such disability, or any part thereof, if in his opinion the same 
shall have been incurred without willful negligence or any 
intention of fraud in the person or persons incurring the 
same, and to direct the prosecution, if any shall have been 
instituted for the recovery thereof, to cease and be discon-
tinued upon such terms or conditions as he may deem rea-
sonable and just." 
Under these t.wo sections the judge or commissioner is in-
vested with the power and charged with the duty of ascer-
taining the facts of the case presented in the petition and of 
stating the facts so ascertained, and of transmitting such 
statement, together with the petition and a certified copy of 
the evidence, to the Secretary of the Treasury, ~, who shall 
thereupon have power to mitigate or remit," etc. 
Plainly the responsibility is not laid upon the Secretary of 
the Treasury of ascertaining the facts; but upon the case 
stated in the petition and upon the statement of the facts 
ascertained by the judge or commissioner and upon the cer-
tified copy of the evidence, the Secretary of the Treasury 
must form his opinion; and if in his opinion the penalty has 
been incurred "without willful negligence or any intention of 
fraud," he may direct the prosecution to be discontinued upon 
such terms as to him may seem proper. 
Now here in the letter or reason of the statute does it 
appear to have been contemplated that after the judge or 
commissioner has conducted his investigation inter partes 
that the Secretary of the Treasury should have the power by 
an ex parte and secret investigation to supplement the facts 
already ascertained. 
It was the opinion of Attorney-General Harmon (21 Opin., 
289) that in the case presented to him by your predecessor 
in office it was within the discretion of the Secretary "in 
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remission proceedings under the antimoiety act of June 2:2, 
187 4, chapter 391, sections 17 and 18, to return the findings 
to the United States commissioner for a further hearing 
before him upon a claim of newly discovered evidence." 
I am of the opinion that you have not the right, in case of 
an application for a remission of penalty under section 17 of 
the act of June 22, 187 4, to prosecute a further inquiry into 
the facts after the United States commissioner has reported 






The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE. 
The provision of the act of June 4, 1897, "that any chief engineer of the 
Revenue-Cutter Service who has held the office of engineer in chief 
shall hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of said 
service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the office of captain 
of engineers in said service, with the pay and emoluments of such 
captain," creates the office of captain of engineers; the pay is that of 
a captain of the revenue service, and the appointment is to be made 
from the chief engineers who have held the office of engineer in chief, 
and by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The word "such" ordinarily refers to the next immediate antecedent, 
but not necessarily; never when the purpose of the section in which 
it is used would thereby be impaired. 
DEPA.RTMEN'.I.' OF JUSTICE, 
June 25, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of June 14, in which you recite from the 
act approved June 4, 1897, making appropriations for sundry 
civil expenses for the Government for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1898, and for other purposes, the following pro-
vision: 
'' Provided, That any chief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter 
Service who has held the office of engineer in chief shall 
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hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of 
said service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the 
office of captain of engineers in said service, with the pay 
and emoluments of such captain." 
You request my opinion on the following points: 
"1. As there is not now and never has been any such 
,grade' or 'title' as 'captain of engineers' in the revenue 
service, and as a consequence no salary for such 'captain of 
engineers' has been fixed by law, does the provision cited 
create the office of 'captain of engineers 1' 
"2. If the grade of 'captain of engineers' is created by 
the provision cited, and it is filled by appointment, what 
would be the 'pay and emoluments' of such 'captain of engi-
neers 1'" 
You transmit with your letter a copy of an opinion of the 
Solicitor of the Treasury. 
The legislation on tbe subject of the Revenue-Cutter 
Service which preceded the provision, the interpretation of 
which is solicited, is as follows: 
"SEC. 27 49, R. S. The officers for each revenue vessel shall 
be one captain and one first, one second, and one third lieu-
tenant, and for each steam vessel, in addition, one engineer 
and one assistant engineer, etc. 
"SEC. 2750. The grades of engineers shall be chief engi-
neer and first and second assistant engineer, with the pay 
and relative rank of first, second, and third lieutenant 
respectively. 
"SEC. 2751. The commissioned officers of the Revenue-Cut-
ter Service shall be appointed by the President, by and with 
tbe advice and consent of the Senate. 
"SEC. 2752. No person shall be appointed to the office of 
captain, first, second, or third lieutenant of any revenue 
cutter who does not adduce competent proof of proficiency 
and skill in navigation and seamanship. 
~, SEC. 2753. The compensation of the officers of the Reve-
nue-Cutter ServicA shall be at the following rates while on 
duty: 
"Captains, twenty-five hundred dollars a year each. 
'' First lieutenants and chief engineers, eighteen hundred 
dollars a year each." 
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By act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 172), it is provided-
" That the Secretary of the Treasury shall detail a cap-
tain of the Revenue-Cutter Service, who shall be chief of the 
division of Revenue-Cutter Service; and a chief engineer, 
who shall be ~ngineer in chief of said service; but no addi-
tional pay or emoluments shall be allowed on account of such 
detail." 
By the appropriation act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat., 149), it 
is provided-
'' That the chief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter Service 
detailed as engineer in chief of said service under the pro-
visions of the legislative appropriation act of July 31, 1894, 
shall hereafter receive the duty pay and have the relative 
rank of a captain of the Revenue-Cutter Service." 
This was the state of legislation when the provision of 
June 30, 1898, was enacted, and which I reveat here for con-
venient connection: 
"Provided, That any cp.ief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter 
, Service who has held the office of engineer in chief shall 
hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of 
said service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the 
office of captain of engineers in said service with the pay . 
and emoluments of such captain." 
This provision is certainly not clear, but it may be assumed 
that it was intended to be an addition to then existing law, 
and I think, notwithstanding its obscurity, the intention of 
Congress may be discerned. · 
It will be observed that rank by detail and the pay thereof 
had been provided for by previous legislation. Fixity of 
rank was evidently intended to be made by the new pro-
vision. .A. new grade was therefore to be created, and ( as 
accessory to it) the pay of it and a class of officers eligible 
to it were to be provided. In providing for these, confus.ion 
of expression occurred, but keeping to intention it is easily 
resolvable by the application of well-known rules of inter-
pretation. 
- The legislation was to have a present operation. It could 
not have unless it created a new grade-an eligible class 
and pay were but accessories to that, as we have seen. If 
this is so, and the words of the statute be not inconsistent 
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with it, they must be so construed. The important inquiry 
always is the legislative intent. 
The Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Clifford, in Kohlsaat 
v. Murphy (96 U. S., 160), said: 
''Rules and maxims of interpretation are ordained as aids 
in discovering the true intent and meaning of any particular 
enactment; bnt the ~on trolling rule of decision in applying 
the statute in any particular case is that whenever the 
intention of the legislature can be discovered from the words 
employed, in view of the subject-matter and the surround-
ing circumstances, it ought to prevail, unless it leads to 
absurd and irrational conclusions, which should never be 
imputed to the legislature, except when the language 
employed will admit of no other signification." 
See also Neal v. Clark (95 U. S., 704). 
In Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold, etc., Oo. (93 U. S., 634), the 
Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Davis, said: 
"If a literal interpretation of any part of it would operate 
unjustly, or lead to absurd results, or be contrary to the evi-
dent meaning of the act taken as a whole, it should be 
rejected. There is no better way of discovering its true 
. meaning, when expressions in it are rendered ambiguous by 
their connection with other clauses, than by considering 
the necessity for it, and the causes which induced its 
enactment." 
The causes which induced the enactment of the cited pro-
vision were, as we have seen, to make a new grade in the 
revenue service, and the language employed, though not as 
direct or as apt as it might be, is nevertheless sufficient, "in 
view of the subject-matter and surrounding circumstances." 
There is no defect. The name or title of the grade is given, 
the qualifications necessary to attain it are prescribed, and 
also the method of appointment, and from what class of 
officers. 
The assumption of the existence of a grade or the recog-
nition of it is enough for its creation. A striking example 
of this kind, and especially applicable, is the case of Post-
master-General v. Early (12 Wheat., 135). In March, 1815, 
Congress pa sed "An act to vest more effectually in the State 
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courts and in the district courts of the United States juris-
diction in the cases therein mentioned." The fourth section 
contained this clause: "And be it further enacted, That the 
district court of the United States shall have cognizance, 
concurrent with the courts and magistrates of the several 
States, and the circuit courts of the United States, of all 
suits at common law, where the United States, or any officer 
thereof, under the authority of any act of Oongress, shall 
sue, although the debt, claim, or other matter in dispute 
shall not amount to one hundred dollars." 
The question arose, did this clause give jurisdiction to the 
circuit court of the United States as well as the district 
court, The court, by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, said: 
"The language of the act is, that the district court shall 
have cognizance, concurrent with the courts and magistrates 
of the several States and the circuit courts of the United 
States, of all suits, etc. What is the meaning and purport 
of the words '. concurrent with' the circuit courts of the 
United States, Are they entirely senseless, Are they to 
be excluded from the clause in which the legislature has 
inserted them, or are they to be taken into view and allowed 
the effect of which they are capable¥ The words are cer-
tainly not senseless. They have a plain and obvious mean-
ing. And it is, we think, a rule that words which have a 
meaning are not to be entirely disregarded in construing a 
statute. We can not understand this clause as if these words 
were excluded from it. They, perhaps, manifest the opinion 
of the legislature that the jurisdiction was in the . circuit 
courts; but ought, we think, to be construed to give it, if it 
did not previously exist. * * * It has been said, and per-
haps truly, that this section was not framed with the inten-
tion of vesting jurisdiction in the circuit courts. The title of 
the act, and the language of the sentence, are supposed to 
concur in sustaining this proposition. The title speaks only 
of State courts. But it is well settled that the title can not 
restrain the enacting clause. It is true that the language of 
the section indicates the opinion that jurisdiction existed in 
the circuit courts, rather than an intention to give it; and 
a mistaken opinion of the legislature concerning the law 
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does not make the law. But if this mistake be manifested 
in words competent to make the Jaw in future, we know of 
no principle which can deny them this effect. The legisla-
ture may pass a declaratory act, which, though inoperative 
on the past, may act in future. This Jaw expresses the sense 
oft.be legislature on the existing law as plainly as a declara-
tory act, and expresses it in terms capable of conferring the 
jurisdiction. We think, therefore, that in a case plainly 
within the judicial power of the Federal courts, as prescribed 
in the Constitution, and plainly within the general policy of 
the legislature, the words ought to receive this construction." 
See also State v. 111.iller (23 Wis., 634). 
Another difficulty is urged in your second proposition. 
You ask: 
" If the grade of captain of engineers is created by the 
provision cited, and it is filled by the appointment, what 
would be the 'pay and emoluments' of such 'captain of 
engineers'1" 
To appreciate the reason of the inquiry, we must agah1 
quote the "cited provision:" 
"Provided, That any chief engineer of the Revenue-Cutter 
Service, who has held the office of engineer in chief, shall 
hereafter receive the pay and emoluments of a captain of 
said service, and shall be eligible for appointment to the 
office of captain of engineers in said service, with the pay 
and emoluments of such captain." 
The ambiguity is in the relation of the words " such cap-
tain." It is easily resolved. Ordinarily the word "such" 
refers to the next immediate antecedent, but not necessarily; 
never when the purpose of the section would thereby be 
impaired. (Summerman v. Knowles, 33 N. J., 205.) 
Broom, in his Legal Maxims, after- quoting the maxim 
"Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, msi impediatur sen-
tentia," says : 
" Relative words must ordinarily be referred to the next 
antecedent, where the intent upon the whole deed or instru-
ment does not appear to the contrary, and where the matter 
itself doth not hinder it; the 'last antecedent ' being the 
la t word which can be made an antecedent so as to have a 
m aning. 
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"But although the above general proposition is true in 
strict grammatical construction, yet there are numerous 
examples in the best writers to show that the context may 
often require a deviation from this rule, and tllat the rela-
tive may be connected with nouns which go before the last 
antecedent, and either take from it or give to it some 
qualification." 
The learned author cites numerous authorities to sustain 
his text. 
Applying the rule to the "cited provision," the words 
"such captain" must be held to refer to the captain of the 
revenue service. That office had defined emoluments. It 
was naturally made a measure, and, so regarding it, meaning 
and completeness is given to the language used. It would 
be defective else, and hence an exception to the maxim of 
relation is necessarily indicated. 
From these views it follows that the ' 4 cited provision," 
creates (1) the office of captain of engineers; (2) the pay is 
that of the captain of the revenue service, to wit, $2,500 per 
annum (Rev. Stat., 2753); (3) the appointment is to be made 
from the chief engineers who have held the office of engineer-
in-chief, and (4) by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate ( sec. 2751 ). 
Respectfully, yours, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
TAX ON CIRCULATING NOTES-ATTORNEY-GENERAL-COM-
PROMISE. 
Banks of the United States are liable for the tax of 10 per cent on the 
circulating notes issued by banks in Canada, for circulation in Canada, 
which have passed over the line and been received by such United 
States banks and paid out by them within the United States. 
The intent and meaning of the twentieth section of the act of February 
8, 1875, was to apply the tax to the amount of the circulating notes 
issued by any of the persons or corporations named in the statute, and 
used by the banks and other persons therein named. 
Whether the statute of limitations does or does not bar a claim on behalf 
of the Government is a judicial question to be determined by the 
courts and not by the Attorney-General. 
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It does not appear to be necessary that resort should be had by the 
Government to a "suit or prosecution" in order to a recovery of the 
penalty of 5 per cent and the interest of 1 per cent per month for 
which the banks are liable. 
This is a case which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the 
advice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, may compromise 
under section 3229, Revised Statutes. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Jiine 25, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of May 12, presenting for my opinion the 
questions arising out of the use by the Calais National Bank 
and the Calais S~vings Bank, in common with other banks 
of Calais, Me., of circulating notes issued by banks in Canada 
for circulation in Canada, which had passed over the line 
and been received by banks of the United States and paid 
out by them within the United States. 
It appears from the recitals in your letter that upon the 
returns made by the banks of Calais, Me., an assessment was 
made by the Treasury Department of 10 p·er cent upon the 
circulating notes of Canada banks, which had been received 
and paid out within the United States by the banks in 
Calais, under and in pursuance of section 20 of the act of 
February 8, 1875 (18 Stat., 311). 
You request an opinion upon the following points herein-
after stated: · 
You call my attention to the opinion of Solicitor-General 
Aldrich (20 Opin., 534), and state that in view of certain 
questions presented to you in the printed brief, which do 
not appear to have been considered by Solicitor-General 
Aldrich, and in view of the brevity of his opinion, you "deem 
it advisable to obtain a further opinion on the points argued 
by counsel in their brief." 
The delay in replying to your request has been occasioned 
by frequent oral arguments submitted to me, in the interval, 
by counsel on behalf of the banks. 
I have considered fully and attentively the case as pre-
sented in your letter, in the light of the law bearing upon it 
and the argument of counsel. 
To the first point, "Are the banks liable for the tax of 
10 -per cent on tbe circulating bank notes of the banks of 
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St. Stephens, received and paid out as current funds, upon 
the facts stated below, under the act of February 8, 1875," 
I reply that they are. 
The act of February 8, 1875 (18 Stat., 307), provides: 
" SEC. rn. That every person, firm, association, other than 
national banking associations, and every corporation, State 
bank, or State banking association, shall pay a tax of ten 
per centum on the amount of their own notes used for cir-
culation and paid out by them. 
" SEC. 20. That every such person, firm, association, cor-
poration, State bank, or State banking association, and also 
every national banking association, shall pay a like tax of 
ten per centum on the amount of notes of any person, firm, 
association, other than a national banking association, or of 
any town, city, or municipal corporation, used for circulation 
and paid out by them." 
It is insisted that the words "used for circulation," which 
were added to section 20 by the act of February 8, 1875, were 
intended :to restrict the meaning and effect of the · words 
"paid out by them," which occur in the previous statutes. 
Perhaps a recurrence to the antecedent legislation will 
afford the safest interpretation of the intent and purpose of 
Congress as we find it declared in the varying forms of 
expression employed in successive acts. 
On the 17th day of July, 1862, Congress enacted: 
'' No private corporation, banking association, firm, or 
individual, shall make, issue, circulate, or pay any note, 
check, memorandum, token, or other obligation, for a less 
sum than one dollar:, intended to circulate as money, or to 
be received and used in lieu of lawful money of the United 
States." 
March 3, 1863, Congress enacted-
" That all banks, associations, corporations, or individuals 
issuing notes or bills for circulation as currency shall be 
subject to and pay a duty * * * upon the average 
amount of circulation of notes or bills as currency issuing 
beyond the amount hereinafter named." * * "' 
June 30, 1864, an act was passed imposing a duty upon 
the average amount of circulation issued by-
" Circulation issued by any bank, association, corporation, 
company, or person, including as circulation all certified 
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caecks, and all notes and other obligations calculated or 
intended to circulate or to be used as money." * * * 
March 3, 1865, it was further enacted-
" That every national banking association, State bank, or 
State banking association shall pay a tax of ten per centum 
on the amount of notes of any State bank or State banking 
association paid out by them after the :first day of July, 1866." 
On the 13th of July, 1866, it was enacted, by amendment-
"That every national banking association, State bank, or 
State banking association shall pay a tax of ten per centum 
on the amount of notes of any person, State bank, or State 
banking association used for circulation and paid out by 
them after the :first day of August, 1866." 
March 26, 1867, it was enacted-
" That every national banking association, State bank, or 
banker, or association shall pay a tax of ten per centum on 
the amount of notes of any town, city, or municipal corpo-
ration paid out by them after the first day of May." * * * 
February 8, 1875, the act of which sections 19 and 20 are 
a part was enacted, and is the law under which these assess-
ments complained of were made. 
It is quite evident from this that the words "used for cir-
culation" and "paid out by them," were understood and 
intended to mean very different things. 
A. bank might pay out notes, such as notes " payable in 
merchandise," not intending that they should be "used for 
circulation." On the other hand, they might have in their 
possession notes to be used for circulation, but as to which 
they would not be liable to tbe tax unless such notes were 
actually '' paid out" by them. An illustration of this is pre-
sented in the opinion of Attorney-General Olney (20 Opin., 
695), in which he held that notes of a national bank, properly 
executed and ready to be issued, are not liable to the tax 
while they remain in the vaults of the bank. 
The main object of all the Federal legislation on this subject 
was to secure for the national currency the exclusive use in 
the United States as a circulating medium; and this object 
was sought to be effected by imposing upon all competitive 
paper money such a tax as would make its issue unprofitable. 
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In National Bank v. United States, decided October term, 
1879 (101 U. S., 1), the question of the constitutionality of 
section 3413, Revised Statutes, imposing a tax of 10 per 
centum "on the amount of notes of any town, city, or muni-
cipal corporation" paid out by any bank or. banker, Chief 
Justice Waite said : 
" The tax is' on the notes paid out; that is, made use of as 
a circulating medium. Such a use is against the policy of 
the United States. Therefore, the banker who helps to keep 
up the use by paying them out-that is, employing them as 
the equivalent of money iu discharging his obligations-is 
taxed for what he does. The taxation was no doubt intended 
to destroy the use; but that, as has just been seen, Congress 
had the power to do." 
Had this decision been made before the passage of the act 
of February 8, 1875, Congress might have deemed it unneces-
sary to amend section 3413, Revised Statutes, by adding the 
words" used for circulation," for .the Supreme Court, in that 
opinion, very clearly indicated that the banker who pays out 
notes thereby helps to keep up their use as a circulating 
medium. 
We have seen that from the earliest act of Congress-that 
of July, 1862-down to the latest, the prohibition has been 
laid upon the use of notes ''intended to circulate as money," 
''for circulation as currency," "intended to circulate, or to 
be used as money," and "used for circulation." 
By the act of March 3, 1863, a duty was imposed upon 
banks or individuals "issuing notes or bills for circulation 
as currency." 
On March 3, 1865, a tax was imposed upon banks of 10 per 
cent on the amount of notes of any State bank paid out by 
them. 
Up to that time banks had been required to pay the duty 
or tax only on the average amount of notes issued by them-
that is, made by them. But it was discovered that this was 
not sufficient to_ effect the principal object of destroying all 
competition with national currency. That, for one bank of 
circulation which paid a tax on notes issued by it, there 
might be a hundred banks of discount and deposit which 
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had no circulation of their own but which received their 
deposits and paid out their discounts in the notes of the 
bank of circu1ation, thereby giving· to them extensive circu-
lation; and if such notes were issued by a national bank, 
their extended use by the banks having no circulation of 
their own took away inducement to the cre~tion of addi-
tional national banks; and if the circulation was that of a 
State bank, it offered dangerous competition to the national 
currency, and was enabled to pay the tax on the circulation 
issued by it by reason of the untaxed use of that circulation 
by other banks having no circulation of their own. 
It was doubtless to meet this contingency that the act of 
March 3, 1865, was passed, which by a process of evolution 
bas taken on the form it now wears under the act of Febru-
ary 8, 1875. 
Some of the inferior Federal courts have l1eld that the mere 
paying out of notes by a bank was evidence of the intent to 
use them for circulation. But in many parts of the country 
individuals, partnerships, and corporations engaged in min-
ing or manufacturing enterprises, for the convenient conduct 
of their own business, issued certificates or promises to pay 
in merchandise, designed originally for use between the 
employer and the employees alone, but which gradually 
acquired neighborhood circulation. And in 1884 the question 
came before the Supreme Court in Hollister v. Merca,nti le 
Institution (111 U.S., 62), whether notes payable "to bearer 
for a gi-ven sum in merchandise at retail, paid out and used 
as circulation, were subject to the 10 per cent tax imposed 
by the statute of February 8, 1875 (18 Stat., 311)." Chief 
Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 
"From this review of the legislation on the general sub-
ject, and the apparently studied use by Congress of words 
of appropriate signification whenever it was intended to 
cover anything else than promissory notes, in the commer-
cial sense of that term, we are led to the conclusion that 
only such notes as are in law negotiable, so as to carry title 
in their circulation from hand to hand, are the subjects of 
taxation under the statute. It was, no doubt, the purpose 
of Congress, in imposing this tax, to provide against compe-
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tition with the established national currency for circulation 
as money, but as it was not likely that obligations payable 
in anything else than money would pass beyond a limited 
neighborhood, no attention was given to such issues as 
affecting the volume•of the currency or its circulating value." 
Such notes, therefore, although "paid out" by the banks, 
were not regarded as" used for circulation." 
A distinction is sought to be taken between '' notes used 
for circulation" and '' notes used as current funds." 
The distinction, if any exists, is too impalpable to form a 
difference. And if, indeed, such difference existed, it would 
be difficult to understand the necessity for and meaning of 
section ZO of the act of February 8, 1875. 
The paper circulating medium of the country consists of 
the notes issued directly by the United States, the national 
bank notes, and the State bank notes-if any exist. 
The notes paid out and used for circulation by the banks 
are the notes issued by the bank which first pays them out 
and the notes of the United States and of the other banks. 
Section 19 provides that every person and corporation, 
other than a national banking association, shall pay a tax of 
10 per cent on the amount of their own notes used for cir-
culation and paid out by them. 
Section 20 provides that every such person or corporation 
and "also every national banking association" shall pay a 
tax of 10 per cent on the amount of the notes of any person, 
firm, or corporation, other than a national banking association, 
used for circulation and paid out by them. 
What effect section 20 could possibly have except to im-
pose a tax on the amount of other notes than its own, paid 
out by a bank as circulation, is difficult to see. 
A vague notion has been suggested that section 20 was 
intended to apply to cases in which one bank ''adopted" the 
notes issued by another bank as its own and used such notes 
for circulation. 
But if any such case has actually occurred I have been 
unable to discover evidence of it, and certainly it can not be 
said that they have been of such frequent occurrence as to 
have induced the enactment of a legislative remedy to meet . 
them. ' 
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The tax is not upon the creation of the notes, but upon 
their use as circulation; and if the view contended for on 
behalf of the Calais National Bank was sound, that bank, by 
its use as circulation of the notes of the Canadian banks, 
would be in the enjoyment of an immunity from the 10 per 
cent tax imposed by the Government to prevent competi-
tion with the national currency, from which all other banks 
in the United States would be excluded. 
If the tax is only that imposed by section 19 "on the 
amount of their own notes used for circulation," and does not 
reach the use of the notes issued by other persons and cor-
porations, although used for the same purpose, is it not a 
premium offered to the banks of the United States to dis-
pense with their own issue of notes and employ as a circu-
lating medium the notes of Canadian banks, and thereby get 
rid of the 10 per cent tax¥ 
I have no doubt that the intent and meaning of the twen-
tieth section was to apply the tax to the amount of the cir-
culating notes issued by any of the persons or corporations 
named in the statute and used by the banks and other per-
sons therein named. 
Second. "If the banks are liable, whether the penalty of 
5 per cent and the interest of 1 per cent per month, or any 
part thereof, is barred by the limitation in section 104 7, Re-
vised Statutes." 
Statutes of limitations apply to the legal remedies and not 
to the rights of the parties. Whether the statute of limita-
tions does or does not bar a claim on behalf of the Govern-
ment is, therefore, a judicial question to be determined by 
the courts and not by the Attorney-General. 
Section 3415, Revised Statutes, imposes "a penalty of 
$200, besides the additional penalties of forfeitures provided 
in other cases," for any refusal or neglect to make return 
and payment of the amount of circulation and tax thereon. 
It may be true that section 1047, Revised Statutes, does 
afford a bar to the maintenance of any" suit or prosecution 
for any pen"alty or forfeiture," etc., instituted more than five 
years from the time when the same accrued, but it does not 
appear to be necessary that resort should be had by the 
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Government to "suit or prosecution" in order to a recovery 
of the penalty here. 
Third. ''Whether the matter, as it now stands, is a con-
tested matter that can be compromised by and with the 
consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the provi-
sions of section 3229, Revised Statutes." 
I think this is a case which the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, with the advice and consent of the Secretary of 







The SECRET.A.RY OF THE TREASURY. 
ERECTION OF BETHEL, READING ROOM, AND LIBRARY ON 
SHIP ISLAND. 
The Secretary of War has no authority to grant permission for the 
erection of a bethel, reading room, and library within the army res-
ervation on Ship Island. (21 Opin., 537, followed). 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 7, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge tue receipt of your 
communication of July 1, in which you transmit a letter 
addressed to yourself by the Rev. Ebenezer Thompson, 
dated Biloxi, Miss., June 1, 1897, and stating in part as fol-
lows: 
"Ever since I left Lansing, eight years ago, I have been 
stationed as rector of this parish and dean of the coast. 
·' Directly opposite and in plain sight, 12 miles away, is 
the harbor of Ship Island, with 25 large vessels loading lum-
. ber. About 500 men are employed. 
" Except for Fort Massachusetts at the extreme west end, 
the light-house next, and quarantine station 2· miles east, 
there are 110 habitations on the island. It is mostly a desert, 
barren waste. The officers and men on these ships the 
light-house keeper, the stevedores, and others have ~ften 
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applied to me to do something for them, as being more com-
pletely shut off from civilizing and christianizing influences 
than almost any port of its size in the world; and at last I 
have undertaken to write to you in their behalf. 
' 1 What we want is a bethel, and a reading room and 
library, with living rooms for the keeper. 
" Money for such a building will be furnished freely. We 
have abundant offe.rs of books, newspapers, and magazines. 
"What we ask is for permission to erect ~his building on 
the army reservation. In any other port this building 
would be erected on private or purchased ground, but this 
island belongs entirely to the Government." 
You request to be advised whether this case falls within 
my opinion of May 19, 1897, in the matter of the petition 
for the erection of a Catholic chapel at West Point, N. Y. 
. I answer in the affirmative, and that the War Department 
does not possess authority to grant the permission applied 
for. The applicant, as in the West Point case, must be 
remitted to Congress. 
I return the papers herewith, as you request. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA . 
The SECRET.A.RY OF WAR. 
ROCK CREEK PARK. 
The board of control of Rock Creek Park has not the power t~ authorize 
the water department of the District of Columbia to construct a r es-
ervoir, for the use of the District, within the limits of said p ark . 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Julys, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours 
of the 1st instant, inclosing letter of Edward Burr, captain, 
Corps of Engineers, to Brig. Gen. John M. Wilson, Chief of 
Engineers, United States Army, and asking my opinion as 
to whether the board created by section 7 of the act of Sep-
tember 27, 1890, chapter 1001 (26 Stat., 492), has the power to 
authorize the water department of the District of Columbia 
to con truct a reservoir, for the use of the District, within 
the limits of Rock Creek Park. 
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Rock Creek Park was created by the act referred to, and 
the purposes for which it was created are described as fol-
lows: "That a tract of land * * * shall be secured, as 
hereinafter set out, and be perpetually dedicated and set 
apart as a public park or pleasure ground for the benefit and 
enjoyment of the people of the United States, to be known 
by the name of Rock Creek Park." 
Section 7 of the act provides that the park thus established 
"shall be under the joint control of the Commissioners of the 
District of Columbia and the Chief of Engineers of the United 
States Army, whose duty it shall be, as soon as practicable, 
to lay out and prepare roadways and bridle paths, to be 
used for driving and for horseback riding, respectively, and 
footways for pedestrians; and whose dltty it shall also be to 
make and publish such regulations as they deem necessary 
or proper for the care and management of the same. Such 
regulations shall provide for the preservation from injury or 
spoliation of all timber, animals, or curiosities within said 
park, and their retention in their natural condition, as nearly 
as possible." 
The question submitted is whether this board of control of 
lands thus designated and set apart as a public park or 
pleasure ground, for the benefit and enjoyment of the people 
of the United States, has any power or dominion over the 
park save those conferred by section 7. 
In considering this statute and the powers of the board 
of control we must not, of course, restrict it to limits 
which would preclude the objects which are plainly intended 
by the statute; that is, the creation of a public park or 
pleasure ground where people of the United States could 
resort and find a place of enjoyment. In order to constitute 
a par_k of this sort it is necessary for the board of control to 
have the power to make it a place of enjoyment and of pleas-
ure by the improvement of the scenery, the opening of road-
ways, bridle paths, footways, the construction of fountains, 
rustic seats, arbors, and such other conveniences as are 
required in a park which is set apart for the pleasure and 
enjoyment of people. It is no doubt also within their power, 
if they see proper, to plant trees, shrubbery, cultivate flower 
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f , lik n tur which wou1 d tend to 
adorn and make th plc e m r t ractive. But here the 
que tion pre ent d i wheth r r n t they can devote this. 
property thu set apart for th purpo of the erection of a 
re ervoir to be u d a a p r t of the water system of the 
District of olumbia. In other words, ha the board of con. 
trol the power to take this property, designated aud set 
apart by the act of Con-gre as a pleasure resort for all the 
people of the United State who de ire t o come and enjoy it, 
and devote it, in part, to the municipal uses of the District 
of Columbia by the erection of a reservoir to be used in con-
nection with the water system of the aid District , The 
question does not seem to admit of argumeut, and I unhesi-
tatingly say that there is no such power vested in the board 
of control. It would, in my opinion, be an entire perversion 
of the purposes of the dedication. 
If the board of control has the power, under the act, to 
authorize the water department of the District of Columbia 
to construct a reservoir within the limits of the park for the 
use of the District, then it would follow that the board has 
the right to authorize the use of the park for any other public 
purpose demanded by the District authorities, and thus this 
tract of land, which was condemned under an act of Congress 
and dedicated as a public park for the benefit of the whole 
people of the United States, might eventually be devoted 
entirely to the necessities of the District of Columbia and 
the object of the dedication defeated. 
Y ery respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL-DESER'fER FROM THE .A.RMY. 
The cases in which the Attorney-General is authorized to give opinions to 
the heads of E xecutive _Departments are such as are actually pending 
in such Dep artment s and involving the l egal questions submitted . 
.A. conv ict ed deserter from the Army, undergoing sentence, must b ecome 
the r ecipient of E xecutive clemency and must make application for 
r eenlistment b efore the question of the effect of the President's pardon 
upon his r ight t o r eenlist can arise, 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 9, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
comn;nmication of May 25, 1897, in re Thomas Buchanan, a 
convicted deserter now undergoing a sentence and who has 
on file an application for a pardon. 
The facts in this case, as set forth in your letter, are as 
follows: Thomas Buchanan is now a general prisoner at Fort 
Columbus, N. Y. He enlisted in Company H, Tenth Infan-
try, United States Army, October 5, 1891, and was discharged 
October 4, 1896, by expiration of service. He reenlisted 
October 8, 1896, in Battery H, Fifth Artillery; deserted at 
Fort Hamilton November 2, 1896; surrendered at that post 
February 1, 1897; was tried by court-martial, convicted of 
desertion, and sentenced to be dishonorably discharged, with 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and to be confined at 
Fort Columbus, N. Y., for eighteen months. Nine months of 
this sentence were remitted by the reviewing authority, and 
the prisoner is now serving sentence, which will expire 
November 16, 1897. He bas recently applied to the Presi-
dent, through military channels, for a pardon. 
In your letter you say: "To assist the Depa1·tment in 
making a recommendation in forwarding the application to 
the President, I have the honor to request your opinion on 
the following point: 
"In the event of a pardon being granted this man by the 
President, has the Secretary of War authority to permit 
him to enlist again in the Army under the present law," 
I do not deem this a case in which I am authorized to give 
an opinion. Cases in which the Attorney-General is author-
ized to give opinions to the heads of Executive Departments 
are such as are actually pending in such Departments and 
involving the legal questions submitted. Two very impor-
tant contingencies must occur before the question of the 
effect of the President's pardon to Buchanan upon his right 
to reenlist can arise. In the first place, he must become the 
recipient of the Executive clemency, and in the second place 
he must make application for reenlistment. If the Presi-
dent should pardon Buchanan, and Buchanan in turn should 
570 HON. JO EPH M°KEN A. 
r t r from t h e Arm y. 
make application to reenli t, then the question as t o the 
legal effect of the pardon upon Bu banan's disability 
incurred unuer the statute ·ov rning the reenlistment of 
solcliers would be directly pre ented, and not until then . 
I am supported in my declination to give an opinion in 
this ~atter in jts pre ' ent tatus by ~umerous opinions here-
tofore rendered, and I cite particularly 9 Opin. , 421 : " The 
Attorney-General will not give an opinion on an important 
legal question when it is not practically presented by an 
existing case before a Department." 
20 Opin., 536: ''The Attorney-General is neither required 
nor authorized to give an opinion to the head of a Depart. 
ment except in cases actually pending for decision by him 
in such Department." 
21 Opin., 109: The authority of the Attorney-General to 
advise the head of a Department "officially is confined to 
cases actually and presently arising in the administration" 
of his Department. 
Opinion . of March 25, 1897 (21 Opin., 509): "The opinion 
of the Attorney-General may be asked by the head of any 
other Executive Department ~ on any question of law arising 
in the administration or his Department.' (Rev. Stat., 356). 
The inquiry must relate not to a mere moot question, but to 
one which requires immediate action. The answer must 
be necessary for the protection of the officer making the 
inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the action which be 
is about to take." 
These citations are sufficient to indicate that this is not a 
case in which I am authorized to give an opinion. 
There is no legal principle involved in the course which 
you may take in forwarding Buchanan's application for a 
pardon to the President. You can recommend the . pardon 
or refuse to recommend it, as you may deem consistent with 
the facts in the case. An opinion upon the legal effect of a 
pardon could have no possible bearing upon the lawfulness 
of the official action to be taken in forwarding B uohanan's 
application to the President. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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DECLARATIONS TO INVOICES. 
Tho person making the declara,tion to an invoice of goods intended for 
shipment from a foreign country to the United States under sections 
2 and 3 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, is not 
required to be actually present before the consul, vice-consul, or 
commercial agent of the United States in order to authorize such 
consular officer to certify such invoice. 
All that is necessary in order to authorize such consular officer to certify 
the invoice produced, with the declaration indorsed thereon signed, 
and with the oath attached, is that he shall be satisfied that the per-
son making the oath thereto is the person he represents himself to be; 
that he is a credible person, and that the statements made under 
such oath' are true. 
If he should have doubts as to the identity of the person making the 
declaration, as to his credibility, or as to the truthfulness of the state-
ments set forth in the declaration, he would have the right to require 
the declarant to come personally before him. 
Under section 249, Revised Statutes, the Secretary of the Treasury has 
power to prescribe rules and regulations for the collection of duties 
on imports, and the question as to where and in what manner the 
oaths to the declarations indorsed on invoices shall be taken is more a 
matter of regulation or instruction for the government or" the consular 
officers than of construction of the statute. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 15, 1897. 
Sm: I find among the matters in this Department not 
acted upon by my predecessor a communication from you 
under date of December 17, 1896, asking an opinion upon 
section 3 of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890, 
chapter 407. 
You say that it has been represented to the Treasury Depart-
ment that houses which maintain branches in Manchester, 
England, for the purpose of collecting and forwarding to the 
United States shipments purchased in various places in Great 
Britain are put to serious inconvenience by the requirement 
that declarations to invoices under the above section shall be 
made in the respective consular districts in which such pur-
chases are made, and it is proposed that such declarations 
shall be made before any officer who has been duly authorized 
under the laws of the respective countries to administer oaths, 
or before any United States consul, and that the invoice, con-
taining the declaration duly indorsed thereon, shall be pro-
duced for authentication to the United States consul in the 
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district from. which the goods are to be exported. You ci te 
sections 1715, 2855, and 2862 of the Revised Statutes, and 
request an opinion as to whether there is any legal objection 
to a consul issuing a certificate to an invoice when the person 
who ·makes the declaration and takes the oath does not in 
person present it to him for authentication. 
Section 2 of the act under consideration prescribes the 
manner of making the invoice of goods intended for shipment 
from a foreign country to the United States. Section 3 of 
the act provides that the invoice thus prepared shall be pro-
duced to the consul, vice-consul, or commercial agent of the 
United States of the consular district in which the merchan-
dise was manufactured or purchased, as the case may be, for 
export, and the invoice shall have indorsed on it, when so 
produced, a declaration signed by the purchaser, manufac- . 
turer, owner, or agent, setting forth that the invoice is in all 
respects correct and true, and was made at the place from 
which the merchandise is to be exported to the United States, 
and that it contains, if the merchandise was obtained by 
purchase, a true and full statement of the time when, the 
place where, the person from whom the same was purchased, 
and the actual cost thereof, and of all charges thereon as 
provided by this act. 
Section 1715 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows: 
"No consular officer shall certify any invoice unless he is 
satisfied that the person making oath thereto is the person 
he represents himself to be, that he is a credible person, and 
that the statements made under such oath are true, and he 
shall thereupon, by his certificate, state that he was so sat-
isfied." 
These three sections seem to be easily construed and the 
meaning readily arrived at; that is, that the invoice, prepared 
as required by section 2, shall be produced to the officer or 
agent of the United States 11amed in section 3, of the con-
sular district in which the merchandise described in the 
invoice was manufactured or purchased, and at the time of 
the production of the invoice to the officer or agent named 
it must have indorsed on it a declaration signed by the 
purchaser, manufacturer, or owner of the merchandise, or 
the agent of such purchaser,manufacturer, or owner, that the 
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invoice is in all respects correct and true and was made at 
the place from which the merchandise is to be exported to the 
United States, etc. In addition to being signed, the declara-
tion must be sworn to, anc~ all that is necessary in order to 
authorize the consular officer to certify the invoice produced, 
with the declaration indorsed thereon signed, and with the 
oath attached, is that he shall be satisfied that the personm~k-
ing the oath thereto is the person he represents himself to be, 
that he is a credible person, and that the statements made 
under such oath are true. I see no reason why the consular 
officer could not issue a certificate to the invoice when the 
person who makes the declaration and takes the oath is not 
personally present before such officer. I see nothing in the 
law which requires that the person making the declaration 
should be actually present before the consul, vice-consul, or 
commercial agent, nor is there anything in the statutes that 
indicates that the oath to the declaration should be adminis-
tered only by such consular officer. The only requirement 
seems to be that the invoice, with the declaration, in proper 
form as required by the act, shall be produced to the consul, 
vice-consul, or commercial agent of the United States of the 
consular district in which the merchandise was manufactured 
or purchased, as the case may be. But if the consular officer 
before whom the invoice is produced with a declaration 
indorsed should have doubts as to the identity of the person 
making the declaration, as to his credibility, or as to the 
truthfulness of the statements set forth in the declaration, he 
would have the right, if necessary, to require the declarant 
to come personally before him. The law, as set forth in the 
sections cited, vests in the officers of the United States who 
are required to certify invoices a large discretion as to what 
will be required in order to place them in a position to cer-
tify such invoices. This power is derived from section 2862 
of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: 
"All consul;:tr officers are hereby authorized to require, 
before certifying any in voices under the provisions of the 
preceding sections (being sections 2853 and 2854 of the 
Revised Statutes, which sections are now repealed, and sec-
tions 2 and 3 of the act of June 10, 1890, substituted there-
for), satisfactory evidence, either by the oath of the person 
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presenting such invoice or oth rwi e, that such invoices are 
correct and true. In the · rci e of the discret ion hereby 
given the consular officer hall be governed by such general 
or special regulations or in tructions as may be from time to 
time established or given by the Secretary of State.' ' 
It will be observed in this section that the oath of the per-
son presenting an invoice to the consular officer is not indis-
pensable, but the power is conferred upon such officer to 
ascertain that the invoice is correct and true, either by t he 
oath of the person presenting it or otherwise, thus confiding 
to the consular officer the authority to ascertain t he facts 
upon which to base his certification of an invoice in any fea-
sible and proper manner, subject, however, in the exercise of 
this discretion, to general or special regulations or instruc-
tions established or given by the SP-cretary of State. 
The power is also conferred upon the President to pre-
scribe regulations and to make and issue orders and instruc-
tions for the government of the ·diplomatic and consular 
officers, under section 1752 of the Revised Stat,utes, which 
reads as follows : 
'' The President is authorized to prescribe such regula-
tions and make and issue such orders and instructions, not 
inconsistent with the Constitution or any law of the United 
Sta,tes, in relation to the duties of all diplomatic and consular 
officers, the transaction of their business, etc. * * * 
from time to time as he may think conducive to the public 
interest." · 
I call attention also to section 249 of the Revised Statutes: 
'' The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the superin-
tendence of the collection of duties on imports and tonnage 
as he shall judge best." 
Under this sect.ion the Secretary of the Treasury undoubt-
edly is authorized to prescribe reasonable rules and such as 
are necessary to secure the collection of the duties on imports 
and to protect the United States from irregular or fraudulent 
proceedings. 
Upon the whole, the statute is clear, and the question as 
to where and in what manner the oaths to the declarations 
indorsed on invoices shall be taken is more a matter of reg-
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ulation or instruction for the government of the consular 
officers than of construction of the statute. 
Respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CHINESE. 
The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to permit the r eturn to 
the United States of Chinese laborers who left for China after having 
received the necessary certificates entitling them to return, and availed 
themselves of the extension of one year provided by the treaty of 
1894, and who, although they left China in sufficient time to reach the 
United States within the extended year, were delayed in quarantine 
by the Canadian authorities, so that in fact they did not reach this 
country until three days late. 
In the extension of one year the treaty has made the sole provision for 
delay, and in any event the laborer must return to the United States 
within the additional year. . 
Neither the Secretary of the Treasury nor the collector has discretion to 
inquire into causes of further delay or grant an additional extension. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 16, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communica ion of the 21st ultimo, requesting my opinion as 
to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the 
treaty of 1894 between the United States and China, to allow 
the admission to this country of two Chinese laborers, Dang 
Tip and Dang Ng, who apply for permission to return under 
the following circumstances: 
The treaty of 1894 (Art. I) ab_solutely prohibits the coming 
of Chinese laborers fo the United States, except under speci-
fied conditions. Article II, prescribing these conditions, 
permits a registered Chinese laborer, having certain interests 
here in the way of kin or property, to leave the United States 
and come back, upon complying with certain regulations. 
The laborer must deposit with the collector of customs of the 
district he departs· from a statement identifying and bring- \ 
ing himself within the article. Thereupon the collector fur-
nishes him a certificate of his right to return . . '' Such right 
576 HO. 
of r turn to th ni 
exer ised ithin on 
United t, te ." R c 
a labor ght, b 
from returning wit 
(' h l 11 
exteu ion of the ter n 
treaty, "shall be 
e of leaving the 
contingency that 
rol, be p revented 
y provides for an 
"But uch right of r turn to the nited States may be 
e tended for an additi n l period, not toe ceed one year, in 
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beyond his control, such Chin e laborer shall be rendered 
unable sooner to return, which facts shall be fully r eported 
to the Chinese consul at the port of departure and by him 
certified, to the satisfaction of the collector of the port at 
which such Chinese subject shall land in the United States." 
Such being the law, Dang Tip and Dang Ng left the United 
States at the Vermont district on l\Iay 28, 1895, each having, 
after compliance with the regulations, received a certificate 
from the collector at St. Albans assuring him of his right to 
return within twelve months from that date. 
Before the twelve months expired each of the laborers 
availed himself of the extension of one year, Dang Tip on the 
ground of sickness and Dang Ng because ~f the death of his 
wife. 
Knowing their certificates, as extended, would expire May 
28, 1897, the two left Hongkong on April 7, 1897, and, being 
detained in quarantine by the Canadian authorities at Van-. 
couver, did not reach the United States until three days after 
their certificates had expired. They apply for admission on 
the ground that they left China in time to get here before 
their certificates expired, and were prevented by a cause be-
yond their control, namely, the Canadian quarantine. For 
this they say they ought not to suffer. 
It might be suggested that a quarantine is not "actus 
Dei," but an ordinary incident of travel by sea, to be contem-
plated by one undertaking a voyage• but aside from this 
consideration, it is apparent that in' the ~xtension of one 
year the treaty has made the sole provision for delay, 
whether "by reason of sickness or other cause of disability 
beyond the control" of the laborer desiring to return. Mode 
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of proof of such course of delay is provided and a limit put 
on the period of extension; in any event the laborer must 
return to the United States within the additional year. In 
the case of an extension the date of the original certificate 
and the date of the return must control. Neither the collector 
nor the Secretary of the Treasury has discretion to inquire 
into causes of further delay, or grant additional extensions. 
The impracticability of enforcing the treaty if such inquiries 
are permitted is apparent. 
My opinion, therefore, is that the Secretary of the Treasury 
has no authority to permit the return to this country of the 
laborers mentioned. 
Very respectfully, 




The SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
CONTRACTS FOR NAVAL SUPPLIES-ADVERTISEMENTS. 
A contract with a gun company for the manufacture and delivery to the 
Navy Department of a number of guns, the manufacture of materials 
to be subject to the inspection and approval of the Department, sup-
plemented by an agreement providing for the manufacture of the 
guns at a particular place, and for keeping an account of the cost of 
labor involved., in order to arrive at the remuneration ultimately to be 
paid to said gun company, is a contmct for supplies to the Navy 
Department, and not for services, and a contract with another com-
pany for the manufacture of any of said guns may be made by the 
Navy Department as a coµtract for ordnance without submitting the 
subject-matter thereof to competition by public advertisement. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
July 21, 1897. 
Srn: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of July 15, in which you inclose copies of a 
contract dated February 5, 1897, between the Navy Depart-
ment and the Maxim-Nordenfelt Company, of London, Eng-
land, and of an agreement supplemental thereto, dated April 
14, 1897, for the manufacture and delivery of 100 1-pounder 
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Maxim- orden:£ lt gun with a ·ce ory parts. You state 
that the avy Department, in view of the importance of 
maintaining in th nited tate factories for the manufac-
ture of guns of thi' type, i willing to bave a certain num-
ber of Ma ·im-Nordenfelt gun o contracted for made by the 
American Ordnance Company, of Bridgeport, Conn. , and 
has the consent thereto of tbe Maxim-N ordenfelt Company, 
and you request an expression of my opinion whether a con-
tract made by the Navy Department with the American 
Ordnance Company for the construction of any of the guns 
embraced in the contract and agreement above described 
could be made as a contract for "ordnance" under section 
3721 of the Revised Statutes, without submitting tbe subject-
matter thereof to competition by public advertisement, or 
whether such contract would fall within the meaning of 
section 3709 as a contract for services requiring advertise-
ment "a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting 
the same." 
Section 3709 provides that "all purchases and contracts 
for supplies or services in any of the Departments of the 
Government, except for personal services, shall be made by 
advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals respect-
ing the same, when the publ1c exigencies do not require the 
immediate delivery of the articles or performance of the serv-
ice." Section 3721 provides that '' the provisions which 
require that supplies shail be purchased by the Secretary of 
the Navy from the lowest· bidder, after advertisement, shall 
uot apply to ordnance, gunpowder," etc. 
The contract ~ith the Maxim Company of February 5, 1897, 
contempiates that they shall manufacture and deliver or 
furnish to the Navy Department 100 guns, the manufacture 
of materials to be subject to the inspection and approval of 
the Department. The agreement of April 14, 1897, supple-
ments and modifies the contract, chiefly by providing for the 
manufacture of the guns at the Na val Gun Factory in Wash-
ington, and by certain provisions for keeping account of the 
cost of labor involved, in order to arrive at the remuneration 
ultimately to be paid to the Maxim Compa~y. In view of 
these facts it is my opinion that this is a contract for sup-
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plies to the Navy Department, and not for services, and as 
such is excepted by section 3721, relating, among other arti-
cles, to ordnance, from the provisions of section 3709 respect-
ing advertisements for proposals. 
I therefore answer your question by stating that a con-
tract made by the Navy Department with the American 
Ordnance Company for the manufacture and delivery of any 
of said 100 guns under the terms and conditions of the con-
tract and agreement with the Maxim-Nordenfelt Company 
would be a contract for "ordnance," which could be made 
without submitting the subject-matter thereof to competi-
tion by public advertisement. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH MCKENNA. 
The SECRE'l'ARY OF 'l'HE NAVY. 
ARMY OFFICERS-VOLUNTEER SERVICE. 
Persons who served during the rebellion in the Army of the United 
States as officers in the volunteer service and have been honorably · 
mustered out of such service, are entitled to bear the official title, and 
upon occasions of ceremony to wear the uniform of the highest grade 
they have held in the volunteer service. 
DEP.A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
July 23, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of the 14th ultimo, requesting tlin opinion 
whether section 1226 of the Revised Statutes is applicable 
to persons who were officers in the volunteer service during 
the late war, but are not now officers in the Regular Army. 
The request for the opinion grows out of the application 
of James F. Farrell, late a captain of the Fifth New York 
Heavy Artillery, and brevetted major of United States Vol-
unteers, to your Department for instructions as to the kind 
of uniform he is entitled to wear under this section. 
. I am not altogether satisfied that the application of this 
private citizen raises a question of law in the administration 
of your Department which properly calls for an opinion from 
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ction in u tion r ad a follows: 
" E . L26. 11 offic r \ ho have served during the rebel-
lion as volunte rs in the Army of the United States, and 
have b en honorably mu tered out of the volunteer service, 
shall be entitled to bear the official title, and upon occasions 
of ceremony to wear the uniform, of the highest grade they 
have held, by brevet or other commissions, in the volunteer 
service. The highest volunteer rank which has been held 
by officers of the Regular Army shall be entered, with their 
names, respectively, upon the Army Register. But these 
privileges shall not entitle any officer to command, pay, or 
emoluments." 
This section speaks for itself; the language is plain; it 
requires no construction. ln its leading features-the bear-
ing of an official title and the wearing of a uniform upon 
occasions of ceremony-the section applies only to ex-officers 
who have served during the rebellion as volunteeri:;, and have 
been honorably mustered out of that service, and are not now 
in the Regular Army. The only privilege granted to officers 
of the Regular Army who acquired rank in the volunteer 
service is the entry of their highest volunteer rank upon 
the Army Register. 
Both departmental and legislative construction confirm 
the accuracy of the above conclusions. (War Department, 
General Orders, No. 78, August 24, 1867; act of February 4, 
1897, 29 Stat., 511.) 
Your question is therefore answered in the affirmative. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 
JOHN K. RICHARDS, 
Solicitor- General. 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R. 
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CHINESE-CERTIFICATES AS TO CITIZENSHIP. 
The certificate of a, United States commissioner states that a Chinaman 
charged with • unlawfully coming within the United States, after a 
:full hearing, was adjudged to have the lawful right to remain in the 
United States, and was accordingly discharged, it appearing that h e 
is a citizen of the United States: Held, that certificates of this char-
acter should not be accepted as sufficient evidence of the right of the 
holders to enter this country. 
Since the act of May 6, 1882, no court has jurisdiction to admit Chinese 
to citizenship. 
Whether or not children born in this country of subjects of the Chinese 
Empire are to be recognized as citizens of the United States: Qumre. 
:0EP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 4, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of July 30, 1897, transmitting a copy of a report, 
dated July 26, 1897, with its original inclosure, from the 
collector of customs at Burlington, Vt., relating to the 
admission into this country of Chinese -persons who present 
certificates (in the form of the said inclosure) issued by 
F. W. McGettrick, United States commissioner for the dis-
trict of Vermont. You request my opinion whether, under 
existing laws, certificates of the character referred to should 
be accepted as sufficient evidence of the right of the holders 
to enter this country. 
The certificate states, under the hand and seal of the com-
missioner, that on complaint of the United States attorney 
for said district, one Chu Lock did, on or about March 16, 
1896, unlawfully come within the United States, and that 
said defendant was on said date brought before the commis-
sioner, and after a full hearing it was adjudged that the 
defendant had the lawful right to remai.n in the United 
States, and he was accordingly discharged, it appearing 
that he was a citizen of the United States. 
The third section of the act of May 5, 1892 ( Chines'e 
exclusion act, 27 Stat., 25), provides-
" That any Chinese person or person of Chinese descent 
arrested under the provisions of this act, or the acts 
hereby extended, shall be adjudged to be unlawfully within 
the United States unless such person shall establish by 
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affirmative proof, to the sati faction of such justice, judge, 
or commissioner, his lawful right to remain in the United 
States." 
It is to be presumed that in the case in hand, and in simi-
lar cases, the defendant has established by affirmative 
proof, to the satisfaction of the commissioner, his lawful 
right to remain in the United States; but whether or not 
the character and measure of the proof has met the require-
ments of the act, it appears from the face of the certificate 
that the ground of defendant's right to remain in the United 
Statts is his alleged citizenship. Is he or can he be a citi-
zen of the United States, being a Chinese person or person 
of Chinese descent, · 
The fourteenth section of the act of May 6, 1882 (1 Supp. 
Rev. Stat., 342) provides-
" That hereafter no State court or court of the United 
States shall admit Chinese to citizenship, and all laws in 
conflict with this act are hereby repealed." 
It is therefore clear that since the date of this act no court 
has had jurisdiction to admit Chinese to citizenship. It has 
been held that a :iiative of China is not entitled to become a 
citizen of the United States under the Revised Statutes as 
amended in 1875 (in re Ah Yup, 5 Saw., 155; 21 Opin., 37), 
and it is not yet finally decided whether or not children born 
in this country of subjects of the Chin-ese Emperor ·are to be 
recognized as citizens of the United States. A case is pend-
ing in the Supreme Uourt in which that question is raised, 
but an opinion bas not yet been handed down. A different 
question would be presented in the case of a child of Chinese 
parents born in this country, and whose father had been 
legally naturalized, but this state of facts is not presented 
on the papers submitted. 
I am therefore of the opinion that certificates of the char-
acter referred to should not be accepted as sufficient evidence 
of the right of the holuers to enter this country. 
I return herewith the original certificate, as you request. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The ~E 'RETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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FUR SEALS-ATTORNEY-GEr ER.A.L. 
A request for au opinion failing to state definite facts showing by what 
persons, in what manner: ancl during what period of the year fur seals 
arc being killed in the passes of the Aleutian Islands, it is impossible 
to determine whether the administrative duty imposed upon the Sec-
retary of the Treasury by section 1956, Revised Statutes, is or is not 
qualified by the provisions of the act of April 6, 1894. 
In the absence of facts presenting a case actually or presently arising 
ancl pending in the administration of a department, calling for action, 
which can not be determined by the Attorney-General without usurp-
ing judicial functions, his official :opinion can not be required. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1.'ICE, 
Aitg'llst 6, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of July 19, 1897, in which you express the view that 
the opinion of my predecessor, under date of January 5, 1897, 
regarding fur seals, to which I have referred you in my letter 
of July 10, is limited to questions affecting the Macah Indians, 
and leaves undetermined the question whether or not the 
act of April 6, 1894, which was passed to carry into effect 
the provisions of the Paris award, repeals in whole or in 
part the provisions of section 1056, Revised Statutes; and 
you ask whether, in the event s~ction 1956 is repealed by the 
said act, it is lawful for any person to take fur seals in the 
passes of the Aleutian Islands, provided, in so doing, they 
comply with the requirements of sections 1 to 5 of said act of 
April 6, 1894. 
In your previous letter of July 8, 1897, to which the fore-
going correspondence related, you stated that you had been 
informed by the lessee of the sealing right on the Pribilof 
Islands that seals are being caught and killed by unauthor-
ized persons in the passes of the Aleutian Islands, and that 
the lessee has requested that steps be taken to prevent such 
kil1ing, and you then ask the following questions: 
'' First. Does the act of April 6, 1894, repeal the provisions 
of section 1956, Revised Statutes, in whole or in part, 
"Second. If said section 1956 ii-; not affected by said act of 
April 6, 1894, is it lawful for Indians or others to kill fur 
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seat in the , provid d th y comply with the 
provision of se tion 1 to r- f aid , t of April G, 1894. ,,, 
ou do not tate, for m c n id ration, any definite facts 
showing by what per on ·, in what manner, and during what 
period of the year fur eal are b ing caught and kill~d in 
the pa e of the leutian I land a alleged. It is neces; 
sary to have this information in order to determine properly 
whether the admini trative duty imposed upon you by sec-
tion 1956 to prevent the killing of fur seals is or is not quali-
fied, in any special case ubmitted, by the provisions of the 
act of April 6, 1894. In the absence of such facts presenting 
a case actually or presently arising and pending in the 
administration of your Department, calling for action, this 
question can not be determined by me without usurping 
judicial functions and construing generally the effect pro-
duced upon section 1956 by the act of April 6, 1894, apart 
from reference to a specific case demanding the exercise of 
your administrative duty. Nor is it proper for me to give a 
list in advance of the persons, places, and times embraced 
in the prohibitions of the said section and the permissive 
provisions of the act of April 6, 1894. I can only answer as 
to each case as it arises. 
It has been held by my predecessors from a very early date 
that an official opinion can not be required and is not author-
ized, except. in accordance with these principles. I direct 
your attention to the following recent opinions among others: 
(18 Opin., 487; 19 Opin., 414,696; 20 Opin., 383,440, 526, 602, 
614, 618; 21 Opin., 106). 
For these reasons I am precluded from responding to your 
request until I receive such statement of facts as is herein 
indicated, with such new formulation of the legal questions 
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REVOCATION 01!' CONTRACT-FERRY SERVICE. 
In the contract for ferry service between Ellis Island immigrant station 
and the barge office, New York, to continue for three years, and there-
after from year to year, until terminated by notice from either party, 
given sixty days before the end of the original period or any one year 
thereafter, and in which it was also covenanted that the contract 
might be annulled and terminated at any time hy the Secretary of the 
Treasury for good and sufficient cause: Held, that the burning of the 
buildings on Ellis Island, the removal of the immigrant station from 
that place, and the discontinuance of the ferry service, supplied a 
good and sufficient cause to the Secretary oft.he Treasury for the ter-
mination of the contract. · 
What one party to a contract may have personally understood a pro-
vision to mean at the time the contract was made can not avail. 
What both parties understood controls, and that is to be ascertain~d 
from the language of the contract itself. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 11, 1897. 
SIR: On July 1, 1896, Daniel Butterfield, doing business 
as "The Brooklyn Annex," entered into a contract with the 
Becretary of the Treasury" to perform and carry on the ferry 
service" between the Ellis Island immigrant station and the 
barge office in New York for a stipulated price per day "for 
each and every day during the said time that the said ferry 
service shall so be performed," agreeing, for the purpose, to 
build a new ferry boat, subject to approval by the Commis-
sioner-General of Immigration. 
The contract provides that it shall continue in full force 
for the peri~d of three years ending June 30, 1899, and there-
after from year to year until terminated by notice from either 
party, given sixty days before the end of the original period 
or any one year thereafter. ~hen follows this paragraph: 
'' Ninth. It is further covenanted and agreed that this con-
tract may be annulled and terminated at any time by the 
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States for good and 
sufficient cause." 
After inviting my attention to the contract, and more par-
ticularly to the provision quoted, you state that, in view of 
the recent :fire at Ellis Island, there is no further necessity 
for · this ferry service, and you request my opinion whether 
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The cont ntion of t h c ntractor is that the words "good 
and uffi ient an e in th paragraph mean a cause good 
and ufficient in law; that t h e con tractor so understood at 
the time he entered int the outract, otherwise he would 
not have e pend d th money be did to build and equip a 
boat ve uliarly adapted to t he service, and uufit for any 
other u e, without large addition al out lay. 
What one party to a contract may have personally under-
stood a provision to mean at the time t he contract was made 
can not avail. What both parties understood controls, and 
that is to be ascertained from the language of the contract 
itself. 
While it is possible the termination of the contract may 
work some hardship to the contractor, it is certain that its 
continuance, under the circumstances, results in daily need-
less expense to the Government. 
The contract provides for a period of three years, and for 
an extension from year to year thereafter , with power on 
either side to terminate it after sixty days' notice. A failme 
or refusal by either party to perform. the cont ract during its 
continuance w·ould be cause in law for its termination, with-
out any special provision to that end. What, then, was the 
object of insertiug the ninth paragraph ! Obviously to pro-
vide for .a contingency like that which has occurred, the 
happening of some event which would put a stop to the 
necessity for the ferry service. The Secretary of the Treas-
ury entered into the contract to serve a public purpose. Be 
agreed to pay for a ferry service because it was needed by 
the Government. Appreciating the fact that something 
might occur to terminate the need for the service, he reserved 
the right to abrogate the contract when the service it pro-
vided for should no longer be required in the public inter-
est-in other words, to terminate it "for good and sufficient 
cause." 
I do not understand that the words,, good and sufficient 
cause" are so vague and indefinite as to lack meaning and 
effect. Similar word s were construed by the Court of Claims, 
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speaking by Judge Weldon, in the case of Starin v. United 
States ( 31 C. Cls., 66, 88) :: 
"It is not necessary, as insisted by the defendants, to go 
to the extent of holding that the words '' good and sufficient 
cause" are ine~ective. We hold that in this case they are 
effective to the extent that they circumscribe the power of 
the defendants to the limits of good faith, and change the 
power of cancellation from an arbitrary and absolute power 
to a power regulated by good faith on the part of the party 
exercising it." · 
There can l:;le no question but that the burning of the 
buildings on Ellis Island, the removal of the immigrant 
station from that place, and the absolute discontinuance of 
the ferry service supply a cause "good and sufficient" for 
the termination of the contract by the Secretary of the 
Treasury. In the light of these facts it could scarcely be 
urged subsequently that the Secretary in abrogating the 
contract acted otherwise than in good faith, and upon reason-
able grounds, such as would induce a prudent public officer 
to annul the contract in the protection of the interests con-
fided to him. 
It is t)lerefore my opinion that, in view of the circum-
stances mentioned, you have authority, under the ninth 
paragraph, to terminate the contract. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 
JOHN K. RICHARDS, 
Solicitor- General. 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRE'l'ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
SAN PRDRO HARBOR, &c.-RIVER AND HARBOR ACT. 
The river and harbor act of 1896, provided for a deep water harbor of 
commerce and of refuge at either San Pedro Harbor or Port Los Angeles 
and the appointment of a board to select the place and determine the 
plans of improvement. 
The decision of the board as to iocation of the harbor is final. 
The report of the board considered and the conclusion reached that the 
project reported by t,hem is a breakwater, and that it fulfills the 
provision of the law and will make within its meaning a harbor for 
commerce and refuge. 
8 H . J PH M°KENNA. 
I\ n Ped r o ll n. r b or , .- Riv er I\ n d U I\ r b or Act . 
D i P R 'rMENT o F JusTrcE, 
August 9, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communic tion of ugu. t 3, in relation to San Pedro Harbor. 
Th inquiry you propound (which will be stated hereafter) 
grow out of the provi ion of the river and harbor act of 
1896 and a r port of a board of engineers provided to be 
appointed by it. 
You expres doubts of your duty and power under the 
act and report of the board as to whether the appropriation 
is sufficient to provide for a harbor both of commerce and 
refuge. After some discussion you say-
" It is possible, however, that in order to complet e this 
harbor for commerce and of refuge there may be private 
subscription by those who are financially interested in the 
matter, to enable the building of the breakwater, and also 
to create or deepen the inner harbor and approach to the 
same. The opiu~on of the Attorney-General is therefore 
respectfully requested as to whether the War Department 
would be justified in advertising for the whole work, and in 
making a depth of 25 feet instead of 30 feet as suggested in 
my communication of May 18, heretofore referred to (which 
would be ample, in my opinion, for the present commerce of 
the Pacific centering there), and also for an inner harbor 
(harbor of commerce of, say, half the dimensions named in 
my letter of May 18)." 
This inquiry, may be, should be answered in the negative, 
but I think the law and your powers under it and as deter-
mined by the report of the board may be considered more 
broadly. 
The provision of the river and harbor act is as follows: 
"For a deep-water harbor for commerce and of refuge at 
Port Los Angeles, in Santa Monica Bay, California, or at San 
Pedro, in said State, the location of said harbor to be deter-
mined by an officer of the Navy, to be detailed by the Secre-
tary of the Nav·y, an officer of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, 
to be detailed by the Superintendent of said Survey, and three 
e perienced civil engineers, skilled in riparian work, to be 
apI)oint d by tbe Pre ident, wbo shall constitute a board, 
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and who shall personally examine said harbors, the decision 
of a majority of which shall be final as to the location of said 
harbor. It shall be the duty of said board to make plans, 
specifications, and estimates for said improvement. When-
ever said board shall have settled the location and made 
report to the Secretary of War of the same, with said plans, 
specifications, and estimates, then the Secretary of War may 
make contracts for the completion of the improvement of the 
harbor so selected by said -board, according to the project 
reported by them, at a cost not ~xceeding in the aggregate 
two million nine hundred thousand dollars, and fifty thou-
sand dollars is hereby appropriated, so much thereof as may 
be necessary, to be used for the expenses of the board and 
payment of the civil engineers for their services, the amount 
to be determined by the Secretary of War: Provided, how-
ever, That if the board hereby constituted, as in this section 
provided, shall determine in favor of the construction of a 
breakwater at Port Los Angeles, no expenditure of any part 
of the money hereby appropriated shall be made, nor shall 
any contract for the construction of such breakwater be 
entered into, until the Southern Pacific Company, or the 
owner or owners thereof, shall execute an agreement and file 
the same with the Secretary of War, that any railroad com-
pany or any corporation engaged in the business of trans-
portation, may share in t.he use of the pier now constructed 
at Port Los Angeles, and the approaches and tracks leading 
thereto, situate westerly of the easterly entrance to the Santa 
Monica tunnel, upon such just and equitable terms as may 
· be agreed upon between the parties, and if they fail to agree 
then to be determined by the Secretary of War; and before 
any ~xpeuditure of the money hereby appropriated is made 
for the construction of a breakwater at Port Los Angeles 
said Southern Pacific Company, or the owner of the tracks 
and approaches leading to said pier, shall execute an agree-
ment and file the same with the Secretary of War, that any · 
railroad or transportation company or corporation desiring 
to construct a wharf or pier in Santa Monica Bay may, for 
the purpose of approaching such wharf or pier, and for the 
purpose of constructing and operating the same, cross the 
5 H . J I E II M('JKE NA. 
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trac1 r track • 1 p' ach , and riO'ht of way now used by 
the outb rn P citi ' mp, ny nnd r uch r egnlations as 
ma b pr rib d by th ·r tary of War, alHl upon the 
payment of nch ompeu , ti 11 a that otlicer may find to be 
rea OU ble: Pro? i4e(7, further, Tha,t in vent said harbor is 
located at Port Lo no- 1 no greater rnyalty 011 the rock 
u ed for the con ~truction of the breakwater tha11 twelve and 
· a half cents a cubic yard shall b charged, and the Southern 
Pacific Company shall charge no more than one ha1f a cent a 
ton mile for freight on rock tram:;ported over its road ." 
The statute therefore I rovided for a deep-water harbor 
for commerce and of refuge at one of two places-San Pedro 
or Port Los Angeles-and the appointment of a, board to 
select the place and determine the plans of improvement. 
It will be observed that the powers of the board are large. 
There is a limitation of the amount to be expended; in all 
else the judgment of the board is free. They decide between 
the places, and the contracts of the Secretary of War are to 
be "according to the project reported by them." The deci-
sion of the board is final as to location, and it shall be their 
'' duty to make plans, specifications, aud e8timates for said 
improvement," and upon their report "the Secretary of War 
may make contract8 for the completion of the improvement 
* * * according to the project reported by them." The law 
itself besides indicates the project. Both the places men-
tioned are open roadsteads ; in both, therefore, a breakwater 
is necessary to make protected water-a harbor of refuge-
and this may be a harbor of commerce as well. Obviously 
so at Port Los Angeles, as we shall see. 
'fhe report is voluminous, too much so to be quoted, and yet 
it can hardly be understood any other way. The double func-
tion of the board to select, and hence compare sites and 
report plans for both, led them into comments and compari-
sons and an intermingling of considerations somewhat confus-
ing; nor did they accurately discriminate that which was to 
be Government work from that which was to be the work of 
private enterprise or that which was necessary now and that 
which might become so with the advance of time and trade. 
I do not think, however, that the quays or pier or wharves or 
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the excavation of the docks formed by them are a part of the 
project reported. They are the means by which private enter-
prise may avail itself of the project. Some piers were already 
so erected at Port Los Angeles. They were the property of 
the Southern Pacific Company and were to remain so. The 
law only required that other transportation companies should 
be allowed to use them, but, .however, '' upon such just and 
equitable terms" as should be agreed on, or, if agreement fail, 
"then to be determined by the Secretary of War." 
From a careful consideration of the report of the board, I 
am of the opinion that the project reported by them is a 
breakwater and that it fulfills the provision of the law and 




The SECRE'l'ARY OF WAR. 
DISCRIMINATING DU'l'Y-DINGLEY TARIFF ACT. 
Diamonds imported into the United States from Canada, not in the 
usual course of strictly retail trade, which were the productions of a 
foreign country not contiguous to the United States, are subject to 
a discriminating duty of 10 per cent under section 22 of the tariff act 
of July 24, 1897. 
In determining the liability of the diamonds to the discriminating duty, 
it is not necessary to ascertain the mode of conveyance used in trans-
porting them into the United States from Canada. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 11, 1897. 
SIR: In your communication of the 6th instant you state 
that recently, since the tariff act of ,July 24, 1897, went into 
effect, certain diamonds have been imported into the United 
States from the Dominion of Canada, a foreign country con-
tiguous to the United States. These diamonds were the 
production of a foreign country not contiguous to the United 
States, and were worth $90,000, so they can not be regarded 
as imported in the usual course of strictly retail trade. The 
92 II . J O EPH ICKENNA. 
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m thod of tran p rtation f h diamond from Canada into 
th nited State' , b th r by ve el, rail, or otherwise, is 
not tated. 
Aft.er calling at t nti n to t he provisions of section 22 of 
the tariff act of July 24, 1 97, you inquire-
''First. Whether a di criminating duty of 10 per cent under 
section 22, hould be levied on the diamonds described; 
" Second. Whether, in determining t he liability of the dia-
monds to the discriminat ing duty, it is material to ascertain 
tbe mode of conveyance u ed in transporting them into the 
United States from Canada." 
Section 14: of the tariff act of August 28, 1894, provided a 
discriminating duty of 10 per cent on goods imported in 
foreign vessels, with certain exceptions, the section reading 
as follows: 
4 ' SEC. 14. That a discriminating duty of ten per centum 
ad valorem, in addition to the duties imposed by law, shall 
belevied,collected, and paid on all goods, wares, or merchan-
dise which shall be imported in vessels not of the United 
States; but this discriminating duty shall not apply to goods, 
wares, and merchandise which shall be imported in vessels 
not of the United States, entitled, by treaty or any act of 
Congress, to be entered in the ports of the United States on 
payment of tbe same duties as shall be paid on goods, wares, 
and merchandise imported in vessels of the United States." 
Section 22 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, continued the 
discriminating duty imposed by section 14 of the former law, 
and added a discriminating duty of 10 per cent on all goods 
which," being the production or manufacture of any foreign 
country not contiguous to the United States, shall come into 
the United States" from a contiguous country, without being 
imported "in the usual course of strictly retail trade." The 
full text of the section is as follows: 
"SEC. 22. That a discriminating duty of ten per centum 
ad valorem, in addition to the duties imposed by law, shall 
be levied, collected, and paid on all goods, wares, or mer-
chandise which shall be imported in vessels not of the United 
States, or which, being the production or manufacture of any 
foreign country not contiguous to the United States, shall 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 593 
Discriminating Duty-Dingley Tariff Act, 
come into the United States from such contiguous country; 
but this discriminating duty shall not apply to go.ods, wares, 
or merchandise which shaJl be imported in vessels not of the 
United States, entitled at the time of such importation by 
treaty or convention to be entered in the ports of the United 
States on payment of the same duties as shall then be pay-
able on goods, wares, and merchandise imported in vessels 
of the United States, nor to such foreign products or manu-
factures as shall be imported from such contiguous countries 
in the usual course of strictly retail trade." 
The former law imposed a discriminating duty only on 
goods imported in certain foreign vessels. The present law 
imposes a discriminating duty also on goods which come into 
the United States from a contiguous country and are the 
product of a foreign noncontiguous country and are not 
imported "in the usual course of strictly retail trade." 
It will be observed that the word ''imported" is not used 
in connection with goods which "come into"the United States 
from a contiguous country, save in the exception exempting 
goods ''imported in the usual course of strictly retail trad~ ;" 
but for the purposes of this opinion it is not necessary to 
consider the precise effect of the words "come into," as dis-
tinguished from the word "imported," if indeed there be any 
difference in meaning. 
In determining whether the goods under consideration are 
subjAct to the discriminating duty, it is not material to ascer-
tain th A ruode of transportation or method of importation; it 
is sufficient to know that they "come into" the United States 
from a contiguous country, and are within a class subject to 
duty, namely, are the "production or manufacture of a for-
eign country not contiguous to the United States," and are 
not "imported in the usual course of strictly retail trade." 
Your first question is, therefore, answered in the affirma-
tive; your second in the negative. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 
JOHN K. RIOHARDS, 
Solic-itor- General. 
JOSEPH MCKENNA. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 
I -
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-ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
n t d t rmine, wit,hout considering 
q t a bar in Flnshing Creek, formed 
o tl off ring an obstrnctiou to naviga-
t io in th e.·c pt ion provided in section 
· f be retary of War is not precluded 
frot . , g the attention of the town authorities 
of 1'.,lnsbing to the matter, a may b advisable. 
The Attorney- eneral i preclucl d from answering questions of fact or 
from onsidering que tions of fact on evidence submitted. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
A1igust 19, 1897. 
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of August 4, 
1897, with its inclosures, relating to a complaint of certain 
citizens of the town of Flushing, N. Y., that soiid matter dis-
charged through a sewer of said town into Flushing Creek 
is forming a bar in the creek and thereby injuring the navi-
gable capacity of the same. 
It ~ppears from your statement that this sewer drains about 
one-half of the town and receives the storm waters from sev-
eral streets, and that there is a bar of very hard, fine sand in 
Flushing Creek opposite the mouth of the sewer extending 
nearly halfway across the creek and thereby offering obstruc-
tion to navigation; and it also appears that the available 
depth of water at high tide in the remainder of the channel 
opposite the bar is as much as prevails in the bay. Certain 
action in the premises having been recommended to you, you 
request my opinion whether this case comes within the 
exception provided in section 6 of the act of August 17, 1894. 
(28 Stat., 363). 
The said section provides, among other things, as follows: 
"That it shall not be lawful to place, discharge, or deposit, 
by any process or in any manner, ballast, refuse, dirt, ashes, 
cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other 
matter of any kind other than that · flowing from streets, 
sewers, and passing therefrom in a liquid state, in the waters 
of any harbor or river of the United Stat.es, for the improve-
ment of which money has been appropriated by Congress, 
el ewbere than within the limits defined and permitted by 
tbe ecretary of War." 
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It is evident that before the legal questions arising can be 
properly considered by me certain questions of fact should 
be determined or agreed upon, viz: Whether or not the bar 
complained of is formed by discha,rg~ from the sewer, which, 
so far as appears, is left to inference; and whether the sand 
or other material is discharged merely in suspension and is 
then deposited upon the bar by the ordinary prompt action 
of gravity, or passes out in solution and is then precipitated. 
The facts on these points are necessary to determine the 
question whether the sand or sewage passes from the sewer 
in a liquid state within the meaning of the above act. 
As I am precluded from answering questions of fact or 
from considering questions of fact on evidence submitted, I 
am obliged to decline at present to answer your question 
(19 Opin., 672; 20 Opin., 253). I reach this conclusion with-
out prejudice to your right to take such action, inviting the 
attention of the town authorities to the matter, as may seem 
to you advisable. I return the papers herewith. 
Respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF W .A.R. 
ADVERTISEMENTS FOR PROPOSALS-DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
Advertisements, such as those for proposals for the interior finish of a 
public building in the District of Columbia, need not be made in six 
newspapers published in said rnstrict. 
The selection of newspapers in which to publish advertisements of this 
character in the District of Columbia is in the discretion of the heads · 
of the departments. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
August 24, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of August 20 relating to previous correspondence con-
cerning public· advertising in the District of Columbia, and 
advising me that the Treasury Department contemplates at 
an early date advertising for proposals for the interior :finish 
of the new post-office building in this city, and stating your 
views that unless it is incumbent under the law to advertise 
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in six new papers publi hed in the District of Columbia, in 
accordance with the provi ions of the act of January 21, 
1 81 (21 Stat., 17), the intere ts of the Government would 
be better sub-erv d by the u of a less number of news-
11ap rs. ou th refore a k to be advi 'ed if it is necessary, 
und r the exi ting law, to ad erti 'e the matter referred to in 
six newspapers published in the District of Columbia. 
The act referred to provides that all advertising required 
by existing laws to be done in the District of Columbia by 
any of the departments of the Government shall be given 
to one daily and one weekly newspaper of each of the two 
principal political parties, and to one daily and one weekly 
neutral newspaper. 
By section 1 of the a~t of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 342), so 
much of section 3836 of the Revised Statutes as required all 
advertisements, notices, and proposals for contracts for "all 
of the Executive Departments of the Government" among 
other matter to be advertised by publication in the District 
of Columbia, was repealed. Section 3709 of the Revised 
Statutes ( amended by the act of January 27, 1894, 28 Stat., 
33, and by the act of April 21, 1894, 28 Stat., 58 ), which 
requires advertisements for proposals for all purchases and 
contracts for supplies and services in any of the departments 
of the Government, except for personal services, does not 
require the advertising to be done in the District of Columbia. 
There appears to be no law now in force requiring the 
publication of advertisements of this character in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and it is therefore my opinion that the 
selection of newspapers in which to publish such advertise-
ments of the Treasury Department in the District is in your 
discretion as head of the department, and I therefore con-
clude that it is not necessary for you under the existing law 
to advertise the matter referred to in six newspapers pub-
lished in the District of Columbia. (See 14 Opin., 577.) 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRET.A.RY OF 'I.'HE TREASURY. 
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DINGLEY TARIFF ACT-DISCRIMINATING DUTY. 
Certain goods came from Japan via Vancouver, B. C., and thence per 
railroad through Canada to Chicago in cars sealed at Vancouver by a 
United State!'! consular officer: Held, not to be subject to a discrimi-
nating duty, as section 4228 Revised Statutes is noti repealed by section· 
22 of the Dingley tariff act. 
The J>urpose of this section was to secure to United States vessels the 
transportation of goods by sea by discriminating against transporta-
tion in other vessels to ~he United States, and also to prevent evasion 
to a contiguous country. 
To hold that there should be a discrimination by different duties upon 
importations, direct or indirect, under section 22 of the above act, 
would be to put a new purpose in the law and destroy its unity. 
This is not compelled by its language or any mischief intended to be 
remedied. 
Section 22 of this act and section 4228 Revised Statutes, as amended, are 
not coextensive in scope, therefore are complements of each other. 
Section 4228 Revised Statutes is in effect made a proviso to section 22 of 
the Dingley tariff ac't by the act of July 24, 1897, and as such is not 
repugnant to section 22. , 
The opera.tion of section 22 commences with its passage and continues 
until it is suspended according to section 4228 Revised Statutes, and 
again takes effect if the reciprocal exemptions of foreign nations be 
withdrawn. 
Savings and exceptions are often introduced in a statute from excessive 
caution. It would sometimes pervert the intentions of an author of 
a writing if every other thing of the same general tenor as that 
excepted should be regarded as embraced in the general words. 
Where two acts are passed on the same day, the order of their passage 
is not important if they can be reconciled. 
Two acts under legislative consideration at the same time should be 
construed as contemporaneous acts in arriving at the intent of the 
legislature. 
Irreconcila,ble conflict is necessary for an implied repeal of a statute, 
and the presumption is stronger against implied repeals where provi-
sions supposed to conflict are in the same act or were passed at nearly 
the same time. 
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
September 20, 1897. 
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of August 10. It is not necessary to quote 
all of it. You say: 
"On the 6th instant I had the honor to submit for your 
consideration a copy of a letter received by me from the 
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Trea ury pecial a nt at Ogden burg, N. Y., which in 
v lv d the que tion whether, und r ection 22 of the new 
tariff' act, a di criminating duty of 10 per cent should be 
a e sed upon certain diamond brought into the United 
tate from the contiguou territory of Canada. 
· '' Since the date f my letter above referred to, I have 
received from the collector of customs at Chicago a request-
for instructions as to the as essment of discriminating duty, 
under the above provision of law, upon certain goods which 
came from Japan via Vancouver, British Columbia, and 
thence per railroad through Canada to Chicago. These 
goods arrived in Ohicago in cars, sealed at Vancouver, 
British Columbia, by a United States consular officer, under 
regulations of the Department which are based upon the 
treaty of Washington, and upon section 3102 of the Revised 
Statutes." 
You inquire, shall these goods be subjected to a special 
discriminating duty of 10 per cent! 
An answer to your inquiry depends upon the interpreta-
tion of section 22 of the Dingley tariff bill and its effect on 
section 4228 of the Revised Statutes. 
Section 22 is as follows: 
"That a discriminating duty of ten per centum ad valorem, 
in addition to the duties imposed by law, shall be levied, 
collected, and paid on all goods, wares, or merchandise which 
shall be imported in vessels not of the United States, or 
which being the production or manufacture of any foreign 
country not contiguous to the United States, shall come into the 
United States from such contiguous country; but this dis-
criminating duty shall not apply to goods, wares, or mer-
chandise which shall be imported in vessels not of the United 
States, entitled at the time of such importation by treaty or 
convention to be entered in the ports of the United States 
on payment of the same duties as shall then be payable on 
goods, wares, a.nd merchandise imported in vessels of the 
United States, nor to such foreign products or manufactures 
as shall be imported from such contiguous countries in the usual 
course of strictly retail trade." 
The italics are mine and indicate the affirmative changes 
made in preexi ting laws. 
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Three plausible contentions are based upon this section 
which, as to strength, only differ in degree. 
(1) That the duty is a discrimination upon importatious 
in vessels not of the United States, whether directly to the 
United States or to a contiguous country and thence to 
the United States. 
(2) A discrimination against importations of goods (not in 
the usual course of strictly retail trade) from a contiguous 
country, they not being the products thereof. In this the 
character of the vessel is not important. 
(3) A discrimination against goods, being the productions 
of a foreign country not contiguous to the United States, 
which shall come into the United States fro~ a contiguous 
country. 
In this contention the words "come into the United 
States" are used as designating movement only. 
Under the first and second contentions the duty would 
not be imposed. Under the third it would be-I hence select 
it as a basis for consideration. 
To support it it is said that the section imposes the duty 
in two cases: (a) when the goods are imported in vessels 
not of the United States and to the United States; ( b) when 
they are the production of a country not contiguous and 
come into the United States from a ·contiguous country, 
the character of the vessel in which they were transported 
to the contiguous country being indifferent. 
The first case we are not now concerned with and the sec-
ond is attempted to be established by the following reason-
ing. The goods (which are the subject of inquiry) are 
Chinese or Japanese production, hence the production of a 
foreign country "not contiguous to the United States." 
They come into the United States from Canada, a contiguous 
country, and so it is urged that by the letter as well as by 
the spirit of the statute they are subject to the duty. 
It is conceded that the importation is to the United States-
passage through Cana,da , being mere movement only toward 
destination-the latter being the United States. This being 
so, it would seem that there was no reason to distinguish 
between that importation and what may be called in distinc-
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tion a dire •t ne-, b one hould b burdened and. the other 
n t burdened- h n he di rirnination was not necessary · 
to the main purp se f the law. It i said that the purpose 
of th amendm nt wa to r lieve the American trans-
coutiuental railroad again t the competition of the Canadian 
Pacific I ailroad. It may be admitted that this is a strong 
consideration, but, on the other hand, it is urged that this 
competition is a benefit, and other American railroads claim 
that the Canadian Pacific is a direct advantage to them. 
How Congress regarded this conflict we have no means of 
knowing. There was certainly no avowal, and the only 
expressions of Members which we have indicate a different 
purpose than one which might or might not have been enter-
tained, and which if it had been entertained it would seem 
the natural thing to have explicitly declared. 
As there was no reason, therefore, why the importations-
indirect or direct-should be discriminated by different 
duties, I am not disposed to think that it was intended. To 
so hold would be to put a new purpose in the law-destroy-
ing its unity-which is not compelled by its language or any 
mischief which we may say was in the contemplation of the 
lawmakers to be remedied. 
'.rhe section therefore regards, as the law which preceded 
it regarded, the transportation of goods by sea. Its purpose 
was to secure this to vessels of the United States by dis-
criminating against transportation not in them primarily to 
the United States, secondarily and to prevent evasion, to a 
contiguous country-Canada or Mexico. The necessity of it 
to the effectiveness of the law is obvious. Mere distance 
from the port of Vancouver to an American custom-house 
was as accidental to an importation that way as mere dis-
tance from the port of San Francisco to a New York custom-
house was to an importation that way. The essential fact 
to be regarded was that Vancouver was not in the United 
States and that Canada was a contiguous country. That 
could be a means of evasion. It would have been useless to 
have imposed a discriminating duty on goods brought to San 
Francisco in foreign vessels and leave them free to go to 
Vancouver in foreign vessels and thence across the inter-
vening land to the D nited States. 
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The amendment of the law which is made by section 22 
therefore continues its object while it strengthens and better 
secures it. It does this in two ways, if I may repeat-by 
taking away the means of its evasion through the contiguity 
of Canada and Mexico and by repealing the statutory 
exemptions from the 10 per cent duty: The special effect of 
this repeal I will consider hereafter. 
I have considered your inquiry so far as if the section only 
regarded mere transportation through Canada. We shall 
see hereafter that it has a broader scope. 
In the second contention the words'' come into the United 
States" are used as synonymous to imported. The language 
"being the production or manufacture of any foreign country 
not contiguous to the United States" is urged only as 
descriptive of the goods to which the duty applies. The 
goods themselves, it is contended, must take their departure . 
from the contiguous country in the strict sense of importa-
tion as distinguished from coming through it as an importa-
tion from some other country. I do not consider it necessary 
to detail the reasoning advanced to support this view. I 
have already given my interpretation of the words "come 
into" and that of the provision in which they are contained, 
and it would serve no purpose to make a circumstantial dis-
sent from any other. I may say, however, that this view is 
given plausibility to by the exception that the duty shall" not 
apply to such foreign products or manufactures as shall be 
imported from such contiguoµs countries in the usual course 
of retail trade." It is said that the words "imported in the 
course of strictly retail trade" indicate the rule. They are 
claimed to be the opposite of importation in the course of 
wholesale trade and that the latter must be direct, as those 
by retail could be no other way. But this does not follow. 
Such construction would confine the rule strictly to the 
exception, whereas it may be broader-including importa-
tions strictly so called-those which take their departure 
from a contiguous country if the other conditions of the rule 
exist. If so, the exception has an adequate and proper office. 
But it is not even necessary to go this far. '' It is a matter 
of common experience that savings and exceptions are often 
introduced from abundant and excessive caution. And it 
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would sometimes pervert the intention of the author of a 
writing if every other thing of the same general tenor as.that 
excepted should be regarded as embraced in the general 
· words." (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 222.) 
It follows, therefore, that the answer to your inquiry so 
far as section 22 is concerned depends (1) upon the character 
of the vessel in which the goods were carried to Vancouver; 
(2) if in foreign vessels, whether the goods were entitled by 
treaty or convention to be entered in the ports of the United 
States upon the payment of the same duties as if imported 
in American vessels. 
-I assume the vessels were not of the United States, but 
British vessels, and this brings me to your communication 
of August 1~, in which you inquire whether section 22 
repeals sections 4228 to 4232 of the Revised Statutes, and 
your communication of September 2, asking whether man-
ganese ore, imported from Chile in the British bark Lurlie 
to Philadelphia, is also subject to a discriminating duty. 
A law imposing discriminating duties has been on the 
statute books in some form from the time of the enactment 
of the first tariff bill. 
In the form (substantially) it maintained until section 22 
was passed it was inserted in the act of May 22, 1824. Sec-
tion 2 of that act was as follows: 
'' SEO. 2. And be it further enacted, That an addition of ten 
per centum shall be made to the several rates of duties 
hereby imposed upon the several articles aforesaid, which, 
after the said respective times for the commencement of the 
duties hereby imposed, shall be imported in ships or vessels 
not of the United States : Provided, That this addition shall 
not be applied to articles imported in ships or vessels not of 
the United States entitled by treaty, or by any act of Con-
gress, to be admitted on payment of the same duties that 
are paid on like articles imported in ships or vessels of the 
United States." 
This section, with unimportant verbal changes, became 
section 14 of the act of 1890 and section 2502 of the Revised 
Statutes. 
In section 22 there is a change. There is omitted from it 
the words "by any act of CongTess." Does this repeal sec-
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tion 42281 It will be observed that there are no words of · 
express repeal. The effects of · the acts of Congress are 
avoided, and this may not be the same as to section 4228 as 
to sections 4229 and 4230, which grant exemption directly to 
Prussian vessels. However, consideration will be simplified 
by a reference to contemporaneous legislation. 
On the same day the Dingley bill was approved an act 
entitled "An act to authorize the President to suspend dis-
criminating duties imposed on foreign vessels and commerce" 
was approved. I shall hereafter, for convenience, call it the 
suspension act. It is as follows: 
"That section forty-two hundred and twenty-eight of the 
Revised Statutes is amended by adding to the same the fol-
lowing, to wit: 'Provided, That the President is authorized 
to suspend in part the operation of sections forty-two hun-
dred and nineteen and twenty-five hundred and two, so that 
foreign vessels from a country imposing partial discriminat-
ing tonnage duties upon American vessels, or partial dis-
criminating import duties upon American merchandise, may 
enjoy in our ports the identical privileges which the same 
class of American vessels and merchandise may enjoy in said 
foreign country.'" 
It will be observed that it recognizes the existence of sec-
tion 4228 and amends it and enlarges the President's power. 
By 4228 that could only be exercised w1en no discriminating 
duties were imposed or laid on American vessels. The 
amendment provides that the power may be exercised to 
meet and respond to partial discriminating duties as well, 
reciprocating th~ exact privilege though less than total ex-
emptions. 
This act is somewhat confused by its Teferences. It refers 
to section 2502 of the Revised Statutes. That is the same 
in words as section 14 of the act of 1890 (the Wilson bill), and 
this is expressly r~pealed by section 34 of the Dingley bill, 
while section 2502 is not mentioned, but its provisions in 
exact words are carried into section 22. But notwithstand-
ing this confusion, the act does recognize the existence of 
and extends section 4228, and it also recognizes section 2502. 
What is the effect of this l The act and the Dingley bill 
were passed on the same day, and I do not think the order 
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of passage is important if they can be reconciled. ( Crane 
v. Reeder, 22 Mich., 331.) If either repeals the other, it is 
only by implication. There are no words of express repeal. 
The rule of implied repeals is well established by a long line 
of cases. There must be more than difference-there must 
be irreconcilable conflict (Red Rocle v. Henry, 106 U. S., 596, 
and cases cited), and " the presumption is stronger against 
implied repeals where provisions supposed to conflict are in 
the same actor were passed at nearly the same time." (Suth-
erland Statutory Construction, section 153; see also E ndlich 
ou the Interpretation of Statutes, section 45.) 
Let us apply this rule. 
Section 22 and section 4228 are both commercial r egula-
tions, and what the effect of section 22 would be on the other 
if subsequent in time and not accompanied by legislative in-
terpretation is easily perceived to be different when contem-
poraneous in time and so accompanied. In Crane v. R eeder 
(supra) two acts passed at the same session of the legislature 
were under consideration. The court said, speaking by 
Christiancy, J.: * * * '4 It is not possible to ascertain with 
certainty which was first passed by that body [senate], nor 
which was first approved by the governor, though a loose 
inference may be drawn that the governor's approval of the 
special act was communicated to the senate prior to his 
approval of the revision. * * * Both the revised statutes, 
as a whole, and the special act in question were, however, 
approved by the governor on the same day, May 18, 1846; and 
which was first actually passed by the legislature or first 
approved by the governor we do not deem at all material to 
the discovery of the legislative intent. It is sufficiently cer-
tain that both were practically under the legislative consid-
eration at the same time, and were, properly speaking, con-
temporaneous acts, and should be construed as such in arriv-
ing at the intention of the legislature." 
In the case of Payton v. Moseley (3 Monroe), the court of 
appeals of Kentucky, speaking by Judge Mills, of two acts 
said: 
"lt is true, as observed by the court below, the expres-
sion of this latter act are very broad, and ifit had not passed 
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at the same session with the former, it might, by the ordi-
nary rules of construction, be held to be a repeal of the for-
mer, pro tanto. 
"But with regard to acts of the same session, we appre-
hend that the rules of construction are somewhat different. 
When they are compared together, they ought to be con-
strued as one act on the same subject ; and the presumption 
of so sudden a change or revolution in the minds of the leg-
islature ought not to be indulged. There ought to be an 
express repeal, or an absolute inconsistency between the two 
provisions, to authorize a court to say that the latter had 
repealed the former." 
And the supreme court of the State of California, by Judge 
Sanderson, in People v. Jackson, said of two acts claimed to 
conflict : "Both acts were passed upon the same day, and 
relate to the same subject-matter. They are, therefore, 
according to a well-settled rule of interpretation, to be read 
together, as if parts of the same act." 
Section 22 and section 4228 and amendments are not coex-
tensive in scope; in purpose, therefore, they may be the com-
plements of each other. One prescribes a rule, the other the 
condition upon which, and the agency by which, it may be 
suspen<led. Each, therefore, has its purpose-definite and 
consil:3tent. Section 4228 might be a proviso to section 22 
and is in effect made so by the suspension act, and as such 
proviso it is certainly not repugnant to section 22. The lat-
ter has its operation-commencing with its passage, contin-
uing until the conditions of section 4228 occur, and the 
President acts on account of them, resuming again if the 
reciprocal exemptions of foreign nations be withdrawn. 
Examples of this are familiar in our legislation. The pro-
vision in the Dingley bill for reciprocity of trade is such an 
example. Under that the duties of the act may be changed. 
An example not so direct, but of the same principle, is found 
in the case of Russel v. Williams (106 U.S.). It would seem 
from the import of language that a statute imposing duties 
on articles was exclusive of prior ones, regular or discrimi-
nating, whether they were imported from or were the prod-
uct of one country or another. It was held, nevertheless, -in 
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Russel' v. Williams that a discriminating duty on the prod-
ucts of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope, when 
imported from places west of it, was not repealed by subse-
quent acts, though not repeated in them or mentioned by 
them. In this case it is true there was the distinction 
between a commercial regulation and provisions for revenue 
duties, but the principle of the case is that where there is 
difference in purpose legislative provisions may be inde-
pendent. But the rule of repeal by implication does not 
require us to find independence. If there is not irrecon-
cilable conflict, the laws may exist together. A.s we have 
already seen, there is certainly no irrecoucilable conflict. 
Even if there was more conflict in their language-more in 
their purpose-this would have to yield to the interpretation 
of the time and manner of their passage. The suspension 
act was reported to the House of Representatives by the 
same committee which reported the Dingley bill; was con-
sidered and passed while that act was in memory. I t passed 
the Senate while the Dingley bill was pending in considera-
tion, and was approved by the President on the same day 
the Dingley bill .was. A. knowledge of its relations to that 
bill and its effect on it must, therefore, be attributed to the 
legislature. It may be it was the later bill, for the Congres-
sional Record shows that the President's approval of it was 
communicated to the Congress subsequently to tha1, of the 
other. 
Even a more extreme position might be taken. It was 
held in Mead v. Bagnall and others (15 Wis., 156) that 
'' Where the provisions of a statute which relates to a par-
ticular class of cases are repugnant to those of another 
statute approved the same day, which is of a more general 
character, the former must prevail as to the particular class 
of cases therein referred to." (S(,e also Endlich on the 
Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 216, and cases cited.) 
It follows, therefore, that section 4228 was not repealed by 
section 22, and that the merchandise of both inquiries is not 
to be subjected to a discriminating duty. 
Respectfully, 
JOSEPH MCKENNA.. 
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. 
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GALVESTON HARBOR. 
Under the contract for the improvement of Galveston Harbor, the rail-
way to be built upon trestlew~rk following the line of the jetty 
must be at the expense of the Government, whether it is the case of 
original construction or extension. 
The Government must bear the expense of maintaining the r ailway 
upon the original work and upon the extension, after the suspension 
of operations upon these respectively. 
DEP A.RTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE, 
November 15, 1897. 
Sm: On May 12, 1891, the Government entered into a 
contract with O'Connor, Laing & Smoot for improving the 
entranc_e to Galveston Harbor, Texas, wherein it was agreed: 
"That the said O'Connor, Laing & Smoot shall construct 
the railway and trestle and furnish and place the sandstone, 
riprap, and granite blocks required for the construction and 
maintenance of the north and south jetties for improving 
the entrance to Galveston Harbor, Texas, and also for the 
extension of the same to any required distance beyond the 
outer crest of the bar, but not beyond the contour of thirty-
foot depth in the Gulf of Mexico." 
Among the specifications which are attached to and form 
a part of the contract are the following: 
"1. General outline of work.-The plan of the works con-
templates the construction of two jetties, one on the south 
side and one on the north side of the entrance to Galveston 
Harbor. The south jetty has been partially constructed by 
the Government, taking 1ts origin near the junction of Ninth 
street and Avenue A, at the east end of the city of Gal-
veston, and extending out to the crest of the bar in the 
Gulf of Mexico, which obstructs the entrance to Galveston 
Harbor. This jetty has a present total length of about six 
miles. It has been completed for a length of nearly four 
miles, of which nearly two miles constitute the shore branch, 
commencing near the junction of Avenue A and Ninth street, 
as noted above, and the remainder being the jetty proper, 
extending out into the Gulf. * * * It is proposed to 
complete this jetty, * * * and to build the north jetty 
* * * and to maintain both jetties for a period of five 
years after construction * * * 
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"2. General method of construction.-A railway of standard 
guage will first be constructed upon trestlework following 
the line of the jetty. The material will then be deposited 
aboi1t and between the piles." * * * 
"5. Railway.-The railway is to be of standard guage, its 
axis to coincide in plan with the axis of the jetty. * * * 
They (the rails) are to be carried upon trestlework con-
structed as follows: Bents of piling will be driven fifteen 
feet from centre to centre; each bent capped with a piece of 
12-inch by 12-inch timber, ten (10) feet long. * * * Upon 
the caps will be placed two twelve-inch by fourteen-inch 
stringers, upon which the rails will be laid. * * * Addi-
tional strength will be given to the trestle when required, 
the additional amount paid therefor to be the actual addi-
tional cost to the contractor." 
"9. Use of railicay.-During the period of the contract 
the contractor will be allowed the use of the railway now 
existing upon the completed portion of the southjetty, and of 
that built under this contract, for the purpose of transport-
ing the material to be delivered by him, and he wm be 
required to keep the track and trestle in good repair, but 
should extraordinary damage occur from storms the repairs 
will be the subject of special adjudication; and the decision 
of the engineer officer in charge as to what constitutes 
~xtraordinary damage, and what portion thereof should be 
borne by the contractor, shall be final. All temporary side 
tracks and switches must be provided by the contractor at 
his own expense." 
"14. Extent of the worlcs.-The exact distance out in the 
Gulf to which it will be necessary to carry the jetties can not 
be determined in advance, but it will not fall short of the 
outer crest of the bar, nor will it extend beyond the contour 
of the thirty-foot depth outside the bar. The United States 
re erves the right to suspend operations upon either or both 
of the jetties at any point between these two limits, and the 
work shall then, for the purpose of releasing the percentage 
referred to in specification 21, be considered complete, and 
further operations shall then consist in maintaining the 
work in good condition and in extending them further into 
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the Gulf, should the engineer officer in charge think proper 
to make such extension at any time withiu five years after 
this suspension of work." * * * 
Specification 15 required prices to be given separately for 
each of the thirteen items, twelve being for blocks of stone 
or concrete, of different weights and locations per ton, and 
the thirteenth for the" railway, including trestles and rails 
complete and ready for service, per linear foot." Under each 
item the price bid was to cover the cost of all labor required 
to put the material in place. 
'' 18. Maintenance.-The works will not be considered com-
pleted until they shall have been maintained a period of five 
years aner their construction. Whenever repairs become 
necessary, the engineer officer in charge shall notify the con-
tractor of the character and approximate quantity of the 
materials required, and the contractor shall, within thirty 
days from the date of such notification, begin the delivery 
of the materials, and shall push the work of repair with dili-
gence. The prices paid for materials used in maintenance 
will be the same as those for the original work and the terms 
of payment will be the same, except that there shall be no 
retained percentage. 
"19. Extension of jetties.-Should it be necessary, in the 
opinion of the engineer officer in charge, at any time within 
the five years after the original construction of the jetties, 
to extend them further into the Gulf, the contractor shall 
begin such extension within sixty days from the date of noti-
fication, and all of the terms and conditions which governed 
the original work shall apply to such extension, but the con-
tractor will not be required to maintain such extensions for 
a period beyond the termination of the five years during 
which he is required to maintain the original works." 
"21. Payments.-At the end of each ~alendar month, or as 
soon thereafter as the necessary formalities can be complied 
with, payment will be made for work accomplished during 
the month, less ten per cent of its contract price. The 
retained per cent does not become due until the completion 
of the works." * * * 
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After inviting my a tention to the above contract, in your 
communication of August 10, you submit the following ques-
tion for my opinion: 
'' There is a proposition pending in the War Department 
to enter into supplementary contract to relieve the contract-
ors from the maintenance for five years of the jetties as 
originally constructed. It is said that, if it is the duty of 
the United States to pay for the necessary repairs that are 
to be made on the railroad situated on the works during the 
five years the works are to be maintained after being com-
pleted, it would be to the interest of the United States to 
enter into the supplementary contract referred to, but that 
if under the contract it is the duty of the contractors to make 
said repairs at their own expense, it would not be to the 
interest of the United States to enter into such supple-
mentary contract, and in this way the question bas arisen, 
and as before stated is now pending, which it is necessary 
to have decided before further action can be taken on the 
proposition to enter into the proposed supplementary co11-
tract. This question is, whether under the said contract of 
May 12, 1891, the United States or the contractors should 
bear the cost of maintaining the railway upon the original 
work, and upon its extension, after the suspension upon these, 
respectively." 
At the time the contract was entered into, the south jetty 
had been partially constructed by the Government, having 
then a total length of 6 miles, of which 4 miles had been 
completed, 2 miles constituting the shore branch and the 
remainder being the jetty proper extending out into the Gulf. 
It was proposed by the contract to complete this jetty, to 
build the north jetty, and to maintain both jetties for a period 
of five years after construction (spec.1). In building the jet-
ties, the Government reserved the right to suspend work 
after the jetties should reach a certain point, and _then, if 
thought necessary, to direct their extension at any time 
within five years after such suspension (spec. 14). So the 
contract provided for three things: First, the work of original 
con truction to a point between the outer crest of the bar and 
th 30-foot depth outside the bar (spec. 14); second, the main-
tenance of the e works for a period of five years after the 
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work of original construction should be suspended ( spec. 18); 
third, the extension of the jetties farther into the Gulf, 
should that be deemed necessary (spec. 19). 
In constructing the works provided for, the contractor was 
required, first, to build a railway of standard gauge upon 
trestlework following the line· of the jetty. The material 
was then to be deposited about and between the piles ( spec. 
2), the railway becoming, as it were, the backbone of the 
jetty. For the railway in place the contractor was to receive 
so much a linear foot; for the stone and concrete blocks so 
much a ton. Of the contract price for both railway and 
stone work 10 per cent was to be retained until the comple-
tion of the works. (Spec. 21.) 
There is no dispute that, in the case of original construc-
tion, and in the case of extension, the Government must 
bear the expense of building the railway as a part of the 
works which become the property of the United States. Is 
this true with respect to maintenance under specification 181 
Specification 14, wherein the Government reserves the right, 
after the jetties shall have been carried a certain distance 
out in the Gulf, to suspend operations, provides that, for the 
purpose of releasing the retained 10 per cent under specifi-
cation 21, the work shall be considered complete, " and fur-
ther operations shall then consist in maintaining the works 
in good condition and in extending them farther into the 
Gulf," should the Government so require. What was to be 
extended farther into the Gulf, should the Government so 
reqnire1 Unquestionably, the railway and the jetty built 
under and about it, constituting " the works." What was 
to be maintained, should the Government not require any 
extension 1 Obviously the same thing-"the works," both 
railway and jetty, or, if you please to put it so, the jetty, in_ 
eluding the railway. In specification 19, providing for the 
extension of the jetties, the works required to be maintained 
are described as '' such extensions;" the thing extended is 
railway and jetty, and the same thing, the extension, must 
be maintained under this specification. 
At whose expense is this to be done1 In specification 18 
it is provided that" the worlcs will not be considered com-
pleted until they shall have been maintained a period of five 
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years after their construction." These are not different from 
"the works" referred to in specification 14-works which 
have been constructed, and might be extended, and must 
be maintained. For maintenance, the contractor is to be 
paid the same prices as for original construction, the lan-
guage of the contract being', "The prices paid for materials 
used in maintenance will be the same as those for the origi-
nal work." In the case of original work materials in place 
alone were paid for-completed railway at so much a foot, 
stone and concrete in place at so much a ton, these prices 
covering all labor required. (Spec. 15.) If in maintaining 
the rail way it does not become necessary to rebuild any part 
of it, there is provision for giving additional strength at a 
price to be measured by the actual additional cost to the 
contractor. (Spec. 5.) 
The doubt as to the proper construction of the contract 
referred to in your question is evidently due largely to the 
apparent requirement in·specification 9, that the contractor 
shall keep the railway in repair "during the period of the 
contract," but what this specification really provides, as a 
careful reading shows, is that the contractor will be allowed 
the use of the railway during said period. He is allowed the 
use, not only of the railway built by him under the contract, 
but of that "now existing upon the completed part of the 
south jetty," and this privilege is granted upon the condition 
that he "keep the track and trestle in good repair," extraor-
dinary damage from storms excepted. The obligation to 
keep in repair is not therefore consequent to the construction 
of the railway, but accompanies and flows from its use. 
The railway, that already constructed and that to be con-
structed, becomes a part of the permanent works belonging 
to the United States; so the Government permits its use on 
condition that the contractor shall keep it in good repair. 
The exception of extraordinary damage from storms strength-
ens the conclusion that the damage to be made good by the 
contractor is that which occurs while the railway is being 
used by him, attributable to causes for. which he may fairly 
be held responsible. 
The railway and trestle were to be built first, the stone 
and concrete placed under and about it to complete the jetty. 
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The railway thus built is incorporated into and becomes a 
part of the jetty. The provision for maintenance at the 
expense of the Government takes cognizance of the fact 
that the action of the elements will probably damage and 
partially destroy the work of the contractor. The same 
causes which damage and partially destroy the stonework 
will, in all likelihood, at the same time damage and partially 
destroy the railway. Why pay the contractor for maintain-
ing the stonework and not pay him for maintaining the 
railway¥ In neither case is he responsible for the damage; 
in each the elements alone are to blame. The prices for 
maintenance are those provided for original construction. 
The price for stonework in original construction was not put 
at a figure to cover the cost of building a railway to deliver 
it in place. The .railway was paid for separately. If the 
price for stone in original work did not cover the cost of 
building the railway, neither will the price of stone in main-
tenance cover the cost of rebuilding and maintaining it. 
Answering your question, I am therefore of the opinion 
that the railway built under this contract becomes a part of 
the works belonging to the United States, and that the Gov-
ernment must bear the expense of maintaining it upon the 
original work and upon the extension after the suspension of 
operations upon these respectively. 
It appears that early in 1895, about two years after work 
had been suspended on the south jetty, the War Department 
ordered an extension of the jetty further into the gulf. To 
enable the contractor to proceed with the work of extension, 
the Government paid him for repairing and in part rebuilding 
the railway on the south jetty. There was no authority for 
this expenditure, if the contract requires the contractor to 
bear the expense of maintaining the railway for five years 
after the suspension of the original work. The action 
amounted to a departmental construction of the contract in 
line with the conclusions reached in this opinion. 
Very respectfully, 
Approved. 
JOHN K. RICHARDS, 
Solicitor-General. 
JOSEPH McKENNA. 
The SECRETARY OF WAR. 
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CIII ESE. 
Certain Chinese persons of alleged American birth who entered the 
United States were deported to Canada, but subsequently returned 
to the United States: Held, the Collector of Customs h as the right to 
enforce his exclusion by again returning them to Canada. 
DEPARTMENT OF ,JUSTICE, 
November 19, 1897. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
letter of November 11, in which you transmit a copy of a 
letter dated November 5, with its in closures, received by you 
from the collector of customs for the port of Burlington , Vt., 
in relation to the admission of Chinese persons to this coun-
try. From the collector's letter it appears that ten Chinese 
persons of alleged American birth entered bis district and 
were at once returned by him to Canada, and that these ten 
Chinese have again presented themselves in bis district. 
The collector questions his authority to again deport them, 
and before answering the collector's letter you desire an 
expression of my views upon the subject. 
By the act of August 18, 1894, chapter 301, paragraph 6 
(2 Supp. R. S., 253), it is provided that-
"ln every case where an alien is excluded from admission 
into the United States under any law or treaty now existing 
or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigra-
tion or customs officers, if adverse to the admission of such 
alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury. " 
Iu the case of Lem JJ1oon Sing v. United States (158 U. S., 
538,548) the Supreme Court, in commenting upon this act, 
say: 
"But by the act of 1894 the decision of the appropriate 
immigration or c:ustoms officers excluding an alien 'from 
admission into the United States under any law or treaty' 
is made final in every case, unless, on appeal to the Secretary 
of the Treasury, it be reversed." 
And the court add that they do not express any opinion 
on the question whether in the case before them the appli-
cant wa entitled of right under some law or treaty to reen-
for the nited States, but decide that that question has been 
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constitutionally committed by Congress to the named officers 
of an executive department of the Government for final 
determination. There is no reason to doubt that this deci-
sion is applicable to an applicant seeking to enter the United 
States under claim of right, as well as to reenter. 
To hold that Chinese persons, after being excluded by a 
collector of customs at a frontier port under the authority 
of the above act and decision, may again return to this coun-
try and appear in the collector's district, claiming that he 
has no further jurisdiction over them, will be to set at 
naught the plain provision of the act of August 18, 1894, and 
the determination of the Supreme Court regarding it. I am 
therefore of the opinion that the collector of customs at Bur-
lington has the right to enforce his exclusion as to the Chinese 
persons in question, being in his district, by returning them 
to Canada. 
Very respectfully, 
JOSEPH l\1cKENN A. 
The SECRETARY OF '.l'HE TREASURY. 
10892-V0L 21, P'.l' 3-14 

*INDEX-DIGEST OF OPINIONS. 
-A.BANDONMENT. 
SEE CUSTOMi?_ LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 8-10. 
ABSENCE, LEAVES OF. 
1. The operation of the act of March 3, 1893, with reference to leaves 
of absence in the Treasury Department, is confined to clerks 
and employees in the city of Washington. 338. 
2. Employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing are entitled 
to leaves of absence under the act of July 6, 1892, notwithstand-
ing the act of March 3, 1893. Ib. 
3. Section 41 of the act of March 1, 1889, providing for leaves of 
absence, in case of an authorized encampment or parade, for 
members of the National Guard employed by the United States 
and the District of Columbia, is not repealed or modified by 
section 5 of the act of March 3, 1893, which regulates and limit~ 
leaves of absence for private reasons or purposes. 353. 
4. Absence of employees of the Government in the discharge of mili-
tary duties is not to be charged to the thirty days' leave allowed 
them for rest and recreation. lb . 
5. The provisions in the legislative appropriation act of March 3, 
1893, relative to annual and sick leaves of absence, does not 
apply to employees of the Department of Agriculture outside of 
the city of Washington. 427. 
ACCOUNTS. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is not required under the act of 
July 31, 1894, to report to Congress the balances due on postal 
accounts for the prior fiscal year. 296. 
2. The methods adopted in the settlement of accounts for the trans-
portation of the Army under the act of March 3, 1879, are not 
applicable to accounts for the transportation of enlisted men of 
the Navy and Marine Corps. ~ 297. 
3. Where Congress has omitted some accounts from an act covering 
certain accounts for transportation, it is evident that the inte11-
tion was that it should not apply to all accounts for transporta-
tion furnished under preceding acts. Ib. 
ACTIONS. 
1. Third persons claiming title to the land patented under the act of 
March 3, 1851, may bring a suit to declare a trust in said lands. 
Such suit may be brought in the State courts and without the 
aid of the Attorney-General. The decision of a State court 
upon snch a suit unappealed from binds the parties thereto, 
wltether righteous or erroneous. 13. 
· * See Inclex to Subjects, p. xvii. 
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2. ·when such thircl person fail to sue uutil the period of the statute 
of limitations of the State has expired, they are barred by their 
laches from suing th reafter. That they had meanwhile been 
applying to Congress for relief is immaterial. Ib. 
3. The Attorney-G neral should not institute for the benefit of private 
parties a suit to vacate or reform a United States land patent 
unless there is a reasonable ground to believe that it w ill be 
sustainecl by the court, or except for a wrong which private 
litigation could not remedy. Ib. 
4. The United States does not suffer itself to be suetl without its 
consent. 18. 
5. Public property can be subject to claims against it only when it 
is in the possession of the courts by act of the Government seek-
ing to have its rights established. Ib. 
6. As a recourse to law for the settlement or collection of certain 
bonds issuecl by certain States and owned by the United States 
would involve the grave act of suing a State, the Secretary of 
the Treasury is advised not to institute suit. 478. 
7. One may proceed on the same cause of action against the same 
defendants in as many different jurisdictions as be can have 
service of process executed upon the defendants. 447. 
8. One final judgment on the merits rend~red in one action can be 
pleaded in bar in all others upon the same cause of action. lb. 
9. The appearance of parties to a suit in one jurisdiction does not 
operate as an abandonment of proceedings instituted by them 
in another jurisdiction, the parties to the cause of action being 
the same. lb. 
ADVERTISEMENTS. 
1. All purchases and contracts for supplies in any of the departments 
of the Government mnst be made after advertisement, unless 
immediate delivery of the articles is necessary. 59. 
2. The first two sentences of section 3709, Revised Statutes, as 
amended apply to purchases anywhere in the United States, 
while the remaining three sentences apply only to purchases in 
the city of Washington. Ib. 
3. Revised Statutes, section 3709, prohibiting the purchase of sup-
plies except after advertisement, does not apply to paper and 
materials for the Government Printing Office, and the acts 
amendatory thereof enlarge it in respect to this office only so 
as to apply to fnel, ice, stationery, and miscellaneous supplies. 
137. 
4. The purchases to be made by the Public Printer as contemplated 
by the act of January 12, 1895, are paper and materials for 
printing and binding public documents and such as do not come 
within section 3709, Revised Statutes. Ib. 
5. nd r sections 3709 and 3718, supplies of every n~me and nature 
for the avy are to be purchased by contract upon advertise-
m~nt, xcept in ca e wb 11 the pnl.,li • exigency will not permit 
of delay, anll theu by optJu p,m . .: lrn-o ash tween individualA. 181. 
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6. The act of January 12, 1895, transfers the authority to contract 
for envelopes to the Postmaster-General; and this act must be 
construed in pari materia with sections 3709 and 37 .. 3, Revised 
Statutes. lb. 
7. Contracts for the purchase of seals by the United States, used to 
secure packages while being transported in bond, must be 
awarded upon advertisement. 304. 
8. Advertisements for proposals in accordance with the provisions of 
section 3709, Revised 8tatutes, are not required for supplies or 
services for the Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb. 
349. 
9. The Maxim-Nordenfelt Company contracts to furnish the Navy 
Department 100 guns. By a supplemental agreement provision 
is made for the manufacture of the guns at the Naval Gun 
Factory in "\Vashington and for ascertaining the remuneration 
ultimately to be paid the Maxim Company: Held, That this is 
a contract for ordnance and another contract may be made by 
the Department with the American Ordnance Company for .the 
manufacture and delivery of any of said guns under the con-
tract and agreement with the Maxim- N ordenfelt Company 
without submitting the matter to competition by public adver-
.tisement. 577. · 
10. It is competent for the Secretary of State to prohibit the pub-
lication in the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of American 
Republics of advertisements of private :firms or corporations. 
514. 
11. The bulletins containing such advertisements may be sent through 
the mail free of postage. lb. 
12. It is not necessary under existing law for the Secretary of the 
Treasury to advertise in six newspapers published in the Dis-
trict of Columbia for proposals for the interior finish of the 
post-office building in the city of Washington. 595. 
13. 'l'he selection of newspapers in which to publish advertisements 
of this character in the District of Columbia is in the discretion 
of the head of the Department. lb. 
14. The advertisements in Le Petit Journal, a French publication, 
considered and held to fall within the prohibited class defined 
in section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-
tember 19, 1890, and therefore unmailable. 171. 
See Brns, 6. 
AGENT. 
The authority t,o collect drawbacks may be delegated by a manu-
facturer to a general selling agent or to some attorney at law, 
but such a person must conduct his business through a licensed 
broker unless he obtains himself a license. 255. 
See WORDS AND PHRASES. 
ALIENS. 
See CITIZENSHIP; IMMIGRANTS; VESSELS, 4. 
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AMERICAN REGISTRY. 
1. The British steamship Southery was wrecked outside of the limits 
of the United States, abandoned, turned over to the underwrit-
ers, and finally towed to New York, where she sank in or nea.: 
Erie Basin. She was repaired and purchased by an American 
citizen at three times the cost of the wreck: Held, The vessel 
was wrecked in the "Cnited States within the meaning of Reviseu 
Statutes, section 4136. 143. 
2. The word "cost" in said section is to be construed liberally, and 
if the actual cost of the repairs is three times the actual pur-
chase price of the wreck, then she is entitled to registry. Ib. 
3. The Secretary of the Treasury was justified in denying the appli-
cation for registry of the vessel Southery under this section, 
in view of the narrow construction placed upou the clause 
"wrecked in the United States." 198. 
4. If any of the injuries which have made a vessel a wreck were 
received in the United States, in the absence of bad faith.she 
should be held to come within the clause " wrecked in the 
United States," although others h ad been received elsewhere. 
Ib. 
5. The word "wreck" in section 4136, Revised Statutes, must be 
taken in a very comprehensive sense as applicable to a vessel 
which is disabled and rendered nnfit for navigation, whet.her 
this state of the vessel ha,s been caused by the winds or the · 
waves, by stranding1 fire, explosion of boilers, or by any other 
casualty. Ib. 
AMERICAN REPUBLICS. 
See BUREAU OF AMERICA.,.""i REPUBLICS. 
ANIMALS, DISEASED. 
See CATTLE. 
APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS. 
1. The President can appoint to office only those who are eligible 
under the Constitution. His appointment of one not eligible is 
a nullity. 211. 
2. The sole responsibility of every appointment in an executive 
department rests upon the head of that department, except 
where otherwise specially provided by statute. 355. 
3. The power of appointment and removal in an executive depart-
ment being discretionary in character, they can not be delegated. 
lb. 
See CIVIL, ElWICE; NAVAL ACADEMY, 1-4. 
A.PPROPRIATIONS. 
1. The ques_tion out of which appropriation certain expenses of the 
Department of Agriculture should be paid is one which should 
be addressed to the Comptroller of the Treasury. 221. 
2· • 0 should the question whether or not the appropriation act of 
1 , 96 authorizes the ~ecretary of the Treasury to purcliase news-
papers and other articles for use outside of Washington. 178. 
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3. The allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the 
different departments is not actually passed upou by the account-
ing officers of the Treasury, and is not within their jurisdic-
tion. 423. 
4. No authority exists in the Secretary of the Navy to incur obliga-
tions for the completion of a dry dock where the appropriation 
has become exhausted, although it would result in a great 
saving to the Government. 288. 
5. The object of sections 3732, 3733, and 5503 is to prevent executive 
officers from involving the Government in expenditures or lia-
bilities beyond those contemplated and authorized by the law-
making' power. 244-. 
6. N. notified the Secretary of War that it elects to carry on the work 
of dredging in the Mobile Harbor under its contract, if the 
appropriation is exhausted, without waiting for an appropria-
tion by Congress to pay for it, and asks the Secretary of War 
to supervise the same: Held, That he is without authority to 
continue the employment of the contractors, and that the w.ork 
which they propose to do does not come within their contract 
and that he can not supervise it. lb. 
7. The appropriation for special speed premiums made by the act of 
July 26, 1894, is not limited in its application to premiums 
earned prior to January 1, 1894. 84. 
8. Un:der section 5 of the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, which 
limits the amount that the Secretary of War can obligate the 
Government for in any fiscal year to $400,000, the con.tractor may 
perform in one year the work for which the contract allows him 
three years, and although he may earn a larger sum than this 
amount he may not receive full payment therefor under three 
years. 379. 
9. Where the total amount authorized to he expended is less than 
$400,000, contractors may be allowed to earn the amounts ' 
authorized to be expended in advance of the appropriation by 
Congress for such work. lb. 
10. The river and harbor act of June 3, 1893, making an appropria -
tion. for the protection of the east bank of the Mississippi River 
opposite the mouth of the Missouri River, leaves it to the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of War whether he shall make such 
expenditure or not. 391. · 
11. The river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, made a lump appropria-
tion for certain improvements on the Mississippi River, while 
the proviso thereto specified '' that the sum hereby appropri-
ated'' shall be expended for improvements at Greenville, Helena, 
and New Madrid: Held, That the sums specified in the proviso 
are chargeable to the specific appropriation set forth in the body 
of the act. 4-14. 
12. The direction to expend the sums mentioned in the proviso to 
this act is not mandatory to the extent that the full amount 
must be expended if the work can be done for less, or to pro-
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ceed with it at all contrary to the recommendation of the Mis-
sissippi River Commission, whose recommendations are to be 
considered. lb. 
13. If the appropriation made for river and harbor improvements by 
the act of June. 3, 1896, should not be expended, the work could 
at a subsequent time be contracted for by the Secretary of War 
under a provision in said act for such additional contracts as 
may be necessary to carry on continuously the plans for the 
work. lb. 
14. The specific appropriations in this act, if not used for the partic-
ular work designatecl by Congress, can not be used for any other 
purpose. lb. 
15. The various provisions in the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, 
that contracts "may be" entered into by the Secretary of War 
for the completion of certain improvements, to be paid for out 
of future appropriations, are not mandatory, but discretionary ; 
and he may decline to make contracts in all cases where he is 
convinced that the public interests will not be subserved by 
making them. 420. 
See CLAIMS, 3, 4; DAMAGES; SEEDS, 1-3, 5, 6. 
ARBITRATOR. 
See CONSULAR OFFICERS, 2. 
ARKANSAS. 
Certain interest-bearing bonds of the State of Arkansas held not 
to bear interest after maturity. 135. 
ARMS. 
See NATIONAL GUARD. 
ARMY. 
1. The troops of the United $tates can not be employed in thb Indian 
Territory for the purpose of assisting in the preservation of 
peace and the arrest of bandits and outlaws unless they are 
trespassing upon Indian country, or absconding offenders within 
the provisions of section 2152, Revised Statutes. 72. 
2. A "municipal ordinance" is comprehended by the phrase "laws of 
the land" as used in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a soldier 
violating such an ordinance and escaping to a military reserva-
tion should be surrendered to the civil authorities for trial 
upon demand. 38. 
3. A soldier should not be held accountable for money paid him in 
excess of the amount to which he was entitled where such pay-
ment was made through a mistake of law on the part of the 
executive officers of the Government. 323. 
4. A convicted deserter from the Army undergoing sentence must 
become the recipient of Executive clemency and make applica-
cation for reenli tment before the question of the effect of the 
President's p ardon upon his right to reenlist can arise. 568. 
See Ace NT , 2, 3; ARMY OFFICERS. 
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1. The E'ifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia was not in the 
military service of the United States in such sense as to entitle 
Capt. Frederick Huidekoper to a certificate of discharge from 
the United States. 130. 
2. The phrase "he shall be retired with the rank to which his sen-
iority entitled him to be promoted," under section 3 of the act of 
October 1, 1890, is not a mandatory provision for the retirement 
of the disabled officer, but for the purpose of fixing the rank 
with which he should be retired. 385. 
3. No officer can be retired from the Army upon the report of any 
board, even if approved by the Secretary of War, except it is 
also approved by the President. Ib. 
4. An examination of a lieutenant of the Army for promotion, which 
results in a finding by the examining board of incapacity for 
act,ive service on account of physical disabilities, and which is 
approved by the proper military authorities but not by tlie Presi-
dent, was not such an examination as is required by law for the 
retirement of an offir.er from the active service. Ib. 
5. Upon the removal of such physical disability a reexamination may 
be allowed by the Secretary of War. Ib. 
6. The President has authority to assign enlisted men of the Army 
who have passed the examination as candidates for commission 
to vacancies tliat may exist in any corps or arm of the service 
in which they have been commissioned, notwithstanding the 
fact that additional second lieutenants remained in other corps 
unassigned. 491. 
7. The question as to whether a retired officer is eligible to hold 
certain diplomatic or consular appointments without affecting 
his position on the retired list, with rank and pay, is one of 
private concern only and not a subject with which the United 
States can be interested until some action has been taken by 
such officer. 510. 
8. Officers who served during the rebellion as volunteers in the 
Army of the United States and have been honorably mustered 
out are entitled to bear the official title and upon occasions of 
ceremony wear the uniform of the highest grade they have held 
in the volunteer service. 579. 
See ARMY; PENSIONS, 1, 2; TAXATION, 8, 9. 
ARREST. 
See ARMY, 1. 
ASSIGNMENTS. 
An assignment of an indebtedness admittedly due bv the United 
Statee is not prohibited by section 3177, Rev.ised Statutes. 75. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
1. A question once fully considered and answered by one Attorney-
General can not with propriety be reconsidered by his successor, 
unless in some extraordinary case. 23, 264. 
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2. Upon a question of fact the Attorney-General will not give an 
opinion. 174, 240,454. 
3. Nor is it his province to inquire into matters of fact. 481. 
4. He is precluded from considering questions of fact on evidence 
submitted. 594. 
5. The existence of a foreign law is a question of fact upon which t he 
opinion of the Attorney-General can not be requested . 80, 377. 
6. The Attorney-General is not authcrized to give an official opinion 
upon the course to b e pursued by an executive department, as 
that involves a question of fact and considerations of expedi-
ency. 73. 
7. As to whether one patent infringes upon others is a matter of 
fact upon which the Attorney-General will not express an official 
opinion. 96. 
8. Questions of fraud or intent or colorable transactions are questions 
of fact, and not within the authority of the Attorney-General 
to determine. 129. 
9. As to whether or not the Official Gazette, including the indexes 
therefor, is as a whole ''printing for the Patent Office, making 
use of lithography or photography, together with the plates 
for the same," being a question of fact, the Attorney-General 
will not give an opinion thereon. 174. 
10. The question of whether one trade-mark simulates another is a 
question of fact upon which the Attorney-General can not 
express an official opinion. 260. 
11. Whether a term has a settled technical meaning is a question of 
fact upon which the Attorney-General is not authorized to 
pass. 179; 
12. The Attorney-General will not give an official opinion except upon 
questions of law, nor without a definite statement of the facts 
upon which the question is submitted. 36,179, 201, .506. 
13. And he can not investigate the papers for the purpose of ascer-
taining such facts. 220. 
14. An opinion required for the guidance of the head of an executive 
department in the discharge of official duties, and both public 
and private interests requiring that it should be acted upon 
promptly, is given by the Attorney-General, although he migllt 
refuse it for the reason that the points to be submitted are not 
stated but are to be gathered from the communications sub-
mitted. 486. 
15. A request for an opinion failing to state definite facts showing by 
what persons, in what manner, and during what period of the 
year fur seals are being killed in the passes of the Aleutian 
Islands, it is impossible to determine whether the administra-
tive duty imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury by section 
1956, Revised tatutes, is or is not qualified by the act of April 
6, 1894. 583. 
16. The rule of the Department which forbids the expression of an 
official opinion upon any qu stion of law which has not arisen 
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in an existing case, and presented upon a definite statement of 
facts, would prevail, but for the fact that it is a quest.ion of the 
legality of a provision of long standing in contracts of the War 
and Navy Departments. 207. 
17. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion on a matter not 
pending before the department requesting it. 167,240,531. 
18. Nor where it does not appear that some question exists calling for 
the action of the department requesting it. 201. 
19. An opinion can not be give~ by the Attorney-General upon a case 
not actually arising in the department, the head of which re-
quests the opinion. 178,219,478. 
20. The Attorney-General can only render opinions in cases which 
are actually pending and involving the legal questions sub-
mitted. 568. 
21. The Attorney-General will not express an official opinion upon a 
question not presently arising in the administration of an execu-
tive department. 106, 109, 186, 506. 
22. The Attorney-General is not permitted to give opinions as to tho 
construction or interpretation of a statute, except in an actual 
case which has arisen and is before an executive department 
calling for its action in the regular course of administering its 
affairs. 510. 
23. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a question 
presented where no occasion has arisen for official action of the 
head of the department requesting it. 174,457. 
24. The Attorney-General is not required or authorized to give an 
official opinion except when needed for the guidance of the 
head of a department, and when relating to .some matter call-
ing for action or decision on his part. 174. 
25. In the absence of facts presenting a case actually or presently 
arising and pending in the administration of a department, call-
ing, for action, which can not be determined by the Attorney-
General witliout usurping judicial functions, his official opinion 
can not be required. 583. 
26. The rule of the Attorney-General in declining to give an opinion 
in a case where it is doubtful whether a question of law is raised 
in the administration of the department requesting it is disre-
garded, as proper cases raising such a question are pending in 
several of the other Executive Departments. 579. 
27. The Attorney-General will not give au opinion upon an inquiry 
which appears to present but a moot case. 506. 
28. A request for an opinion of the Attorney-General must relate, not 
to a mere moot question, but one which requires immediate 
action. The answer must be necessary for the protection of the 
officer making the inquiry or to insure the lawfulness of the 
action which he is about to take. 509. 
29. An opinion is given upon a mere moot question, although in 
accordance with custom it might with propriety be declined, 
320. 
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30. The question whether or not the Secretary of the Treasury is 
authorizecl by tlle appropriation act for the fiscal yea,r 1896 to 
purchase newspapers and other articles for use outside of Wash-
ing-ton, in view of sections 192 and 3683, Revised Statues, belongs 
to a class of questions which should be submitted to the Comp-
troller of the Treasury, except in matters of great importance, 
as under the act of .July 31, 1894, his opinion is a complete 
protection. 178. 
31. A question affecting all the Executive Departments is answered 
by the Attorney-General, as it falls within the exception to the 
rule that his opinion should not be rendered upon questions 
which, under section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894, can be referred 
to the co"mptroller for decision, except in matters of great 
importance, inasmuch as a conflict of precedents might arise. 
181. 
32. An opinion which could have been asked of the Comptroller of 
the Treasury is, notwithstanding, given by the Attorney-General, 
it appearing that the question is one of importance and the 
Comptroller joins in requesting it. 224. 
33. The question as to the right to refund certain duties claimed to 
have been collected through mistake of law should be asked 
of the Comptroller of the Treasury. 188. 
34. A request for an opinion of the Compt11oller of the Treasury is 
referred by him to the Attorney-General and is furnished by 
the latter, as the question is an important one. 402. 
35. The Attorney-General will not pass upon the question to what 
appropriation a certain expenditure should be charged, as it is 
one which should more properly be submitted to the Comptroller 
of the Treasury. 405. 
36. On questions of disbursement of money or payment of clairus, 
which are by law relegated to the Comptroller, the Attorney-
General should not render an opinion. 530. 
37. An expression in an opinion of the Attorney-General which is 
merely obiter does not have the force and effect of au official 
opinion. 25. 
38. ,veight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are not questions 
to be considered in rendering an opinion. 58. · 
39. The Attorney-General is not at liberty to comply with a request 
for a further consideration and opinion upon the residence of 
M., a civil-service employee, as it would involve consideration 
ancl decision upon conflicting evidence. lb. . 
40. Certain-steamship companies dispute the validity of the regula-
tions of the Treasury Department holding them liable for the 
maintenance and transportation to the seaboard, under the act 
of March 3, 1891, of certain alien immigrants who had reached 
the interior of the country: Held, That the enforcement of the 
regulation is the duty of the Department of Justice and the 
opinion of the Attorney-General can not be required thereon. 6. 
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41. The Attorney-General should not institute, for the benefit of pri-
vate parties, a suit to vacate or reform a United States land pat-
ent unless there is reasonable ground to believe that it will be 
sustained by the court or where it is for a wrong which private 
litigation could not remedy. 13. 
42. Third . persons claiming title to land patented in California under 
the act of March 3, 1851, may bring a suit to declare a tri1st in 
said lands. Such suit may be brought in the State courts and 
without the aid of the Attorney-General. The decisions of a 
State court upon such a suit unappealed from binds the parties 
thereto, whether righteous or erroneous. Ib. 
- 43. The question of how far the judgment of a court is void for want 
of jurisdiction should be deferred until actually presented for 
decision in the case in which one of the parties to such judg-
ment shall be a party. 37. · 
44. The Attorney-General will not give an opinion upon a judicial 
question not arising in the admil}istration of a dep_artment 
within the meaning of section 356, Revised Stat_utes. 369. 
45. The question whether or not a civil action or criminal prosecu-
tion could be commenced relative to lands found to have been 
erroneously patented under the Western Pacific Railroad grant 
in California is not one upon which the Attorney-General 
can give a legal opinion to the head of another department. 
509. 
46. As to whether or not the statute of limitations did or did not 
bar a claim on behalf of the Government is a judicial question 
to be determined by the courts and not by the Attorney-
General. 557. 
47. The Attorney-General will not give an official opinion upon the 
question whether certain plates and cuts used for making 
sketches and pictures .of foreign postage stamps come within 
the terms of the act of May 16, 1884, and the act of February 
10, 1891 ( except section 4), prohibiting counterfeiting, because 
· they relate only to criminal proceedings. 133. 
48. Whether or not an act constitutes a crime is a question that in 
but rare instances can ·arise except in the Department of Jus-
tice. lb. 
49. Whether or not certain material or apparatus come within the 
scope of section 4 of the act of 1891 is a question of fact, and 
an opinion can not be given thereon, lb. 
50. A question involving the construction or application of a customs 
regulation which is subject to modification at any time is not 
a proper one upon which the Attorney-General should give an 
opinion. 255. 
51. The existence of a usage affecting the legal definition of a statu-
tory term is a question of fact upon which the Attorney-Gen-
eral will not give an opinion. lb. 
52. The Attorney-General can not undertake to give a general defini-
tion of the words applicable to all cases arising. 109. 
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AUDITORS 01!., THE TREASURY. 
They are agents of the Government in the broad sense of the term 
but are more properly called officers, and were not intended to 
be included within the meaning of the word " agent" in section 
3469, Revised Statutes. 361. 
BALTIMORE POST-OFFICE. 
Certain removals of superintendents and .clerks in the Baltimore 
post-office and the appointment of their successors held to be 
legal. 140. 
BANKS AND BANKING LAWS. 
The proposed issue of interest-oearing bonds by the county com-
missioners of Floyd County, Ga., will not be in conflict with 
the banking laws of the United States. 70. 
See TAXATION, 3-6. 
BERING SEA AWARD ACT. 
See SEAL FISHERIES,. 2-9. 
BIDS. 
1. The Secretary of the Navy is obliged to award contracts for sup-
plies to the lowest bidder who complies with the requirements 
as to security, etc., although the Secretary is the person charged 
with the duty of ascertaining the facts in this regard, and bis 
decision is not reviewable by any court. 56. 
2. In the al>sence of any special statutory provision, a bidder may 
withdraw his bid at any moment until notice of acceptance 
thereof. lb. 
3. In case of a failure to accept the lowest bidder in a contract for 
naval supplies, it is not necessarily the duty of the Secretary 
to award the contract to the next lowest bidder. lb. 
4. If a bid for the construction of public works bas been accepted, 
it can not be withdrawn by the contractor l>ecause be made a 
clerical error in preparing his estimates, as the mistake was not 
mutual, but was due to negligence. 18fi. 
5. It is within the authority of the Secretary of War to waive infor-
malities in the submission of bids and the written guaranty 
accompanying the same, and in specific cases to waive formal 
defects, both in the bids and bonds. 469. 
purpose. 1 b. 
6. There is nothing in section 3709, Revised Statutes, providing for 
adverti ements for public supplies, as amended, inconsistent 
with the legal right of the board of award of the Department 
of Agriculture to consider any bid received by them through 
the mail after the hour of 2 o'clock p. m. 546. 
7. Th statutory designation of 2 o'clock p. m. for the opening of 
all proposals in each department means only that such pro-
posal hall not be opened before 2 o'clock p. m. thus securing 
to both the Government and the bidders the advantage of the 
prescribed moment priortowhich no bids can be opened. lb. 
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8. A proposal .received after 2 o'clock p. m. under circumstances 
which warrant the belief that it had been prepared and sub-
mitted in the light of the proposals submitted by other bidders, 
which had already been opened and made known, should not 
be received or entertained; but a proposal received under con-
ditions which precluded the possibility of such inference should 
not be rejected because it happens to be received by the board 
of award a few minutes after 2 o'clock p. m. Ib. 
See ADVERTISEMENTS; BONDS, 4; CONTRACTS, 7; MILITARY ACAD-
EMY, ETC., 1. 
BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 11-14. 
BOARD OF SUPERVISING INSPECTORS OF STEAM VESSELS. 
See NAVIGATION, RULES, 3. 
BONDED WAREHOUSES. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 15-25. 
BONDS. 
1. The proposed issue of interest-bearing bonds by the county com-
missioners of Floyd County, Ga., will not be in conflict with 
the banking laws of the United States. 70. 
2. Certain interest-bearing bonds of the State of Arkansas held not 
to bear interest after maturity. 135. 
3. United States district attorneys are not required or authorized to 
make the examination into the sufficiency of the sureties on 
official bonds required by section 5 of the act of March 2, 
1895. 154. 
4. A bond accompanying a bid for certain public works which is on 
printed blanks bound together and consecutively paged in print 
is not sufficiently defective to make it invalid because the 
date of the bid and that of the bond were not inserted in the 
blanks left for that purpose. Ib. 
5. As a recourse to law for the settlement or collection of certain 
bonds issued by certain States and owned by the United States 
would involve the grave act of suing a State, the Secretary of 
the Treasury is advised not to institute suit. 478. 
See Brns, 5. 
BRIDGES. 
The action of a State with reference to the rights of parties 
among themselves concerning the construction of a bridge does 
not affect the interests of the United States so long as the 
directions of the Secretary of War concerning the location and 
plan of the bridge are respected. 293. 
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 1, 3, 9, 10. 
BRIG ''GENERAL ARMSTRONG." 
See CLAIMS, 3, 4. 
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BUREAU OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS. 
1. 'fhe Monthly Bulletin, containing advertisement!:J of private firms 
or corporations, published by the Bureau of American Repub-
lics, is entitled to transmission through the mails free of post-
age, under the act of February 20, 1897. 514. 
2. It is competent for the Secreta1·y of State to prohibit the publica-
tion in the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of Amer ican Repub-
lics of advertisements of private firms or corporat ions. Ib. 
BUREAU OF ENGRAVING AND PRINTING. 
See ABSENCE, LEAVES OF, 2. 
CALIFORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION. 
1. The California Debris Commission may take the necessary steps to 
prevent injury to the navigability of a river by operation of 
hydraulic mining within the t erritory of the jurisdiction of the 
commission and resort to the remedy of injunction on a bill in 
equity in the name of the United States. 10. 
2. The North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company is w ithin the juris-
diction of the California Debris Commission. 62. 
3. The California Debris Commission may resort to a court of equity 
for the purpose of obtaining authority to make an inspection of 
the premises where hydraulic mining is being or supposed t o be 
unlawfully conducted, and pray for an injunction to r es tr ain 
the mining during the time the commission is excluded. I b. 
CANNED MEAT. 
See MEA'l' INSPECTION, 1. 
CAPITATION TAX. 
See TAXATION, 2. 
CARTAGE CHARGES. 
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 14. 
CATTLE. 
1. The act of August 30, 1890, provides a summary method of appraisal 
and payment in case of the slaughter of animals exposed to 
infection, but no payment is provided where they are imported 
in violation of the act. The evident intent of the act was that 
exposed animals imported in violation thereof were to be 
slaughtered indiscriminately, without regard to the question of 
the legality of the importation. 460. 
2. The authority of the Department of Agriculture to seize and 
slaughter imported sheep affected with scab under that act is 
doubtful. Ib. 
Seo MEAT INSPECTION; QUARANTINE, ETC. 
CE TRAL PACIF IC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
1. The l anguage of t he Thurman Act, section 8, with reierence to 
t he Pacific Railroad companies, does not create a lien on t he 
sinking fund pr ior to t hat of the United States in favor of 
t he fi r t-mortgag bondholders. 104. 
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2. The entire sinking fund belonging to the Central Pacific, or its 
proceeds, may, if necessary, be used to pay the indebtedness of 
the Central Pacific to the United Statea maturing in January, 
1885. lb. 
3. A demand upon the railroad companies is not necessary to fix its 
liability to reimburse the United States for all sums paid by the 
latter on account of principal and interest of subsidy bonds. Ib. 
4. The acts of July 1, 1862, and July 2, 1864, with reference to the 
Central Pacific Railroad Company, construed in the light of the 
act of May 7, 1878, and sundry decisions of the Supreme Court: 
Held, That the one-half of the earnings of the company on 
Government business and its yearly paymants of 5 per cent of 
its net profits can not be treated as having liquidated the whole 
or any part of the company's indebtedness on account of the 
principal of the subsidy bonds maturing January 16, 1895; but, 
on the other hand, must be regarded as paying interest debts 
exclusively. Held further, Applying the familiar rule that in 
case of payments by a debtor to a creditor upon distinct trans-
actions for distinct accounts, when neither party makes an 
~propriation at the time, the payments are applied by law to 
the liabilities of earliest date; that the sums applicable in any 
one yeartothe payment of the company's interest debts forthat 
year must be applied in the order in which such debts arise, and 
the fact that bonds have been issued at various times is of no 
consequence. 145. 
CHICAGO RIVER. 
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 4. 
CHINESE. 
1. A Chinese person is not a merchant within the meaning of section 
2 of the act of March 3, 1893, unless he conducts his business 
either in his own name or in a firm name of which his own is a 
part. 5. 
2. The requirements of tho act of July 5, 1884, with reference to the 
admission of Chinese to this country should be strictly com-
plied with by the applicants for admission. 6. 
3. The Secretary of the Treasury, under the act of May 5, 1892, may 
authorize the landing and detention at a port within the United 
States of Chinese sentenced to deportation, until the vessel 
returns to such port and is ready to proceed to China. 18. 
4. The third paragraph of section 2 of the act of November 3, 1893, is to 
be regarded as wholly prospective in its operations and as apply-
ing exclusively to Chinese merchants who both came into the 
United States for the first time since November 3, 1893, and, 
having carried on business here, afterwards left the country and 
seek to return. 21, 99. 
10892-VOL 21, PT 3--15 
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5. Merchants already here when the statute took effect may leave the 
country and return as if the act of November 3, 1893, had not 
been passed. 21. 
6. Since May 6, 1882, neither State nor Federal courts had jurisdiction 
to admit Chinese to citizenship. 37,581. 
7. The convention of March 17, 1894, between the United States and 
China, repea,ls only the act of October 1, 1888. 68. 
8. The Secretary of the Treasury has power to require the production 
of a certificate in such form as he may prescribe, as evidence of the 
right of certain Chinese subjects to enter the United States. lb. 
9. The Secretary of the Treasury has authorit,y to issue regulations 
requiring Chinese laborers residing in the United States, and 
who may depart therefrom for temporary sojourn abroad, to 
return to this country only at the ports from which they depart. 
lb. 
10. A certificate of naturalization issued by the circuit court at Mont-
real, Canada, and a passport issued by the governor-general of 
Canada can not be accepted in lieu of the certificate required by 
the act of July 6, 1884, in order to entitle such person claiming the 
right as a merchant to enter and travel in the United States. 123. 
11. Chinese subjects resident of t,he British Colony of Hongkong desir-
ing admittance to the United States under the provisions of the 
treaty of 1894 with China, must produce the necessary certificate, 
signed by the register-general of that colony. 347. 
12. In the convention with China of 1894, the use of the words "port" 
and ''land" do not limit the right to return to such Chinese as 
travel by sea. 357. 
13. lt is necessary for Chinese laborers to leave this country at a port 
which is within the jurisdiction of a Chinese consul, and should 
return to it at a port of entry where there is a collector; but as 
they have the right to go and return by land, these places need 
not be seaports. lb. 
14. Under Article II of that convention, the officer to whom the evi-
dence of sickness or disability are to be reported, in order to 
enable Chinese laborers to return to the United States, is the 
Chinese consul at the place he left the United States. 357. 
15. The policy of the Government being against the admission of Chi-
nese laborers, treaty provisions making exceptions should not 
"be extended by construction to cases not falling within the 
plain scope of the language used. 424. 
16. The intent of Article II of the treaty with China was that each 
Chinaman should, before leaving the United States, receive 
from the collector a certificate of his right to return, in order to 
entitle him to do so. lb. 
17. The Trea ury Department can not directthe aclrnission ofChinesc 
laborers who fail to obtain before t,heir <leparture from this 
country the certificate required by the treaty with China, 
although they complied with all the requirements affect.ing Chi-
nese lahornR wl10 leave the nited, 'tates, except the procuring 
of certificateH of their rigb t to return. I b. 
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18. The departing Chinese laborers comply with the conditions neces-
sary to demand a certificate, if they file the required papers 
with the collector of customs of the district from which they 
depart. Ib. 
19. Certificates issued to residents of China by a Chinese consular 
officer and presented as evidence of the right of such persons to 
enter this country, conformably to section 6 of the act of July 
5, 1884, are not entitled to be treated as made by the Chinese 
Government within the meaning of said act. 481. 
20. The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to limit the num-
ber of Chinese to be admitted to the United States as partici-
pants in the Tennessee Exposition. 517. 
21. In case of an extension of one year allowed under certain condi-
tions to Chinese laborers to return to the United States by the 
treaty with China, the date of the original certificate and the 
day of the return: must control. 575. 
22. In case of such extension neither the collector nor the Secretary 
of the Treasury has discretion to inquire into causes of further 
delay or grant additional extensions. Ib. 
23. Certain Chinese persons of alleged American birth who entered 
the United States were deported to Canada, but subsequently 
returned to the United States: Held, The collector of customs 
has the right to enforce his exclusion by again returning them 
to Canada. 614. 
24. A Chinese laborer leaving the United Etates is furnished with the 
necessary certificate entitling him to return within one year, 
but before the expiration of such period he avails himself of the 
privilege of an extension of one year allowed by the treaty of 
1894, on the ground of sickness or other cause of disability 
beyond his control. He started to return in sufficient time to 
reach the United States by the ordinary course of travel, but 
was delayed in quarantine by the Canadian authorities, so that 
he in fact did not reach the United States until three days after 
the expiration of bis second year: Held, That the return to the 
United States must be within the additional year which the 
treaty has made the sole provision for delay. 575. 
25. The certificate of a United States Commissioner states that a 
Chinaman charged with unlawfully coming within the United 
States, after a full hearing, was adjudged to have the lawful 
right to remain in the United States, and was accordingly dis-
charged, it appearing that he is a citizen of the United States: 
Held, That certificates of this character should :µot be accepted 
as sufficient evidence of the right of the holders to enter this 
country. 581. 
26. Whether or not children born in this country of subjects of the 
Chinese Empire are to be recognized as citizens of the United 
States: Quaere. Ib. 
CHINESE MERCHANTS. 
See CHINESE, 1, 4, 5, 10. 
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CIRCULATING NOTES. 
See TAXATION, 3-6 . 
. CITIZENSHIP. 
Since May 6, 1882, neither State nor Federal courts have jurisdic-
tion to admit Chinese to citizenship. 37, 581. 
See CHINESE, 26; VESSELS, 4. 
CIVIL SERVICE. 
1. Thequestionofwhetheror notM was ·aresident of Alabama at the 
time of his appointment under the civil-service rules consid -
ered: Held, 'That he was not a bona fide resident of such State 
on the date named. 33. 
2. The Attorney~General is not at liberty to comply with a request 
for a further consideration and opinion upon the residence of 
M, a civil-service employee, as it would involve consideration and 
decision upon conflicting evidence. 58. 
3. The phrase "no person appointed to a place" as used in the civil-
service rules substituted by the President November 2, 1894, 
affects persons holding the positions at the time as well as those 
thereafter appointed. 91. 
4. Certain removals of superintendents and clerks in the Baltimore 
post-office and the appointment of their successors held to be 
legal. 140. 
5. The act of March 2, 1895, does not make the offices of all clerks in 
the offices of the Comptroller and Auditor of the Treasury the 
subject of competitive examination. 187. 
6. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make temporary 
appointments, without certification from the Civil Service Com-
mission, of draftsmen and skilled service, under the act of 
March 2, 1895. 261. 
7. An irregularity in the certification of the name of an eligible for 
appointment under the civil service is cured by the probational 
and absolute appointment of such a person. 289. 
8. The certificate of eligibles delivered to the appointing officer by 
the subordinates of the Civil Service Commission is a complete 
authority to such officer to make any selection he may desire 
therefrom, and is a complete protection to the appointee. 335. 
9. Section 4415 Revised Statutes, so far as it prescribes the method 
by which vacancies on the board of inspectors of hulls and 
steam vessels shall be filled, is repealed by the civil-service 
act. 393. 
10. Tho board designated by this section to fill such vacancies can 
not act as a board of examiners Uil(ler the civil-service act, unless 
its members are duly selected and appointed as such. Ib. 
11. Rule III of the civil service includes in the departmental service 
all employees of whatever designation, however, or for what-
ever purpose employed, whether compenHated by a fixed salary 
or otherwise, who are serving in or on detail from the several 
Executive Departments, commissions, and offices in the District 
of Columbia. 407. 
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12. The confidential agents employed in the free-delivery division of 
the Post-Office Department, and designated as secret agents, were 
not classified under Rule III, by the civil-service •rules pro-
mulgated May 6, 1896. Ib. 
13. This rule covers only those who are to be regarded as appointed 
for service in the departments at the seat of Government, 
whether for the time being actually employed there or detailed 
for service elsewhere, as distinguished from those appointed for 
service in the States or Territories. Ib. 
14. Paymasters' clerks assigned to sea duty not being classified by the 
Executive Order of May 6, 1896, while those performing similar 
services in offices on shore were, there is no authority for trans-
ferring one of the former to a similar position in the Navy 
Department. 503. 
15. The Executive Order of May, 1896, including within the classified 
service a person .not under the civil service at the time of his 
appointment, bestowed upon such appointee all the rights and 
benefits of persons of like class or grade under the civil service, 
making him eligible for transfer, and retained him in the service 
absolutely and not subject to the period of probation. 534. 
16. An employee of the Government who receives money to pay certain 
secret postal agents and, at the direction of one of said agents, 
deducts therefrom a portion thereof and pays it to the repre-
sentative of a political campaign fund, is not guilty of either 
receiving or being concerned in receiving a contribution for 
political purposes within the meaning of the act of .January 
16, 1883. 298. 
17. The intention of the above act was not to forbid voluntary con-
tributions for political purposes by persons in the employ of 
the Government, but to protect them from solicitation and 
coercion with respect to such contributions. Ib. 
CLAIMS. 
1. The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States, 
which includes judgments on recognizances, is vested by law 
in the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to all claims save 
those arising under the postal laws. 494. 
2. The question of the legality of payment of a claim for pay pre-
sented to the Secretary of the Treasury is one exclusively for 
the Comptroller, whose decision thereon is by the statute made 
final as to all executive officers. 530. 
3. The claim of Samuel C. Reid, jr., considered and directions given 
for stating account with owners, etc., of the U. S. brig of war 
General Armstrong under the acts of May 1, 1882, and March 2, 
1895: Held, That the Secretary of State has no authority to 
apply any part of the unexpended balance of the fund in reim-
bursing Samuel C. Reid, jr., or anyone else for the expenses and 
charges incurred in securing the appropriation. 154. 
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4. Upon reconsideration it is held that the unexpended balance of 
the appropriation made to satisfy the claims growing out of the 
destruction of the brig General Armstrong should be nsecl to 
reimburse S. C. Reid, jr., to the extent that the vouchers ou file 
in the State Department show that he has made expenditures 
or disbursements on this account. 523. 
See ASSIGNMENTS. 
CLERKS. 
See GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. 
CLOQUI'l' RIVER. 
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 2, 3. 
CLOUD UPON THE TITLE. 
A contract of option for the sale of certain lands to the officers of 
the Shiloh Battlefield Association, which purports to waive 
homestead and dower rights, although the wives of the vendors 
are not parties to the agreement, also purporting to have been 
admitted of recorcl, when in fact it was never acknowledged or 
attested, etc ., does not constitute a cloud upon the title. 302. 
COASTING TRADE. 
See VESSELS, 9. 
COLLECTORS OF CUS'fOMS. 
1. Collectors of customs are subordinates of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, providing 
that the collector or Secretary of the Treasury, if dissatisfied, 
may apply for a review of the decisions of the Board of General 
Appraisers, does not mean that the collector may appeal against 
the decision or wishes of the Secretary. 203. 
2. They have no authority to interfere or direct the United States 
storekeeper to interfere in a controversy between the importers 
and the warehousemen with reference to the delivery of goods. 
232. 
COLLISIO SAT SEA. 
See NAVIGATION RULES. 
COLORADO. 
See PUBLIC LANDS, 3-6. 
COLUMBIA 1 TITUTION FOR THE DEAF AND DUMB. 
1. Advertisements for proposals in accordance with the provisions 
of section 3709, ReYised Statutes, are not required for supplies 
or services for t he Columbia Institution for the Deaf and 
Dumb. 349. 
2. The 'olumhia Institntion for the Deaf and Dumb is not a bureau, 
office, or other subdivision of the Department of the Interior, 
although Gov rnmPnt contributions toward its support is lmsi-
ne s within the jurisdiction of that Department. Ib. 
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COMMON CARRIERS. 
It is within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to require 
of common carriers transporting merchandise in bond, under 
the immediate transportation act, to file a hond agreeing to 
accept and transport within a definite fixed period of time all 
merchandise offered under the act. 369. 
COMPROMISE. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized by section 3469, 
Revised Statutes, to remit or release any portion of a judgment 
indebtedness on consideration of h ardship to certain individ-
uals. The authority to compromise relates to claims of doubtful 
recovery or enforcement. 50. 
2. The Secretary of tho Treasury has no authority to remit or release 
judgments in favor of the Government from which there is no 
appeal and which are clearly recoverable. 264. 
3. The distinction between the compromising of a doubtful case and 
the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability is that the 
former is strictly a fiscal one, while the latter is in the nature 
of a pardoning power. Ib. 
4. The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States, 
which includes judgments on recognizances, is vested by law in 
the Secretary of the Treasury with respect t o all claims Sa"fe 
those arising under the postal laws. 494. 
5. An assessment made by the Treasury Department of 10 per cent, 
under the provisions of section 20 of the act of February 8, 
1875, upon the circulating notes of Canadian banks which had 
come into the United States and been received and paid by 
banks in Calais, Me., is one which may be compromised. 557. 
COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY. 
1. The question whether or not the Secret::i,ry of the Treasury is 
authorized by the appropriation act for th o fiscal year 1896 to 
purchase newspapers and other articles for use outside of Wash-
ington, in view of sections 192 and 3683, Revised Statutes, 
belongs to a class of questions which should be submitted to 
the Comptroller of the Treasury, except in matters of great 
importance, as nnder the act of July 31, 1894, bis opinion is a 
complete protection. 178. 
2. The act of July 31, 1894, makes it obligatory upon the Comptrol-
ler of the Treasury to make a decision upon any question 
involving a payment to be made by or nuder the b ead of any 
department, and it contemplates the construction by him of 
statutes. 181. 
3. The Comptroller is an agent of the Government in the broad 
sense of the term, but is more properly callecl an officer, and 
was not intended to be included within the meaning of the 
word "agent" in section 3469, Revised Statutes. 361. 
4. The question as to the right to refund certain duties claimed to 
have been collected through mistake of law should be asked of 
the Comptroll(lr of the Treasury. 188. 
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5. An opinion which could have been asked of the Comptroller of 
the Treasury is notwithstanding given by the Attorney-General, 
it appearing that the question is one of importance, and the 
Comptroller joins in requesting it. 224, 181, 402. 
6. The Attorney-General will not pass upon the question to wha,t 
appropriation a certain expenditure should be charged, as it is 
one which should more properly be submitted to the Comptroller 
of the Treasury. 405, 221. 
7. On questions of disbursement of money or payment of claims, 
which are by law reltlgated to the Comptroller, the Attorney-
General should not render an opinion. 530. 
8. The question of the legality of payment of a claim for pay pre-
sented to the Secretary of the Treasury is one exclusively for 
the Comptroller, whose decision thereon is by the statute made 
final as to all executive officers. 530. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 5. 
CONDEMNATION. 
See EMINENT DOMAIN. 
CONGRESSMEN. 
,. 1. During the term of R. as United States Senator, Congress 
increased the salary of the minister to Mexico. On February 
23, 1895, the President nominated R. to such office, and he was 
confirmed the same day, but did not take the oath of office 
until March 4, 1895, when his term expired. His commission 
was delivered to him the following day: H~ld, That the nomi-
nation by the President and confirmation by the Senate consti-
tuted the appointment within the inhibition of the Constitution 
relative to the appointment of members of Congress to an office 
the emoluments whereof have been increased during the term 
for which he was- elected. 211. 
2. The acceptance of any office under the United States by a member 
of either House of Congress operates as a vacation of his seat, 
as he is disabled by the Constitution from holding any civil 
office under authority of the United States while a member of 
either House. Ib. 
3. Members of Congress whose seats are contested, until a decision 
is made unseating them, are considered in all respects endowed 
with the same rights, powers, and privileges as other mem-
bers. 342. 
See NAVAL ACADEMY, 1--4. 
CO J PIRACY. 
Interference with the carriage of the mail on railroads in the 
usual and ordinary way is a criminal offense, and the combina-
tion of offenders may be prosecuted under section 5440, Revised 
tatute . 8. 
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CONSULAR OFFICERS. 
1. Consular officers of the United States Mn not extend expired 
inspection certificates granted to American steamers, nor is 
there any authority of law for sending local inspectors out of 
the country to make inspection. 52. 
2. The United States consul in intervening by mutual consent of the 
parties in a controversy between the officers and crew of the 
unregistered yacht Barraconta, acted merely as an arbitrator 
and not as consul. 201. 
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 26-29. 
CONTESTED ELECTIONS. 
See CONGRESSMEN, 3. 
CONTRACTS. 
1. It is not competent for the Secret,ary of the Navy under the con-
tract for the construction of the battle ship Indiana to pay to 
the contractors certain reserved payments prior to her prelimi-
nary or conditional acceptance, but a supplemental contract 
may be entered into, modifying the terms and provisions of the 
existing contracts. 12. 
2. A penalty imposed under a contract for delay in completing a 
work which has been :finished according to the contract with-
out damage to the Government, may be remitted by the Secre-
tary of War and the sum withheld paid to the contractor. 27. 
3. A contract for the improvement of the Hudson River may be 
legally modified so as to provide for the acquirement by the 
United States through process of condemnation of the neces-
sary lands for use as dumping grounds to be maintained by the 
contractors. 78. 
4. The Secretary of the Treasury has no power, by virtue of his gen-
~ral authority, to change contracts entered into by the United 
States with responsible parties secured by responsible sureties, 
in the inierest of private parties thereto, without considerations 
inuring to the United States. 115. 
5. The provision in a contract providing for the forfeiture of $20 per 
day for each day's delay in completing certain work at West 
Point Military Academy, is to be regarded as a penalty, and in 
case of delay it is lawful to assess against the contractor the 
actual damages sustained instead of the penalty. 139. 
6. Modifications of contracts to meet contingencies may be made 
upon consent of the contracting parties, without rescinding 
and abrogating the entire contract. 207. 
7. The modification of a contract which does not prejudice the inter-
ests of the Government or violate any statutory provision, is 
not such a new contract as must be preceded by an advertise-
ment for proposals from bidders. Ib. 
8. Executive officers are expressly prohibited from making contracts 
to extend beyond one year an~ for which no appropriation by 
Congress has been made. 207, 304. 
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9. N notified the Secretary of War that it elects to carry on the work . 
of dredging in the Mobile Harbor under its contract if the 
appropriation is exhausted without waiting for the appropria-
tion by Congress to pay for it, and asks the Secretary of War to 
supervise the same. Held, That he is without authority to con-
tinue the employment of the contractors, and that the work 
which they propose to do does not come within their contract, 
and that he can not supervise it. 244. 
10. A contract not for the completion of any specific work, as the 
erection of a building, the construction of a road, or rendering 
a channel adequate for the passage of vessels of a certain draft, 
is at an end after the appropriation becomes exhausted. Work 
done thereafter would not come within such contract. If fur-
ther appropriations are made there mu.st be a new contract for 
their expenditure. Ib. 
11. The Secretary of War is not required by the act of March 3, 1896, 
providing that contracts may be entered into by him for the 
completion of improvements named, to make such contracts, 
but he may decline to do so in all cases where he is convinced 
the public interest would not be subserved by making them. 
420. 
12. Contracts for the purchase of seals by the United States used to 
secure packages while being transported in bond, must be 
awarded upon advertisement. 304. 
13. The period at which persons reach their majority and become sui 
j'/1,ris with .respect to the ordinary affairs of life can not abridge 
this power of the General Government. 327. 
14. Under section 5 of the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, 
which limits the amount that the Secretary of War can obli-
gate the Government for in any fiscal year to $400,000, the con-
tractor may perform in one year the work which the contract 
allows him three years, and although he may earn a larger sum 
than this amount, he may not receive full payment therefor 
under three years. 379. 
15. Where the total amonnt authorized to be expended is less than 
$400,000, contractors may be allowed to eatn the amounts author-
ized to be expended in advance of the appropriation by Congress 
for such work . Ib. 
16. The contract with the Pnuematic Gun Carriage and Power Com-
pany for the construction of a uisappearing gun carriage under 
the act of August 1, 1894, makes no provision for the payment 
of a premium, and does not bind the Government beyond the 
amount appropriated: 457. 
17. The 1 tting of this contract for the full amount appropriated 
exhausted the power of the , 'ecrctary of the Navy under the 
act, and there is no authority for making a supplemental con-
tract binding the Government to further expenditures in the 
way of premiums. 4.95, 
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18. What one party to a contract may have personally understood a 
provision to mean at the time the contract was made can not 
avail. What both parties understood controls, and that is to 
be ascertained from the language of the contract itself. 585, 
19. Under the contract for the improvement of Galveston Harbor the 
railway to be built upon trestlework following tbe line of the 
jetty must be at the expense of the Government, whether it is 
the case of original construction or extension. 607. 
See ADVERTISEMENTS; APPROPRIATIONS; Bms; CLOUD UPON 
TITLE; ELLIS ISLAND, ETC., 1, 5 j PATENTS, 4 i RIVERS AND 
HARBORS. 
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 16, 17. 
COPYRIGHTS. 
1. Section 3 of the act of March 3, 1891, designed to protect domestic 
authors against foreign infringements of their copyrights, 
applies as well to books copyrighted before as those copyrighted 
after the passage of the act. 159. 
2. The exceptions in the case of persons purchasing for use and not 
for sale, who import, subject to the duty thereon, not more than 
two copies of such book at any one time, is not limited in its 
application to the "authorized editions" of such book. lb. 
3. The importation of foreign-made chromos which have not been 
copyrighted, but which are copies of a foreign copyrighted 
painting, is not prohibited by the act of March 3, 1891, amend-
ing section 4956, Revised Statutes. 416. 
4. A foreigner simulating a trade-mark of a domestic manufacturer 
can not obtain the right to send fraudulently marked goods 
into the country merely by recording his fraudulent mark under 
section 6 of the act of August 27, 1894, before the domestic man-
ufacturer has taken the steps necessary to protect himself. 260. 
COUNSEL. 
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1. 
COUNTERFEITING. 
1. 'rhe Attorney-General will not give an official opinion upon the 
question whether certain plates and cuts used for making 
sketches and pictures of foreign postage stamps come within 
the terms of the act of May 16, 1884; and the act of February 
10, 1891 ( except section 4); prohibiting counterfeiting, because 
they relate only to criminal proceedings. 133. 
2. Tho counterfeiting of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp comes 
within the meaning of the phrase "obligation or other securi-
ties * * * of any foreign government," in section 4 of the 
act of February 10, 1891. 136. 
COURT-MARTIAL. 
See PENITENTIARIES, l. 
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1. The expression, "any judge of any court of the United States'' 
may be retired under section 714, Revised Statutes, was intended 
to have the widest application, and applies to the chief justice 
as well as the judges of the Court of Claims. 449. 
2. The expression, "after having held his commission as such at least 
ten years," in the foregoing section, does not mean that the 
commission under which the judge serves at the time of his 
retirement must have been in force at least ten years. It was 
being in commission and not holding a particular ·commission 
· that Congress meant to make a condition. lb. 
GUBAN INSURRECTION. 
1. The Cuban insurrection can not be brought within the rules of 
internationai law with respect to belligerence and neutral rights 
and duties. 267. 
2. The sale and shipment or carriage of arms ancl munitions of war 
to Cuba does not become a violation of international law merely 
because they are destined to a port which is recognized by the 
Spanish Govel'nment as open to commerce, nor because they are 
to be or are landed by stealth. Ib, 
3. The mere sale or shipment of arms and munitions of war by per-
sons in the United States to persons in Cuba is not a violation 
of international law, however strong a supposition there may 
be tha-t they are to be used in an insurrection against the 
Spanish Government. Individuals in the United States have 
the right to sell such articles and ship them to _whomever may 
choose to buy. lb. · 
4. Neither our Government nor our citizens have means of knowledge 
and therefore can not be bound to take notice who-are and who 
are not loyal subjects of Spain, so long as their actions are con-
.fined to her own territory. lb. 
5. If persons supplying or carrying arms and munitions from a place 
in the United States are in any wise parties to a design that 
force shall be employed against the Spanish authorities, or that 
either in the United States or elsewhere, before final delivery of 
such arms and munitions, men with hostile purposes toward the 
Spanish Government shall also be taken on board and trans-
ported in furtherance of such purposes, the enterprise is not 
commercial but military, and is in violation of international 
law and of our own statutes. lb. 
See INrERNA.TIONAL LA.w, 1-8. 
CUSTOM-HOUSE BROKER. 
1. The term" custom-house broker," as used in the tariff act of 1894, 
section 23, includes persons who deal in drawback matterH 
exclusively, as well as those who combine all branches of 
custom-house work: 255. 
2. When the li ense of such a broker has been revoked, he can not 
th reafter deal directly with the customs officials: except when 
acting for himself as principal. lb. 
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3. The authority to collect drawback may be delegated by a manu-
facturer to a general selling agent or to some attorney at law, 
but such a person must conduct his business through a licensed 
broker unless he obtains himself a license. Ib. 
CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS. 
IN GENERAL-
1. Goods smuggled into the United States may be seized and sold by 
a collector of customs although protected by patents. 72. 
2. "Sea stores," in tariff legislation, are the stores contained in 
incoming vessels which are necessary for use for the purpose 
of the voyage; articles brought into port aboard ship to be 
consumed aboard or carried off again on the outward voyage, 
or if put ashore at all, landed only for the convenience of the 
ship itself. 92. 
3. The word "merchandise" is used in different senses in different 
parts of the customs legislation. In sectious 2766 and 3111, 
Revised Statutes, it covers any tangible personal property. In 
sections 2795 and 3113 it means property imported into the coun-
try, whether for sale or not. In the act of March 3, 1875, it has 
a narrower meaning, but still includes personal property not 
imported for the use or enjoyment of the importer himself. lb. 
4. The export tax imposed by a foreign government is not to be con-
. sidered as one of the" costs, charges, and expenses'' referred to 
in section 19·of the customs administrative act of June 10, 1890. 
108. 
5. The decisions of the Secretary of the Treasury on all questions as 
to the construction or meaning of any part of the revenue laws 
are made conclusive upon all customs officers by section 2652, 
Revised Statutes. 203. 
6. Collectors of customs are subordinates of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and section 15 of the act of June 10, 1890, providing 
that the collector or Secretary of the Treasury, if dissatisfied, 
may apply for a review of the decisions of the Board of Gen~ 
eral Appraisers, does not mean that the collector may appeal 
against the decision or wishes of the Secretary. Ib. 
7. The importation of foreign-made chromos, which have not been 
copyrighted, but which are copies of a foreign copyrighted 
painting, is not prohibited by the act of March 3, 1891, amend-
ing section 4956, Revised Statutes. 416. 
ABANDONMENT-
8. Goods not damaged may be abandoned to the United States under 
section 23 of the act of June 10, 1890, and the importer thereof 
relieved from the payment of duty. 326. 
9. It is not· the intent of Congress that the United States should in 
any case exact as duties an amount greater than the value of 
the property imported. Ib. 
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10. In an application for an abandonment under section 23 of the cus-
toms administrative act of June 10, 1890, the Board of General 
Appraisers had jurisdiction to review the collector's decision, 
which review is :final for all purposes, since the importers did 
not appeal. 402. 
BOARD OF GENERAL APPRAISERS-
11. The General Appraisers appointed under the provisions of the act 
of June 10, 1890, are officers of the Treasury Department. 85. 
12. In case of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, 
it is the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to investigate 
the matter for the advice of the President. lb. 
13. A protest filed by an importer under the customs administrative 
act of 1890 was overruled by the Board of General Appraisers 
on September 26, 1892. The decision was in part made inad-
vertently, some of the evidence being overlooked, which was 
first called to their attention on July 6, 1894, with the request 
that the decision be reviewed. Held, that it was the importer's 
duty to watch for the decision of the board, and that after the 
lapse of time stated it was without further jurisdiction in the 
premises. 144. 
14. The Board of General Appraisers has jurisdiction under section 14 
of the act of June 10, 1890, to decide whether cartage charges as 
made by a collector of customs are proper. 262. 
See 10, 79. 
BONDED WAREHOUSES-
15. Goods imported and warehoused for nearly three years, then with-
drawn and exported to Canada, and :finally reshipped to the 
United States by a different merchant, the transaction not ap-
pearing to be merely colorable for the purpose of evading the 
tariff laws, may be entered for warehousing as an original im-
portation within !lection 2971, Revised Statutes. 23. 
16. The provisions of the South Carolina dispensary law of 1893 are 
ineffective and inoperative as against distilled liquors held in a 
United States bonded warehouse under the control of a collector 
of internal revenue. 73. 
17. Distilled liquors in a bonued warehouse are exempt from the oper-
ations of the process of a State court. lb. 
18. Goods imported and entered for warehouse prior to the act of 
August 28, 1894, and not withdrawn for consumption within 
three years from the date of the original importation, are unaf-
fected by the new rate of duties. 116. 
19. Goods deposited 1Jefore that act in store as unclaimed merchandise 
unders ction 2965, Revised Statutes, maybe withdrawn for con-
sumption upon payment of the new rates of duties at any time 
within three years from the da.te of their original importation, 
so long as they remain unsold. If sold, however, the dutv is to 
be deducted from the proceeds of sale, as are those of 1890. lb. 
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20. Whether goods exported for the mere purpose of extending the 
three years' warehousing period provided by the statutes, and 
immediately reimported, can be regarded on the second arrival as 
an original importation under the customs laws. Qna:re. 129. 
21. The collector of customs has no authority to interfere or direct 
the United States storekeeper to interfere in a controversy be-
tween the importers and the warehousemen with reference to 
the delivery of goolls. 232. 
22. The Government has no further concern with imported goods 
which have been deposited iu a private bonded warehouse, the 
duty having been paid and a withdrawal permit issued, and 
the right to deliver or withhold rests with the warehouseman 
alone. lb. 
2:-J. Under the act of August 27, 1894, dutiable goods purchased by the 
United States from an importer while in bond remain dutiable, 
and the duty must be paid before delivery. 243. 
24. The by-products: such ns rice meal and broken rice resulting from 
the cleansing of irnported rice in importers' bonded warehouses, 
intended for exportation, may be withdrawn for consumption 
instead of exporting. 474. 
25. The act of March 2, 1874, relative to bonded warehouses for the 
storage of imported rice is still in force. lb. 
See 71, 89. 
DECLARATIONS TO INVOICES-
26. 'rhe person making the declaration to au invoice of goods intended 
for shipment under the customs-administrative act of June 10, 
1890, is not required to be actually present before a consular 
officer of the United States in order to authorize such officer to 
certify such invoice. 571. 
27. All that is necessary is that he shall be satisfied that the person 
making the oath thereto is the person he represents himself to 
be; that he is a credible person, and that the statements made 
under such oath are true. lb. 
28. Where the consular officer has doubts as to the identity of the 
person making the declaration, or as to his credibility or tho 
truthfulness of the statements set forth in the declaration, he 
has the right to require the declarant to come personally before 
him. lb. . 
29 . The question as to where and in what manner oaths to the decla-
rations indorsed on invoices shall be taken, is more~ matter of 
regulation or instruction for the government of the consular offi-
cer than of construction of a statute. . lb. 
DISCRIMINATING DUTIES-
30. Paragraph 608 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894, imposing a dis-
criminating duty on salt imported from a country which imposes 
a duty on salt exported from the United States, does not violate 
the "most favored nation clause" in the treaty of May 1, 1828, 
with Prussia. 80. 
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31. Whether or not such di!!criminating duty applies to a country 
which imposes a duty on salt exported f'roin tl).e United States, 
but lays a countervailing excise tax on domestic salt. Qumre, 
lb. 
32. As .to whether a discriminating duty should be imposed under the 
act of 1894 upon salt imported from Germany, which country 
imposes a duty in the nature of an internal excise tax on salt 
exported from the United States. Qumre. 377. 
33. Diamonds imported into the United States from Canada, not in the 
usual course of strictly retail trade, which were the productions 
of a foreign country not contiguous to the United States, are 
subject to the discriminating duty of 10 per cent under section 
22 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897. 591. 
34. In determining the liability to this discriminating duty, it is not 
necessary to ascertain the mode of conveyance used in the trans-
portation into the United States from Canada, lb. 
35. Certain goods came from Japan via Vancouver, British Columbia, 
and thence per railroad through Canada to Chicago, in cars 
sealed at Vancouver by a United States consular officer: Held, 
not to be imbject to a discriminating duty, as section 4228, 
Revised Statutes, is not repealed by section 22 of the Dingley 
. tariff act. 597. 
36. The purpose of this section was to secure to United States vessels 
the transportation of goods by sea by discriminating against 
transportation in other vessels to the United States, and also to 
prevent evasion to a contiguous country. Ib. 
37. To hold that there should be a discrimination by different duties 
upon importations, direct or indirect, under section 22 of the 
above act would be to put a new purpose in the law and destroy 
its unity. This is not compelled by its language or any mischief 
intended to be remedied. Ib. 
38. Section 22 of this act and section 4228, Revised Statutes, as 
amended, are not coextensive in scope, therefore are comple-
ments of each other. lb. 
39. Section 4228, Revised Statutes, is in effect made a proviso to section 
22 of the Dingley tariff act by the act of July 24, 1897, and as 
such, is not r epugnant to section 22. Ib. 
40. The operation of section 22 commenced with its passage and con-
tinues until it is suspended according to section 4228, l{evised 
Statutes, and again takes effect if the l'eciprocal exemptions of 
foreign nations be withdrawn. Ib. 
DRAWBACKS-
41. The que tion of drawbacks upon exhibits of foreign governments 
at th World's Fair is governed by the act of April 25, 1890, aml 
not by section 3025, Revised , tatutes. 36. 
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42. A drawback is allowable on oil cake made from imported linseed 
under the tarfff act of Angust 28, 1894. 109. 
43. The proviso to paragraph 25 of the McKinley tariff act allows a 
drawback only in cases where the article manufactured or pro-
duced can be so separated into its component materials that the 
relative proportions of each material may be ascertained with-
out reference to past books of account. 110. 
44. This section is intended to apply only to cases where the article 
is made up of two or more different materials. Ib. 
45. A drawback is claimed under section 25 of the McKinley tariff 
act on certain lead ore used in smelting operations, the lead 
in the ore which is used being about 90 per cent of foreign 
origin ancl 10 per cent domestic: Held, that no portion of the 
lead entered for drawback could be regarded as incidental to 
any other portion thereof or to the whole, nor is the proportion 
of the domestic lead in the total product small enough to be 
disregarded. 110. 
46. Drawback of duties can not be allowed by reason of the existence 
of product of foreign ore in the lead of which the manufactured 
artfole is composed. 229. 
47. Camel's hair noils, resulting from the separation of imported 
camei's hair into hair and noils, were not entitled to drawback 
under section 25 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as a manu-
factured article. 159. 
48. Imported articles of domestic origin are to be regarded as '' im-
ported materials," within the meaning of section 22 of the act 
of August 28, 1894, and are entitled to a drawback where their 
prior importation was not merely colorable. 501. 
49. The exportation of alcohol with the intention of its reimportation 
for the purpose of taking advantage of the drawback privilege& 
is to be regarded as colorable only, and the alcohol is to bs 
forfeited, the person engaged in the transaction punished, and 
no drawback is recoverable. Ib. 
50. Where the exportation of alcohol is genuine and with the intent 
to dispose of it abroad, so that upon its arrival there it is to be 
regarded as absorbed in the general mass of foreign commodities, 
the subsequent importation is proper. Ib. 
51. The authority to collect drawback may be delegated by a manu-
facturer to a general selling agent or to some attorney at law, 
but such a person must conduct his business through a licensed 
broker unless he obtains himself a license. 255; 
52. ''Drawback moneys" are duties-repayment to the importer or the 
person to whom he has transferred bis right:;., of a part of the 
duties which have been paid by him upon receiving his goods. 
Ib. 
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DUTIES-
53. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe reasonable 
rules, and such as are necessary to secure the collection of the 
duties on imports and to protect the United States from irregu-
lar or fraudulent proceedings. 571. 
54. A vessel containing a cargo of sugar for the United States was 
wrecked in the journey; she was subsequently returned with the 
goods to the port of departure, repaired, and the goods reloaded 
on the same vessel: Held, that the goods should not be appraised 
under section 2928, Revised Statutes1 as merchandise taken from 
a wreck. 121. 
55. Under the act of August 28, 1894, dutiable goods purchased by the 
United States from an importer while in bond remain dutiable 
and the duty must be paid before delivery. 243. 
56. The importation of certain bird of paradise feathers, being com-
posed of natural feathers which are neither dressed, colored, 
nor manufactured, is not included within paragraph 328 of the 
tariff act of August 28, 1894. 541. 
57. Books imported for the purpose of sale are dutiable under the act 
of August 28, 1894. 301. 
58. The phrase "manufactnres of wool" in paragraph 297 of the act 
of 1894 does not include articles of which wool is a component 
material but of which it is not the material of chief value. 66. 
59. The phrase "manufactures of wooP1 has been given a restrictive 
meaning in prior tariff acts. There is a presumption, in the 
absence of anything to the contrary, that Congress intended it 
still to have the same significa.nce. Ib. 
60. The headings of the schedules in the tariff act have little signifi-
cance, they· being intendeu. only for general suggestions as to 
the character of the articles within the schedules. Ib. 
61. All doubts arising under the act are presumptively to be resolved 
in favor of the lower rate of duty, save where the act mentions 
or describes the same article in two different places, when the 
higher rate governs. Ib. 
62. Persons crossing into Canada for no other purpose than to purchase 
clothing there, and immediately returning, are not entitled to 
introduce the same free of duty as "personal effects" under the 
tariff act of 1890. 3. 
63. The duty on the by-products, such as broken rice and rice meal, 
withdrawn for consumption from importers' bonded warehouses 
should be assessed upon the proportion of unclean rice repre-
sented by such by-products. 474. 
61. The by-products1 such as rice meal and broken rice, resulting 
from the cleansing of imported rice in importers' bonded ware-
houses intended for exportation may be withdrawn for con-
sumption instead of exportation. Ib. 
6:-. The word "wool," as used in paragraph 297 of the tariff act of 
1 91, r fers to hair of the sheep only, and the new duties upon 
arti les made of the hair of other animals went immediately 
into ·ff ct upon the passag1J of the act. 66. 
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66. "Wool," within dictionary definitions, includes the hair of the 
alpaca and of the angora goat, but never is used to include all 
goat's hair, nor yet camel's hair, cow hair or horse hair. 
Throughout schedule K of the above act it is used so as to 
include even hair of the kinds first mentioned. Ib. 
PENAL DUTIES-
67. A consignee representing two different principals made an entry 
covering two invoices of goods imported by the same vessel 
upon each of which there was a penal duty. The invoice is_ to 
be treated as the ur:.it and not the entry. 283. 
68. The statutes forbid the Secretary of the Treasury from making a 
customs regulation permitting collectors of customs to receive 
as special deposits penal duties, to be returned to the importers 
in case of a remission of the duties. 345. 
69. All moneys paid_ to coilectors of customs for unascertained duties, 
must be placed to the credit of the Treasurer of the United 
States. Ib. 
70. When goods are entered or withdrawn for consumption, all duties 
then charged against them, including penal duties, must be 
paid before they are released from Government custody. 418. 
See 80-89. 
REFUNDS-
71. Upon an application to withdraw free of duty under the merchant 
shipping act certain warehoused coal imported under the tariff 
act of 1890, the shipper being refused, paid without protest in 
order to get possession thereof, certain liquidated duties that 
had been erroneously assessed : Held, that the Secretary of 
the Treasury had the authority to refund the amount so col-
lected. 92. 
7'2. The act of March 3, 1875, was intended only to apply to cases where 
the duties are improperly assessed and therefore improperly 
collected. Ib. 
73. The power to refund duties collected by mistake, in the absence 
of a proper protest, is limited to the following : (1) when the 
duties provisionally paid are reduced upon the final liquidation; 
(2) for mere clerical error; (3) for mutual mistake of fact. 224, 
251. 
74. Prior to the customs administrative act, duties collected by mis-
take of law, could not be returned after one year from the time 
of entry in the absence of a protest by the importer under sec-
tion 2931, Revised Statutes. 251. 
75. There is no statutory authority for the Secretary of the 'rreasury 
to refund penal duties which have been paid into the treasury 
on the ground that they were incurred without willful 11egli-
gence or an intention of fraud on the part oft.he importer. 320. 
76. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make a refund of 
duties where there was an error due to a mutual mistake of 
fact. 454. 
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77. A mistake on the part of the Secretary of the Treasury in esti-
mating the equivalent of the Spanish pound or libra, in the 
absence of due protest by the importers, is not sufficient to 
warrant a refund of the excess of duties paid under such erro-
neous estimate. Ib. 
RELIQUIDATION OF DUTIES-
78. Section 14 of the act of June 10, 1890, did not in any way limit 
the power of the collector of customs to reliquidate duties in the 
interest of the Government within one year after entry. 334. 
79. The duty on an importation of mohair goods after August 28, 1894, 
being erroneously assessed, an appeal was taken to the Board of 
General Appraisers, and upon notice by the appraiser that a mis-
take of fact had been made, the collector requested a return of the 
papers for reconsideration, but .the board declined to comply: 
Held, that section 1 of the act of March 3, 1875, is still in force 
and that the Secretary of the Treasury has the power to order a 
reliquidation of the assessment of duties in the interest of the 
importers and to direct the return of the papers to the col-
lector. 152. 
REMISSION OF PENAL TIES-
80. In case of a fraudulent undervaluation by one partner of a firm, 
although it was his purpose to cheat his own firm, as well as 
the United States, the Secretary of the 'l'reasury is without 
authority to remit the consequent penalty. 90. 
81. Section 17 of the antimoiety act supersedes section 5292, Revised 
Statutes, as to all cases arising under the customs laws except 
those of vessels and merchandise seized or subject to seizure 
and of less value than $1,000. 101. 
82. Penal duties may be remitted by the Secretary of the Treasury 
under the provisions of section 5293, Revised Statutes, where 
they do not exceed $1,000. 283. 
83. And without recounie to a proceeding before a district judge. l 01. 
84. The limit of $1,000 referred to in section 5293, Revised Statutes, and 
section 20 of the antimoiety act refer to the amount of the pen-
alty to be remitted and not to the value of the merchandise. lb. 
85. The Secretary of the Treasury may return the findings to the 
United States commissioner iu proceedings for the remission of 
penalties under the act of June 22, 1874, for further bearing 
upon the claim of newly discovered evidence. 289. 
86. But he has no authorit,y to prosecute a further inquiry into the 
facts after the commissioner has r eported his findings under 
section 18 of said act. 549. 
7. The Secretary of the Treasury has power to remit a fine or penalty 
under section 5294, Revised Statutes, as amended, but he can 
not remit a forfeiture. 291. 
Ther is no statutory authority for the 'ecretary of the Treasury 
t o refund penal duties which have been paid into the Treasury 
on the ground that they wrrr inrnrr<'d without willful 11egli-
genc or an intention of francl ou the part of the importer. 320. 
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REMISSION OF PENAL Tl ES-Continued. 
89. ·where payment of the penal duties imposed under section 7 of the 
act of June 10, 1890, is required as a condition precedent to the 
delivery of the goods, the power of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to remit such penalties is unavailing in many cases, but not 
in the case of warehoused goods, nor where the penalties are 
first assessed upon final liquidation after the delivery of the 
goods to the importer. 418. 
DAMAGES. 
The appropriation in the act of March 2, 1895, for raising the 
height of the dam at Great Falls and for damages on account of 
the consequent flooding of land and other injuries was intended 
to cover all damages that might result from raising the dam :d½ 
feet higher than bad been conternpldited under the act of July 
JG, 1882. 223. 
See EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, 1; SEAL FISHERIES, 2. 
DAMS. 
See RIO GRAN DE RIVER, 1, 2; NA VI GABLE WATERS, 2, 3, 12, 13. 
DATE. 
The date is no part of the substance of a sealed instrument and 
not necessary to be inserted. The real date is the time of its 
delivery, which may always be proved. 469. 
DEAF AND DUMB INSTITUTION. 
See COLUMBIA INSTITUTION l!'OR THE DEAF AND DUMB. 
DECLARATIONS TO INVOICES. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGUL•.TIONS, 26- 29. 
DEFINI1'IONS. 
See WORDS AND PHRASES. 
DELIVERY TO IMPORTERS. 
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 2 l, 22. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE. 
1. All appointments and removals of messengers and laborers in the 
Department of Agriculture must be made by the Secretary or 
Acting Secretary. 355. 
See ABSENCE, 5; Brns, 6-8; CATTLE; MEA'l' INSPECTION; SECRE-
TARY OF AGRICULTURE; SEEDS. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 
1. The Secretary of the Navy is not authorized to employ special 
counsel in foreign countries to institute suits in behalf of the 
United States for the purposes of recovering damages caused to 
war vessels of the Unfted States, but should refer the matter to 
the Department of Justice for attention. 195. 
2. The Department of Justice is charged with the duty of determin-
ing when the United S-'.iates shall sue, for what it shall sue, and 
that such suits shall be brought in appropriate cases. 195. 
See ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
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DEPARTMENTAL CLERKS. 
See ABSENCE; APPOINTMENTS, &c., 2, 3; CIVIL SERVICE; GoVERN:-
MENT EMPLOYEES. 
DEPARTMENTAL CONSTRUCTION. 
1. ,vhen an act of Congress has for a considerable period received a 
uniform departmental construction, which was known to Con-
gress, and a subsequent act in pari materia is enacted without 
change of language, there is a presumption of considerable 
force that the new language is intended to receive the same 
construction as the old. 338. 
2. If there be any ambiguity in a statute, the uniform departmental 
practice for a number of years should be regarded as having 
settled the law. 412,349. 
3. This is especially so where the language was not modified when 
incorporated in the Revised Statutes. 349. 
4. Departmental practice which has not been uniform, although of 
long standing, forms no guide to the construction of the law. 
363. 
5. A uniform departmental practice, continuing for a quarter of a 
century, ought to be conclusive in case of an ambiguous statute. 
408. 
6. The weight to be given departmental practice is greatly increased 
when Congress, in reenacting the law, fails to indicate in anJ' 
way its disapproval of the settled construction, to which it is 
thus regarded as giving an implied approval. lb. 
7. Departmental practice clearly defeating the obvious purpose of a 
statute which is not ambiguous, should not govern in its inter-
pretation. lb. 
DEPORTATION. 
See CHINESE, 3, 23. 
DEPOSIT OF SAVINGS. 
See NAVY, 7. 
DIPLOMAS. 
See WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION, 2, 3, 5. 
DISBURSING OFFICER. 
See MONEY IN DISPUTE, 1. 
DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE. 
See MILITIA, 1. 
DISCRIMI A.TI G D TIES. 
ee CUSTOMS LAW AND REGULATIONS, 30-40. 
DIS CRIMIN A. TIO 
ee QUARANTINE, ETC., 3. 
DI PE ARY LAW OF O TH CAR LI A. 
, 'ee INTER AL REYE GE, 1, 2. 
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DISTILLED LIQUORS. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 16, 17. 
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. 
United States district attorneys are not required or authorized to 
make the examination into the sufficiency of the sureties on 
official bonds required by section 5 of the act of March 2, 1895. 
154. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
1. Certain questions arising in the settlement of an award made 
under a joint resolution of Congress, approved July 10, 1888, to 
arbitrate and settle certain questions at issue between the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Samuel Strong considered. 87. 
2. The unauthorized stretching of wires across tho Iowa Reservation 
in the District of Columbia is governed by section 1818, Revised 
Statutes, and should be brought to the attention of the Secre-
tary of the Interior. 224. 
3. The laying of conduits or erection of overhead wires for electric 
lighting purposes in any park or reservation for the purpose of 
illumination is prohibited by the act of March 3, 1897. 545. 
4. The board created by the act of September 27, 1890, establishing 
the Rock Creek Park, has no power to authorize the construc-
tion of a reservoir for the use of the District of Columbia within 
the limits of such park. 566. 
5. It is not necessary under existing law for the Secretary of the 
Treasury to advertise in six newspapers, published in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, for proposals for the interior finish of the 
post-office building in the city of Washington. 595. 
6. The selection of newspapers in which to publish advertisements 
of this character in the District of Columbia is in the discre-
tion of the head of the Department. Ib. 
DRAUGHTSMEN. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 6. 
DRAWBACKS. 
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 41-52. 
DUTIES. 
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS. 
EIGHT-HOUR LAW. 
See LABORERS AND MECHANICS. 
ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRAN'f STATION. 
1. The express stipulation in certain contracts with reference to 
rentals at Ellis Island that they may be annulled by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury for • cause implies some facts or state of 
facts inducing or justifying an abrogation of the contract for 
the benefit of the United States. 115. 
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ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRANT STATION-Continued. 
2. The Secretary of the Treasury may grant a license, revocable at 
his will, to erect and maintain a building on Ellis Island, an 
immigrant station, for the purpose of an exhibition ball and 
condncting a land and labor bureau. 473. 
3. He has power under section 9 of the act of March 3, 1893, to 
grant exclusive privileges in connection with Ellis Island Immi-
grant Station, after public competition, under such limitations 
and conditiont:i as he may prescribe. 476. 
4. He has no authority to lease an:y part of Ellis Island Ib. 
5. In a contract for ferry service between Ellis Islanu Immigrant 
Station and the Barge Office, New York, to continue for three 
years and thereafter from year to year until terminated by 
notice from either party, given sixty days before the end of the 
original period or any one year thereafter, and in which it was 
also covenanted that the contract might be annulled and ter-
minated at any time by the Secretary of the Treasury for good 
and sufficient cause: Held, that the burning of the buildings 
on Ellis Island, the removal of the immigrant station from that 
place, and the discontinuance of the ferry service supplied a 
good aud sufficient cause for the termination of the contract to 
the Secretary of the Treasury. 585. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
1. Under the river and harbor act of August 18, 1894, and the act of 
April 24, 1888, the Secretary of War has full authority to con-
demn the land necessary for the construction of a boat railway 
provided for in the former act. 221. 
2. If a change in the location of an existing railroad is a necessity 
in the building of an authorized boat rail way, the acquisition 
by the Secretary of War of the necessary land to make such 
a change is merely an incident to the enterprise intrusted 
to him. 221. 
3. The United States in their sovereign capacity have power to acquire 
and bold· real estate wherever and whenever needed fur the use 
of the Government in the execution of any of its powers. 455. 
4. Such property may be acquired by any of the means by ·which 
natural or artificial persons may acquire property, subject in 
certain cases to the local laws of the State. lb. 
5. A contract for the improvement of the Hudson River may be 
lega1ly modified so as to provide for the acquirement by the 
United States through process of condemnation of the necessary 
lands for use as dumping grounds to be maintained by the con-
t ractors. 78. 
E GRA VI "G AND PRI TING. 
See BUREAU 01!' ENGRA. YING A.ND PRIN'l'ING. 
E TRY ~~ GOOD ' . 
See Cu TOM LA.WS A.ND REGULATION , 67. 
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EVIDENCE. 
The Secretal'y of the Treasury may rnturn the findings to the 
United States commissioner in proceedings for the r emission 
of penalties under the act of June 22, 1874, for further hearing 
upon the claim of newly discovered evidence. 289. 
EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES. 
See ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRANT STATION, 3. 
EXECUTIVE. 
The Executive has no right tQ interfere or control the action of the 
judiciary in proceedings against persous charged with being 
concerned in hostile expeditions against friendly nations. 267. 
See APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS, 1. 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS. 
1. An injunction will not lie against one of the departments of the 
Government to restrain the manufacture or use of an article 
alleged to be an infringement of a patented invention, nor will 
a claim for damages lie against the Government for such 
use. 96. 
2. It is unlawful for an executive department to make a contract 
for supplies for a longer term than one year from the time the 
contract was made. 304. 
3. The sole responsibility of every appointment in an executive 
department rests upon the head of that department, except 
where otherwise specially provided by statute. 355. 
4. The power of appointment and removal in an executive department 
being discretionary in character, they can not be delegated. lb. 
5. The statutory designation of 2 o'clock p. m. for the opening of all 
proposals in each Department means only that such proposals 
shall not be opened before 2 o'clock p. m., thus securing t.o both 
the Government and the bidders the ad vantage of the pre-
scribed moment prior to which no bids can be opened. 546. 
See Brns, 1-8; MONEY IN DISPUTE, 1, 2; PRINTING, ETC. 
EXTRADITION. 
1. In an application by Mexico to a United States commissioner 
for the extradition of a fugitive under the treaty with that 
country, the commissioner shouid decline to proceed with the 
inquiry until a translation of the papers containing the charges 
are produced before him; but in such a case he should so advise 
that Government and make a liberal allowance of time for the 
production of such translation before returning the papers. 
428. 
2. While such treaty does not in terms provide for such translation, 
yet the proceedings thereunder must accord with the rules aud 
forms of the tribunals of that jurisdiction to which recourse is 
had; and inasmuch as the commissioner is the sole j1tdge of the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence upon which extradition 
is sought, it follows that such evidence must be presented in a 
language that is intelligible to him. Ib. 
656 DIGEST OF OPINIONS. 
FISHING VESSELS. 
See VESSELS, 5. 
FLOOD TIDE. 
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 2, 3. 
FLOYD COUNTY, GEORGIA, BONDS. 
The proposed issue of interest-bearing bonds by the county com-
missioners of Floyd County, Ga., will not be in conflict with 
the banking laws of the United States. 70. 
FORFEITURES. 
See PENALTIES, 2, 3. 
FRAUD. 
·A fraud committed by one member of a partnership in a transac-
tion which he is conducting on behalf of the firm is regarded 
as a fraud of the firm, whether successful or unsuccessful, and 
although it was the purpose of the partner to cheat his own 
firm as well as the United States. 90. 
FUNDS IN DISPUTE. 
See MONEY IN DISPUTE, ETC., 1, 2. 
FURLOUGHS. 
See SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, 1. 
FUR SEALS. 
See SEAL FISHERIES. 
GALVESTON HARBOR. 
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 8, 9. 
" GENERAL ARMS'fRONG," BRIG. 
See CLAIMS, 3, 4. 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. 
1. Government employees are not entitled to witness fees when sub-
pamaed to testify in behalf of the United States, but are enti-
tled to their expenses. When subpamaed by a private party, 
they may demand and accept witness fees. 263. 
2. Absence of employees of the Government in the discharge of mil-
itary duties is not to be charged to the thirty days' leave allowed 
them for rest and recreation. 353. 
See ABSENCE; CIVIL SERVICE; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; PUB-
LIC OFFICERS; STATE DEPARTMENT, 1. 
GRE T F LLS OF THE POTOMAC. 
ee DAMAGES. 
GRE T LAKE. 
The rea.t Lake are high seas within the meaning of the act of 
Augu t 19, 1 90. 106. 
ee TA. VIGATI RULE , 2. 
DIGEST OF OPINIONS. 657 
GUADALCPE HIDALGO. 
See TREATIES, 6-9. 
HYDRAULIC MINING. 
See CALII<'ORNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION, 1, 2, 3. 
IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION ACT. 
It is within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to require 
of common carriers transporting merchandise ih bond, under 
the immediate transportation act, to file a bon<L agreeing t o 
accept and transport, within a definite fixed period of time, all 
merchandise offered under the act. 369. 
IMMIGRANT STATION. 
See ELLIS ISLAND IMMIGRANT STATION. 
IMMIGRANTS. 
Certain steamship companies dispute the validity of the regula-
tions of the Treasury Department, holding them liable for t he 
maintenance and transportation to the seaboard, under the act 
of March 3, 1891, of certain alien immigrants who had reach ed 
the interior of the country: Held, that the enforcement of the 
regulation is the duty of the Department of Justice, and t he 
opinion of the Attorney-General can not be required thereon. 6. 
IMPORTED MATERIALS. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS and REGULATIONS, 42-48. 
INCOME-TAX LAW. 
See TAXATION, 8, 9. 
JNDIAN DEPREDATION CLAIMS. 
1. Payments of Indian depredation claims are not payments for the 
benefit o:i: the Osage Indians within the meaning of section 12 
of the act of July 15, 1870, and can not be authorized by t he 
President under its terms. 131. 
2. The same considerations apply in the case of the Ute Indians 
under the act of June 15, 1880. Ib. 
3. The President h, not charged with any power or duty of approval 
or disproval respecting the payments of Indian . depredation 
judgments from annuities and property of Indians or from 
appropriations on their account, but all authority and discre-
tion in the premises are vested in the Secretary of the Interior. 
Ib. 
INDIAN TERRITORY. 
See ARMY, 1. 
INDIANS. 
1. The word "subjects" is used in treaties and international awards 
chiefly because the inhabitants of monarchies are called sub-
jects instead of citizens, yet in the act of April 6
1 
1894, it wa,s 
intended to embrace Indians. 466, · 
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INDIANS-Continued. 
2. Indians are not commonly understood to be embraced by the laws 
of Congress, yet they may ue and often are, and whether they 
are or not is a question of intent. lb. 
See SEAL FISHERIES, 12. 
INFORMERS. 
The Secretary of the Na.vy has implied authority to contract with 
persops for their compensation in furnishing information of 
frauds practiced upon the Government in the supply of equip-
ment which was not according to contract. 1. 
INJUNCTIONS. 
See PROCEDURE, 1, 2. 
INSPECTION. 
See MEAT INSPECTION. 
INSPECTION CERTIFICATES. 
Consular officers of the United States can not extend expired in-
spection certificates granted to American steamers, nor is there 
any authority of law for sending local inspectors out of the 
country to make inspection. 52. 
INSPECTORS OF HULLS AND STEAM BOILERS. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 9. 
INTERN AL REVENUE. 
1. The provisions of the South Carolina dispensary law of 1893 is 
ineffective and inoperative as against distilled liquors held in a 
United States bonded warehouse under the control of a collector • 
of internal revenue. 73. 
2. Distilled liquors in a bonded warehouse are exempt from the op-
erations of the process of a State court. Ib. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
1. Arms and munitfons of war, and in some cases the ship carrying 
them, are subject to· seizure by the government within whose 
jurisdiction they come if its domestic laws or regulations are 
violated, but international law imposes no duty upon the United 
States with respect to such transactions. 267. 
2. Internationallaw takes no account of a mereinsnrrection, confined 
within the limits of a country, which has not been protractecl 
or successful enough to secure for those engaged in it recogni-
tion as beligerents by their own government or by foreign gov-
ernments. lb. 
3. The obligation of preventing hostile expeditions against a friendly 
nation is one of diligence a1Hl not a guaranty against such expe-
ditions; and what constitutes diligence depends upon the cir-
circumstance in each case. lb. 
4. Th Ex cutive has no right to interfere or control the action of 
the ,judiciary in proceedings against 1)ersons cha,rged with being 
concerned in hostile expeditious against friendly nations. lb. 
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5. The neutrality laws of the United States, so called because their 
main purpose is to carry out the obligations imposed upon the 
United States while occupying a position of neut,rality toward 
belligerents, were also intended to prevent offenses against 
friendly powers, whether they should or should not be engaged 
in war or in attempting to suppress revolt. lb. 
6. The failure of the United States to pass neutrality laws would not 
diminish its international obligations, nor would the passing 
thereof increase such obligations. lb. 
7. The revenue and police regulations of a country have never .been 
recognized by international law as coming within the rules 
regulating the conduct of other nations. lb. 
8. The duty of the United States, when a state of war is declared or 
recognized by another country, is of its own motion to use dili-
gence to discover and to prevent within its borders the forma-
tion or departure of any military expedition intended to carry 
on or take part in such war. lb. 
9. The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute 
sovereignty of every nation as against all others within its own 
territory. 274. 
See Cu~AN INSURRECTION. 
IOWA RESERVATION. 
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2. 
IRRIGATION. 
See RIO GRANDE RIVER; TREATIES, 8, 9. 
JUDGES, RETIREMENT. 
See COURT OF CLAIMS, 1, 2. 
JUDGMENTS. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury is not authorized by section 3469, 
Revised Statutes, to remit or release any portion of a judgment 
indebtedness on consideration of hardship to certain indi-
viduals. The authority to compromis~ relates to claims of 
doubtful recovery or enforcement. 50. 
2. He has no authority to remit or release judgments in favor of the 
Government from which there is no appeal and which are 
clearly recoverable. 264. 
3. One final judgment on the merits rendered in one action can be 
pleaded in bar in all others upon the same cause of action. 447. 
JURISDICTION. 
See ACTIONS, 9. 
LABORERS. 
See CHINESE. 
''LABORERS AND MECHANICS." 
Certain foremen of mechanics at the Fort Leavenworth militarv 
prison are not "laborers and mechanics" within the eight-hoU:-r 
law of August 1, 1892. 32. 
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LACHES. 
See ACTIONS, 2. 
LANDS AND LAND PATENTS. 
1. Patents to Mexican laml grants in Cal'ifornia under the act of 
March 3, 1851, were conclusive only as between the United 
Sta,tes and the patentees, and did not affect the interests of 
third persons. 13. 
2. The surveys confirmed by such patents do not preclude a l egal 
investigation and decision by the proper tribunals between 
conflicting claimants. lb. 
· See ACTIONS, 1-3; PUBLIC LANDS; REAL ESTATE. 
LAWS OF THE LAND. 
A" municipal ordinance" is comprehended by the phrase "laws 
of the land" as used in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a 
soldier violating such an ordinance and ~scaping to a military 
reservation should be surrendered to the civil authorities for 
trial upon demand. 88. 
LEASE. 
1. There can not strictly be a lease of a use. 4 76. 
See ELLIS ISLAND, ETC., 4. 
LEAVES OF ABSENCE. 
See ABSENCE. 
LEGAL ADVICE. 
The Commissioner of Patents should submit to the law officers 
assigned to the Department of the Interior questions arising in 
the administration of his ·department upon which legal advice 
is desired. 17 4. · 
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1, 2. 
LIBEL. 
Any publication in an official circular of the ground upon which 
an officer or employee of the Government has been suspended 
or discharged from the public service will not support a cause 
of action for libel against the officer making such publication, 
provided it is made in good faith, without malice, in the per-
formance of an official duty, and with the design only of pro-
moting the public interests. 320. 
LICENSES. 
1. Licenses are not required for vessels engaged in fur-seal fishing 
in other waters than those covered by the award of the Paris 
Tribunal and the act of Congress of April 6, 1894. 239. 
2. Wh n th license of a custom-house broker has b een revoked, h e 
can no t thereafter deal directly with the customs officials, 
ex ·ep when acting for himself as principal. 255. 
3. The ecr et ary of the Treasury may grant a license, r evocable at 
his will, to erect and maintain a building on Ellis Island, an 
immi •rant tation, £ r th purpose of an exhibition ball and 
ndu ·t ing a l and and l abor b ur au. 473. 
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4. He has no power to leas_e for any length of time Government 
property withC1ut express authority of law, though he may 
license the use thereof. 4 76. 
5. A revocable license without limitation of time given by the Sec-
retary of War for the erection of a Roman Catholic chapel on 
a military reservation at West Point transcends the statute. 
537. 
LIENS. 
1. A mechanic's lien will not lie against property of the United 
States. 18, 78. 
2. Assuming that the title to the land on which the dry dock at Port 
Royal is built and the exclusive jurisdiction over it are in the 
United States, the mechanics' lien laws of South Carolina do not 
operate thereon and claims under such laws may be ignored in 
the settlement with contractors. 18. 
3. On the grounds of -public policy, the mechanics' lien Jaws do not 
generally, in the absence of expressed provisions, apply to pub-
lic buildings erected by States for public use. lb. 
4. The owner or consignee of a vessel arriving from a foreign port 
is entitled to a lien for freight on the merchandise imported on 
such vessel for the purpose of exportation. 38. 
5. The Treasury Depal'tment may legally accept the revenue cutter 
Calumet subject to a creditor's lien, and after satisfying the 
lien proceed against the contractor's bondsmen to recover pay-
ment made in excess of the contract price. 70. 
LIFE-SA. VING CORPS. 
See LIFE-SAVING MEDALS, 5. 
l .IFE-SA. VING MEDALS. 
1. Section 12 of the act of June 18, 1878, does not authorize the Sec-
retary of the Treasury to bestow life-saving medals for signal 
service made in saving persons from drowning in small inland 
streams, r,onds, and pools. 65. 
2. The waters contemplated by such section are either the high seas 
or what 1night be described as waters of the United States. lb. 
3. Section 12 of the act of June 18, 1878, with reference to the award-
ing by the Secretary of the Treasury of life-saving medals of 
the second class upon persons for bravery in "succoring the 
shipwrecked and saving persons from drowning," refers only to 
those cases wher~ the rescued were suffering from the perils of 
the sea either by actual shipwreck or from being upon or con-
nected with any vessel in distress. 124. 
4. It applies only to those who are in danger of drnwning in any of 
the waters of the United States in the vicinity of a life-saving 
station, life-boat station, or house of refuge. Ib. 
5. The intent of such statute was to provide for the bestowal of such 
medals of honor upon the regular or volunteer members, whether 
permanent or temporary, of the life-saving corps. Ib. 
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LOTTERIES. 
1. The plan of business of a certain company considered and declared 
to be in the nature of a lottery within the meaning of sections 
3894 and 4001, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-
tember 19, 1890, and the use of the mails by it forbidden. 4. 
2. The advertisements in Le Petit Journal, a French publication, 
considered and held to fall within the prohibited class defined 
iu section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-
tember 19, 1890, as unmailahle. 171. 
3. The acts of Congress authorizing the Postmaster-General to with-
hold mail matter from persons and concerns engaged in conduct-
ing a lottery or gift enterprise, etc., are constitutional, and em-
power him to deny mail facilities to all such. 313. 
4. The name "lottery" covers any dl:ltermination of gain or loss by 
the issue of an event which is merely contrived for the occasion. 
It is none the less a lottery because it is fairly conducted 0r be-
cause such conduct is amply secured. Ib. 
MAILS. 
1. Interference with the carriage of the mail on railroads in the usual 
and ordinary way is a criminal offense, and the combination 
of offenders may be prosecuted under section 5440, Revised 
Statutes. 8. 
2. The extension of the free-delivery service of the Detroit post-office 
so as to permit the delivery of mail to vessels in Canadian 
¥Taters is not legally authorized. 173. 
3. Public interests require that the Government should have a mo-
nopoly of the business of carrying the mail. 394. 
4. The Monthly Bulletin containing advertisements of private firms 
or corporations, published by the Bureau .of American Repub-
lics, is entitled to transmission through the mails free of postage, 
under the act of February 20, 1897. 514. 
See LoTTERrns, 1, 2, 3; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 1-7. 
MAKAR INDIANS. 
See SEAL FISHERIES, 12. 
MARINE CORPS. 
See AccoUNTs, 2; PENSIONS, 1, 2. 
MARINE-HOSPITAL FUNDS. 
Sick and disabled officers and seamen of the Revenue-Cutter 
Service are entitled to the benefit of ihe Marine-Hospital funds 
provicled for sick and disabled seamen. 340, 365. 
MEAT I SPECTIO . 
1. A criminal prosecution will not lie for falsely representing in a 
label placed on canned meat that the meat contained in the can 
has lrnen inspected in accordance with the act of March 3, 1891. 
12 . 
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2. It is the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture, under the act of 
March 2, 18~5, to make regulations toprevent the transportation 
of condemned carcasses of cattle, sheep, etc., inspected in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this act. 167. 
3. The act of March 3, 1891, imposes a penalty for transporting the 
carcasses or the food p-roducts thereof, declared to be unsound 
or diseased, but the law does not require that they should be 
rendered unfit for human food. Ib. 
4. The Department of Agriculture is not required to effect the pre-
vention of the consumption of diseased meat as human food 
within the State of its origin and without its having been car-
ried out and brought back into such State. Ib. 
5. It can not compel the destruction of pork, although a:f(ected with 
trichinoo, nor can it license its use under limitationM and restric-
tions. 167. 
6. Section 2 of the act of March 2, 1895, with reference to the inspec-
tion of cattle the meat of which is intended for exportation, 
relates alone to live cattle and the meat of cattle, and any 
reasonable regulation affecting these and these alone is author-
ized by the statute. 229. 
7. An act of Congress providing for the inspection of beef intended 
for exportation, and that no clearance shall be given to any ves-
sel having on board for exportation uninspected beef, does not 
authorize tbe making of a regulation by the Secretary of Agri-
culture requiring that meat other than beef products shall be so 
marked as to show the species of animal from which it was pro-
duced, cl~ssifying all unmarked packages of meat as uninspected 
beef and refusing clearance to vessels having on board such 
unmarked packages. 229. · 
See CATTLE, 1, 2. 
MECHANIC'S LIEN. 




See LIFE-SAVING MEDALS; W ORLD's COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION, 2-7. 
MERCHANDISE. 
See w ORDS AND PHRASES. 
MERCHANT MARINE. 
See VESSELS. 
MEXICAN LAND GRANTS. 
See LANDS, ETC., 1, 2. 
MEXICO. 
See CONGRESSMEN, 1; TREATIES, 6-9. 
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MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT. 
1. In selecting the granite for t,he Memorial Hall at vVest Point the 
safest plan is to designate certain fixed standar<ls, each l>id being 
upon the separate kinds with the right added to the boarcl to 
make selection. 240. 
2. A revocable license without limitation of time given by the Sec-
retary of War for the erection of a Roman Catholic chapel on 
the military reservation at West Point transcends the s_tatute. 
537. 
MILITARY EQUIPMENT. 
See NATIONAL GUARD. 
MILITARY RESERVATIONS. 
1. A revocable license without limitation of time given b y the Sec-
retary of War for the erection of a Roma,n Catholic chapel on 
the military reservation at vVest Point transcends the statute. 
537. 
2. An explicit authority is necessary for even a transient occupation 
of a military reservation for other than its special purpose. Ib. 
3. Permanence of right of occupation is forbidden by the act of July 
28, 1892, and consequently an occupation which contemplates 
permanency or duration longer than five years is forbidden. lb. 
4. The Secretary of War has no power to accept for the Government 
a donation of a building erected upon a military reservation, 
where the acceptance is accompanied by a limitation for its 
use in perpetuity by the Roman Catholics. lb. 
5. The Secretary of War has no authority to grant permission for the 
erection of a bethel, reading room, and library within the army 
reservation on Ship Island. 565. 
MILITIA. 
The J!.,ifty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment of Militia was not in 
the military service of the United States in such sense as to 
entitle Capt. Frederick Huidekoper to a certificate of discharge 
from the United States. 130. 
See NATIONAL GUARD. 
MINORS. 
1. The consent of parents and guardians to enlistments in the Navy 
of minors over 18 years of age is not necessary to make the 
enlistment valid. 327. 
2. The period at which persons reaeh their majority and becorne sui 
juris with respect to the ordinary affairs of life can not abridge 
this power of the General Government . lb. 
3. The United States have a right to prescribe the rules and condi-
tions under which voluntary or compulsory services are to be 
rendered by citizens. lb. 
4. If a statute permits a man to bind himself by enlistment during 
his minority, there is no reason why he can not bind himself 
for a further period. lb. 
5. The phra e "other persons" in section 1416, Revi!,ed Statutes, 
includes all persona over 18 years, whether of age or not. Ib. 
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MISTAKE. 
1. If a bid for the construction of public works has been accepted, 
. it can not be withdrawn by the contractor 1)ecause he made a 
clerical error in preparing his estimates, as the mistake. was not 
mutual, but was due to negligence. 186. 
2. A soldier should not be held accountable for money paid him in 
excess of the amount to which he w2.s entitled where such pay-
ment was made through a mistake of law on the part of the 
executive officers of the Government. 323. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 71-77. 
MODIFICATION OF CONTRACTS. 
See CoNTRACTS, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7. 
MONEY IN DISPUTE. 
1. A disbursing officer of the United States holding a Treasury draft 
payable to certain contractors can not with propriety or safety 
be directed to turn it over to a receiver appointed by a State 
court in an action between contesting claimants. 75. 
2. Funds in the hands of the Secretary of War may be retained by 
him pending a controversy between the parties claiming them 
until a final adjudication of the whole matter by the tribunal 
to which the parties may last resort. 447. 
"MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE." 
See TREATIES, 1-3. 
NATIONAL GUARD. 
Certain arma furnished the Washington Light Infantry of Charles-
ton, S. C., are held by the State of South Carolina for the use 
of the whole body of the militia of the State in snch manner 
and in accordance with such rules and regulations as the 
authorities of the State may prescribe. 54. 




1. The act of March 2, 1895, authorizing Representatives or Delegates 
in Congress to recommend a candidate for appointment as a cadet 
at the Naval Academy of the United States limits this right to 
members of the then existing Fifty-third Congress. 164. 
2. In order for such a recommendation to be valid, it should have been 
made before 12 o'clock noon of March 4, 1895; consequently three 
recommendations made on that day, but received at the Navy 
Department after such hour, are ineffective. Ib. 
3. The Secretary of the Navy has no right to call for a new recom-
mendation for appointment of a cadet at Annapolis, even though 
he had not acted upon the recommendation until after the Con-
gressman who made it was unseated, ·unless it ue under sectiol!. 
1516J Revised Statutes, where the candidate failed to pass. 342• 
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' NAVAL ACADEMY-Continued. 
4:. The nomination of a ca,det for appointment at the Naval Academy 
by a Congressman who was subsequently unseated b y contest 
. of election is good, and the candidate can not lawfully be 
deprived of his place if he passes his examination. Ib. 
NAVAL OFinCERS. 




See ADVERTISEMENTS, 5, 9; Brn·s, 1, 2. 
NAVIGABLE DEPTH. 
"Navigable depth" is a depth sufficiently wide to be navigated 
by vessels either moved by sails or steam and to permit them to 
pass each other. 29. 
NAVIGABLE WA'l'ERS. 
1. Where a State has grantecl authority to construct a bridge over a 
navigable river and the location and plan has been approved 
by the Secretary of War, the question whether the purchasers 
of such right are authorized to proceed is one which does not 
concern the Government. 293. 
2. The St. Louis and Cloquet rivers are navigable waters of the 
United States, and the Secretary of War had exclusive author-
ity to permit their obstruction by dams, but can not revoke his 
permit when large sums of money have been expended on the 
faith thereof. 41. 
3. The act of September 19, 1890, as amended, intended that the 
navigable ·waters of the United States should thereafter be 
under the exclusive control of the United States; and that for 
the future their navigability should be interfered with by 
bridges, dams, or other obstructions only by express permission 
of the United States granted by the Secretary of War. Ib. 
4. It is the duty of the Secretary of War to act upon a petition to 
have designated the portion of a river within which refuse mat-
ter may be discharged, in accordance with the provisions of the 
act of August 18, 1894, chapter 299, sect.ion 6, although the nav-
igability of the river will not be affected. 305. 
5. In making such designation he should be governed only by con-
siderations affecting the navigation of the river or which may 
affect its future navigation. 305. 
6. The power of Congress over navigable streams is supreme, and 
grows out of the power to regulate commerce. 430. 
7. Congress may declare what is an obstruction and remove it. Ib. 
8. When Congress chooses to act, it is not concluded, by anything 
that the States or that individuals by its authority have done, 
from as urning entire control of the matter and abating any 
erection that may have been made and preventing any others 
from heiu<r made, except in conformity with such regulations 
as it may impo. e. Ib. 
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9. The provision in the river and harbor act of September 19, 1890, 
that whenever the Secretary of War shall determine that any 
bridge constructed over "any of the navigable waterways of 
the United States is an unreasonable obstruction to the free 
navigation of such waters," he shall give notice to have such 
obstruction removed or remedied, is not an unconstitutional 
delegation of the legislative functions . 430. 
10. Where a bridge was erected by authority of a State before Con-
gress assumed actual jurisdiction over the river for tho pur-
poses of navigation, and it was declared an obstruction to 
navigation by the Secretary of War under the above act, such 
obstrnction can be abated without compensation by the United 
States for the expenses incurred. lb. 
11. The control and supervision of the navigable waters of the United 
States is placed in the Secretary of War. 518. 
12. The remedy of the United States in case of the erection of a dam 
without authority across the Rio Grande River is by injunction 
under section 10 of the act of September 19, 1890. 518. 
13. The Secretary of the Interior has no power, under the provisions 
of the act of March 3, 1891, to authorize the damming of the Rio 
Grande River for irrigation purposes. 518. 
14. The Secretary of War is authorized, under the act of July 13, 
189'.&, to permit the construction of a canal connecting Port 
Arthur, Tex., with Sabine Pass, a navigable water improved at 
the expense of the Government, for a canal is such a work as 
is provided for iu section 7 of said act. 
15. Although the Attorney-General can not determine without con-
sidering questions of fact whether or not a bar in Flushing 
Creek formed opposite the month of a sewer and offering an 
obstruction to navigation is .such a case as comes within the 
exception provided in section 6 of the act of August 17, 1894, 
the Secretary of War is not precluded from taking such action 
inviting the attention of the town authorities of Flushing to 
the matter as may be advisable. 594. 
See CALIFO_RNIA DEBRIS COMMISSION, 1. 
NAVIGATION RULES. 
1. Rules 6 and 7 of section 4223, Revised Statutes, relating to river 
steamers navigating waters flowing into the Gulf of Mexico and 
their tributaries, and to coasting steam vessels, etc., navigating 
the bays, lakes, or other inland waters, are repealed by the act 
of August 19, 1890. 106. 
2. The act of August 19, 1890, adopting the regulations for prevent-
ing collisions at sea are applicable to all waters navigable. for 
seagoing vessels and connected either with the ocean or with 
the Great Lakes, and also applicable to every kind of steam 
vessel. 106. 
3. The Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels have power 
to make regulations not inconsistent therewith. 106. 
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4. The provision of section 4234, Revised Statutes, requiring sailing 
vessels to show a lighted forch on the approach of any steam 
vessel <luring the night time was not repealed by section 3 of 
the act of February 19, 1895. 227. 
5. Sections 12 and 13 of the act of March 3, 1897, relating to the 
navigation laws, which amends section 4233, Revised Statutes, 
are special rules duly.made by local authority according to the 
provisions of article 30 of the act of 1890. 513. 
6. Those portions of the international regulations for preventing 
collisions at sea prescriLed by the act of August 19, 1890, which 
did not interfere with the operations of the special rules duly 
made by the local authorities according to the provisions of 
article 30 as construed by the act of 1895 are rules for the 
guidance of American vessels on the high seas as well as on all 
waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels. 513. 
NAVY. 
1. The status of members of the staff corps of the Navy are governed 
by sections 1485, 1486, and 1487, Revised Statutes. 46. 
2. Article 21 of the Naval Regulations is within the authority con-
ferred upon the Secretary of the Navy by section 1547, Revised 
Statutes. lb. 
3. There is no inconsistency between sections 1483 and 1484, Revised 
Statutes, in their operation upon the question of the precedence 
of engineer officers of the Navy. Ib. 
4. The orders, regulations, and instructions issued by the Secretary 
of the Navy, with the approval of the President, for the govern-
ment of the Navy have the force of the statute law when not 
inconsistent therewith. lb. 
5. The rule of the Febiger Board for ascertaining the date of prece-
dence of officers on the active list of the Navy is in conflict with 
the act of August 5, 1882. lb. 
3. B. entered the Navy September 20, 1854; on February 8, 1868, he 
was dismissed from the service; on March l, 1871, pursuant to a 
joint resolution of Congress, he was reappointed; on September 
20, 1894, at his request, he was placed upon the retired list under 
the provisions of section 1443, Revised Statutes: Held, that as 
he had not been forty years in actual service of the United 
States, the retiring order was without effect, and he should be 
restored to the active list of the Navy. 103. 
7. Paymasters of the Navy may receive from enlisted men or petty 
officers, for deposit under the act of February 9, 1889, accumu-
lated savings to any amount, providing they represent the earn-
ings of such a person as an enlisted man or petty officer in the 
United, tates avy. 498. 
8. The consent of parents and guardians to enlistments in the Navy 
of minors over eighteen years of age is not necessary to make 
the enlistment valid. 327. 
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NAVY-Continued. 
9. The person to be employed under the act of February 19, 1897, to 
supervise the c·ompletion of the tables of planets may be desig-
nated either by the order of the Secretary of the Navy or of the 
head of the Bureau, which order need only designate the person 
selected as a competent mathematician and the compensation 
he is to receive. 507. 
10. There is no obj ection to the employment of a retired officer to 
supervise the completion of this work. Ib. 
11. As adequate power resides in the Secretary of the Navy to cause 
the arrest of an officer for mal-appropriation of public funds, . 
notwithstanding the fact that he has been arrested by the civil 
authorities for the same offense, and discharged on bail, it is 
improper to cause his arrest by the civil officers in order to his 
trial for a naval court-martial. 504. 
12. The appropriation for special speed premiums made by the act of 
July 26, 1894, is not limited in its application to premiums 
earned prior to January 1, 1894. 84. 
See ACCOUNTS, 2, 3; CONTRACTS, 1; MINORS, 1-5; PENSIONS, 1, 2; 
PUBLIC LANDS, 2. 
NEUTRALITY LAWS. 
See INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
NORTH AMERICAN COMMERCIAL COMPANY. 
The Secretary of the Treasury can not rightfully require the 
North American Commercial Company to furnish security to the 
amount of its indebtedness for the years 1894 and 1895 in addi-
tion to the $50,000 of bonds already made pursuant to section 
1963, Revised Statutes. 177. 
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO., 
See PUBLIC LANDS, 7-9. 
OATHS. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 26-29. 
OFFICE. 
1. The President can appoint to office only those who are eligible 
under the Constitution. His appointment of one not eligible is 
a nullity. 211. · 
2. A statute making an appropriation for certain employment, pro-
viding no permanency to the term or contemplating none of the 
usual formalities in the selection of an employee for such serv-
ice, as the taking of an oath or receiving a commission, does not 
create an office. 507. 
See CONGRESSMEN, 1, 2. 
OFFICERS. 
_See ARMY OFJ.<'ICERS; NAVY, 1-6, 9-11. 
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OFFICIAL BONDS. 
See BONDS, 3. 
OPTION. 
See CLOUD UPON THE TITLE. 
OS.A.GE INDIANS. 
Payments of Indian depredation claims are not payments for the 
benefit of the Osage Indians within the meaning of section 12 
of the act of July .15, 1870, and can not be authorized by the 
President under its terms. 131. 
OVERHEAD WIRES. 
See DISTRIC! OF COLUMBIA, 2. 
P .A.CIFIC RAILROAD COMP .A.NIES. 
See CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY. 
PAPERS. 
See POST-OFFICE.DEPARTMENT, 1. 
PARDON . 
.As in some of the States a person convicted of an offense which 
the laws of the United States call a misdemeanor loses his right 
to vote, sit as juror, etc., if the action of the President on an 
application for pardon depends simply on the question of neces-
sity for pardon, such necessity exists, unless the applicant is to 
be prevented from freely changing his residence under penalty 
of losing his rights of citizenship thereby. 242. 
P .ARKS .A.ND RESERV .A.TIONS. 




See CHINESE, 10. 
PATENT OFFICE. 
1 . .A rule promulgated by the Commissioner of Patents with the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, limiting appeals in 
patent cases to six months from ·the time when in a condition 
for appeal, is not in contravention of the law. 122. 
2 . .A rule or regulation made by the Commissioner of Patents and 
adopted and approve<l by the Secretary of the Interior, under 
s ction 483 Revised Statutes, is a regulation prescribed by the 
bead of a Department, and as such,. when not incon istent with 
law, bas the force of law and is taken judicial notice of by the 
courts. lb. 
3. The Commissioner of Patents shoul<l submit to the law officers 
a signed to the Department of the Interior questions arising in 
the a lmioi ·tration of his D partment upon which legal advice 
i d ired. 174. 
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PA'rENTS. 
1. Goods smuggled into the United States may be seized and sold by 
a collector of customs, although protected by patents. 72. 
2. A preliminary injunction may be granted to restrain the manu-
facture or use of a patented invention prior to the :final deter-
mination of the case. 96. 
3. An injunction will not lie against one of the departments of the 
Government to restrain the manufacture or use of an article 
alleged fo be an infringement of a patented invention, nor will a 
claim for damages lie against the Government for such use. Ib. 
4. Where loss and injury may result to the Government from the 
appropriation by its contractors of a patented invention or 
other property of third persons, a bond of indemnity should be 
required as a part of a contract. Ib. 
PAYMASTERS'. CLERKS. 
See C1v1L SERVICE, 14. 
PAYMENT .THROUGH MISTAKE. 
See MISTAKE, 2. 
PENALTIES. 
1. A penalty imposed under a contract for delay in completing a 
work which has been :finished according to the contract without 
damage to the Government, may be r emitted by the Secretary 
of War and the sum withheld paid to the contractor. 27. 
2. The provision in a contract providing for the forfeiture of $20 per 
day for each day's delay in completing certain work at West 
Point Military Academy is to be regarded as a penalty, and in 
case of delay it is lawful to asRess against the contractor the 
actual damages sustained instead of the penalty. 139. 
3. The distinction between the compromising of a doubtful case and 
the remission of a penalty, forfeiture, or disability is that the 
former is strictly a fiscal one, while .the latter is in the nature 
of a pardoning power. 264. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 80-89. 
PEN ALTY ENVELOPES. 
See MAILS, 4. 
PENITENTIARIES. 
Prisoners sentenced by a military court-martial to confinement in 
a United States penitentiary shoulcl be conducted thereto L>y the 
proper officer of the vVar Department, and not be turned over 
to a United States marshal for delivery. 204. 
See PUBLIC LANDS, 3-6, 10. 
PENSIONS. 
1. The provision of section 4724, Revised Statutes, forbidding per-
sons in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps from drawing both a 
pension as an invalid and the pay of his rank in the service, is 
not applicable to retired officers. 408. Reversed, 453. 
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2. The pension acts of August 29, 1890, and March 3, 1891, providing 
that thereafter no officer of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps on 
the retired list should draw or receive pension under any law, 
should not have a retrospective effect and forbid the allowance 
of pension to ~uch person up to and jncluding the last quarterly 
payment falling due prior to the :first-mentioned date. 408. 
''PERILS OF THE SEA." 
See w ORDS AND PHRASES. 
"PERSONAL EPFECTS." 
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 62. 
PNEUMATIC GUN CARRIAGE AND POWER COMPANY. 
See PREMIUMS, 1, 2, 3. 
POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FUND. 
See CIVIL SERVICE, 16, 17. 
PORT ROYAL DRY DOCK. 
See LIENS, 2. 
POSSESSION OF FUNDS. 
See MONEY IN DISPUTE, 1, 2. 
POSTAGE STAMPS. 
The counterfeiting of an uncanceled foreign postage stamp comes 
within the meaning of the phrase "obligation or other securi-
ties * * * o any foreign Government" in section 4 of the 
act of Pebruary 10, 1891. 136. 
POSTAL SERVICE. 
1. The proviso to the act of January 12, 1895, constitutes no substan-
tial limitation upon the power to print and supply "special 
request envelopes," under section 3915, Revised Statutes. 119. 
2. The extension of the free-delivery service of tbe Detroit post-
office so as to permit the delivery of mail to vessels fo Canadian 
waters, is not legally authorized. 173. • 
See AccouNTs, 1; CIVIL SERVICE, 4, 12, 16; LOTTERIES; MAILS; 
RAILROAD COMPANIES, 1-6. 
PO T-OFFICE DEPARTMENT. 
The disposition of useless papers which have accumulated in the 
office of the Auditor for the Post-Office Department should be in 
accordance with the act of February 16, 1889. 151. 
PRACTICE. 
0 ACTION i J UDGMENTS i PR CE DURE. 
PRE~UU I . 
1. The appropriation for special speed premiums made by the act of 
July 26 1894 is n t limited in its application to premiums 
earned prior to January 1, 1 94. 84. 
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2. The contract with the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Com-
pany for the construction of a djsappearing gun carriage under 
the act of August 1, 1894, makes no provision for the payment 
of a preminm, and does not bind the Government beyond the 
amount appropriated. 457. 
3. And there is no authority for him to make a supplemental con-
tract binding the Government to further expenditures in the 
way of premiums. 495. 
PRESIDENT. 
1. 'fhe President can appoint to office only those who are eligible 
. under the Constitution. His appo_intmen~ of one not eligible 
is a nullity. 211. 
2. He has no power to remit forfei ture of a judgment on a recogni-
zance elsewhere than in the Distr:i.ct of ColuTLbia. 494. 
See CONGRESSMEN, 1; PARDON. 
PRINTING AND BINDING. 
1. The Public Printer should print and distribute in slip form 760 
copies of private bills, postal conventions, etc., under section 
56 of the public printing and binding act of 1895. 405. 
2. Under that section the State Department shouhl receive 500 copies 
of the private laws, conventions, etc., printed in slip form. Ib. 
3. The t1llotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the 
different departments is not actually passed upon by the 
accounting officers of the Treasury and · is not within thejr 
jurisdiction. 42B. . 
4. The order of the Secretary of State upon the Public Printer, under 
section 90 of the public printing and binding act of January 12, 
1895, for a number of copies of certain Congressional documents, 
not exceeding the number of bureaus in his Department, should 
be furnished without being charged to the allotment of his De-
partment. 423. 
5. The word "order" in the clause in section 80 of this act, provid-
ing "that no order for p11blic printing shall be acted upon after 
the expiration of one year, unless the entire copy and illustra-
tions shall be furnir:ihed within that period," was not intended 
to include a joint resolution of Congress for· the printing of a 
"history of international arbitrations," digest, etc. 427. 
6. Under section 90 of the act of J anuary 12, 1895, the head of an 
executive department has no right to r equest the Public Printer 
to furnish a greater number of copies of publicatjons, other than 
bills and resolutions, than the number of bureaus in the depart-
ment and divisions in the office of the head thereof. 370. 
7. The head of an executive department may make a requisition on 
the Public Printer for any number of publications, where the 
cost of printing is to be charged against such department, and 
the Pubhc Printer has no authority to pass upon the character 
of the publications. Id. 
See ADVERTISEMENTS, 3, 4. 




1. A preliminary injunction may be granted to restrain the manufac-
ture or use of a patented invention prior to the final determina-
tion of the case. 96. 
2. An injunction will not lie against one of the departments of the 
Government to restrain the manufacture or use of an article 
alleged to be an infringement of a patented invention, nor will a 
claim for damages lie against the Government for such use. lb. 
See ACTIONS. 
PROCESS. 
Distilled liquors in a bonded warehouse are exempt from the opera-




See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 13, 73, 74, 77. 
PRUSSIA. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 30, 31, 32. 
PUBLIC BUILDINGS. 
On the grounds of public policy the mechanic's lien l aws do not 
generally, in the absence of express provisions, apply to public 
buildings erected by States for public use. 18. 
See PUBLIC w ORKS. 
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. 
See PUBLIC WORKS; RIVERS AND HARBORS. 
PUBLIC LANDS. 
1. Lands of the United States within the limits of a State are not 
subject to her laws, except there be in the act of her legislature, 
under which jurisdiction was ceded to the United States, a res-
ervation of concurrent jurisdiction to the State. 18. 
2. Lands reserved from the public domain for the use of the Navy 
Department can only be restored to the public domain by Con-
gres ional action. 120. 
3. The provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, granting certain sec-
tions of unappropriated public lands within the State of Colo-
rado to the State for penitentiary purposes, that S3,id lands are 
to be selectccl and located by direction of the legislature of 
saicl tate and with the approval of the Pi-esident of the United 
States, on or before a specifiecl clay, are not directory, as Con-
gre . . · had no rio-ht to give directions to the legislature of a 
tat , hut are rather in the nature of conditions precedent and 
can nly b given effect as conditions, and a failure by the 
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designated authorities to select and locate lands within the 
time named renders the grant inoperative, and after the expira-
tion of said time the President is not authorized to approve a 
selection and location of said lands. 462. 
,1. An act r eqniring a State to make a selection of lands within a 
specified period after its a<lmission into the Union can not be 
construed as directions to those whom CongreRs bad no right to 
direct, as they can only be given effect as conditions precedent, 
,vhich, if not complied with, prevent the grant from being 
effectual. Ib. 
5. The President is not authorized to approve a selection of public 
lands for penitentiary purposes by the State of Colorado under 
section 9 of the act of March 3, 1875. lb. 
6. Failure by the designated authorities of a State to Relect and 
locate lands within the time named by an act providing for such 
selection renders the grant inoperative. Ib. 
7. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, a Wisconsin corporation, 
having purchased, under a foreclosure sale, the mortgages of 
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, the Secretary of the 
Interior should act upon the application of the former for pat-
ents to land, npon the same considerations which wonld govern 
in case there had been no foreclosure and the a,pplications were 
all made by the latter company. 486. 
8. The consideration for the grant of pnblic lands to the Northern 
Pacific Railroad Company, under the act of July 2, 1864, being 
the construction and maintenance of a railroad telegraph line, 
and such obligation having been fully performed by it, the right 
to have the lands patented was perfect in said company. lb. 
9. Congress, by consenting to the issuing of bonds secured by mort-
gage on the railway and telegraph lines of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad Company, necessarily consented to their transfer to 
the purchaser in case of foreclosure, whether a natural or artic 
ficial person, and if the latter, no matter bow or by what 
authority created, would take the property subject to all the 
continuing rights of the Federal Government just as the orig-
inal company held it. Ib. 
10. The States of South Dakota and Montana having received grants 
for the erection of penitentiaries, the enabling act under which 
the two Dakotas, Montana, and Washington ,vere admitted into 
the Union provided that North Dakota and Washington should 
have like grants for the same purpose. ·washington already 
has a penitentiary. Held, that further legislation is required. 
352. 
PUBLIC OFFICERS. 
When power is given to public officers to be exercised for the 
public interest the language used, though permissive iu form, 
is in fact mandatory. 167. 
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PUBLIC PRINTER. 
See PRINTING AND BINDING. 
PUBLIC PROPERTY. 
1. Public property can be subject to claims against it only when it 
is in the possession of the courts, by act of the Government, 
seeking to have hs rights established. 18. 
2. The Secreta,ry of the Treasur~, ha,s no power to lease for a term of 
years, or for any length of time, the property of the Govern-
ment placed in his charge, wHhout express authority of law 
therefor. 476. 
See PUBLIC WORKS. 
PUBLIC WORKS. 
1. A mechanic's lien can not be acquired upon property of the United 
States. 78. 
2. In a contract for public works, although tbe representations of an 
officer of the Government have been relied up·on, they must be 
regarded as wholly personal antl of no effect as ~1gainst the 
United States. lb. 
3. No authority exists in the Secretary of the Navy to incur obliga-
tions for the completion of a dry dock where the appropriation 
has become exhausted, although it would result in a great saving 
to the Government. 288. 
See Brns, 4-5; CONTRACTS; Punuc PROPERTY; RIVERS AND 
HARBORS. 
QUARANTINE AND QUARANTINE REGULATIONS. 
1. The Secretary of Agriculture may lawfully provide food for quar-
antined cattle where they are in danger of loss, but in such case 
h e should hold them until such expenses are repaid, and in case of 
default sell them. 193. 
2. The Secretary of Agriculture may provide and enforce regulations 
requiring the food and attendance to be furnished quarantined 
cattle by the owner, under the act of August 30, 1890. lb. 
3. In quarantine regulations against yellow fever promulgated by 
the Secretary of the Treasury an exemption from disinfection, 
etc., of vessels bound to ports in the United States north of the 
southern boundary of Maryland does not constitute a discrimi-
nation within the meaning of the act of February 15, 1893, pro-
viding that Tegu1ations shall operate uniformly and in no manner 
discriminate against any port or p1ace. 446. 
4. The authority of the Department of Agriculture to seize and 
slaughter imported sheep affected with scab, under the act of 
August 30, 1890, is doubtful. 460. 
5. Tb act of August 30, 1890, provides a summary method of appraisal 
and payment in the case of the slaughter of animals exposed to 
infection, but no payruent is provided where they are imported 
in violation of the act. The evident intent of the act was that 
1•xposed animals imported in violation thereof were to be slangh-
t r cl incli criminately, without regard to the question of the 
1 gality of the importation. 460. 
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QUARANTINE AND QUARANTINE REGULATIONS-Continued. 
6. A Chin~se laborer fnrnishecl with the necessary certificate, etc., 
arrived in tbe United States two clays after the period :fixed by 
the treaty, being delayed in quarantine by the Canadian authori-
ties; Held, That be could not enter the United States, as his 
return should have been within the period which the treaty bas 
made the sole provision for delay. 575. 
7. Quarantine is not actus Dei, but an ordinary incident of travel, to 
be contemplated by one undergoing a voyage. 575. 
RAILROAD COMPANIES. 
1. Railroad companies are prohibited from carrying, outside of the 
mails, first-class mail matter not in Government stamped envel-
opes, for companies, corporations, or private individuals operat-
ing car lines, transportation lines, hotels, restaurants, or any 
other class of business that may either be connected or not con-
nected with the railroad company. 394-. 
2. Any railroad company or any officer or employee thereof, carrying 
letters which are neither written by that company nor addressed 
to it, is liable to the penalties imposed by the law. lb. 
3. A railroad company can not carry letters from one of its connect-
ing lines to another, although they may relate to through busi-
ness over the lines of all. lb. 
4. A r ailroad company has the right to carry letters about its own 
business, written and sent by its officers and agents, without 
being in Government stamped envelopes. They may be letters 
to others of its officers and agents, to those of connecting lines, 
or to anyone else, so long as no other carrier intervenes. lb. 
· 5. Letters of a railroad company addressed to officers or agents of a 
connecting line on company business, and delivered to an agent 
of the latter at the point of connection, may be carried by the 
latter to any point on its line. lb. 
6. The term "private hands" as used in section 3992, Revised Stat-
utes, with reference to the conveyance or t ransmission of mail 
matter, was evidently intended to cover all except common car-
riers on post routes. Neither the latter nor their employees, 
while engaged in this business can be considered as "private 
hands." lb. 
7. Railroad companies can not set up a common right against the 
conditions which tlie law incorporates in their contracts with 
the Government. lb. 
8. The act of July 29, 1892, does not authorize the Secretary of War 
to approve the survey of the Great Falls Electric Railway Com-
pany over the lands of the Washington Aqueduct, where the 
inner rail of said railway is less than the distance specified in 
said act. 394. 
REAL ESTATE. 
1. The United States had authority to take possession of and use 
real estate during the period of the war for war purposes, but 
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REAL ESTATE-Continued. 
they did not have authority or power, by any summary proceed-
ing, to divest the title of the owner, nor the power ~o retain 
possession beyond the period during which the occasion for the 
taking continued. 382. 
·2. A proceeding to ouster the Government from such possession, while 
not maintainable strictly against the United States, ma.y be 
maintained against the individuals in possession of the premises. 
Tb. 
3. The United States having taken possession and still retaining the 
same, such possession can not be surrendered by the officers of 
the Government without authority from the Secretary of War. 
Ib. 
4. If the United States have abandoned such real estate and the 
lawful owner has entered and taken possession, his possession 
is lawful and can not be disturbed. Ib. 
5. In order to acquire title to land upon which Fort Taylor is located, 
which was taken possession of by the United States authorities 
during the war, the proper course is to apply to Congress for its 
condemnation or purchase. Ib. 
6. If the United States is in possession of land taken during the war 
for war purposes, anu is forcibly ejected or ousted , even by the 
lawful owner, such possession is unlawful and should be restored 
to the United States. lb. 
7. The United States in their sovereign capacity have power to 
acquire and hold real estate wherever and whenever needed for 
the use of the Government in the execution of any of its powers. 
455. 
8. Such property may be acquired by any of the means by which 
natural or artificial persons may aeqnire property, subject in 
certain cases to the local laws of the State. Ib. 
9. The Secretary of the Treasury, without further authority than the 
act of March 3, 1891, may accept a voluntary grant of land from 
the city of Saginaw, Mich., to be used for the purposes of a 
public building. Ib. 
10. No legislation by Congress is needed to enable the United States 
to take and hold lands rnceived through voluntary gift, devise, 
or grant. Ib. 
RECOG IZA TCES. 
1. The I resident has no power to remit forfeiture of a judgment on 
a recognizance elsewhere than in the District of Columbia . 494. 
2. Th power to compromise claims in favo1· of the United States, 
which in lud s judgments on recognizances, is vested in the 
, 'ecretary of the Treasury. Ib. 
REF 
TOM ' LAW AND REGULATIONS, 71- 77. 
REGI,'TRY FOR l◄'OREIG -B ILT VE,' ELS. 
''e A.MEHI A~ REGISTHY, 1-5. 
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REID CLAIM. 
See CLAIMS, 3, 4. 
RELIQUIDATION OF DUTIES. 
See CusTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS, 78, 79. 
REMISSION OF PENALTIES AND RECOGNIZANCES. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS, ETC., 80-89; RECOGNIZANCES, 1, 2. 
REMOVALS. 
See APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS, 3; NAVAL ACADEMY, 4-. 
REPRESENTATIONS. 
In a contract for public works, although the representations of 
an officer of the Government have been relied upon, they must 
be regarded as wholly personal and of no effect as against the 
United States. 78. 
REPRESENT A 'l'IVES. 
See CONGRESSMEN. 
RESIDENCE. 
See CIYIL SERVICE, 1. 
RETIRED OFFICERS. 
See ARMY OFFICERS, 2-5, 7; NAVY, 6, 10. 
RETIREMENT OF JUDGES. 
See COURT Ol!' CLAIMS, 1, 2. 
REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE. 
1. Officers of the Revenue-Cutter Service placed upon "permanent 
waiting or<ler" under the act of March 2; 1895, are withdrawn 
from the line of promotion1 but may be restored to their former 
rank when their disability ceases. 286. 
2. There is no legal limitation to the number of officers who may be 
placed upon permanent waiting orders. Ib. 
3. Sick seamen of the Revenue-Cutter Service are entitled to the 
benefit of the Ma.rine Hospital funds provided for sick and dis-
abled seamen. 340, 365. 
4. The provision in the act of June 4, 1897, that certain chief engi-
neers of the Revenue-Cutter Service" shall be eligible for appoint-
ment to the office of captain of engineers in said service, with 
the pay and emoluments of such captain," creates the office of 
"captain of engineers," with pay the same as that of n, captain 
of the Revenu.e-Cutter Service. 551. 
See LIENS, 5. 
REVENUE LAWS. 
Sections 3985 and 3993, Revised Statutes, are revenue laws, and 
aro not to be strictly constrne<l, though they impose r,enalties. 
394. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS; TAXATION. 
10892-VOL 21. P'.l' 3--18 
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REVISED STATUTES. 
In case of doubt as to the construction of a revised statute, 
reference may always be had to the original act. 190. 
RIO GRANDE RIVER. 
1. The remedy of the United States in case of the erection of a dam 
without ·authority across the Rio Grande River is by injun ction 
under section 10 of the act of September 19, 1890. 518. 
2. The Secretary of the Interior has no po:wl:'r, under the provisions 
of the act of March 3, 1891, to authorize the tlamming of the 
Rio Grande River for irrigation purposes. lb. 
See TREATIES, 6-9. 
RIVERS AND HARBORS . . 
1. The contract for tbe construction of a ship canal between the 
South Pass of the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico, by James 
B. Eads and his associates construed, and former opinions rela-
tive to width and characteristics of channel required to be main-
tained concurred in. 29. 
2. Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary of War justice, either 
to the Government or to the contractor on the works at the 
South Pass jetties of the Mississippi River, so requires, he has 
tho right to determine the actual height of average :flood tide 
as a datum for measurements. 308. 
3. 'l'he period to be covered by observations for the purpose of fixing 
the proper average flood tide of a river depends on science, not 
on law; but it should be sufficiently long to include every 
phase of the situation as it is affected by the various causes 
which operate upon it. lb. 
4. The act of June 3, 1896, providing for the improYement of the 
Chicago River "as far as may be permitted by the existing 
docks and wharves" confines the improvement·s within the 
existing docks and wharves. 471. 
5. The river and harbor act of 1896 provided for a deep-water harbor 
of commerce and of refuge at either San Pedro Harbor or Port 
Los Angeles ancl the appointment of a board to select the place 
and determine the plans of improven:i:ent. 587. 
6. The decision of the board as to location of the harbor is final. lb. 
7. The report of the board considered and the c0nclusion reached 
that the project reported by them is a breakwater and that it 
fulfills the provision of the law and will make within its me11n-
ing a harbor for commerce and refuge. lb. 
8. Under the contract for the improvement of Galveston Harbor the 
rail way to be built upon trestle work following the line of the 
jetty must be at tho expense of the Government, whether it is 
the cas of original construction or extension. 607. 
9. The Government mu t bear the expense of maintaining the rail-
way npou the ori 0 ·inal work aud upon tho extension after the 
suspension of operations npon the.'i<', respectively. lb. 
, ee APPROPIUATIO ·s, 5, 6 8-15; NAVIGABLE W .A.TERS. 
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ROCK CREEK PARK, D. C. 
See DISTRICT Ol!' COLUMBIA, 4. 
SAN PEDRO HARBOR. 
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 5-7. 
SAVINGS. 
See NAVY, 7. 
SEAL FISHERIES. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury can not rightfully require the North 
American Commercial Company to furnish security to the amount 
of its indebtedness for the years 1894 and 1895 in addition to 
the $50,000 of bonds already made pursuant to section 1963, Re-
vised Statutes. 177. 
2. The British Government present a claim for damages on account 
of the seizure by American cruisers in the North Pacific Ocean 
and Bering Sea of the British sealing schooners Wanderer and 
Favorite for violation of the laws for the preservation of fur 
seals, having on board prohibited and unsealed firear_ms, 
together with large numbers of seal skins. The schooners were 
delivered to a British naval officer with a written statement of 
the facts upon which the seizures bad been made, but which 
did not specifically assert that seals had been taken contrary 
to law, which officers, without in anywise invoking the action 
of the courts, released them, having reached the conclusion, 
after investigation and upon legal advice, that no case could 
ue made out against them: Held, there is no liability for dam-
ages. 234. 
3. There is nothing in the British statutes or orders and instructions 
issued for their execution which requires any formal charge by 
officers making seizure of a vessel. An indorsement of the 
grounds upon which it was seized on the certificate of the vessel 
· is required in order to enable the vessel to proceed to port for 
trial. Ib. · 
4. The mode provided by the Bering Sea Award act for dealing with 
vessels seized is to subject them to l egal proceedings in the 
British courts. Delivery to the naval authorities of the coun-
try to which the vessel belongs, in place of delivery to its judi-
cial authorities, was merely for convenience and not for the 
purpose of dispensing with legal proceedings or having a trial 
by such nava,l authorities instead. lb. 
5. The naval officer to whom delivery is made of a vessel seized 
under the provisions of this act has no power to review or 
investigate the seizure. Ib. 
6. While the acts of both countries are directed only against cases 
of unlawful seal fishing, they are not limited to the seizure of 
vessels actually caught in the act, for in all other cases the 
action must depend upon the evidence and indications. Ib. 
7. ·where reasonable grounds for the seizure of a vessel are shown, 
there is no liability, although the court has discharged the ves-
sel. lb. 
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SEAL FI ITERIES-Contilmed. 
If a, liability exists for unlawful seizures, it is governed by the 
well- ettled principles of law ommon to both countries rela-
tive t.o such liabiliti s. lb. 
9. Licenses a,re not requiretl for vessels engaged in fur-seal fishing 
in other waters tba,n those cov-ered by the award of the Paris 
Tribunal and the act of Congress of April 6, 1894. 239. 
10. A rngulation of the Secretary of the Treasury preRcribing that 
only a certain race or class of peopl e shall have the pridlege of 
1dlling sea otter within n, certain area would be a violn.tion of 
section 1915, Revised Sfotutes, a,s being a grant of a special 
privilege. 333. 
11. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized under section 1956, 
Revised Statutes, as amended, to instruct captains of the fur-
seal patrol fleet to seize all foreign vessels found hunting or to 
have hunted sea otter within the Territory of Alaska and the 
waters thereof and to a11 the dominion of the United States in 
the waters of Bering Sea. 346. 
12. The Makah Indians arc prohibited as other persons from killing 
seals in the Pacific Ocean, including the Bering Sea, by the act 
of March 6, 1894, aud the only right they can claim is that of 
sealing in the particular manner and places permitted in explicit 
terms l)y section 6 of the act to coast Indians generally. 466. 
See ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 15. 
SEA OTTER. 
See SEAL FISHERIES, 10. 
SEAMEN. 
The amount expended by a, United States consular officer in pro-
viding shipwrecked seamen with food, clothing, and passage to 
a port in the United States should not be deducted from the 
wages of such seamen. 25, 34. 
See NAVY, 7; REVENl'E-CUTTER SERVICE, 3; VESSELS, 4, 7, 9. 
SEA STORES. 
See w ORDS AND PHRASES. 
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE. 
The Secretary of Agriculture can make general regulations under 
which subordinates in charge of particular localities can fur-
lough, without pay, assistant microscopists, the same to take 
effect at once. 318. 
See QUARANTINE ETC., 1, 2; MEAT INSPECTION, 2, 7; SEEDS, 1, 2, 4. 
,'ECRETARY OF STATE. 
It is competent for the Secretary of State to -prohibit the publica-
tion in the Monthly Bulletin of the Bureau of American Republics 
of advertisements of private firms or corporations. 514. 
, 'E 'RETARY l!"' THE I TERIOR. 
The e ·r tary of the Interior has no power under the provisions 
of th a.ct of 1farc11 3 1 91, to authorize tbe damming of the 
l i (;r:mll Hiv r for irri~ation pnrpos s. 51 . 
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SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 
See APPROPRIATIONS, 4; Brns, 1-3; 90NTRACTS, 1; INFORMERS; 
NAVAL ACADEMY, 3; NAVY. 
SECRET.ARY OF THE TREASURY. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority to make distribu-
tion of the diplomas and medals directly to the exhibitors of the 
World's Columbian Exposition. 216. 
2. '.('he Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to make temporary 
appointments, without certification from the Civil Service 
Commission, of draftsmen and skilled service, under the act of 
of March 2, 1895. 261. · 
3. The Secretary of the Treasury is not required under the act of 
July 31, 1894, to report to Congress the balances due on postal 
accounts for the past :fiscal year. 296. 
4. The power to compromise claims in favor of the United States 
which includes judgments on recognizances is vested by law in 
the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to all claims save 
those arising under the postal laws. 494. 
See CHINESE, 3, 8, 9, 20, 22; COMPROMISE; CUSTOMS LAWS, ETC., 
5, 6, 53, 68, 71-73, 75-77, 79, 80, 82-89 i ELLIS ISLAND, ETC., 1-5; 
JUDGMENTS, 1, 2 j SEAL FISHERIES, 1, 10, 11. 
SECRETARY OF WAR. 
1. A penalt,y imposed under a contract for delay in completing a 
work which has been finished according to the contract with-
out damage to the Government, may be remitted by the Secre-
tary of ,var and the sum withheld paid to the· contractor. 27. 
2. The Secretary of War is charged with the custody, care, and pro-
tection of the Washington Monument. 215. 
3. If a change in the location of an existing railroad is a necessity in 
the building of an authorized boat railway, the acquisition by 
the Secretary of War of the necessary land to make such a 
change, is merely an incident to the enterprise entrusted to 
him. 221. 
4 .. Under the river and harbor act of August 18, 1894, and the act of 
April 24, 1888, the Secretary of War has full authority to con-
demn the land necessary for the construction of a boat railway 
provided for in the former act. Ib. 
5. It is within the authority of the Secretary of War to waive infor-
malities in the submission of bids and the written guaranty 
accompanying the same for the performance of public works, 
and in specific cases to waive formal defects both in the bids and 
bonds. 469. 
6. The control and supervision of the navigable waters of the United 
States is placed in the Secretary of War. 518. 
Sec MILITARY RESERVATIONS, 4, 5; NAVIGABLE vVATERS, 3, 4, 5, 
9-11, 14; RAILROAD COMPANIES, 8. 
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SEEDS. 
1. The seeds purchasab~e under the act of March 2, 1895, by the 
Secretary of Agriculture for distribution are limited to those 
described in section 527, Revised Statutes. 162. 
2. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to make the purchase 
of such seeds, conformable to section 3709, Revised Statutes, 
reserving the right to reject any and all bids. lb. 
3. The act making appropriations for the purchase of seeds for the 
Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year 1895 does not 
authorize the purchase of any others than those described in 
section 527, Revised Statutes. 55. 
4. Under·the joint resolution (S. R. 43) the Secretary of Agriculture 
is required_ to distribute valuable seeds for the year 1896 in 
accordance with the custom of preceding years. If such custom 
has varied from year to year, he is free to exercise his discretion, 
which is merely one of choice and not a discretion to do or leave 
undone. 321. 
5. The appropriation which was made for the purchase of seeds for 
the Department of .Agriculture under the provisions of section 
527, Revised Statutes, for the year 1896, is available for pur-
chases which may be made under joint resolution (S. R. 43). lb. 
6. The act of April 25, 1896, making appropriations for the Depart-
ment of Agriculture for the ii.seal year ending .June 30, 1897, 
authorizes the expenditure of $130,000 for seed already put up 




See VESSELS, 5. 
SMUGGLED GOODS. 
Goods smuggled into the United States may be seized and sold by 
a collector of customs, although protected by patents. 72. 
SOUTH CAROLINA DISPENSARY LAWS. 
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1, 2. 
SOUTH PASS CHANNEL, MISSISSIPPI RIVER. 
See RIVERS AND HARBORS, 1, 2. 
SPAIN. 
See C RAN INSURRECTION. 
STATE BA K CIRCULATION. 
See TAXATION, 6. 
TATE DEPART 1ENT. 
Tl.Je chi f ·lerk, C'hiefs of hureaus, and translators of the State 
partment are derk within the meaning of section 169, 
l vi ed , tatnteH, and are to he appointed by the 8ecretary of 
tat!'. 363. 
' "PRffTI •c; ANJ> BIN»IN ·, 1 2, 4, 5. 
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STATES. 
As a recourse to law for the settlement or collection of certain 
bonds issued by certain States and owned by the United States 
would involve the grave act of suing a State, the Secretary of 
the Treasury is advised not to institute suit. 478. 
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1, 3-6, 10. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
See ACTIONS, 2. 
STATU'rORY CONSTRUCTION. 
1. If a term has no technical meaning, it must be regarded as used in 
the ordinary sense. 179. 
2. If a usage is no~ definite, uniform, and general, it is entitled to no 
weight. 179. · 
3. If a special meaning has been attached to certain words in a prior 
tariff act, there is a presumption of some force that Congress 
intended that they should have the same signification when 
used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject-mat,ter. 
541. 
4. One of the surest methods of interpreting a provision in a tariff 
law is by its past history. Ib. · 
5. The headings of the schedules in the tariff act have little signifi-
cance, they being intended only for general suggestions as to the 
character of the articles within the schedules. 66. 
6. As an aid to the construction of a statute, it is proper to consider 
the original form of the bill and the changes made by amend-
ment. Ib. 
7. All doubts arising under the act are presumptively to be resolved 
in favor of the lower rate of duty, save where the act-mentions 
or describes the same article in two different places, when the 
higher rate governs. lb. 
8. Too great weight should not be placed upon exceptions and pro-
visos in the construction of the main provisions of a statute, 
since they may have been inserted out of an excess of caution. 
255. 
9. Words should not have a retrospective operation unless they are 
so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be 
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature can 
not be otherwise satisfied. 408. 
10. The ordinary meaning of language must be presumed to have 
been intended unless it would manifestly defeat the object of 
the provisions. 420. · 
11. While the word "may" is sometimes construed as imposing a 
duty rather than conferring a discretion, especially where the 
power conferred is to be exercised for the benefit of the public 
or that of private persons, yet this rule of construction is by no 
means invariable. Its application depends on the context of 
the statute and on whether it is fairly to be presumed that it 
was the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary 
power or to impose an imperative duty. Ib. 
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12. A statute should receive a reasonable construction and one in 
consonance with its manifest object and intent. 546. 
13. In the construction of a doubtful passage of a st.atute resort 
should be hacl to the immediate context and the legislation in 
pari rnateria.. 124. 
14. Where language is ambiguous the probable intent of the legisla-
ture should be songht as a guide to the construction. 4Hi. 
15. In case of doubt as to the construction of a revised statute: r efer-
ence may always be had to the original act. 190. 
16. A clear omission from a statute can not bo supplied upon any 
considerations of supposed oversight, inconsistency, or hard-
ship. 291,416. 
17. Savings and exceptions are often introduced in a, statute from 
excessive caution. It wonkl sometimes 
0
porvert the intentions 
of an author of a writing if every other thing of the same 
general tenor as that excepted should be regarded as embraced 
in the general words. 597. 
18. "\¥here two acts are passed on tho same day the· order of their 
passage is not important if they can he reconciled. Ib. 
19. Two acts under legislative consideration at the same time should 
be construed as contemporaneous acts in arriving at the intent 
of the legislature. lb. 
20. In construing an act it is proper to consider facts which must 
have been known to Congress, and to assume that it legislated 
having them in view. Ib. 
21. Repeals by implication are not favored and a.re held to have taken 
place only when the provisions of the earlier and later statutes 
are irreconcilable and could not have been intended to be oper-
ative at the same time. 55, 181. 
22. The inconsistency and antagonism between the two must be such 
that they can not stand together. 119, 203, 227. 
23. Irreconcilable conflict is necessary for an implied repeal of a 
statute, and the presumption is stronger against implied repeals 
where provisions supposed to conflict are in the same act or 
were passed at nearly the same time. Ib. 
24. An act of Congress should not be treated as a nullity if it can by 
any reasonable construction be made operative. 372. 
25. The object of a later act being expressly to a.mend an earlier act, 
a feature of the former act which was omitted from the later 
act was necessarily repealed. 253. 
26. The portions of an amended section of a sta,tute which are merely 
copied ,vithout changes are not to be considered as repealed 
and again enacted, l ut to have been the law all along; and the 
new partH or the changed portions are not to be taken to have 
been the law at any time pi:ior to the pas age of the amended 
act. 159. 
27. In mea uring the legislative intent as to the scope to b given to 
a sta ute in its operation upon previous statutes not specifically 
referr cl to, a onsideration of the effect upon the public welfare 
mu t n e sarily be tak n in view. 181. 
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-Continued. 
28. In case of inconsistenCJ' between a treaty and a subsequent statute 
the latter controls. 80. 
_29. A treaty, the provisions of which are self-executing, modi.fies the 
requirment of a prior statute with which it is in conflict. 347. 
30. The ordinary presumption of a statnte is that it l ays down a rule 
of conduct for the future, but makes no change in rights already 
acquired or conditions already established. 21. 
31. When power is given to pnblic officers to be exercised. for the pub-
lic interest, the language nsed, thongh permissive in form, 
i8 in fact mandatory. 167. 
32. Language whose ordinary meaning is permissive only is some-
times held to be mand~tory when other parts of the la,w make 
plain that it was intended to require and not merely authoriz_e. 
391. 
33. The appropriation of specific funds "to be immediately available" 
ordinarily imposes the duty of expending them for the purpose 
named in the act. 420. 
See DEPARTMENTAL CONSTRt:CTION, 1-7. 
ST. LOUIS AND CLOQUET RIVERS. 
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 2, 3. 
STRONG AW ARD. 
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, l. 
SUBPCENA OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE. 
See WITNESS FEES, 1. 
SUPPLIES. 
It is unlawful for an Executive Department to make a contra.ct for 
supplies for a longer term than one year from the time the 
· contract was made. 304. 
See ADVERTISEMENTS, 1-9; Brns. 
TARIFP ACTS. 
See CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS; STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION, 3-7. 
TAXATION. 
1. A tax imposed upon a schooner, under section 4219, Revised Stat-
utes, on account of having employed on board as an officer one 
not a citizen of the United States should uot be remitted, 
although such person h'ad declared bis intention of becoming a 
citizen, and for three years subsequent thereto continuously 
served on board American merchant vessels, but bad failed to 
actually perfect his citizenship. 412. 
2. The passengers on whom a capitation tax is imposed by the act of 
August 3, 1882,, and August 18, 1894-, are those who make the 
United States their place of destination and not those who 
merelr touch at our ports en route to some other country. 543. 
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TAXATION-Continued. 
3. An assessment made by the Treasury Department of 10 per·cent, 
under the provisions of section 20 of the act of February 8, 1875, 
upon the circulating notes of Cauadian bauks which had come 
into the Unit,ed States and been received and paid by banks in 
Calais, Me., is one which may be compromised. 557. 
4. Banks of the United Sta,tes are liable for this tax on such circu-
lating notes which have come across the line and been received 
by United States banks and paid ont a,s current funds. lb. 
5. The 'intent anu. meaniug of section 20 of this a,ct was to apply the 
tax to the amount of the circulating notes issued by any of 
the ·persons or corporations named in the statute, and used by 
the banks and other persons therein named. lb. 
6. An order on a State bank which can not be used in the community 
as money without danger of total loss to whoever may take it 
is not such a note as is embraced within sections 19 and 20 of 
the act of February 8, 1875, upou which a tax may be imposed. 
336. 
7. The opinion of the Attorney-General of May 15, 1889, does not 
conflict with the collection of the special tax on retail liquor 
dealers in the Indian country and Alaska under section 3244, 
Revised Statutes. 25. 
8. Under the income-tax law mileage and commutation of quarters 
paid officers of the United States Army are to be considered as 
parts of the income of such officer, an<l are to be added to their 
other income in making up the total income. 112. 
9. When the amount paid such officer has reached iu the aggregate 
for the calendar year $4,000, the paymaster should deduct from 
the first payment in excess of such amount the tax on the entire 
amount of such excess of salary payable to such officer for said 
year. lb. 
TENNESSEE EXPOSITION 
See CHINESE, 20. 
TRADE-MARK. 
See COPYRIGIITS, 4.. 
TRANSPORTATION OF ENLISTED MEN. 
See ACCOUNTS, 2, 3. 
TREASURY DEPARTME T. 
1. The general appraisers appointed uncler the provisions of the act 
of June 10, 1890, are officers of the Treasury Department. 85 
2. Tho allotment of the Public Printer's appropriation among the dii 
ferent departments is not actually passe(l upon by the account-
ing offic 0 rs of the Treasury, and is not within their jurisdiction. 
423. 
'ee .Au 'EL'CE, 1, 2; ECRETARY Ol!' THE TREASURY. 
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5. At , of wh ich are elf-e~ cnt ing, modifies the 
re of a prior statute with whi hit ii:; ju conflict. 347. 
6. Article 7 f the tr aty of .February 2, 1848, k nown as the Treaty 
of foa<lalup Hidalgo, i st ill in force so far as it affects the 
Rio Grande. 274. ~ 
7. Article 7 is limited in terms to t hat p ortion of the Rio Grande 
lying below the southern boundary of New Mexico, and applies 
only to such works as either p arty might construct on its own 
side. Ib. 
8. The only right the treaty professed to create or protect with 
respect to the Rio Grande was that of navigation. Claims for · 
injuries to agriculture alone in consequence of the scarcity of 
water resulting from irrigation ditches wholly within the 
Unite·d States at places far above the h ead of navigation, find 
no support in the treaty. Ib. 
9. The taking of water for irrigating purposes from the Rio Grande, 
above the point where it ceases to be entirely within the United 
States and becomes the boundary between this country and 
Mexico, is not prohibited by said treaty. Ib. 
See CHINESE; EXTRADITION, 1. 
UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS. 
1. The Secretary of the Treasury may return the :findings to the 
United States commissioner in proceedings for t he remission of 
penalties under the act of June 22, 1874, for further hearing 
upon the claim of newly discovered evidence. 289. 
2. But he has no authority to prosecute· a further inquiry into the 
facts after a United · States commissioner has reported his find-
ings under section 18 of said act. 549. 
See CHINESE, 25 i EXTRAf>ITION, 1. 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS. 
See DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, 




See POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT, 1. 
UTE INDIANS. 
Payments of Indian depredation claims are not payments for the 
benefit of the Ute Indians within the meaning of the act of 
June 15, 1880, and can not be authorized by the President under 
its terms. 131. 
VESSELS. 
1. 'l'he owner or consignee of a vessel arriving from a, foreign port is 
entitled to a lien for freight on the merchandise imported on 
such vessel ·for the purpose of exportation. 38. 
2. Consular officers of the United States can not extend expired in-
spection certificates granted to American steamers, nor is there 
any authority of law for sending local inspector's out of the 
• country to make inspection. 52. 
3. American steam vessels while engaged in commerce beyond the 
jurisdiction of the United States, are not subject to the regula-
lations provided by Title 52, Revised Statutes. lb. 
4. The act of June 26, 1884, making provision for a class of persons 
who might be officers of United States vessels, although aliens, 
not being in cqn:fl.ict or inconsistent with the act of April 17, 
1874, both statutes must be regarded as in force. 166. 
5. The master of :fishing vessels, enrolled but not registered, are not 
required by sections 4309 and 4310, Revised Statutes, to deposit 
their ship's papers with the United States consul when they ar-
rive at a foreigD port where there is such a consular officer. 190. 
6. Licenses are not required for vessels engaged in fur-seal :fishing 
in other waters than those covered by the award of the Paris 
Tribunal and the act of Congress of April 6, 1894. 239. 
7. Section 4598, Revised Statutes, with reference to the absenting of 
seamen from vessels without leave from the proper officer, 
where he has signed a contract before a shipping commissioner 
to perform a voyage, and the apprehension of such deserters, 
does not apply to a vessel engaged in the coast wise trade of the 
United States, unless, in compliance with section 4520, such a 
seaman contracts formally with a vessel of 50 tons burden or 
upwards. 483. 
8. The purpose of section 22 of the Dingley tariff act was to secure 
to nited States vessels the transportation of goods by sea by 
discriminating against transportation in other vessels to the 
United States, and also to prevent evasion to a contiguous 
country. 597. 
9. e tion 4609, Revised Statutes-, with reference to the demanding 
or receiving of remuneration by- anyone from any seamen or 
persons seeking employment as such, does not extend to vessels 
ngaged in the coasting trade generally. 284. 
e :\IERI 'A.~T REGI TRY; A.VIGATION LAws; SEAL F1snE1uEs; 
TA.XATIO · , 1, 2, 
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VOLUNTEER SERVICE. 
See ARMY OFFICERS, 8. 
WAR. 
See REAL ESTATE, 1. 
WAREHOUSES. 
See CUSTOMS LA ws AND REGULATIONS, 15-25. 
WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT. 
See RAILROAD COMPANIESJ 8. 
WASHINGTON MONUMENT. 
The Secretary of War is charged with the custody, care, and pro-
tection of the Washington Monument. 215. 
WASHINGTON, STATE OF. 
See PUBLIC LANDS, 10. 
WEATHER BUREAU. 
A vacancy in the office of the Chief of the Weather Bureau can 
only be filled by appointment of the President or by detailing 
the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, in accordance with the 
act of October 1, 1890. 189. 
WEST POINT. 
See MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT. 
WITNESS FEES. 
Government employees are not entitled to witness fees when sub-
pamaed to testify in behalf of the United States, but are entitled 
to their expenses. When subpoonaed by a private party they 
may demand and accept witness fees. 263. 
WORDS AND PHRASES. 
Words should not have a retrospective operation unless they are 
so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be 
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature can 
not be otherwise satisfied. 408. 
AGENT-
The Comptroller and Auditors of the Treasury are agents of the 
Government in the broad sense of the term, but are more prop-
erly called officers, and were not intended to be included within 
the meaning of the word " agent" in section 3469, Revised 
Statutes. 361. · 
The "agent" referred to in that section is one who has special 
charge of a claim for the purposes of collection or enforcement, 
in the same way that the district or special attorney bas, 
though he need not possess their professional character. Ib. 
BROKER-
This word has no definite legal signification. 255. 
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COST-
The word "cost" in section 4136, Revised Statutes, is to be con-
strued liberally; and if the actual cost of the repairs is three 
times the actual purchase price of the wreck, then she is 
entitled to registry. 143. 
CUSTOMHOUSE BROKER-
As used in the tariff act of 1894, section 23, the term includes 
persons who deal in drawback l'.llatters exclusively, as well as 
those who combine all branches of customhouse work. 255. 
DRAWBACK MONEYS-
" Drawback moneys" are duties; repayment to the importer or 
the person to whom he has transferred his rights of a part of 
the duties which have been paid by him upon receiving his 
goods. 255. 
EMPLOY-
In section 169, Revised Statutes, this word is regarded as the 
equivalent of " appoint." 355, 363. 
LOTTERY--
The name "lottery" · covers any determination of gain or loss by 
the issue of an event which is merely contrived for the occasion. 
It is none the less a lottery because it is fairly conducted or 
because such conduct is ampl~ secured. 313. 
MAY-
While the word ''may'' is sometimes construed as imposing a duty 
rather than conferring a discretion, especially where the power 
conferred is to be exercised for the benefit of the public or that 
of private persons, yet this rule of construction is by no means 
· invariable. Its application depends on the context of the 
statute and on whether it is fairly to be presumed that it was 
the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power 
or to impose an imperative duty. 420. 
MAY BE-
The various provisions in the river and harbor act of June 3, 1896, 
that contracts "may be" entered into by the Secretary of War 
for the completion of certain improvements, to be paid for out 
of future appropriations, are not mandatory but discretionary, 
and he may decline to make contracts in all cases where he is 
convinced that the public interests will not be subserved by 
making them. 420. 
MERCHANDISE-
The word "merchandise" is used in different senses in different 
parts of the customs legislation. In sections 2766 and 3111, 
Revised Statutes, it covers any tangible personal property. In 
sections 2795 and 3113 it means property imported into the 
country whether for sale or not. In the act of 1875 it has a 
narrower meaning, but still includes personal property not 
import •d for tho use or enjoyment of the importer himself. 92. 
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MERCHANT-
A Chinese person is not a "merchant" within the meaning of 
section 2 of the act of March 3, 1893, unless he condµcts his 
business either in his own name or in a firru name of which his 
own is a part. 5. 
MISCELLANEOUS-
The word "miscellaneous" in tbe act of April 21, 1894, refers to 
that class of commodities which must be purchased on a con-
siderable scale and used alike by many or all of the various 
departments and Government establishments in the city of 
Washington. 59. 
MODIFICATION-
To change slightly, as in the form or in the external qualities of 
a thing, or to change somewhat the form or qualities of. 207. 
MORTAR STEEL-
The term ''mortar steel" properly includes any steel of such 
quality as is considered by experts to be adapted for use in the 
construction of mortars. 179. 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-
A "municipal ordinance" is comprehended by the phrase "laws 
of the land" as used in the fifty-ninth article of war, and a 
soldier violating such an ordinance and escaping to a military 
reservation should be surrendered to the civ~l authorities for 
trial upon demand. 88. 
NAVIGABLE DEPTH-
A depth sufficiently wide to be navigated by vessels either moved 
by sails or steam and to permit them to pass each other. 29. 
~NEUTRALITY LAWS-
The nljutrality laws of the United States, so called because their 
main purpose is to carry out the obligations imposed upon the 
United States while occupying a position of neutrality toward 
belligerents. They were also intended to prevent offences 
against friendly powers, whether they should or should not be 
engaged in war or in attempting to suppress revolt. 267. 
NO PERSON APPOINTED TO A PLACE-
The phr.ase "no person appointed to a place," as used in the civ~l-
service rules substituted by the President ~ovember 2, 1894, 
affects persons holding the positions at the time as well as those 
thereafter appointed. 91. 
ORDER-
The word" order" in the clause in the public printing and bind-
ing act of January 12, 1895, section 80, providing "that no 
order for public printing shall be acted upon after the expira-
tion of one year, unless the entire copy and illustrations shall 
be furnished within that period, was not intended to include a 
joint r.esolution of Congress for the printing of a "history of 
in~eruatioual arbitrations," digest, etc. 427. 
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PERILS OF THE SEA-
By "perils of the sea" is meant all loses which occur from mari-
tune adventure . 124. 
PERMANENT DISABILITY-
.A. permanent disability i one that appears to be chronic or of 
indefinite future duration. 2 6. 
PERMANENTLY INCAPACITATED-
Within the meaning of the act of March 2, 1895, an officer is 
permanently incapacitated when his disability appears to b e 
chronic or of indefinite duration. 286. 
PORT-
The word "port" does not always mean a seaport when used in 
connection with our customs officers, and the word '' land" is 
not necessarily limited to disembarkation from a ship. 357. 
PRIVATE HANDS-
The term "private hands" as used in section 3992, Revised Stat-
utes, with reference to the conveyance or transmission of mail 
matter, was evidently intended to cover all except common 
carriers on post routes. Neither the latter nor their employees 
while engaged in this business can be considered as "private 
hands." 394. 
SEA STORES-
" Sea stores," in tariff legislation, are the stores contained in 
incoming vessels which are necessary for their use for the pur-
pose of the voyage; articles brought into port aboard ship tu 
be consumed aboard or carried off again on: the outward voy-
age, or if put ashore at all, landed only .for the convenience of 
the ship itself. 92. 
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE-
.A. "special privilege" is one which is not open to all persona 
alike who comply with terms and conditions fairly within the 
power of all. The limitation of a right to people of a specified 
race or class is necessarily a "special privilege." 333. 
STATIONERY-
The word "stationery" has no special legal definition, but is 
ordinarily defined as the "articles usually sold by stationers; 
the various materials employed in writing, such as paper, pens, 
pencils, and ink." 59. 
SUBJECTS-
The word" subjects" is used in treaties and intern.ational awards 
chiefly because the inhabitants of mona1·chies are called sub-
jects instead of citizens; yet in the act of April 6, 1894, it was 
intended to embrace Indians. 466. 
SUCH-
Ordinarily the word "such" refers to the next immediate ante-
cedent, hnt not n ·er f!arily. ever when the purpose of the 
s ction would thereby be impaired. 551. 
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TO BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE-
The appropriation of specific fonds u to be immediately avail-
able" ordinarily imposes the duty of expending them for the 
purposes named in the act. 420. 
WOOL. 
The word "wool," as used in paragraph 297 of the ta.riff act of 
1894, refers to hair of the sheep only, and the new~uties upon 
articles made of the hair of other animals went immediate:iy 
into effect upon the passage of the act. 66. 
"Wool," within dictionary definitions, includes the hair of the 
alpa.ca and of the angora goat, but never is used to include all 
goats' hair, nor yet camels' hair, cow hair, or horsehair. 
Throughout Schedule K of the above act it is used so as to 
include even hair of the kinds first mentioned. Ib. 
The phrase "manufactures of wool" in the above paragraph does 
not include articles of which wool is a component material, but 
of which it is not the material of chief value. Ib. 
WRECK. 
The word "wreck" in section 4136, Revised Statutes, must be 
taken in a very comprehensive sense as applicable to a vessel 
which is disabled or rendere_d unfit for navigation, whether this 
state of the vessel has been caused by the winds or the waves, 
by stranding, fire, explosion of boilers, or by any other casu-
alty. 198. 
WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION. 
1. The question of drawbacks upon exhibits of foreign governments 
at the World's Fair is governed by the act of April 25, 1890, and 
not by section 3025, Revised Statutes. 36. 
2. The Secretary of the 'rreasury has no authority to make distribu-
tion of the diplomas a~.d medals directly to the exhibitors of 
the World's Columbian Exposition. 216. 
3. The receipt and distribution by an authorized committee or sub-
ordinate body of the medals and diplomas awarded by the 
World's Columbian Commission are purely ministerial acts, 
involving no discretion. They could consequently be delegated 
by the commission, and, as they were so delegated, delivery can 
be made either to its executive committee or to the board of 
reference and control. 1 b • . 
4. So much of section 3 of the act of August 5, 1892, as provides for 
the duplication of medals at the mints of the United States in 
gold or silver or brass was repealed by the act of March 3, 1893. 
253. 
5. After the exhibitors shall have received the medals and diplomas 
awarded them, the Treasury Department has not any authority 
to say what use shall or shall not be made of them, or to restrict 
the making or using of facsimiJes of them by exhibitors to whom 
they have been awarded, beyond wlJat is prescribed by the 
express provision of the statutes already referred to. 330. 
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6. The law authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish 
electrotypes and photographs of the m.edals of award t o exhib-
itors to whom medals have been awarded, and to newspapers 
a111l periodicals for publication, carries with it the authority, to 
those to whom such electrotypes and photographs may be fur-
nished, to have prints made therefrom without further or more 
specific authority. lb. · 
7. The exhibitors, printers, or publishers have not the right to insert 
the name of the exhibitor in the blank space which will bo used 
for that purpose on the medal. Ib. 
"WRECK." 
See WORDS AND PHRASES. 
YELLOW 1<.,EVER. 
See QUARANTINE, ETC., 3. 
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